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ABSTRACT 
From the perspectives of optimum currency area theory, money and monetary policies, 
exchange rates determination and exchange market behaviours, this thesis evaluated the 
feasibility of monetary cooperation in the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) through the 
assessments of the homogeneity of macroeconomic performances and patterns of economic 
dynamics, business cycles, production structures, factor market flexibilities, financial systems 
convergence, openness to trade and investments, inflation convergences, money neutrality, 
monetary-fiscal dominance, monetary reactions, loss of monetary independence, suitability of 
the future common monetary policy for prospective members, homogeneity of the exchange 
rate fundamental determinants, currency crisis vulnerability and exchange market pressures. 
Employing annual, quarterly and monthly macroeconomic and financial data of the WAMZ 
countries (The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone), generally spanning 
over a 36-year period between 1980 and 2015 on the average, the thesis applied various 
statistical and econometric estimation methods of canonical cointegrating regression, dynamic 
ordinary square regressions, fully modified ordinary least square regressions, autoregressive 
distributed lag bound tests, Markov regime switching regressions, ordinary least square 
regressions, quantile regressions, robust ordinary least square regressions and the generalised 
autogressive conditional heteroscasticity modelling to gather evidences and draw relevant and 
useful inferences. Although, there were indications that the zone is not currency crisis 
vulnerable while monetary dominance was established and money was uniformly neutral and 
superneutral, there were evidence that the prospective members of the WAMZ generally failed 
some uniformity and convergence tests of macroeconomic fundamentals and monetary 
reactions. Some stylised facts and theoretical propositions as well as decisive international 
parity conditions failed to hold across the WAMZ. Crucial monetary policy tests pointed to the 
possibility of high degree of influence and domination of the future monetary union by Nigeria, 
which possesses close to 90% of the economic size of the entire zone. This, with its associated 
political implications may likely draw back the feasibility of monetary integration of the 
WAMZ. Further evaluation of the initial design of the European Monetary Union identified 
design flaws from which lessons were drawn for the African monetary integration initiatives. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The formation of the European Monetary Union and the introduction of euro in 1999 sparked 
off the interest of the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to develop the desire for the 
African Monetary Union which aims at the creation of a unified currency (afro) for the 
African Continent as a whole.1 The continent of African which has the largest number of 
countries and the largest number of currencies has special initiatives for monetary 
cooperation within its regions. Nevertheless, there had been several attempts by different 
African regional economic groupings to form monetary unions in Africa. For instance, there 
were efforts in the Economic Community of Central Africa (ECCAS) where there is the 
Central African Economic and Monetary Community which shares single currency within the 
Central African CFA franc zone, parallel to the West African CFA zone franc shared by 
members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Economists and 
other analysts consider the step towards a stronger and great African regional integration to 
be in the interest of Africa because of the small sizes (in terms of economy and population) of 
many African countries.  
Over decades ago, many regional economic groups were evolved in Africa for the purpose of 
free trade. Some of these regional economic groups still exist till date while some are 
modifications and rejuvenations of those that were in existence during the colonial regimes in 
Africa.2 Nevertheless, there are plans in pipeline for several currency unions within the 
                                                          
1 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) had since transformed to the African Union. The Durban Summit in 2002 
launched the African Union and convened the first Assembly of the Heads of States of the African Union. 
2 Presently, South Africa’s Monetary Area and the CFA franc Zones in Central and West Africa respectively are 
the monetary integration arrangements that still exist. 
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regions of Africa as at present. This plan, set out in the 1991 Abuja Treaty, makes an African 
single currency the African Union’s long term goal. Article 44 of the 1991 Abuja Treaty 
states that “…member states shall within a timetable to be determined by the Assembly (of 
the Organisation of African Unity), harmonise their monetary, financial and payments 
policies and boost intra-community trade in goods and services to further the objectives of the 
community and to enhance monetary cooperation among member states.”3 The African 
Union Abuja Treaty that established the African Economic Community set out six stages in 
the process of achieving a monetary union and a single currency for Africa by 2023.4 The 
strategy for African monetary integration is based on progressive monetary integration of the 
activities of the regional economic communities, which are regarded as building blocks of 
Africa. These economic communities are the East African Community (EAC), the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of the West 
African States (ECOWAS). 
As a step in the direction of monetary integration of West Africa, the authority of Heads of 
States and Governments of the ECOWAS at the 1987 Abuja summit in Nigeria, adopted the 
ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme (EMCP) which entails the adoption of 
collective policy measures to be fashioned towards achieving a harmonised monetary system 
and common monetary system management institutions. The medium and long-term 
objectives of the EMCP are to achieve limited convertibility and to create a single monetary 
zone in West Africa, with the following characteristics: (i) a common monetary authority; (ii) 
the issue of a common convertible currency; (iii) the pooling and management of all reserves; 
(iv) the formulation of a common policy on short-term external liabilities arising from trade 
                                                          
3 Regional Integration- http://www.uneca.org/aria3/chap1.pdf. 
4 The 1991 Abuja Treaty which was signed on 3 June 1991 and was effective in May 1994 established the 
African Economic Community. 
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and balance of payments financing;5 (v) the adoption of a common monetary policy; and (vi) 
an agreement on convertibility guarantee.6 The responsibility of monitoring, coordinating and 
implementing the EMCP with the focus on the creation of the common currency for the 
ECOWAS is placed in the hands of the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA). In 1993, 
the ECOWAS Treaty was revised. The aim of the revised treaty was to accelerate the 
economic integration process and strengthen political cooperation. With a long term objective 
of establishing an economic and monetary union between all member countries. This 
ECOWAS revised objectives caused the formation in 2000, of the second monetary zone 
when five countries (The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) signed the 
Accra Declaration that established the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). 
1.1.1 Monetary Integration of West Africa 
The history and experience of monetary integration of the West African region can be traced 
back to the era of colonialism in the region and also, to the relationship which existed 
between countries within the region and their colonial masters. In the colonial era, through 
regional links and with respective currencies of their colonial masters, countries within the 
sub region were linked with the world economic system. There was distinction between 
countries which were under the French rule (the Francophone countries) and countries that 
were under the authority of the British (the Anglophone countries).  
For the francophone countries: There was the policy by France to issue currencies linked to 
the French franc in each of her colonies and these countries were brought together into the 
French union which maintained its unified economic zone and was later transformed into a 
monetary union on 26 December 1945. This led to the creation of the common currency, the 
                                                          
5 The policy on management of medium and long-term debt will however, be the responsibility of each Member State 
6 http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=adec020787&lang=en 
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CFA franc for the former French colonies with the intention of protecting these countries 
from the effects of the depreciation of the French currency against the dollar in the Bretton 
Woods arrangements and to ensure the consolidation of the economies of French colonies in 
the 1940s and 1950s. CFA franc was pegged to the French franc till 1999 after which it was 
subsequently pegged to the euro. The currency was devalued against French franc by over 
17% in 1948 when the parity was fixed at 0.5 CFA franc to 1 French franc and this was 
changed to 50 CFA francs to 1 French franc during the 1968 French currency reform 
programme.7 This devaluation, coupled with economic deterioration and the consideration of 
the need for convergence and harmonisation of the macroeconomic policies of these 
francophone countries led to the establishment of two common currency areas for the Central 
African and the West African francophone countries with each currency area having its own 
common central bank.8  The two CFA franc zones are: (i) Communaute Economique et 
Monetaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) which is for Central African francophone 
countries; and (ii) Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) meant for the 
West African francophone countries. In effect, there are two CFA franc currencies: (a) franc 
de la Communaute Financiere d’Afrique (XOF - for the West African francophone 
countries); and (b)  franc de la Cooperation Financiere en Afrique Centrale (XAF - for the 
Central African francophone countries).9 Initially, CFA franc was issued by French’s central 
bank, Banque de France. This currency issuing power was later transferred in 1955, to the 
two regional central banks created for these two regions. These two regional currency issuing 
banks which were granted independence in 1962 are: (i) Banque Centrale des Etats d’Afrique 
de l’Ouest (BCEAO), serving as the central bank for the West African francophone countries 
with its headquarters in Dakar, Senegal; and (ii) Banque des Etats de L’Afrique Centrale 
                                                          
7 Factsheet Histoire du franc CFA of the BCEAO. 
8 These common central banks were established in 1994. 
9 The West African CFA countries (Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine - UEMOA) is made up of Benin, 
Togo, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, Mauritania. Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Mali. 
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(BEAC) headquartered in Yaounde, Cameroun serves as the central bank for the Central 
African francophone countries.10  
For the Anglophone countries: There were monetary relationships with Britain through the 
British West African Currency Board (WACB) which had the powers to issue currencies to 
the British colonies and at the same time control the supply of these currencies to these 
colonies.  As the French West Africa’s medium of exchange was the franc and linked at par 
with French franc, the medium of exchange in the British West Africa was the West African 
Pound which was linked at par with the British pound sterling. In the colonial years, the West 
African pound was backed by pound sterling on 100% sterling exchange system and this 
deprived the countries within the British West Africa of independent monetary policy 
(Carney, 1961).  The British West African Currency Board (WACB) was later dissolved thus 
paving the way for the British West African countries to sever monetary relationships and 
links with Britain, take up different respective currencies and establish separate national 
central banks. It was Ghana that first got independence from the WACB in 1957 and the 
currency issuing functions was taken over from the Accra branch office of the WACB by 
Ghana’s central bank (the Bank of Ghana) when it started operations in 1958. The Central 
Bank of Nigeria was established in 1959 (a year before the country’s independence) to take 
over the currency issuing functions. For Sierra Leone, which got independence in 1961, its 
central bank with the currency issuing functions was established in 1964. However, The 
Gambia maintained the British West African Currency Board as its currency issuing body 
until 1971 when its central bank was established. 
                                                          
10 The two regional issuing banks both issue currencies that are commonly referred to as CFA franc. BCEAO issues the franc 
de la Cooperation Financiere en Afrique Centrale (XAF) and BEAC issues franc de la Communaute Financiere d’Afrique 
(XOF). 
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After independence, French West African countries brought themselves together as the West 
African Monetary Union (WAMU) and continue to maintain monetary links with France 
through the French Franc-linked CFA franc and maintained external reserves with France. 
The West African Monetary Union (WAMU) was changed to the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU) following the 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc which was 
later pegged to the euro after its introduction. While Nigeria abandoned the British currency 
and introduced the naira as its currency in 1973, The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone took up dalasi, cedi, Liberian dollar and Leone respectively as their national 
currencies.With the circulation of the Communaute Financiere d’Afrique (XOF) within the 
West African francophone countries since 1994, members of ECOWAS that are not members 
of the UEMOA (the non-CFA West African countries) agreed towards future harmonisation 
of  their monetary and fiscal policies with the UEMOA (the CFA West African countries).11  
In 1999, there was an observation of the slow pace in the implementation of the EMCP. This 
was attributed to: (a) member states’ lack of commitment and political will; (b) lack of policy 
harmonisation and coordination among the non-CFA franc Zone members and the CFA franc 
Zone member countries (with the exception of Guinea); and (c) lack of uniformity in the 
adoption of the macroeconomic framework that were required (Abudu, 2003). The 
recognition of these obstacles and difficulties prompted the adoption of new approaches that 
aimed at successful implementation of the monetary cooperation programme during the 22nd 
ECOWAS Heads of State and Government Summit held in Lome, Togo in December 1999. 
In order to foster the acceleration of the pace of monetary integration process within the West 
African bloc, a ‘Fast-Track initiative’ was introduced by Ghana and Nigeria in December 
1999. The Fast-Track initiative was a two-track fast track approach incorporating two-step 
                                                          
11 UEMOA is also called the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). 
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plan towards the implementation of the monetary union for the whole of ECOWAS. The first 
step was the resolution of the non-CFA franc Zone member countries (the non-UEMOA) to 
form a second monetary union. The second step was expected to be the merger (at a future 
date) of the existing CFA franc Zone (the UEMOA) with the new second monetary union to 
form an eventual broader monetary union for the whole of ECOWAS. There were 
consultations with the governments of The Gambia, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone on the 
Fast Track Initiative after which the Authority of Heads of States and Governments of five 
ECOWAS countries created, in the sub-region, the second monetary zone known as the West 
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) in Accra, Ghana on 20 April, 2000 at a mini-summit where 
the monetary zone agreement documents were signed (Accra Declaration).  It is therefore 
consequent that there are two monetary groups in the ECOWAS.  
1.1.2 The West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) 
Membership of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) launched on 20 April, 2002 was  
(as at launching) made up of The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Liberia 
joined the WAMZ in February 2010 as the sixth member country. However, the WAMZ 
formally came into existence on 15 December, 2000 when the five countries signed the 
Articles of Agreement of the zone. The thinking was that the successful launching of the 
WAMZ would aid the merger with the CFA zone to usher in the ECOWAS single currency, 
the eco. The objective of the WAMZ is to establish a monetary union characterised by a 
common central bank and a single currency, the eco, to replace the existing five national 
currencies. The WAMZ was originally scheduled to take-off in January 2003. Apart from 
launching the WAMZ at the ‘Accra Declaration’, the summit also set up a task force that 
would look into the process and modalities for the establishment of the West African 
Monetary Institute (WAMI) which would serve as a forerunner or a precursor for the 
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proposed common central bank for the West African sub region. The mission of the West 
African Monetary Institute (WAMI) is “to undertake preparatory activities towards the 
establishment of the West African Central Bank (WACB), and the launching of a monetary 
union for the WAMZ. The responsibility of the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) is 
to manage the stages of implementation of the WAMZ  up to the commencement of the West 
African Central Bank. While the WAMI is to monitor the macroeconomic convergence 
programme within the WAMZ,  its central role is the preparation of the frame work that will 
guide the management of monetary policy and exchange rate in the zone as well as other 
operational matters like bank supervision, currency management and the payment system. 
The WAMZ implementation programme consists of a set of macroeconomic convergence 
criteria that member countries are expected to achieve. The successful attainment of these 
convergence criteria was expected to pave the way for the launching into the monetry 
integration. 
There were four quantitative primary convergence criteria for countries within the WAMZ 
thus: (i) single digit inflation rate by 2000 and inflation rate of 5% by 2003; (ii) budget deficit 
(excluding grants) of not more than 5% of GDP by 2000 and 4% by 2002; (iii) central bank 
financing of budget deficit to be limited to 10% of previous year’s tax revenue; and (iv) gross 
external reserves to cover at least, three months of imports by the end of 2000 and six months 
by end-2003. Additional six secondary convergence criteria to be observed in support of the 
primary convergence criteria are: (a) no accumulation of new domestic payment arrears and 
liquidation of all old arrears; (b) tax revenue should not be less than 20% of the GDP; (c) 
wage bill should be less than 35% of tax revenue; (d) domestically financed public 
investment should be at least 20% of tax revenue; (e) the central parity of nominal exchange 
rate determined on 31 December, 2003 should be maintained with 15 per cent fluctuation 
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band as defined by WAMZ Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM-II); and (f) maintenance of 
positive real interest rates.  
A mid-term convergence assessment in 2002 revealed that despite some achievements by 
WAMZ member countries, these were not adequate enough support the take-off of the 
monetary union in January 2003. A major problem was the inadequate commitment of 
member countries of WAMZ to support their expressed commitment with actions. This 
consequently led to the extension of the WAMZ programme to 30 June, 2005 so that the 
common central bank and the common currency would take off on 1 July 2005. This failed. 
Another deadline of 31 December, 2009 was set so that the single currency and the common 
central bank would be effective from 1 January 2010; and due to same reasons this could not 
be met. The official excuse for this failure was "the global economic and financial crisis 
which had put constraints on member state's ability to meet the convergence criteria 
individually and collectively".The last agreed take off date of 1 January 2015 actually 
became unrealistic, and eventually, was not met. 
For the WAMZ, Tables 1.1 below exhibits the year-by-year attainments of the primary 
convergence criteria by the six WAMZ countries over the thirteen-year convergence period 
spanning from 2000 to 2014.  
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Table 1.1: WAMZ Members' Primary Convergence Criteria Attainments (2000-2014) 
Budget Deficit/GDP (….should be ≤ 4%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 3.6 9.8 9.1 5.2 9.9 8.4 2.7 1.1 4.2 8.6 2.7 4.2 4.6 8.8 9.1 
Ghana 10.1 13.2 8.3 7.5 8.1 6.9 12.9 1.4 19.5 12.4 5.9 0.9 5.9 8.2 6.4 
Guinea 5.2 3.4 6.2 8.8 5.9 1.6 2.0 0.9 1.7 7.5 14.3 2.9 3.7 3.1 3.9 
Liberia 0.9 1.9 1.0 3.7 4.4 0.9 -3.0 3.4 2.0 2.0 -4.2 -0.6 -4.2 -1.0 -2.0 
Nigeria 2.7 5.8 5.9 2.8 17.0 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.2 3.3 3.8 5.0 2.6 2.7 1.0 
S/Leone 17.3 16.7 16.5 19.4 14.3 9.5 8.5 5.0 7.0 11.0 5.2 5.0 5.6 1.5 3.4 
Inflation Rates (….should be ≤5% or 0.05) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 0.2 8.1 13.0 17.6 8.0 1.8 1.4 6.0 6.8 2.7 5.0 4.8 4.3 5.7 5.6 
Ghana 40.5 21.3 15.2 23.6 11.8 13.9 10.9 12.8 18.1 16.0 14.7 8.7 9.2 11.6 15.5 
Guinea 7.2 5.2 6.1 12.9 27.6 29.7 39.1 12.8 13.5 7.9 15.5 21.4 15.2 11.9 9.7 
Liberia 3.2 19.4 11.1 5.0 16.1 7.0 8.9 11.7 9.4 7.8 7.3 8.5 7.7 7.6 9.9 
Nigeria 14.5 16.4 12.1 23.8 10.0 11.6 8.5 6.6 15.1 12.0 12.4 10.8 12.2 8.5 8.0 
S/Leone -28.0 3.4 -1.3 11.3 14.4 13.1 7.3 13.8 12.3 12.0 17.1 16.0 12.9 10.4 7.1 
Central Bank Financing (….should be ≤10% RF) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 0.0 80.7 22.0 63.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.9 13.7 14.9 12.6 0.4 na 41.0 
Ghana 57.9 0.0 12.1 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.3 0.0 0.0 10.5 0.0 9.2 11.0 
Guinea 24.0 -0.7 24.5 14.6 26.2 -8.8 54.0 0.0 5.8 38.7 91.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Liberia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nigeria 0.0 29.3 0.0 19.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
S/Leone 0.0 8.9 0.0 26.4 0.0 0.0 13.3 0.8 0.3 18.6 37.6 1.1 0.0 0.0 7.6 
Gross External Reserves (….should be ≥6 months) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 7.5 7.2 2.9 3.1 4.7 5.2 4.9 4.4 4.3 6.5 6.8 6.1 4.8 na 3.7 
Ghana 0.8 1.2 2.3 4.1 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.9 2.2 4.4 3.7 3.15 0.03 3.5 4.2 
Guinea 2.2 2.8 2.3 1.6 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.4 1.1 1.0 4.2 3.7 3.1 3.4 3.1 
Liberia 3.6 2.6 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 4.3 3.3 2.2 2.4 3.0 
Nigeria 13.6 11.3 9.9 8.5 16.1 11.8 15.1 17.4 15.3 13.0 7.9 6.3 9.5 8.9 7.4 
S/Leone 2.8 2.3 3.1 1.7 3.3 4.8 4.9 5.1 4.2 6.2 1.9 2.56 2.5 2.1 2.8 
Source: West African Monetary Agency and Author's Calculations 
 
The summary of the three-year (2012-2014) averages of the achievements of these primary criteria are 
presented in the first segment of Table 1.3. In Tables 1.2 below, achievements of five secondary 
convergence criteria by the WAMZ countries over a 13-year period (2000-2013) are displayed; while 
the second segment of Table 1.3 below reflects the 3-year (2011-2013) averages of these secondary 
convergence criteria by the WAMZ countries. On comparative basis, Tables 1.4 below shows the 
rankings of the WAMZ countries regarding the meeting of the primary and secondary convergence 
criteria over the3-year periods of assessments.  Nigeria and Guinea respectively achieved the number 
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one spots in the achievements of the primary and secondary convergence criteria while Ghana and 
Sierra Leone took the last position in each category, respectively.  
Table 1.2: WAMZ Members' Secondary Convergence Indicators Attainments (2000-2013) 
Tax Revenue/GDP (….should be ≥20%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Gambia 23.3 19.2 14.1 13.8 22.4 17.2 18.8 19.4 17.6 17.5 13.1 13.1 14.1 na 
Ghana 16.3 17.2 17.5 19.3 22.4 21.9 22.3 26.1 27.9 21.5 14.1 16.6 17.6 16.6 
Guinea 10.2 11.4 12.0 10.5 9.5 12.2 14.8 13.5 14.7 15.2 15.0 15.4 18.9 16.9 
Liberia 13.7 11.4 10.7 6.4 9.2 14.7 13.2 12.6 12.5 12.5 24.7 26.4 26.4 19.7 
Nigeria 16.7 19.5 14.0 15.7 14.8 17.2 14.9 11.7 16.2 12.0 10.2 13.1 13.5 11.7 
S/Leone 10.8 13.4 11.4 16.7 13.7 8.1 8.5 7.8 8.7 9.8 10.3 9.7 10.6 9.0 
Wage Bill/Tax Revenue (….should be ≤35% RF) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Gambia 30.6 40.1 38.0 33.3 23.1 24.3 24.2 22.3 31.2 33.9 43.5 45.5 43.3 na 
Ghana 52.1 52.9 57.2 49.6 46.1 44.8 55.7 51.5 53.8 53.2 48.9 40.6 52.7 6.3.9 
Guinea 38.2 32.0 31.0 34.3 32.5 23.2 18.4 25.9 28.0 33.7 38.8 34.1 24.5 27.6 
Liberia 24.8 29.0 19.1 26.4 48.0 59.2 34.5 32.9 28.7 35.2 37.0 46.1 46.1 50.0 
Nigeria 34.5 26.4 47.2 32.6 33.8 17.9 19.5 31.6 31.2 38.0 39.6 40.9 35.4 37.6 
S/Leone 62.0 55.0 63.9 59.7 56.0 65.5 61.6 60.9 56.4 71.7 60.9 58.6 59.2 56.8 
Public Investment/Tax Revenue (….should be ≥20% RF) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Gambia 6.1 6.1 7.5 11.0 14.2 4.8 3.1 6.3 16.3 16.7 10.6 8.3 7.2 na 
Ghana 23.5 16.4 13.2 18.8 18.4 18.8 25.0 27.3 35.8 17.2 14.7 16.8 15.7 11.7 
Guinea 7.7 5.5 10.2 12.1 16.1 12.6 12.0 11.9 12.9 38.7 54.1 16.1 38.5 28.9 
Liberia 39.7 46.1 47.3 0.0 25.6 18.3 14.9 13.8 12.5 14.7 8.8 14.1 14.1 12.7 
Nigeria 29.3 40.3 30.7 21.4 20.3 20.6 20.0 31.2 24.6 39.6 25.4 20.2 14.5 18.4 
S/Leone 4.4 6.6 9.4 11.3 8.2 7.9 10.6 9.1 13.2 16.6 40.4 27.9 29.4 22.4 
Real Interest Rates (….should be > 0) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Gambia 8.8 0.9 0.4 -5.1 6.8 3.2 3.6 -1.0 -1.8 0.6 4.8 3.8 5.2 na 
Ghana 1.5 -6.8 -0.2 -13.9 -2.3 -7.5 -9.4 -11.3 -15.9 -6.0 -2.3 2.9 12.0 10.7 
Guinea 0.7 2.8 1.3 -8.3 -19.2 -23.0 -20.0 1.8 -0.5 8.1 -9.9 -9.1 11.9 3.9 
Liberia 2.6 -13.7 -5.4 -0.6 -12.7 -3.9 -6.2 -9.1 -7.1 -6.9 -4.6 -9.4 -5.7 -5.4 
Nigeria -15.0 4.0 -8.4 -20.6 -5.6 -10.1 -6.5 -3.0 -12.0 -10.0 -7.3 -9.4 -11.2 1.0 
S/Leone 9.3 1.3 8.1 -5.8 -6.6 -7.2 -1.8 -8.3 -8.3 -8.5 -13.6 -12.0 -8.9 -2.3 
Stability of Real Exchange Rate (….should be ± 5%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Gambia 0.0 -13.1 -17.5 -27.7 -01.4 6.3 -0.3 9.6 7.5 -10.2 -4.1 -4.5 -4.5 na 
Ghana 0.0 1.1 -0.4 0.2 -1.5 10.5 0.6 -0.5 -3.7 -7.4 0.1 -8.7 -14.4 -7.4 
Guinea 0.0 -3.2 -2.3 -6.7 -5.8 -22.4 -7.0 32.6 -6.5 4.5 -15.3 -16.6 -2.4 2.1 
Liberia -0.5 -23.2 -30.1 -7.2 -14.2 -3.1 -4.6 2.5 2.7 2.5 -3.3 -4.4 -5.7 -4.0 
Nigeria 0.0 11.1 -0.5 -0.51 2.7 15.3 7.3 -1.9 10.8 -6.1 0.8 -6.0 0.7 2.1 
S/Leone 0.0 9.4 -13.6 -17.8 -10.7 1.2 1.3 -1.0 9.2 9.3 -12.4 11.7 3.3 1.1 
Source: West African Monetary Agency and Author's Calculations 
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Table 1.3: Three-year Averages of Convergence Indicators Attainments by WAMZ Members 
3-year Average of Primary Convergence Indicators (2012-2014) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Budget Deficit/GDP 
(≤4%) 
 
5.7 
 
6.8 
 
3.5 
 
-2.4 
 
2.1 
 
3.5 
Inflation Rates (≤5%) 5.2 12.1 12.2 8.4 9.5 10.1 
Central Bank 
Financing(≤10%) 
 
20.7 
 
6.7 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
2.5 
Gross External Reserves 
(≥6 months) 
 
4.2 
 
2.6 
 
3.2 
 
2.5 
 
8.6 
 
2.4 
3-year Average of Secondary Convergence Indicators (2010-2013) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Tax Revenue/GDP 
(≥20%) 
 
13.6 
 
16.9 
 
17.1 
 
24.2 
 
12.8 
 
9.8 
Wage Bill/Tax Revenue 
(≤35%) 
 
44.4 
 
46.6 
 
28.7 
 
47.4 
 
38.0 
 
58.2 
Public Investment/Tax 
Revenue (≥20%) 
 
7.7 
 
14.7 
 
27.8 
 
13.6 
 
17.7 
 
26.6 
Real Interest Rates (> 0)  
4.5 
 
8.5 
 
2.2 
 
-6.8 
 
-6.5 
 
-7.7 
Stability of Real 
Exchange Rate (± 5%) 
 
-4.5 
 
-10.2 
 
-5.6 
 
-4.7 
 
-1.1 
 
5.4 
Source: West African Monetary Agency and Author's Calculations 
Table 1.4: Rankings of the Attainments of the Convergence Indicators by WAMZ Members 
Rankings of the 3-year Average of Primary Convergence Indicators (2012-2014) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Budget 
Deficit/GDP 
5 6 3 1 2 3 
Inflation 
Rates 
1 5 6 2 3 4 
Central Bank 
Financing 
6 5 1 1 1 4 
Gross 
External 
Reserves 
2 4 3 5 1 6 
Member 
Country's 
Total 
14 20 13 9 7 17 
Overall 
Ranking 
4th 6th 3rd 2nd 1st 5th 
Rankings of the 3-year Average of Secondary Nominal Convergence Indicators (2011-2013) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Tax Revenue/ 
GDP 
4 3 2 1 5 6 
Wage Bill/Tax 
Revenue 
3 4 1 5 2 6 
Public 
Investment/Tax 
Revenue 
 
6 
 
4 
 
1 
 
5 
 
3 
 
2 
Real Interest 
Rates 
2 1 3 5 4 6 
Stability of Real 
Exchange Rate 
3 6 5 4 2 1 
Member 
Country's Total 
18 18 12 20 16 21 
Overall Ranking 3rd 3rd 1st 5th 2nd 6th 
Source: West African Monetary Agency and Author's Calculations 
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In general, for both the primary and secondary convergence criteria over the 3-year period, 
Nigeria gets the number one ranking as Ghana and Sierra Leone share the position at the 
bottom of the table. Within the context of the convergence indictors, these ranking 
demonstrates the readiness of the six WAMZ countries for the currency union, from the 
most-ready (the top ranked) and the least-ready (the low-ranked). 
Table 1.5: Rankings of the 3-year Average of General (Primary and Secondary) Convergence Indicators 
(2010-2012) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Budget 
Deficit/GDP 
5 6 3 1 2 3 
Inflation Rates 1 5 6 2 3 4 
Central Bank 
Financing 
6 5 1 1 1 4 
Gross External 
Reserves 
2 4 3 5 1 6 
Tax Revenue/ 
GDP 
4 3 2 1 5 6 
Wage Bill/Tax 
Revenue 
3 4 1 5 2 6 
Public 
Investment/Tax 
Revenue 
 
6 
 
4 
 
1 
 
5 
 
3 
 
2 
Real Interest 
Rates 
2 1 3 5 4 6 
Stability of Real 
Exchange Rate 
3 6 5 4 2 1 
Member 
Country's Total 
32 38 25 29 23 38 
Overall 
Ranking 
4th 5th 2nd 3rd 1st 5th 
Source: West African Monetary Agency and Author's Calculations 
 
1.1.3 Post-2014 Monetary Integration Developments  
As already highlighted, the desire to fasten the process of the monetary integration of the African sub-
region was indicated by the 15-member countries of the ECOWAS in 2000. This crystallised into a 2-
phase programme for the creation of a single currency for the region. The first phase of this plan was 
the launching of a single currency to be known as ‘eco’ by members of the West African Monetary 
Zone (WAMZ) while the second phase was the merger of the WAMZ with the existing WAEMU to 
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evolve a single currency for the whole of ECOWAS member states by January 2020. The 
WAMZ’s single currency failed to take-off and was postponed on three occasions in 2003, 
2005 and 2009. In July 2014, due to lack of economic convergence among the WAMZ 
members, as well as apparent inadequate preparations, glaringly reflecting non-feasibility of 
the January 2015 take-off, the WAMZ gave up the introduction of the single currency as 
proposed WAMZ and at the same time took the decision to change focus and re-strategised 
by relinquishing the initial plan of the WAMZ-WAEMU merger and replacing this with 
rescheduling of the creation of a single currency for the 15-member ECOWAS countries by 
2020. In the bid to accelerate the pace for the introduction of the West African single 
currency, the Presidential Task Force set up by the Heads of States and Governments of 
ECOWAS considered three options (as displayed in Table 1.6 below) and eventually 
recommended that Option 2 (The Gradual Option) be adopted. The Gradual Option 
highlighted that the participation of countries in the single currency will be based on 
compliance with the primary convergence criteria before 2020. 
Table 1.6: Options for Single Currency in ECOWAS 
 Options Highlights 
Option 1 
 
 
Big Bang 
By 2020, all ECOWAS member countries will participate in the 
single currency; and countries that cannot meet the convergence 
criteria ex-ante will achieve these ex-post. 
Option 2 
 
 
Gradualist 
Member countries of ECOWAS that are able to meet the primary 
convergence criteria before 2020 will participate in the single 
currency. 
Option 3 
 
 
Critical Mass 
The launching of the single currency will take place in 2020 on 
the condition that the critical mass of countries representing at 
least 75% of the region’s GDP 
Source: ECOWAS Commission 
The Task Force rejected Option 1 and Option 3 because of the apparent ‘too high’ levels of 
risks relating to macroeconomic instability if these two options are adopted. Given the 
present situations in the West Africa region, Table 1.7 below reflects four possible 
convergence situations that can result in 2020. 
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Table 1.7: Possible Convergence Situation in ECOWAS by 2020  
Convergence Situation Possible Qualifying Countries Possible Outcomes 
Situation 1  
WAEMU countries 
Current status-quo, leading to a fresh 
postponement of the ECOWAS single 
currency. 
Situation 2 WAEMU countries + Nigeria + 
Ghana + few other WAMZ 
Countries 
Launching of ECOWAS single 
currency. 
Situation 3 WAEMU countries + WAMZ 
countries, but without Nigeria and 
Ghana. 
Fresh postponement of the ECOWAS 
single currency because of the need to 
grant more time for the exclusion of 
the two economic heavy weights 
(Nigeria and Ghana). 
Situation 4 WAEMU countries + WAMZ 
countries 
Launching of the ECOWAS single 
currency. 
Source: Bakoup and Ndoye (2016) 
In order to meet the January 2020 deadline and the launching of the single currency as 
scheduled, those critical measures that were not well addressed in the past were highlighted 
for full implementation before 2017. These were: (a) preparing a strategy and procedures for 
the future single currency of the ECOWAS monetary integration; (b) drafting a treaty that 
will establish the monetary union between member countries of ECOWAS and for all 
members to ratify this treaty; (c) designing, adopting and ratifying the Article of Association 
of the future common central bank for ECOWAS. In May 2015, there was the rationalisation 
of the total number of convergence criteria from eleven to six, consisting of four primary 
criteria and two secondary criteria. These modifications also involved the reviews and 
changes in some benchmarks. The new primary criteria are: (i) ratio of budget deficit 
(commitment basis, including grants) to GDP of less than or equal to 3%12; (ii) average 
annual inflation rate of less than 10%13; (iii) central bank financing of budget deficit of less 
than or equal to 10% of the previous year’s tax revenue; and (iv) gross external reserves - 
higher than or equal to 3 months of imports14. The new secondary criteria:15 (a) stable 
                                                          
12 Previously, the maximum target for budget deficit/GDP ratio was 4% (excluding grants). 
13 This is against the former maximum of 5%. 
14 The previous cover was 6 months.  
15 Criteria removed in the rationalisation exercise were: positive real interest rate, real exchange rate stability, non-
accumulation of domestic and external arrears, tax revenue/GDP, wage bill/tax revenue and public investments/tax revenue.  
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nominal exchange rate of +/- 10%; and (b) ratio of total public debt to GDP of not more than 
70%. 
1.1.4             Characteristics of the Economies of WAMZ Member States  
It is essential to have the understanding and knowledge of the features of the national 
economies of member states of the WAMZ before attempting to go into an in-depth 
assessment of the feasibility of the proposed monetary union. This subsection made brief 
expositions of the salient features of the six national economies within the WAMZ (The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone). These descriptive analyses cover 
the demographics, trade, monetary, fiscal, financial, governance and other macroeconomic 
information.   
The Gambia: The Gambia is the 177th largest export economy in the world. The 2014 
Economic Complexity Index (ECI) revealed the country to be the 94th most complex 
economy. The Gambia got independence from the British colonial rule on 18 February, 1965 
and the capital city is Banjul while the official currency is dalasi.  The Gambia is a founding 
member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 and also of 
the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) in 2000. As at the end of 2015, The Gambia was 
the smallest economy and country in the WAMZ (as well as the smallest country in Africa) 
with 0.26% of the WAMZ’s GDP as well as 0.85% of the total population of the zone. The 
Gambia has a land area of 11, 295 km2 (4,361 square miles), with a 2015 population 
projection of 1.991 million. Estimated population density of The Gambia was 176 as at the 
end 2015. Around 50% of this population lives in urban areas while about three quarters of 
the population are engaged in farming (traditional subsistence agriculture) in the liberal 
economy characterised by historic reliance on groundnuts (peanuts) for export earnings, re-
export trade built up around its ocean port, low import duties, minimal administrative 
procedures, a fluctuating exchange rate with no exchange controls, and a significant tourism 
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industry”. The services industry in The Gambia is the largest sector of the economy majorly 
made up of tourism and foreign banking and by 2016 estimates, this sector accounted for 
63% of the GDP, followed by the agricultural sector, which make up to 21.4% of the GDP. 
The agriculture sector produces peanuts, rice, millet, sorghum, corn, sesame, fish, palm 
kernels, vegetables, forestry, livestock and fishing and over 75% of the population depends 
on this sector for livelihood. The industrial sector recorded 15% of the total output.  In recent 
times, economic performances of The Gambia were affected by some shocks (delayed 
rainfall, Ebola outbreak affecting tourism, weak implementation of economic policy). These 
contracted the real GDP growth, falling to 0.9% in 2014, rebounding to 4.7% in 2015. Recent 
years also witness large fiscal imbalances as fiscal deficit moved to 11% of the GDP in 2014 
(from 4.4 in 2012). Due to the difficulty in securing external finance, the deficit is hugely 
being financed through domestic borrowings. There was an increase of 58.29% in public debt 
over a five year period between 2011 and 2015, causing increase in public debt financing, 
which in 2015, absorbed 4% of government revenue, an increase from 2.5% recorded two 
years earlier. All these culminated into balance of payment crisis, putting pressure on the 
country’s international reserves which have significantly been depleted. The government 
managed to maintain macroeconomic stability in the face of external shocks such as 
reduction in grant aid and trade revenues, as well as rising oil and food prices’.  
The Gambia is a primary commodity exporting country which has sixty seven products on its 
exports product list. As at 2015, the country’s main exports products (with the share of the 
country’s total exports were: (i) cashew nuts (36.6%), wood – in rough (27.6%) and 
groundnut oil, crude (5%). There are five export products accounting for more than 75% of 
the country’s exports.  
Ghana: Ghana was formed from the merger of the British colony of the Gold Coast 
and the Togoland trust territory.  As at 2015, Ghana has a land area of 239.46 km2 
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(92,100 square miles) with a population estimate of 27.410 million and an estimated 
population density of 115. As at independence from British colonial rule on 6 March 1957, 
about 30% of the population lived in urban areas as against more than 50% by 2015. The 
capital city of Ghana is Accra while the official currency is Ghana cedi. Ghana is a founding 
member of ECOWAS in 1975 and also of the WAMZ in 2000. As at the end of 2015, Ghana 
was the second largest economy of the WAMZ, accounting for 9.06% of the economic size of 
the zone, while it is equally the second largest populated member of the WAMZ with 11.65% 
of the zone’s entire population estimation.  The country’s export market is the 92nd largest in 
the world; and according to the ECI, the country is the 122nd most complex economy. Ghana 
is one of the three WAMZ countries having a stock exchange. 
Soon after independence through to 1970s, the Ghanaian economy known to be strong was 
badly affected by failed development plans and series of military interventions. The economy 
was highly protected by state investments, particularly in manufacturing sector which in the 
1980s, turned to be a heavy burden on state resources. Ghana carried out a currency re-
denomination exercise in July 2007 when the unit of account, the cedi was redenominated to 
the new unit of account now called the Ghana cedi with the conversion rate of 10,000 cedis 
for 1 Ghana cedi. 
As at now, Ghana is ranked by the World Bank as lower middle income economy. Ghana’s 
natural resources base is diverse and rich. The principal mineral resources include gold, oil, 
timber, diamonds, bauxite, manganese, and fish while its agricultural products are cocoa, 
wood (timber), pineapples, cashew, spices and rubber. The dependent of the Ghanaian 
economy on gold, cocoa (and now oil) makes it vulnerable to movements in world 
commodity prices. There was a major oil discovery in Ghana in 2001. Oil production 
formally began in December, 2010 at 55,000 barrel production per day and recorded a growth 
up to 99,000 barrels/day in 2013. In spite of the oil discovery and wealth of mineral 
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resources, records as at 2016 showed that agriculture accounted for more than 19.6% of 
Ghana’s GDP (and for around 55% of employment), service, 54% and manufacturing, 24%. 
Cocoa as a primary cash product provides about 19% of export revenue as at 2014, thus 
making cocoa, gold and oil as the top three revenue earning export commodities for Ghana. 
Ghana remains a world’s top gold producer and experts’ projection is that the country is 
likely to be the third largest oil producing country in West Africa. Currently, Ghana is aiming 
at being a major gas exporter.  
Guinea: Guinea, which got her independence from the former French colonial masters on 2 
October, 1958 is the only French-speaking country in the WAMZ. Its capital city is Conakry. 
Guinea is a founding member of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) in 1975 and also of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) in 2000. Guinea 
opted out of the WAEMU to take up her currency known as Guinean franc. As at 2015, 
Guinea was the 3rd largest economy of the WAMZ (claiming 1.22% of the size of the zone’s 
economy as well as 5.36% of the total population of the zone). The Republic of Guinea, has a 
land area of 245, 860 km2 (95,000 square miles) with a 2015 population projection of 12.61 
million and an estimated population density of Guinea was 51. As at this same period, the 
country was the 124th world’s largest economy and 133rd most complex economy.  
Guinea relies solely on the mining sector which provides 95% of export earnings of the 
country, while agriculture sector provides the remaining 5%. Guinea’s natural resources are 
bauxite, iron ore, diamonds, gold, salt, uranium, fisheries and hydropower. The global 
demand for bauxite, diamond and gold has caused the Guinean’s export share of GDP to rise 
in recent times. The country has the largest reserves of these mineral resources and untapped 
high grade iron ore reserves. Though richly endowed with mineral resources, yet, Guinea is 
in the category of ‘poor country’. The outbreak of the Ebola epidemic devastated the 
economy of Guinea and grossly impacted economic growth (with near-zero growth), caused 
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budget deficit of over 7% of GDP and constrained the capacity to accelerate development 
reforms programmes which are essential structural transformation of the economy. Mining, 
light manufacturing and agricultural processing industries made up to 45.7% of Guinea’s 
GDP while agricultural products of rice, cassava, coffee, banana, potatoes, pineapple, sheep, 
goats, timber, palm products and cattle made up to 25.8% of the GDP as at the end of 2015.  
As at 2014, three major export products of Guinea (and their share of the country’s total 
exports) were: petroleum oil (40.4%), aluminum ore (35.6%) and Gold (10.8%). Two export 
products (petroleum oil and aluminum) accounted for over 75% of the country’s total exports.  
Liberia: Liberia of today emanated from the Settlement of Freed Slaves from the United 
States since 1822. On 26 July 1847, when Liberia got its independence, a republic was 
established by the Americo-Liberians, thus making Liberia the first African country to obtain 
independence. Liberia has a land area of 111,369 km2 and a July 2015 population projection 
of 4.503 million. Estimated population density of Liberia was 40 as at the end 2015. The 
capital city is Monrovia and Liberia’s currency is Liberian dollar. Liberia is a founding 
member of the ECOWAS in 1975. Liberia and Cape Verde initially acted as observers in the 
WAMZ but Liberia finally joined the monetary zone on 16 February 2010. 16 As at 2015, 
Liberia was the second smallest economy of the WAMZ (after The Gambia) reflecting 0.38% 
of the zone’s GDP and having 1.91% of the zone’s population. Liberia is the world’s 153rd 
largest export economy and 129th most complex economy as revealed by the ECI.  
Until the 1950s, subsistence farming and rubber production contributed very hugely to the 
Liberian economy. The discovery of mineral resources like iron ore, gold, diamond, tins 
changed the fortune of the country and made its economy to place reliance on mining 
activities. These mineral resources became the significant source of export earnings for the 
country. The country’s economy was largely destroyed by mismanagement and the 14-year 
                                                          
16 Liberia is not a founding member of the WAMZ. 
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civil war that started in 1989 and ended in 2003. As a result of the war, many businesses had 
to leave Liberia with their expertise and capital. Liberia was a major exporter of iron ore 
before the civil war. The military intervention of 1980 reduced the world demand for 
Liberia’s iron ore. However, with the installation of a stable democratic government many of 
these businesses have been returning. Around 70% of the country’s population and three-
quarter of rural workforce are involved in the agricultural sector providing coffee, rubber, 
rice, cocoa, palm oil etc.  
Though, the country is richly endowed with forest, water and mineral resources including 
good vegetation for agricultural purposes, yet the country is hugely under-developed and it is 
one of the world’s poorest countries. Consequently, Liberia is classified a low income 
country. 60% of the country’s population lives below the poverty line, with poor human 
capital and poor infrastructures. 
With the recent drop in prices of primary commodities (and the effects of the Ebola 
epidemic), there had been decline in the Liberia’s economic growth as evident by sharp fall 
from 8.7% in 2013 to as low as 0.7% in 2014 and a further drop to 0.4% in 2015. Agriculture 
however remained the highest contributor to the country’s GDP of 42.6% in 2010 and 35.6% 
in 2014. Nevertheless, in spite of the fragility and poor social conditions after the civil war 
and prior to the outbreak of Ebola epidemic in 2014, Liberian economy witnessed steady 
growth up to 8.7% in 2013. The post conflict growth under a regiment of economic stability 
management and extractive industries’ expansion is impressive and laudable.  
Three principal export commodities of Liberia (with their percentage share in total exports of 
the country) are iron ore (40.7%), vessels/floating structures (13.9%) and natural rubber 
(12.9%). Four products account for more than 75% of the country’s exports. The exportation 
of diamond and timber were banned by the United Nations in the mid-1990s. These bans on 
the exportation of timber and diamond were lifted in 2006 and 2007 respectively. 
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Nigeria: Nigeria has a land area of 923.8 km2 (92,100 square miles) with a 2015 population 
projection of 182.202 million. This makes Nigeria to be the most populous country in Africa 
with more than 250 ethnic groups. Estimated population density of Nigeria was 197 as at 
the end 2015. Nigeria’s capital city is Abuja and its currency is naira. Nigeria got its 
independence on 1 October, 1960. Nigeria is the Africa’s largest economy (and so the largest 
and dominating economy in the WAMZ) having overtaken South Africa in 2012 when it 
posted a GDP of $453 billion (in comparison with South Africa’s same year result of $384). 
The 2012 figure for Nigeria came as a result of the rebasing of the country’s GDP (thought 
by many economists to be long overdue) in order to reflect structural changes in production 
and consumption within the country.17 Nonetheless, Nigeria still trails in per capita income 
and economic development. Nigeria is a founding member of the ECOWAS in 1975 and also 
of the WAMZ in 2000. 
Within the WAMZ, as at 2015, Nigeria was the largest and the dominant economy 
controlling 88.37% of the zone’s GDP as well as the most populated country having 77.48% 
of the entire population of the WAMZ. As at 2014, Nigeria was the world’s 38th largest 
exporting country and the 125th most complex economy in the world according to the ECI. 
Nigeria is classified by the IMF as a mixed economy, a middle income country and an 
emerging market. The country is ranked 20th largest economy (in terms of PPP) and the 21st 
(in terms of nominal GDP). Nigeria had the largest manufacturing sector in Africa in 2013; 
and at the same time, produced large proportion of goods and services for the subcontinent of 
West Africa. These have implications for the WAMZ. 
                                                          
17 The rebasing took Nigeria to change the base year from 1990 to 2010 as well as increase the number of industries. This 
resulted in increase in the size of the economy 75%. All economic variables that were expressed in terms of GDP were 
consequently changed due to the higher nominal GDP.    
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Historically, Nigeria’s economy was agricultural based, yet over 50% of the country’s 
workforce still largely engaged in subsistence farming. The discovery of oil and the growth in 
the oil industry shifted the focus of attention away from the agricultural sector. Over the past 
decades, the country’s economy had been oil-dependent. Petroleum (the lead mineral 
resources in Nigeria) provides around 95% of the government revenue as well as foreign 
exchange earnings for the country. Nevertheless, due to outdated and inactive refineries 
across the country, Nigeria imports most of her fuel, in spite of around 1.8 million barrel a 
day oil production. The poor capacity of oil refineries and the neglect of the agricultural 
sector did not cause Nigerian economy to keep pace with the tremendous growth in its 
population and this is the reason why the country imports refine petroleum products and food. 
The large population, long term mismanagement or resources, endemic corruption, long era 
of military rule are factors of low socio-economic indicators of Nigeria. Despite the huge 
wealth from oil revenue (and potentials of other natural resources), the World Bank ranks 
Nigeria as a ‘poor country’, where the vast majority of the populace lives below the poverty 
line. 
Nigeria’s major natural resources are crude oil, natural gas, tin, iron ore, limestone, coal, lead 
and zinc. The two main export products of Nigeria (and their shares of total exports) are 
petroleum oil (81.4%) and liquefied natural gas (12.3%). Only one product accounts for more 
than 75% of the country’s total exports and this makes the Nigerian economy is very 
vulnerable to movements in international prices and demand for oil and gas. In spite of huge 
dependence on oil, agricultural products still account for up to about 40% of the GDP and 
around 60% of the total employment. The country’s major agricultural products are cocoa, 
palm oil, yam, cassava, sorghum millet, corn, rice, livestock, and groundnuts. On industrial 
scale, Nigeria produces hides and skins, crude oil, coal, ceramics, tin, columbite, rubber 
products, detergents, cement and other construction materials, wood, textiles, beer, food 
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products, footwear, chemicals, fertiliser and steel. Nigeria has a stock exchange which 
performs well, although the country’s private sector underutilises equity as means of 
fostering corporate growth. Rural communities still have poor access to credit facilities. 
In recent times, the Nigeria’s economy witnessed some external shocks. The economy growth 
of the country fell to 3.0% in 2015, from 6.2% in 2014 while inflation rate increased from 
7.8% in 2014 to 9.0 in 2015 and the country eventually entered into economic recession. A 
major attribute of this is the fall in global crude oil price which led to sluggish growth and 
slow-down in economic activities impacted by shortages in the supply of foreign exchange.18  
Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone has a land area of 71,740 km2 (29,925 square miles), with a 2015 
population projection of 6.453 million. Estimated population density of Sierra Leone was 90 
as at the end 2015. Sierra Leone got independence from the British colonial rule on 27 April 
1961. The capital city is Freetown while the official currency is leone.   After 11-year civil 
war (1991-2001), democracy and orderliness are slowly being re-established in Sierra Leone. 
This civil war caused deaths in tens of thousands and displacement of more than 33% of the 
population. Sierra Leone is a founding member of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) in 1975 and also of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) in 2000. 
As at 2014, Sierra Leone was the 136th largest exporting economy and 82nd most complex 
economy. As at 2015, the country was the third smallest economy of the WAMZ, having 0.79 
of the zone’s economic size as well as the third least populated country in the zone, with 
2.74% of the zone’s entire population. 
Sierra Leone is very rich in solid minerals resources. The country has one of the largest 
deposits of rutile in the world. It ranks among the top ten diamond producing countries of the 
world. Sierra Leone’s natural resources include bauxite, iron ore, platinum, gold, manganese, 
chromites, titanium ore and diamonds. The reliance of Sierra Leone on mining (particularly 
                                                          
18 Nevertheless, in late May 2017, the IMF announced the exit of Nigeria from economic recession. 
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diamonds) for its economic prosperity is high. The annual diamond production in Sierra 
Leone is estimated between US$250–300 million. Exportation of mineral resources remains 
the country’s main source revenue from foreign exchange.    
In Sierra Leone, agriculture employs over 80% of the population in subsistence farming. This 
sector generates about 25% of the export earnings for the country and contributed about 71% 
of the GDP as at 2015. Rice, coffee, cocoa, palm kernels, peanuts, cashew, poultry, cattle, 
sheep and fish are the leading agricultural products in this country. Main mineral resource 
extracts involves diamond, gold, iron ore, bauxite and rutile. Diamond and gold generate 
‘sufficient’ foreign exchange for this country. However, there had been series of off-shore oil 
discoveries in the country since 2009.  
The Sierra Leonean economy witnessed a total collapse from 1995 due to the spill-over of the 
civil war in the neighbouring Liberia. The economy however began to witness expansion 
from mid-2000, after continuous decline in GDP from 1980. Despite of her rich resource 
base, Sierra Leone could be described as a depressed economy with low per capita income over the 
years. In recent years, the fall in international prices of iron ore (and the Ebola epidemic) caused 
contractions of more than 20% in the country’s GDP, with a decline from 20.1% in 2013 to 4.6% in 
2014 and to -21.5% in 2015. As at 2014, three principal exports of Sierra Leone (and their share of 
total exports) are iron ore (76.8%), diamond (8.1%). One export product (iron ore) accounts for more 
than 75% of the country’s total exports. All the same, the Sierra Leonean economy is also vulnerable 
to movements in international prices of commodities. The Sierra Leonean stock exchange (one of the 
stock exchanges in the WAMZ) is at a development stage. 
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Table 1.8: Financial and Macroeconomic Indicators for the WAMZ Countries (as at 2015) 
Indicators Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Real GDP % Growth (2007-2015 average) 3.7 6.7 2.2 6.3 6.0 5.1 
GDP (based on PPP) in $ $3.27b $113.35b $15.276b $3.781b $1,105.34b $9.832b 
GDP (per capita) in $ $1,642 $4,135 $1,212 $840 $6,067 $1,524 
GDP (at Official Exchange Rate) in $ 2015 $886m na $6.754b $2.168b $415.1b $4.289b 
CPI Inflation (%) 6.5 17.2 8.0 7.7 9.0 9.9 
External Debt Stock in $ $502.5m $19.15b $2.843b na $32.27b $1.403b 
External Debt as % of GDP 50.7% 64.4% 29.5% 24.0% 2.1% 33.6% 
Exports of Goods (fob) in $ $113.2m $10.36b $1.611b $330.8m $45.89b $569.4m 
Imports of Goods (cif) in $ $365.1m $13.47b $2.173b $2.232b $52.33b $1.575b 
Current Account Balance in $ -$136m -$2.254b -$1.730b -$1.014b -$16.127b -$475m 
Current Account Balance as % of GDP -20 -8.2 -23.6 -36.9 -3.5 -11.3 
Annual Export  % Growth (2010-2014) 16.7 -43.3 2.1 0.6 3.8 127.1 
Trade Balance in $ -$208m -$1.403b -$1.275b -$1.052b -$1.576b -$155m 
Budget balance as % of GDP -9.6 -5.7 -7.5 -5.6 -3.4 -3.7 
International Reserves (gold and Forex) $83.8m $5.885b $233.5m na $29.07b  
Reserves (excluding gold) $143.3m N/A $233.5m na $31.56b $556.5m 
Global Competitiveness Index19 3.5 3.7 na 3.2 3.4 3.2 
Economic Freedom Index20 57.5 63.0 52.1 52.7 55.6 51.7 
Monetary Freedom Index21 70.8 69.2 66.7 72.2 70.4 68.5 
Trade Freedom Index22 65.0 64.8 61.2 74.4 63.8 70.2 
Investment Freedom Index23 65.0 65.0 40.0 40.2 40.0 55.0 
Sources: Various and Own Estimations 
 
Some macroeconomic, financial and demographic information on the six WAMZ countries as 
at the end of 2015 are as displayed in Table 1.8 above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Global Competitive Index (constructed on a score-scale of 1 to 7) is the measurement of institutions, policies and factors 
that create sustainable levels of economic prosperity.  
20 Economic freedom provides a measure of absolute property ownership rights, fully realised freedoms of movement of 
labour capital and goods, as well as absolute absence of coercion or constraints of economic liberty beyond the extent 
necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty (Miller and Holmes, 2011). Economic freedom index is an overall 
measure of up to 10 specific economic freedoms. Each freedom is based on a score-scale ranging from 0 to 10. A country’s 
economic freedom score is a simple average of its scores on these 10 individual freedoms.  
21 Monetary freedom measures the reliability and stability of currency as a medium of exchange, unit of account and store of 
value in a monetarily free society in which people finds it easy to create capital and wealth and long term values.  
22 Trade freedom measures an economy’s openness to importation of goods and services around the world as well as the 
ability of citizens to interact freely as buyers and sellers in international markets. 
23 Investment freedom index gauges the absence of constraints on flow of investment capital and the degree to which 
individuals and firms and market investors are allowed to move their resources into and out of specific activities both 
domestically and across countries’ borders without restrictions. 
 
45 
 
To reflect the sizes of the economies of the WAMZ countries in the context of nominal GDP 
and base money as measures, as well as the population of these countries, Table 1.9 below 
exhibits the proportion (in percentages of the WAMZ total) of these indicators for each 
country. 
Table 1.9: Sizes of the Economy, Base Money and Population of WAMZ Countries 
 
 WAMZ Country 
% Size of Economy in 
WAMZ (as measured 
by Nominal GDP 
(US$) at end of 2015) 
 
% Base Money in WAMZ 
(in US$) at end of 2014) 
% Population 
Estimations in WAMZ 
(as at end of 2015) 
  
The Gambia 0.18 0.50 0.84 
Ghana 7.05 11.5 11.76 
Guinea 1.26 3.7 5.15 
Liberia 0.38 1.91 1.92 
Nigeria 90.33 82.5 77.24 
Sierra Leone 0.80 0.90 3.09 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: IMF and Author’s Estimation. 
 
1.2 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions  
The principal aim of this thesis was to assess the feasibility of monetary integration of the 
West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). This fulfilment of this aim entailed the empirical 
considerations of relevant macroeconomic and finance factors of the member countries of the 
WAMZ jointly and severally. This caused this researcher to engage in a wide scope of 
research investigations in three main perspectives of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA 
theory), monetary and exchange rate behaviour and their associated components as well as 
carry out detailed survey of architecture of the Eurozone from the view-point of the OCA 
theory in order to identify design flaws and draw lessons as appropriate and necessary.  
Flowing from the research aims, the objectives of this thesis centred on various empirical 
analyses and evaluation of homogeneities and similarities and other macroeconomic and 
financial variables and functional relationships: (i) to test the optimality of the WAMZ from 
the perspectives of the OCA theory and some of its properties towards investigating the OCA 
theoretical supports (if any) for monetary integration of the WAMZ; (ii) to evaluate the 
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monetary perspectives of money neutrality and superneutrality , monetary reactions, 
monetary policy interactions with fiscal policy, suitability of common monetary policy and 
the degree of loss of monetary independence across the WAMZ; (iii) to assess perspectives of 
exchange rate behaviour, exchange rate determination and exchange markets pressure. As 
precursor, further objectives established were: (a) to empirically investigate the validity of 
some macroeconomic and financial stylised facts and underlying theories in respect of 
macroeconomic fluctuations and business cycles, Philips Curves, Lucas Output/inflation 
trade-off, international parity relationships, exchange rates and markets volatilities and 
banking sectors fundamentals, all in the cases of macroeconomic and financial characteristics 
of the six member countries of the WAMZ; and (b) to perform a survey of literature on the 
design of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in light of the OCA theoretical 
underpinnings and identify any design defects exposed by the financial crisis towards 
drawing lessons for the WAMZ’s proposed monetary integration specifically and the 
monetary cooperation initiatives of the African continent and other regions of the world at 
large. Consequently, there were research questions drawn in line with these research 
objectives. Various answers provided to the various research questions helped in attaining 
these research objectives appropriately.  
Because of the need for similarities in sources of shocks and also symmetric responses to 
shocks across the WAMZ towards establishing justification for a WAMZ’s common 
monetary policy, research questions for the OCA theory perspectives focussed on the 
similarities, synchronicities, symmetries and homogeneities of historical behaviour economic 
variables and relationships relating to some of the OCA properties, with particular focus on 
economic dynamics, business cycles (classical and deviation), inflation dynamics, production 
structures, trade openness, financial integration and factor market mobility. These research 
questions were: (i) Are there uniformities in macroeconomic performances of the WAMZ 
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countries? (ii) What is the nature of the trends in economic dynamics of the WAMZ 
countries? (iii) Are there synchronicities of business cycles? (iv) Are inflation dynamics 
homogeneous in the WAMZ? (v) Are there similarities of production structures? (vi) What 
are the degrees of trade and investment openness across the WAMZ? (vii) Are there 
convergence of financial integration and financial systems? (viii) Are labour markets 
flexible? Answers to these questions provided the inputs needed for the achievement of 
research objectives of these perspectives and as well, established if the WAMZ satisfied the 
OCA criteria (to some extent) for the introduction of single currency and common central 
bank. 
Research questions raised under the monetary perspectives were based on the nature of 
money and monetary policy related factors, neutrality and superneutrality of money, 
monetary reactions, policy mix (monetary-fiscal policy interactions), loss of monetary 
independence, and suitability of the expected common monetary policy. Specifically, these 
research questions are: (a) what are the nature of the behaviours of money and the nature of 
supply growth toward real variables across the WAMZ economies? Is money neutral and 
super-neutral? (b) Are the forms and patterns exhibited by the reactions of monetary policy 
fundamentals to monetary policy across the WAMZ similar enough to guarantee a workable 
common monetary policy? (c) What is the nature of policy mix (monetary policy interactions 
with fiscal policy) across the WAMZ? To what extent can the necessary monetary dominance 
be established in the WAMZ? (d) What would the degrees of loss of monetary flexibilities 
and independence of WAMZ member countries be in the event of the monetary integration; 
(e) would the expected common monetary policy be equitably suitable for all  member 
countries of the WAMZ. Answer provided to these questions supported in gathering 
evidences for the justifications (or otherwise) of the proposed single currency and common 
central bank. 
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Research questions raised under the perspectives of exchange rate behaviours are: (i) Are 
there similarities in exchange rate behaviours, exchange market pressures and exchange rate 
determination by the fundamentals across the WAMZ? (ii) How uniform are macroeconomic 
determinants of exchange rates in the WAMZ and their explanatory powers? (iii) in the event 
of monetary integration characterised by common currency and  common central bank, can 
the pattern of exchange market pressure across the WAMZ justify a common approach in 
handling currency crisis that may erupt. 
Initial research questions  asked about the empirical analyses of the general macroeconomic  
and financial characteristics of the WAMZ countries were on if the empirically established 
stylised facts and theoretical propositions (relating to the following) are valid in the WAMZ: 
(a) macroeconomic fluctuations and business cycles; (b) structural relationships in 
international parity conditions (purchasing power parity and international Fisher effect); (c) 
Philips Curves; (d) Lucas Output-inflation trade-off; exchange rate and markets volatilities; 
and (e) banking characteristics.  
Answers generated from these were beneficial in producing evidences. Results and findings 
from the achievements of these research objectives led to the convincing conclusions of the 
feasibility of monetary integration of the WAMZ. These are novel research efforts because 
this is the first research exercise (known to the author) to have combined these wider 
spectrum of extensive studies in the evaluation the monetary integration of an African 
subregion. 
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1.3 Significance of the study 
Within academic and policymaking spheres, this research work is relevant and significant 
because of the gaps in research filled by the study as well as the additions to existing body of 
knowledge every facet of this research offerred in its wider spects of coverage. 
This research efforts are unique and significant in drawing inferences about the feasibility (or 
otherwise) of the monetary integration the WAMZ by going through the investigations and 
assessments of diversed perspectives of financial and macroeconomic phenomena in the 
achievement of its aim. This study goes beyond assessments from the view-point of the OCA 
theories by making a comprehensive evaluation of some monetary and exchange rate 
behaviour perspectives as well as identifying flaws in the OCA theory and drawing lessons 
for the African monetary integration initiatives across the world. Specifically, this study 
brought into the investigation of monetary integration of the WAMZ, some aspects that were 
not exploited by past researches. Such wide range of investigations on monetary integration 
feasibility of a geograhical bloc in a single research literature are scare, unique and 
exceptional. These are novel contributions to monetary integration literature. Significantly,  
this thesis shed more light into the remaining dark area of monetary cooperation feasibility 
studies on the WAMZ and the African continent at large.  
1.4 Research Philosophy and Design 
This research study was design, planned and constructed prior to the commencement of the 
work, based on deduction process of moving from the hypothesis and theories involved 
towards inductive generalisation. The thesis was carried out within the positivism 
methodological viewpoint of research. The study was empirical, logical and objective. It 
focused on the accumulation and analysis of facts in order to establish explanations. In the 
spirit of positivism, while empirically assessing the feasibility of monetary integration of the 
WAMZ countries, the research study sourced for past realities of macroeconomic and 
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financial facts in the WAMZ countries. These scientific knowledge were seen as testable 
while predictions were made in order to control economic and social life; thus implying that 
the research was solely performed through empirical means and not through arguments.  
Drawing on the value, precision and measurement principles of quantitative research, this 
thesis considered the roles of financial and macroeconomic theories to generate explanations 
based on the assumptions of measurable economic, financial and political realities within the 
beliefs of unity of scientific methods which considers the logic of enquiry to be uniform 
across the world of finance and economics. These theories were analysed in the context of 
practices in the WAMZ member countries. Realities were captured through data collected 
and through the use of various statistical and econometric analysis techniques that were 
employed. Measures were designed in line with macroeconomic and financial theories and 
concepts they were meant to denote in the actual sense. This research discovered the 
existence of objective realities for others to replicate.   
The research study embarked upon applied research meant to solve specific research 
problems and associated research questions, with direct application to the real world. The 
research work was designed as a quantitative, explanatory, longitudinal (in many aspects) and 
deductive research study of the WAMZ for the proposed monetary integration of its six 
members. In addition to this, there was the application of comparative cross-national research 
design which allowed similarities and/or divergences in macroeconomic variables and 
research results to be established and analysed in the context of monetary integration of 
member countries of the proposed monetary zone under assessment.  
This research work planned and structured the assessments and investigations of various 
perspectives of the feasibility of monetary cooperation of the WAMZ countries employed in 
this research work in forms and ways that the overall aim and objectives of the research 
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efforts were achieved while answers to the main and various research questions were easily 
obtained. Time-based plans and outlines of programmes of the research steps taken at every 
stage of the research process were well laid-out. These guided the researcher in the 
formulation of research questions, review of theoretical and empirical literature, sourcing of 
relevant data and other historical information, choice of statistical and econometric tools for 
data description and analyses, drawing of inference from research analyses and findings and 
gathering evidences to draw conclusions. Relevant economic and financial models were built 
while appropriate statistical and econometric techniques were employed in the analysis and 
evaluation of financial and economic phenomena within the scope of the study and in 
providing answer to the research questions towards producing empirical evidences that 
conform to these applied relevant theories and concepts applied in the study. These caused 
the research findings to add to the existing body of works in economics and finance generally 
and specifically, in the field of international finance and economics. 
1.5 Methodology  
Principally, this thesis employed the use of quantitative secondary data. These data are 
financial, macroeconomic and commodity markets data for the WAMZ member countries. 
Broadly, these various annual data, quarterly and monthly (including daily exchange rate 
data) spanning approximately over 1980 to 2015 were sourced from the databases of 
Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) of the Economists,  Datastream, International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and various editions of the statistical bulletins of the central banks of 
the WAMZ countries as well as the bureau of statistics and offices of statistics in these 
countries. Data on international commodity price were obtained from the commodity 
statistics database of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  
The analysis of data collected were carried in three major stages: (i) data preparation, (ii) data 
description and (iii) data processing. The data preparation stage involved the reconciliation 
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and sourcing for missing and incomplete data and information for the WAMZ countries, 
cleaning up and reviewing data for inconsistencies by watching for the extreme (outliers) and 
out-of-range values, statistical and arithmetical adjustments of some data through the 
applications of various appropriate tools, required weights, percentages, averages, ratios, 
deviations, leads and lags, logarithmic and differencing conversion of data, and other form 
data transformations and adjustments. Transformation and adjustments of data into suitable 
forms for data analysis and expected results were necessitated by specific statistical and 
econometric purposes and for the aim of meeting some software needs and the adequacy of 
statistical and econometric models and methods involved so as to avoid bias and misleading 
results. At data description stage, data meant for analyses were described through the 
statistical highlights of their characteristics. Measures of central tendency or location 
(arithmetic mean, median and mode etc.), measures of dispersion (standard deviations, 
variances, range, percentiles, coefficients of variations, coefficients of determination etc.), 
measures of shape of distribution (kurtosis and skewness), measures of statistical dependence 
(correlation coefficients etc.) at one point or the other, were employed in the research work. 
Further to these, graphical representations of data and results were made with line graphs, bar 
charts, histograms and pie charts. At data analysis stage, in order to draw relevant inference 
and meet the research aims and objectives, some statistical tools and econometric estimation 
methods were employed to estimates times series, cross sectional and panel data involved. 
Averages, variances, standard deviations, Euclidean distance, analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
Theil coeffients of inequality, Levene tests of equality of variance and correlation were some 
of the statistical tools employed. Econometric estimation techniques applied were the 
methods of  ordinary least square (OLS), canonical cointegrating regreession (CCR), 
dynamic ordinary square (DOLS), fully modified ordinary square (FMOLS), robust linear 
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square (RLS), quantile regression (QR), autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL),  Markov 
switching dynamic panel data method and Markov regime switching regression method.  
1.4 Limitations to the Study 
It is necessary to highlight some of the limitations encountered in the process of working 
towards the achievement of the aims and objectives of this research work. A major limitation 
was data collection constraints. This is a common and frequent problem across virtually all 
research studies on Africa. Many African studies lack reliable and consistent data while some 
of the key data required for research studies are not always available at the desired levels and 
degrees of frequency, quantity, quality and accuracy. Jarven and Johnston (2015), rightly 
identified this as ‘statistical tragedy in Africa’ when they expressed that most research studies 
on Africa used flawed data made available in different databases. Even from most of the 
reliable sources of data at national and international levels, monthly and quarterly data were 
lacking for all the six WAMZ countries covered in this study. Though, quarterly and monthly 
data were deemed to be more appropriate for these research exercises, these caused this 
researcher to resort to the use of annual data (which were available as at the time of data 
sourcing) in most of the statistical and econometric estimations performed in this work. 
Despite the availability of annual macroeconomic data for the six WAMZ’s countries, the 
non-availability data for Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone (and not too often, The Gambia) at 
this frequency was a specific source of data limitation problems of this study. These were 
even more evident at national offices of statistics and country official economic and financial 
databases. These problems were probably due to lack of good record keeping in some cases 
and could specifically be attributed to the incidence of civil wars in Liberia and the war spill-
over into Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, in order to abate the impacts of this crucial constraints 
of data availability and data reliability on the quality of statistical and econometric 
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estimations necessary for this study as well as the quality of final output, results and findings 
of this research, the major use of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) database as the major 
source of reliable data was resorted to. This database is strongly believed to reflect carefully 
sourced and processed macroeconomic and financial time series data. However, in spite of 
this broad availability of reliable macroeconomic data from the EIU database, monthly and 
quarterly economic data for the WAMZ (as desired and necessary for this research) were still 
not available in many instances.  
Owing to this major limitations, it is necessary to exhibit in charts some key variables and 
time series data available for various statistical and econometric estimations and analyses 
performed in this study. These selected core macroeconomic time series as displayed in 
Appendix 1.1 show various levels of availability (quantity) over different time span as well as 
various data time frequencies (mostly annual) for the six WAMZ countries. 
Although, the availability of some macroeconomic time series across the WAMZ were shown 
in the charts, these charts also reveal the non-availability (either wholly or partly) of some 
data over the period of study for four WAMZ countries, in particular. As ways out of these 
problems, closely related data were sourced to make up for the missing data. For instance, 
where policy interest rates were lacking, money market rates or deposit rate were used to fill 
these related vacuums. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This research work was structured into seven chapters. Following this chapter which 
introduced the work as well as laid the background of the study is Chapter Two which 
displays the review of the concept of monetary integration and the theory of optimum 
currency area, as well as those of the extant empirical literature on monetary integration and 
the flaws in European monetary integration. Chapter Three exhibits the investigations of the 
validity of some macroeconomic and financial stylised facts and theoretical propositions in 
the cases of WAMZ countries. These relate to macroeconomic fluctuations and business 
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cycles, international parity relationships (PPP, IFE and UIP), Philips curves, Lucas 
output/inflation trade-off, exchange rate/markets volatilities and banking sector 
characteristics. Chapter Four reflects empirical assessments of the perspective of some 
properties of the OCA theory, which are macroeconomic dynamics, business cycles, 
inflation, production structures, trade openness, financial system convergence and factor 
mobility. Chapter Five reports the investigation of money and monetary policy related issues 
pertaining to money neutrality and superneutrality, monetary reactions, monetary-fiscal 
policy mix, degree of monetary independence loss and suitability of common monetary 
policy. Chapter Six presents the evaluation of exchange rate and foreign exchange markets 
behaviours in the WAMZ, in respect of exchange rate determination and exchange markets 
pressures while Chapter Seven summarises the entire work, draws conclusions and reflects 
main findings of the thesis, general contributions to knowledge and the implications of the 
study for policy.  
1.6 Conclusions 
This chapter serves as a general background and introduction to this monetary integration 
study on West Africa by enunciating background information and steps followed in 
pursuance of the achievement of the research aims, objectives and questions, highlighting 
aspects covered in the evaluation pointing out the significance of the study as well as 
methodologies involved in relation to data collection and methods of statistical and 
econometric estimations employed within the explained research philosophy and design 
across the seven-chapter research work. These are essential opener of this research reports. 
The next chapter reports the review of theoretical and empirical literature on monetary 
integration and evaluates the EMU’s monetary integration and its associated design flaws and 
lessons derived thereof.  
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Chapter 2 
Review of Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews extant theoretical and empirical literature on related aspects of the 
research study. The theoretical review section of the chapter was limited to theoretical 
expositions of the concept monetary integration and the theory optimum currency area 
(OCA). In order to establish gaps in literature as well as reveal novel contributions of this 
research work, the empirical literature review centre on past research works and studies on 
the prospective monetary integration of the WAMZ and other African monetary integrating 
blocs (the ECOWAS, East Africa Community (EAC), the South African Development 
Community (SADC)) and some other selected monetary integrating regions of the world. The 
OCA assessment of the European Monetary Union was also reviewed in this chapter in order 
to reveal some design flaws in the establishment of the Eurozone, as lessons for future 
monetary policy initiative in regions of the world.  
2.2  Concept of Monetary Integration 
Monetary integration is the last stage in the process of regional economic integration. This is 
entails the construction of monetary union. It is the unification of exchange rate and 
convertibility of currency. Broadly speaking, monetary integration is a concept that embraces 
currency union and single (common) currency area, otherwise known as monetary union. 
There are four distinctive types of monetary integration as identified in many past studies. 
These are: (i) a formal exchange rate system with separate currencies and fluctuations in rates 
of exchange within narrow/zero margins that establishes strong degree of coordination of 
member central banks is established. The one-for-one link of the South African rand with the 
currencies of Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland is a good example of this form of monetary 
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integration; (ii) dollarization is a form of monetary integration in which a poor/small country 
unilaterally adopts the currency of a richer/bigger country, and such richer/bigger country is 
seen as anchor country. With this form of monetary integration, there is no monetary union, 
but a common currency because the currency issuing country does not consider the monetary 
and economic objectives of the country being dollarised. The use of the US dollar by a 
number of countries and dependencies is equally a good example. Practical examples of 
countries that are dollarised are Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama. In history, many countries 
have used the currency of their colonial masters as we saw many countries and dependencies 
used the British pound sterling or French franc one time or the other. These are cases of 
‘official dollarisation in which the small/poor country loses its sovereign monetary policy 
right and the ability to control interest rates and exchange rates;24 (iii) full-blown monetary 
unions are characterised by common currency, common monetary and fixed exchange rate 
policies, common central bank (which formulates the union’s common monetary policy and 
issues the common currency to which all the currencies of member countries are convertible),  
harmonised credit policy and single pool of foreign exchange reserves. Instances of this type 
of monetary integration are the euro zone and the CFA zones in Central Africa and West 
Africa and the East Caribbean dollar being jointly spent by some Caribbean countries; (iv) 
currency boards system entails a country pegging its currency to another currency with zero 
margins. This link between these two currencies is established by an arrangement in which 
the amount of money supply in the currency board country is limited to the level reserves 
held in the second currency.  
From observed theories, the coming together of a group of countries (usually in the same 
geographical location) to form a monetary union should show the following characteristics: 
                                                          
24 Unofficial dollarisation occurs when the currency of a foreign country circulates widely, but such currency is not the 
formal national currency (Rose, 2006). 
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(i) a single central monetary authority which assumes the responsibility of formulating 
monetary policy for the monetary union; (ii) a single currency; (iii) unrestricted flow of the 
union’s currency among member states; and (iv) the pooling of foreign exchange reserves of 
member state. When these features are visible and the conditions are fulfilled, it results into a 
complete monetary integration known as monetary union in which there should be a single 
currency. Such complete monetary integration has costs stemming from simple relinquishing 
of national currencies and loss of control over important monetary policy instrument which is 
the loss of the ability to conduct a national monetary policy by members of the monetary 
union. 
The usual motivation of coming together to integrate and form a monetary union is out of the 
desire to lower transaction costs that characterise the use of individual currencies and to 
further bring about reduction or outright elimination of the effects on investment and trade 
(which may not be favourable). However, price stability or the stability of the value of money 
is the condition necessary for these potential benefits of monetary unions to be enjoyed. One 
other motivating reason for monetary union formation is the enhancement of anti-inflationary 
credibility of member countries’ monetary policies. Nevertheless, to a large extent, the 
condition that informs individual member countries’ choice of monetary policy is the choice 
made about the exchange rate regime. In a fixed exchange rate regime in which the fixation is 
with a dominant currency, monetary policies that are consistent with the dominating currency 
would be adopted by all member countries. This somehow reduces monetary independence of 
the various domestic monetary authorities. Anti-inflationary credibility may however, be 
attained on the condition that the monetary union exchange rate fixation is with a hard 
currency in order to command price stability. 
There are many institutional arrangement alternatives under which a monetary union’s 
monetary policy could be managed. Firstly, when there is a dominant country, the dominant 
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country’s central bank (which can become the common central bank) may set monetary 
policy for the union as a whole regardless of whether or not the dominant currency circulates 
to other member countries. These member countries can get maximised potential benefits if 
the value of the dominating currency is stable. Secondly, as an alternative, a common 
monetary authority, a supra-national central bank can set monetary policy for the monetary 
union. 
Going by the above features of monetary integration and other associated attributes like 
common economic policies, free mobility of goods, capital and people, fixed exchange rates, 
common institutions and common structural policies, a monetary union therefore translates to 
an area in which there is an immutable relationship between exchange rates. Through 
exchange rate mechanisms, several currencies within a monetary integrating region must be 
fully convertible one into the other at exchange rates that are effectively fixed permanently.  
An optimum currency area as the geographic bloc where the benefits to be derived by internal 
trade through further expansion of the fixed exchange area are balanced by the disadvantages 
of member countries relinquishing the currency valuation and revaluation freedom. What this 
implies is that an OCA is an area reflecting the optimum net advantages of monetary 
integration. These net benefits can be maximised if the area is characterised by labour 
mobility, factor (price/wage) flexibility, diverse economies of members and high level of 
trade openness among members. The OCA theory is fully discussed in the next section of this 
chapter. 
2.3  Theory of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) 
An optimum currency area (OCA) is also a geographical region in which economic 
efficiencies are shared and huge economic benefits are created by a single currency depicting 
a region in which the benefits of forming a monetary union outweigh the cost. Another 
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consensus description of an OCA is that it is a geographical and economic domain that 
operates one currency and one monetary policy with a general means of payments either as a 
single currency or several currencies and whose exchange value are immutably pegged to one 
another with unlimited convertibility for both current and capital market transactions, but 
whose exchange rate fluctuate in unison against the rest of the world. This is from the view-
point of the concept of monetary integration. In short, an OCA is an area that for optimal 
balance adjustments and effectiveness of domestic macroeconomic policy, has fixed 
exchange rates within the area but maintain flexible exchange rates with trading partners. 
There are many criteria for deciding the suitability of countries for an OCA. The general 
agreement among the proponents of ‘optimum currency area’ is that in such region, labour is 
very mobile while economies are faced with same forms of economic shocks. The assertion 
of the OCA literature is that if two or more countries are to share the same currency without 
experiencing negative effects, and that this is necessary and sufficient to meet the OCA 
criteria. This is a position grounded with the assumption that nominal exchange rates are very 
effective; otherwise countries should not abandon their currencies since it would be 
meaningless to do so. As a major macroeconomic stabiliser, exchange rate affects relative 
prices of all goods, terms of trade and wages. Therefore, it is necessary for countries coming 
together to form a monetary union to have some conditions in place so that the functioning of 
nominal exchange rates to be less fascinating or attractive as an adjustment tool. 
The history of the theory of optimum currency area (OCA) dates back to early 1960s when 
the criteria that should gauge the optimality of a region to have a single currency and form an 
optimum currency area (OCA) was first formulated by Robert Mundell in 1961 and further 
developed significantly by Ronald McKinnon in 1963 and Peter Kenen in 1969. These three 
men contributed the main pieces for an academic debate where common notion has not been 
found yet, thus making the theory of optimal currency area an unfinished puzzle. In spite of 
61 
 
the fact that Robert Mundell is known as the father of the theory of optimum currency area, 
(having formulated and named the theory), he was not the first to delve on the issue within 
the idea of the theory.  
The development of the OCA concept came in the context of the discussions of the relative 
advantages of the fixed exchange rate regime over the flexible exchange rate regime. During 
the early part of the Bretton Wood System, economists from many angles had various 
discussions which centre on the result and effect of the fixed exchange regime. Some of their 
conclusion influenced the theory of optimum currency area (OCA). The OCA theory was 
developed when the Bretton Wood System of fixed exchange was still in operation. What 
Mundell did was to determine if it would be optimal for currency of countries to float freely 
(Mundell, 1961). The predominant focus of Mundell was on areas with a single currency in 
which the control of money supply would be in the hands of one central bank.  
Discussions on the OCA theory and field associated with it can be categorised into two: (i) 
the Friedman’s View; and (ii) the views of Mundell, McKinnon and Kenen. Though, 
regarded as two groups of opinions, Kawai (1998) however sees Friedman to have opted for 
flexible exchange rate while Dellas and Tavlas (2009) see Friedman as having a critical view 
on policies that brings stabilisation at the domestic level in accordance with the traditions of 
Keynesian economists. In the 1950s, it was generally assumed that Friedman called for 
flexible exchange rate regime, but Boyer (2009) however regards Friedman as the man who 
laid foundation for the subsequent theory of optimum currency area. 
There are two major phases of contributions to the theory of optimum currency area: (a) the 
Pioneering Phase (first wave); and (b) the Cost-benefit Phase (second wave).  In the 
Pioneering Phase Robert Mundell (1961), Ronald McKinnon (1963) and Peter Kenen (1969) 
are the important authors regarded as the traditional contributors of the OCA theory. Notable 
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authors and contributors in the Cost-benefit Phase (second wave) are Corden (1972), 
Ishiyama (1975), Tower and Willet (1976) and Mundell (1973).  
2.3.1 Labour Mobility and Wage Flexibility - by Robert Mundell   
The initial contributions to the theory of OCA were made by Robert Mundell in 1961 when 
he identified factor mobility as the strategic attribute of an OCA. Mundell’s “Theory of 
Optimum Currency Areas” can rightly be placed in the post-war exchange rate controversy. 
During the 1950s, there were great criticisms of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate 
system. There were shifts in favour of flexible exchange rates based on two fundamental 
premises that: (i) changes in exchange rates are more appropriate tools for the correction of 
imbalances in current account; and (ii) countries have more freedom to pursue their own 
domestic macroeconomic policy objectives through flexible exchange rates.25 Mundell 
(1961), in his OCA paper raised the caution about the workability of a floating exchange rate 
regime when he identified two logically distinct questions on flexible exchange rate. The first 
was if flexible exchange system can effectively and efficiently be implemented in the modern 
world economy, while the second questions was on how the world should be divided into 
currency areas. The focus of Mundell’s article was on the second question pertaining to the 
domain of a currency area. His major concern was the cost of a common currency when there 
is a shock within an economy. His OCA theory gives the conditions to be met by countries if 
membership of a monetary union is to be attractive. This is simply by ensuring that the 
benefits of going into a monetary union exceed its costs. According to Mundell’s theory of 
OCA, a group of countries within a monetary union will benefit from a common currency if 
three conditions are met. Firstly, that the member countries within the monetary union should 
not be hit by shocks that are too asymmetric. This implies that one country within the union 
                                                          
25 Though there had been further developments and experience pointing out that economies are not insulated by floating 
exchange rate, but alter the nature of interdependence (Krugman (1989). 
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should not be hugely or greatly worse-off while other countries within same region are 
blossoming or booming. The more likely a country could suffer an asymmetric shock, the less 
the benefit such country will enjoy in being a part of a common currency regime. This is 
owing to the fact that when a country joins a monetary union and gives up its currency, it 
equally gives up its autonomous monetary policy.26 Secondly, that the degree of labour 
mobility and/or wage flexibility within the union should be high. This condition is a caveat to 
the first condition and it portends that monetary union member countries that are hit by 
asymmetric shocks should have a high degree of labour mobility if they want to enjoy the 
monetary cooperation and continue to be members of the union. The logic is that, due to 
recession, the rate of unemployment will rise in the asymmetric shock country and the 
adverse effect of the shock will be minimised if the unemployed in such country can move to 
other member countries within the union to find jobs. Wage flexibility is a factor that would 
ease out unemployment if job seekers/workers in an asymmetric-shock-hit country within the 
monetary union are willing to accept lower wages. This would cause firms to hire workers 
cheaply, lower prices and make their products competitive.27 Thirdly, that a decentralised 
fiscal policy should be in place to ensure the transfer of money or other resources from 
countries that are performing well within the union to the bad-performing countries within 
the union. This condition is also a caution about the first condition. This central authority will 
redistribute revenue (within the union) from countries that are on good standing and to 
countries that are performing badly.28 In Mundell’s view, there would be less need for 
monetary policy when the labour factors are more mobile and wages are more flexible. In his 
summary of Mundell’s contributions, DeGrauwe (2005) categorises Mundell’s position into 
three main concepts: (i) symmetry (of shocks); (ii) flexibility; (iii) integration.  
                                                          
26 Giving up its autonomous monetary policy removes the ability of such country to respond to external shocks. 
27 This is with the prospect of economic stimulation. 
28 Basically, this will help-out member countries that are affected by asymmetric shocks. 
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The second phase of Robert Mundell’s seminal work on optimum currency area and common 
currency was published in 1973. This work, popularly regarded as ‘Mundell II’ or ‘The 
Second Mundell’is believed to be an “outgrowth of Monetarism”.29 ‘The First Mundell’ (the 
1961 traditional OCA theory) is seen as very much a Keynesian theory posited that effective 
stabilisation of the economy can be achieved through the use of monetary policies/exchange 
rate policies in a world where price and wages are rigid. ‘The Second Mundell’ was of the 
view that exchange rates will cease to be a force of stabilisation in a world where the mobility 
of capital is free (Mundell, 1973). Mundell stressed that exchange rates serves as a factor that 
destabilises speculative movements and as a result of this, large asymmetric shocks would 
result. What this implies is that after abandoning an asymmetric shock, exchange rate can be 
applied as a stabilisation factor. By further implications of position of ‘The Second Mundell’, 
membership of a monetary union should be such that should be associated with benefits of 
eliminating asymmetric shock sources but not that associated with costs caused by loss of 
exchange rate which ought to serve as mechanism for adjustment.  
‘The Second Mundell’ has another insight that capital markets can only be fully integrated in 
a monetary union. This centres on the view that capital markets can be made to serve as 
mechanism for insurance against asymmetric shocks.30 Thus, a basic position of ‘the Second 
Mundell’ is that countries that are outside a monetary union have severe restrictions in their 
ability to insure against traditional asymmetric shocks and therefore they will have to strive 
hard to deal with huge asymmetric shocks that are sourced from international capital inflows 
instability. These analyses consequently made ‘the Second Mundell’ an advocate of monetary 
union worldwide.   
                                                          
29 A basic point stressed in Monetarism is that central banks should be price stability maintenance focused since ‘activist 
monetary policy leads to instability’. Logically, the view of Monetarism points to the position that central banks, in the first 
place, do not have the capacity to stabilise the national economies, so they have no such capacity to lose when opting to join 
a monetary union and consequently, to Monetarists, the costs of a monetary union is minimal. 
30 Capital markets in other nations of the world provide insurance against asymmetric shocks and it is hoped that countries 
that are not within a monetary union cannot benefit from such insurance. 
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In critical evaluation of Mundell’s contributions, Corden (1972) argued that the problem of 
adjustments in two asymmetric shock countries cannot be solved by the long run capital 
mobility, though short-run mobility of labour may be valuable. The argument of Grubel 
(1970) is that because Mundell failed to show the difference between the forms of labour 
mobility, how Mundell defines a region does not apply to the real world problem. In his own 
reaction, Ingram (1969) observes that when Mundell defined ‘regions’, he should have made 
the definition within the context of capital mobility rather than labour mobility, highlighting 
further that in an area that is multi-regional, if there is unemployment in one region, the other 
region must embrace inflation so as to wipe off the unemployment and that different degrees 
of inflation are therefore expected in the regions. 
2.3.2 Size and Openness of the Economy - by Ronald McKinnon 
Ronald McKinnon (1963) emphasised on the size and the degree of openness of an economy 
as a factor that is crucial in an OCA. McKinnon, while agreeing with the idea of Mundell that 
factor mobility is a determinant of an OCA, complement this idea with another criterion, ‘the 
openness of an economy’. An OCA was further defined by McKinnon as a single currency 
area within which monetary-fiscal policy and flexible external exchange rates can be used to 
give the best resolution of three (sometimes conflicting) objectives of full employment, price 
stability and external balance. While analysing an economy from the view point of trade, 
blended with openness, he defined the ‘degree of openness of an economy’ as the ratio of 
tradable goods to non-tradable goods31  He identified trade structure as a measure of openness 
of an economy towards reducing the risk an economy can suffer from shocks.32  McKinnon 
develops two economic scenarios: (i) economy with a high level of tradable goods 
                                                          
31 Tradable   goods are exports and imports goods that are produced outside the country and domestically. Non tradable good 
are those goods produced within the country and which are not involved in international trade. 
32 McKinnon is not the only advocate of “degree of openness” as an OCA criterion. Baldwin and Wyplosz  (2009) conclude 
that countries which are open to trade and which trade heavily with each other would easily form an optimum currency area. 
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consumption (high degree of openness); and (ii) economy with a high level of non-tradable 
goods consumption (low degree of openness).  
McKinnon’s view point was that an OCA must achieve full employment, external balance 
and internal price stability. In an open economy, variable exchange rates will significantly 
impact the price level stability because of the high level of tradable/non-tradable ratio and 
possible devaluation that would increase costs of tradable, and that it is possible to control 
full employment, external balance; but the increase in cost of tradables will have impact on 
internal price stability. 33 Thus the argument by McKinnon (1963) was that in an open 
economy, there is a higher likelihood that the cost of tradables (foreign prices of tradables) 
will transmit to the domestic price level and domestic cost of living with the effect of reduced 
money illusion as the exchange rate influences price and wage contract. The implication of 
this is that exchange rates are inefficient in effecting changes in terms of trade and hence, 
cannot be useful as adjustment mechanism even if it can influence wage contract and price 
level. This was the basis for McKinnon to conclude that while a closed economy will benefit 
from a flexible exchange rate regime, fixed exchange rate is favourable to an open economy; 
and for this reason, such open economies will not lose much by moving from flexible 
exchange rate regime to a single currency union.  
Therefore, McKinnon’s emphasis was that the more the country is open to the world, the 
lower the benefits of flexible exchange rates. Any exchange rates variation in a highly open 
country is without any impact on the terms of trade and real wages because the change in the 
price of the currency will affect both the export price of domestic products and import price 
of foreign products. One further conclusion by McKinnon was that the adopted exchange rate 
regime could be influenced by the size of the economy. Hence, a small economy with a high 
                                                          
33 As previously specified, there are conflicts among the three objectives stated by McKinnon (full employment, external 
balance and internal price stability). 
67 
 
ratio of tradable goods would derive benefits from pegging its currency to a foreign currency 
and joining a larger common currency area, whereas a large open economy can maintain 
flexible exchange rate. This is because such large economy is more self-sufficient and 
usually, a smaller part of its GDP is engaged in foreign trade and consequently, changes in 
the exchange rate would influence only a smaller part of its economy. 
McKinnon’s contributions and his theoretical framework on the theory and property of OCA 
can fully be recognised within the circle of contributions to discussions on optimal exchange 
rate. As the Mundell’s centre of attention was labour mobility and wage flexibility and other 
factors that can make exchange rate adjustment to be abundantly useful, McKinnon’s 
attention was towards goods market and the conditions that causes exchange rate adjustments 
to be ineffective and thus make integration of goods market (in highly open economies) a 
factor that is necessary and conducive for an OCA.  
2.3.3 Diversification of Production - by Peter Kenen 
Peter Kenen (1969) introduced ‘product diversification’ as a more relevant criterion of an 
optimum currency area. Kenen (1969) said: “diversity in a nation’s product mix may be more 
relevant than labour mobility”. His view is that it is impossible for a perfect labour mobility 
to exist and that an economy that is well-diversified would have diversified export sector and 
the law of large numbers will come into play and its aggregate export then are sure to be 
more stable than those of an economy that is less thoroughly diversified. He further 
highlighted that each industry operating within an economy is vulnerable to external shock 
and that if these shocks are not correlated, the effects of a positive shock in an industry can be 
cancelled by the negative shock in another industry, thus affecting stability of the total export. 
However, diversification may not bring forth stability in the whole export sector if payment 
imbalance takes its origin from macroeconomic disturbances. Actually, the whole economy 
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would be affected. Therefore, economies that are well diversified are less vulnerable to 
external shock and would least require flexible exchange rates to correct external imbalance 
or maintain external balance. A well-diversified national economy will not have to undergo 
changes in its terms of trade as often as a single-product national economy (Kenen,1969). 
Kenen however, gave exceptions to his product diversification criterion: (i) that there may be 
a small marginal propensity to import; and (ii) that his views does not apply if business cycle 
swings cause changes in export demand. In the case of a self-sufficient large economy with a 
small export sector, any exchange rate change would only cause an eventual small overall 
effect because of the small part of the economy that is being impacted. Therefore, a small 
economy that does not diversify its product should be more open so as to be able to pay for 
its import with export revenue. This is a sort of conversion of Kenen’s product diversification 
criterion into McKinnon’s openness criterion. Further relevant point raised by Kenen is that 
the impact of a diverse shock on a common currency area can be lessened by fiscal 
integration in which there would be fiscal transfers between countries. 
2.3.4 The New Theory of Optimum Currency Area 
Further to contributions made by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), there 
are many other inputs into the OCA theory by known economists.  
After the emergence of the OCA theory in the early 1960s and through to mid-1970s, 
researches on the optimum currency area were minimal probably because of the lack of 
practical monetary cooperation around the world. The emergence of the EMU in the early 
1990s sparked the re-birth of the OCA theory as many research interests on the topical issue 
arose. Developments in international economic theory have revived interests in the OCA 
theory and “have allowed the original optimum currency area approach to be cast in a new 
light”. The OCA theory had to be revised as progress in economic research was being 
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recorded. In the opinion of De Grauwe (1992), these new developments in the OCA theory 
should be regarded as the New Theory of Optimum Currency Areas.34  
An early acknowledgement that only one criterion should not determine an optimum currency 
area was made by Ishiyama (1975). His position was that it is necessary for the cost/benefit 
evaluation to be made before the decision to join a common currency area is finalised. 
Krugman (1993) identified that among the countries forming a common currency area, 
inflation rates differentials and wage increase differentials are important criteria that should 
be considered. He however concluded that the practical problems of monetary reforms and 
exchange rates policy are addressed by the theory of OCA in little ways. Tower and Willet 
(1976) opined that when new criteria are included in determining the optimum currency area, 
such new criteria (which they believed are not specific theories) will show analytical powers 
of the OCA that delve on the relative costs and benefits of the exchange rates regimes (fixed 
and floating) for an economy joining the currency area. In much more details, Tower and 
Willet emphasised the relevance of determining the benefits and costs of a currency area to a 
country through graphical analyses of the relative net benefits of flexible exchange rates 
system in comparison with those of a currency area. In the graphical representations, they 
were able to show that when they are increases in the degree of openness, the benefits of 
flexible exchange rate will fall, leading to benefits of a currency area; and that with these 
relationships, it is therefore possible to be at a point where the statu quo exchange rate would 
be outweighed by the common currency area.  On the criteria for joining or forming a 
common currency area, modern theorists added that synchronisation of business cycles as a 
criterion, with the view that synchronisation of business cycles of proposed member countries 
of a currency area would reduce the cost of putting in place, individual monetary policy that 
                                                          
34 A good analysis will reveal that the New Theory of Optimum Currency Areas are more of OCA potential benefits while 
potential costs of common currency areas are the central focus of the traditional theorists of common currency area. 
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confronts business and economic  disturbances. Literature that identify these include 
Krugman (1993) and Frankel and Rose (1997), among others.  
There had been huge modifications in the theory of optimum currency area as discussions 
have shifted to expectation formation, credibility and time inconsistency. From time 
inconsistency view-point, if policy makers and wage setters play game, there may be increase 
in inflation.35 It is possible to record reduced costs of lowering inflation if central bank is able 
to increase its credibility. A traditionally high inflation country can gain credibility by ‘tying 
its hands’, that is, pegging its exchange rate to a low inflation country and therefore there is 
an associated important benefit to a would-be member of a currency union. 
Following the earlier literature on ‘Discretion versus Credibility’,36 Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002) concluded that a monetary authority have to acquire credibility for low inflation in 
order to convince private agents that they are transparent. In the alternative, such monetary 
authority may adopt a fixed exchange rate regime that is credible in its entirety or rather opt 
to join a common currency area so as to cancel out the problem of inflation bias. If a country 
is trying to disinflate, the joining of a common currency area with lower inflation will not 
cause a problem of difference in inflation rate preference because countries in the monetary 
union will share the same low inflation goal. However, Gandolfo (1992) acknowledged that 
inflation similarities are not necessarily a precondition for joining a common currency area, 
though joining a common currency area might lead to similarities in inflation rates.  
The above leads to discussions of the theoretical frameworks on expectation theory, time 
inconsistency, discretion, credibility and policy rules as developed by Kydland and Prescott 
                                                          
35 See Barro and Gorden (1983) 
36 Following the earlier literature on ‘discretion vs credibility’, Kyland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) are 
pioneer writers of papers on discretion and credibility. 
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(1977), subsequently elaborated by Barro and Gorden (1983) and later by DeGrauwe (1992). 
According to these contributors, the central point of modern OCA theory is that the monetary 
integration may results in more benefits when there is high level of inflation divergent, even 
as the traditional theory of the OCA concluded that inflation convergence is a precondition 
for an optimum currency area. The reason adduced for this is that a reputation for low 
inflation rate could be achieved overnight by a high inflation country when such country can 
accept the control of central bank with (or working towards) low inflation. Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) highlighted that the optimal control theory would fail where rational 
economic agents would always want to maintain and adjust future expectations; thus leading 
to discretionary policy which gives the agents and policy makers opportunity to play either 
the divergent or the convergent game relative to the mix in policy outcome which is though 
stable, but not often optimal socially. The effectiveness of monetary policy is another issue 
raised in modern OCA literature. Though Corden (1972) argued that there would be loss of 
direct control over monetary policy and exchange rate by a country that joins currency area. 
This position has however, been contradicted by recent contributors to the OCA theory. 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) stressed that the loss arising from giving up monetary policy will 
not attract a significant cost if such country is unable to use monetary policy effectively and 
adequately.  Mongelli (2002) opined that if exchange rate adjustment mechanism is not active 
in the actual sense, then the cost of losing exchange rate as an instrument of adjustment is 
insignificant. The conclusion by Alesina, Barro and Tenreyero (2002) was that the higher the 
correlation between the costs of shocks between potential member countries of a monetary 
union, the lower the cost of giving up monetary independence. 
Many literature on the theory of OCA are of the political that rather than economic criteria, as 
an OCA may hinge on long term political commitments of the member states political 
decision makers. Mintz (1970), emphasised that the most important factor for forming 
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currency areas is the political willingness of the central authorities to pursue monetary 
unions. Thinking along this same line, many literature in the 1990s (Bean, 1992; Goodhart, 
1996; Feldstein, 1997) shared this same view that political commitments govern the 
aspirations of the European Monetary Union (EMU) at its formation stage. Making 
contributions about the aspirations of the EMU, Goodhart (1996) argued that attempting to 
fix even more rigid, and supposedly irrevocable currency linkages in advance of, and in the 
absence of, political and fiscal cohesion among the member states, is a dangerous exercise; 
and further that currency union is essentially a function of political cohesion.  In his own 
contributions in respect of political willingness, Ingram (1969) highlighted that stressing the 
definition of an OCA may be wasted efforts because in deciding on a country’s exchange rate 
regime, economic considerations would take a “back seat”.  Neumeyer (1998) posited that the 
cost of reducing the number of assets held in an economy and the benefits derived when 
excessive volatility in exchange rates is reduced could lead to the adoption of a currency 
union. While identifying the difference between political shocks and economic shocks, 
Neumeyer points out that resources are efficiently allocated through exchange rate 
fluctuations which reflects economic shock and that the volatility that results from political 
shocks (non-economic shocks) reduces the degree of financial market efficiency. According 
to him, “political interference in monetary affairs implies that given the realisation of an 
economic shock, there is still uncertainty about the future actions of monetary authorities 
since such actions will be influenced by future political events. The timing of monetary 
stabilisation in inflationary economies, the value at which currencies enter fixed exchange 
rate regime and exchange rate realignments are instances of monetary policy decisions that 
depend on the realisation of political shocks”. He interestingly argued further that “currency 
union and permanently fixed exchange regimes can be viewed as monetary rules that 
attempts to improve welfare by insulating money from domestic politics”.  
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2.3.5 Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria 
The idea that OCA criteria are endogenous was first raised by Frenkel and Rose (1998) when 
they provided a new and slight dimension to the discussions on the suitability of a country 
entering a currency union. They argued that because the criteria for an OCA are endogenous, 
the “examination of historical data gives a misleading picture”. This implying that since the 
use of a common currency will also force countries to be an OCA, analysing the historical 
fundamentals of two or more countries for these countries to be in tune before the adoption of 
the same currency is therefore “just part of the movements toward an OCA.37 Frankel and 
Rose felt that every decision to commence a monetary union would affect these OCA criteria. 
Therefore, the economic conditions of a country that could not meet the OCA criteria as at 
the commencement of the monetary union may change when the monetary union is formed 
due to the simple fact that such monetary union is formed. Frankel and Rose further 
conjectured that increased trade in common currency area can cause either increased 
industrial specialisation between regions, in goods in which they have comparative 
advantage, which results with in asynchronous business cycles resulting from industry 
specific shocks; or increased trade can result with increased correlation between business 
cycles if common demand shocks prevail; or if intra-industry trade accounts for most of the 
trade. These are positions that favour the endogeneity of the correlation between international 
trade pattern and international business cycle. The proposition of Frankel and Rose is that 
“the more highly correlated the business cycles are across member countries of a monetary 
union, the more appropriate a common currency”. They are of the view that countries that 
join a common currency are moved together or  closer to meeting the criteria for the optimum 
currency area and that there would be increases in the business cycle symmetries of the 
                                                          
37 In the words of Frankel and Rose (1998), naive examination of historical data gives misleading picture of a country’s 
suitability for entry into a currency union since the criteria are endogenous. 
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proposed member countries as a result of closer ties in international trade and common 
monetary policy. 
Contrary to the specialisation theory, the point being made by the endogeneity of OCA 
criteria is that countries are more synchronised when they come together in a currency union. 
This is because as they are committed to a single currency, they have, by implications, 
resolved to be long term associates in politics, economics and trade. Due to these 
commitments, reciprocal trade and foreign direct investments would be facilitated and this 
would cause more synchronised business cycle. What this means is that at the initial stage, 
there is no need for countries’ business cycles to be synchronised before they can be regarded 
as an OCA candidates implying that the synchronising process commences after joining the 
currency union. With this theory, labour mobility need not be as high as required for the 
theory of specialisation (Frankel and Rose, 1998). 
Three different mechanisms that can make the criteria of the OCA to be endogenous were 
identified by DeGrauwe (2006). Firstly, monetary union can affect trade flows and intensify 
trade integration, thereby increasing the benefits of the monetary union, Secondly, monetary 
integration leads to more intense financial integration thereby facilitating insurance 
mechanism. Thirdly, a monetary union affects the functioning of the labour markets and can 
potentially increase their flexibility, leading to the reduction in the costs of adjusting 
symmetric shocks in the monetary union.  DeGrauwe’s position was that the endogenous 
mechanism will propel a monetary zone towards an optimum currency area because when a 
monetary union is formed, the degree of economic trade integration will increase.38   
Mongelli (2008) identified the endogeneity of the optimum currency area as emerging from 
two main channels. The first is that the degree of openness (that is, the reciprocal trade 
                                                          
38 There are many studies to support this position: Rose (2000) and Rose and Va Wincoop (2001) towards drawing 
conclusions that monetary union positively affects economic integration in very significant ways; thus moving monetary 
union towards the optimum currency area. 
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between the member countries of the currency area) is likely to increase after a single 
currency is launched. This insight is widely accepted. The second channel postulates a 
positive link between trade integration and income correlation. On this insight, there are 
divergent views. Many think that monetary unification would instead, spur specialisation and 
asymmetry of shocks.39  Further to these, DeGrauwe and Mongelli (2005) revealed three 
more sources of endogeneity of the optimum currency area as: (i) the endogeneity of product 
and labour market;40 (ii) the endogeneity of symmetry of shocks and (similarly) 
synchronisation of outputs;41 and (iii) the endogeneity of financial integration or equivalently 
of insurance schemes provided by capital markets.42 Mongelli however, identified that the 
common thread of these sources of OCA endogeneity is that monetary integration represents 
a removal of borders (very broadly, intended to include also national monies) that contributes 
to the narrowing of distances and a change in the incentive structure of agents. The theory 
and evidence are strong to suggest that a monetary union can potentially be moved towards 
the optimum area by the dynamics of endogeneity (DeGrauwe, 2006).  There were further 
developments of the endogeneity of the OCA criteria as put forward by Corsetti and Pesenti 
(2002) showing the self-validating nature of common monetary policy as they conclude that 
the best institutional device to guarantee a credible policy commitment to a monetary policy 
is to have the monetary union itself in a place.  
 
 
2.4 Empirics of Monetary Integration 
This section, review of some empirical literature on the assessment of some region from the 
stand-points of the concept of monetary integration and the OCA theory. While emphasis was 
                                                          
39 Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1977), Mongelli (2005). 
40 Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and St Paul and Bentolila (2002) 
41 Melitz (2004) and Firdmuc (2005) 
42 Adjuate and Danthine (2003) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha (2003) 
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placed on literature relating to monetary regions of African, summary review were made in 
respect of literature on some selected regions of the world in order to identify gaps in 
literature and highlight the novel contributions of this research work.  
2.4.1 Review on Monetary Integration of the WAMZ and ECOWAS  
The first part of this review considers studies that got evidences to conclude about monetary 
integration feasibility of the WAMZ and ECOWAS. In a study on ECOWAS, Ogunkola 
(2005) adopted a model of real exchange rate (RER) variability to draw an optimistic 
conclusion that the sub region of Africa is closer to a monetary union, with a cautious note on 
the difference between the tangible RER shock variations in the CFA countries relative to the 
non-CFA zones, while advising that further convergence is desirable. With a gravity model of 
bilateral trade among countries of ECOWAS, Diop (2007) established substantial gains in 
trade caused by WAEMU membership and structural factors, concluding that ECOWAS as a 
monetary union would enhance intra-regional trade, while advocating for macroeconomic 
policy/action convergences, structural reforms and infrastructural development. Omotor and 
Nirtingiye (2011) applied a model of simple bivariate variant of the VAR in assessing the 
WAMZ as an OCA. This study on economic shock symmetries and their effects on member 
economies suggested the feasibility of the WAMZ constituting an OCA as evident by the 
similarities in the pattern of variations in the volatility of output growth and inflation of the 
WAMZ economies; though with some results reflecting ‘weak modesty’ of the VAR applied 
for the assessment. 
Applying various methodologies, some research assessments of the feasibility of the 
monetary integration of WAMZ/ECOWAS as currency union got evidences to conclude 
around ‘conditional feasibility’. Debrun et al. (2005) applied fiscal-monetary policy 
calibration model in analysing and drawing conclusion that the primary obstacle to a viable 
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monetary integration of the ECOWAS is the lack of fiscal convergence, while suggesting 
feasibility only for the non-WAEMU countries. Although Debrun et al advocated  fiscal 
heterogeneity to be of benefit to all member countries of a monetary union, they however 
specifically suggested  (as a condition) that the membership of Nigeria in the current 
monetary integration plans would not offer benefits to other ECOWAS countries involved 
except plans are incorporated for effective containment of the financial needs of Nigeria. 
However, beyond the desirability of fiscal convergence, Iyare et al (2005) suggested the 
establishment of functional payment system mechanism and labour mobility for the success 
of the proposed ECOWAS monetary union. Ojo (2005) attributed possible failure of future 
monetary integration of the West Africa to political instability and inadequacy of political 
commitments with the sub-region, while Obaseki (2005) highlighted lack of a common 
market needed to complement the monetary integration initiatives of the WAMZ. Sagbamah 
(2005), taking a cue from the EU (in tune with Ojo (2005)) suggested that ECOWAS needs 
strong political will, homogeneity of products and financial markets, sound and basic 
economic structures and infrastructural facilities to transit to a viable monetary union.  
The dynamic factor analysis of output fluctuation synchronisation among ECOWAS 
members by Celasun and Justiano (2005) led to the gathering of evidence to suggest that 
rather than wider monetary union, the success of monetary integration of the sub-region 
should be on subsets of countries. This conclusion was drawn from the evidence revealing 
small countries as having more comparative harmony in output variations. Benassy-Quere 
and Coupet (2005) evaluated the optimality of the WAMZ, ECOWAS, WAEMU and 
CAEMU (17 sub-Saharan African countries in all) with cluster analyses and concluded about 
the ‘economic impracticability’ of the inclusion of Nigeria as part the ECOWAS monetary 
integration, further suggesting the non-optimality of the WAEMU which could be feasible 
with The Gambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone thus revealing that the WAMZ should not be 
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centred around Nigeria. From monetary and macroeconomic stability perspectives, Balogun 
(2007) came up with a conjecture testing the ineffectiveness of the influence of independent 
monetary and exchange rate policies on domestic activities (particularly, output and inflation) 
in the WAMZ and the counter-productivity of these indicators. Findings from this study 
suggested that domestic monetary policy (captured by money supply and credits to 
government) hurt real domestic output, thus causing growth stagnation; and that further 
output expansion could not adequately dampen the fuelling effects of past inflation just as 
exchange rate devaluation had no effect on growth in the short run, but manifested in 
domestic inflation in the WAMZ. Balogun (2007) thus got evidence to draw conclusion that 
under an appropriate monetary union arrangement, the WAMZ countries (as a condition) 
would be better-off by surrendering their independence over monetary policy instruments to 
the proposed regional body, just as adverse effects of interest rate on output was established 
contrary to theoretical proposition of inverse relationship. A cost-benefit analysis of the West 
African region was made by Masson (2006) to assess the endogeneity of OCA which led to 
the conclusion that without Nigeria, ECOWAS would be feasible form a monetary union, 
adding that substantial trade impact among potential member countries could be endangered 
by a monetary union. However, in the assessment of the same ECOWAS bloc, Masson 
(2008), performed a welfare gain analysis in which it was concluded that monetary 
integration would only be feasible on the condition of ‘selective expansion’. In same vein, 
Bangake (2008), applying system of simultaneous equation and GMM to study exchange rate 
volatility in 21 African countries concluded that the monetary integration of the WAMZ will 
be feasible  with the membership Ghana, but not of Nigeria. Coulibaly and Gnimassous 
(2013) also concurred with some previous literature on the exclusion of Nigeria from the 
proposed WAMZ or ECOWAS monetary integration in the assessment of the optimality of 
monetary union for the West African bloc, employing a ‘new estimation methodology catch-
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up’ co-movement between exchange rate misalignment as well as cluster analysis. While 
stressing that the WAEMU is the ‘most homogeneous’ monetary zone, the monetary union 
could be enhanced with the membership of The Gambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone while 
indicating Senegal and Ghana as reference member countries for the creation of the monetary 
union. 
Further evaluation of the WAMZ by Balogun (2009) examined the determinants of inflation 
differentials in a panel study of the WAMZ vis-à-vis the set macroeconomic convergence 
benchmark since 2000 when the plan to form the currency union commenced. In this study, 
empirical models based on the theoretical foundations of the New Keynesian underpinnings 
were estimated leading to the evidence (gathered from a stylised 5-country inflation rate 
differential model of the WAMZ) that the desired price stabilisation target could not be 
attained because the unweighted average regional inflation rates varied widely among the 
WAMZ countries and were often above the single digit target; and that the major monetary 
policy instruments determinants of inflationary divergence are in the pursuance of distortions 
in interest rates, exchange rates overvaluation and expansionary monetary policies. These led 
to the conclusion that the WAMZ countries have a very slim chance of attaining price 
convergence in the foreseeable future; and that these countries would be better-off 
conditionally on surrendering their inferior price stabilisation approach to a supranational 
monetary authority that would have the ability to enforce strict compliance with regional 
monetary and inflation targets.   
Ekpoh and Udoh (2013) rather than making direct analysis of feasibility of a monetary union, 
focussed on bringing forth those requirements for transition to a monetary union in an 
exploratory study of the convergence criteria for transiting ECOWAS to a monetary union. 
They gave analytical perspective of cost of monetary union stability and the loss of specific 
ability of member countries to stimulate aggregate output with the use of monetary policy and 
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concluded that monetary integration of ECOWAS is feasible at the price of monetary policy 
(which is the loss of ability to apply monetary policy to boost output), but on the condition 
that sound coordination of economic policies and channels of effective risk-sharing are made 
towards improving the consolidation process of the proposed monetary union. Asongu 
(2014a) employed cointegration and VECM to assess the REER imbalances and 
macroeconomic adjustment in the proposed WAEMU and findings revealed that the long-run 
behaviour of RER in the WAEMU are explained by changes in productivity, terms of trade, 
investments, and trade openness with evidence of stability of error correction mechanisms in 
which four (out of five) long run relationships exhibiting the correct signs (thus establishing 
cointegration), but displaying dissimilar nexus of macroeconomic fundamentals with the 
equilibrium as shown by the evident substantial cross-country disparities in connections 
between the RER and these fundamentals. Harvey and Cushing (2015), investigated if the 
WAMZ is an OCA in a study in which a structural VAR, impulse response functions and 
variance decomposition methods were applied to gather evidence to conclude that due to the 
uncommon sources of shocks (caused by diverse country-specific economic structures) and 
asymmetric responses to common demand, monetary and supply shocks, it is not in the 
interest of individual members of the WAMZ to go into a monetary union now or in the 
nearest future unless the economies of these countries converge further. In a study on 
ECOWAS, Saka et al (2015) got evidence of income convergence overtime when panel least 
square method was used to estimate beta convergence, but further suggested further 
integration towards achieving long-run steady growth. 
The third strand of empirical literature under review here are those of the studies that 
concluded that the monetary integration of the WAMZ and/or ECOWAS is impracticable and 
therefore not feasible. The fiscal-monetary policy interaction analysis of Debrun et al (2005) 
gathered evident to prove that the monetary union proposed for the non-WAEMU bloc 
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(principally, the WAMZ) is not feasible for member countries. Houssa (2008) used a 
dynamic factor VAR model to assess the feasibility of monetary integration of the ECOWAS 
region and got evidence of ‘no feasibility’, claiming that from an economic view-point, the 
integration would be costly due to the asymmetries in supply shocks, although, within the 
proposed currency area, some positive correlation in demand shocks are evident, but not as 
relevant as supply shocks because of their temporal effects on output. In another exploratory 
study of convergence criteria of the WAMZ countries, Cham (2009) investigated if the 
member states of the proposed monetary zone meet the macroeconomic convergence and the 
criteria for an OCA with particular focus on openness, output co-movements, inflation, terms 
of trade and current account balances of member states. The conclusion from the empirical 
study is that the WAMZ is not a feasible OCA due to significant absence of convergence. 
Alagidede et al (2012) employed cointegration and fractional cointegration methods to assess 
inflation dynamics as well as common tendencies in the real output of the WAMZ countries 
to gather evidence towards the conclusion that the monetary integration of the WAMZ is not 
feasible because of the substantial heterogeneous inflation and economic trends. Symmetry 
and/or asymmetry of responses of macroeconomic shock was the method applied by Chuku 
(2012) in investigating the feasibility of ECOWAS bloc as a monetary union. The study 
established that 85% of shocks (demand, supply and monetary) within the West African 
region are asymmetric while external or real exchange rate shocks have symmetric tendency 
thus making costs to outweigh benefits and consequently portraying the proposed monetary 
integration of ECOWAS as not feasible. Dufrenot and Sugimoto (2013) used counterfactual 
analysis and simulations to evaluate single currency proposal for West Africa in a study in 
which a dependent-economy model for small commodity exporting countries was estimated 
and applied in comparing some nominal anchor currencies (the yen, the US dollar, the euro 
and the yuan) that boost competitiveness externally and internally in the event of ECOWAS 
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bloc’s fixed exchange regimes. Corresponding simulation produced evidence of little support 
for a dominant peg in the ECOWAS region if (a) exchange rate variability is to be minimised; 
(b) export revenue is to be maximised; and (c) RER misalignment (based on fundamental 
value) is to be minimised and stabilised. Asongu (2013b) applied granger causality analysis 
to examine the ‘embryonic African monetary zones’ at large, in a “short-run Schumpeterian 
trip”. The specific analysis of the WAMZ produced evidence to suggest that the WAMZ is 
not feasible as a monetary zone because of the ‘non-traditional strand of monetary policy 
regimes for which appropriate policy instruments cannot be used in the short-run to offset 
adverse output disturbances. In further evaluation, Asongu (2014b) employed GMM in a real, 
monetary and fiscal policy convergence analysis of the proposed African monetary unions as 
OCAs. The conclusion that the WAMZ was not feasible as a monetary zone was drawn due 
to the lack of real, monetary and fiscal policy convergence, implying a substantial absence in 
the much desired ‘catch-up’ for policy harmonisation. As extension to previous studies, 
Asongu (2014c) applied VAR to gather evidence from output and price in establishing how 
monetary policy would matter in the proposed AMU by coming up with the analyses of how 
monetary policy affects economic activities in the regions of Africa. The evidence gathered in 
this empirical study led to the conclusion that monetary integration of the WAMZ is not 
feasible because of the ineffectiveness of monetary policies as it is evident that the proposed 
WAMZ cannot use policy instruments to suppress adverse output shocks either through 
contractionary policy or expansionary policy. 
2.4.2 Review on Monetary Integration of the East African Community 
Further to the empirical literature review on monetary integration of the West Africa 
subcontinent, this sub section reflects the review of empirical literature on the feasibility 
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assessment of proposed monetary integration of the East African Community (EAC). 
Discussion here are also structured into three categories as in the previous review. 
The Generalised Purchasing Power Parity (GPPP) technique was applied by Mkenda (2001) 
to investigate the optimality of the EAC as an OCA in the study which covered Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda. While the estimated OCA indices yielded mixed results, findings 
gathered from the GPPP estimations produced evidence to suggest that the EAC is an OCA, 
given the cointegration of the RERs of the proposed member countries as well as similarities 
in shocks in estimations using system of simultaneous equation and GMM. Bangake (2008) 
carried out related study on the EAC (as did for the WAMZ) and got results similar to those 
in Mkenda (2001). As peformed in the case of the WAMZ, Asongu (2013b) applied Granger 
causality method in his ‘Schumpeterian trip’ to the EAC to gather evidence that supports the 
feasibility of the EAC as a monetary union because it was evident that short term policy 
instrument can be used in offsetting negative shocks to output. Applying the cointegration 
technique, Falagiarda (2010), though got evidence to suggest the viability of the EAC as an 
OCA, there were indications of doubts over the quality of the findings generated by the study 
due to some statistical and country-specific anomalies. Durevall (2011) assessed the 
recondition of effective monetary integration of the EAC through costs-benefits analyses as 
well as other political and institutional preconditions, drawing conclusions that although 
monetary integration of the EAC is beneficial to member countries, given the following 
factors of success of such integration: (a) the expected contributions of improved monetary 
and indirect contributions to economic integration, (b) political will among policymakers 
(which change of government can easily wipe off), or discontent among influential lobby 
groups. In evaluating growth correlation and variances in the EAC, the study by Sheik et al 
(2011) focussed on business cycle investigation in which business cycle and trends were 
analysed, using cross-country correlation and variance analysis techniques. Investigations in 
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this study generated the conclusion that EAC member countries (apart from Rwanda) show 
similarities in cycles and transitory components, but exhibit dissimilarities in the permanent 
components of growth tendency. A business cycle synchronisation evaluation was conducted 
by Kishor and Ssozi (2011) employing unobserved component model and time-varying 
parameter modelling in which finding gathered pointed towards increased rate of 
harmonisation post EAC Treaty, but weak degree of interrelatedness as evident by small 
common stock among prospective members. However, in spite of the outcome of the 
empirical literature discussed up to this point on the EAC, some empirical assessments have 
raised the conclusion that the monetary integration of the East African sub-region is not 
practicable.  
In the analysis of the cointegration of exchange rates and base money in the evaluation of the 
monetary integration of the EAC, findings by Buigut (2011) revealed partial convergence 
with an implication of high costs for prospective members. This necessitates enormous 
adjustment that will align members’ monetary policies to give room for policy coordination 
tolerance that would enhance the needed convergence essential for the monetary integration 
to be sustained. Rusuhuzwa and Masson (2012) applied correlation and cointegration 
methods to business cycles and shocks to evaluate the design and implementation of the OCA 
properties in the EAC in a costs-benefits analysis and showed that the EAC countries 
exhibited asymmetric shocks, differences in production structures and difficulties in meeting 
convergence criteria (particularly, that of fiscal deficits). Also, using the structural VAR 
method, Mafusire and Brixiova (2013) had the absence of macroeconomic convergence as 
the basis to draw the conclusion of monetary integration impracticability in the EAC and 
advised against quick transition of the EAC to a monetary union. 43 Equally, Davoodi et al 
(2013) applied SVAR in the EAC monetary integration evaluation which was based on the 
                                                          
43 This advice was based on the adopted 2015 take-off date. 
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analysis of the effect monetary policy on inflation and output in the prospective member 
countries.  Findings from this study led to the conclusion that currency union for the EAC is 
not workable due to the conflicting monetary policy transmission mechanisms with a 
reflection of ineffectiveness of mainstream monetary policy instruments. Lepetit et al (2014) 
used a stylised ‘model of policymakers’ decision problems’ which allows for uncertainty in 
rewards from macroeconomic (fiscal and monetary) and financial stability. The conclusion 
raised by the research work indicated that for all the EAC member countries (apart from 
Rwanda – for fiscal stability), uncertainty does not guarantee successful monetary 
integration, particularly from the standpoints of monetary and financial stability. In a study 
that hugely aligned with Davoodi et al (2013), the method of VAR was adopted by Asongu 
(2014c) to generate findings evidencing the general ineffectiveness of monetary policies in 
affecting output and prices in the EAC countries, thus making monetary integration of the 
economic bloc to be viable. When the GMM technique was applied for further study on the 
EAC by Asongu (2014b) to test convergences of real, monetary and fiscal policies, evidence 
gathered from the evaluation suggested that the EAC is not an OCA due to the lack of real, 
monetary and fiscal policy convergences in the EAC countries assessed. Drummond et al 
(2015) dealt with identifying the susceptibility of the EAC economies to asymmetric shocks, 
assessing exchange rate as shock absorber, reviewing the risk-sharing mechanism essential 
for successful monetary integration, considering the likely structural changes in the EAC 
economies (such as new oil discoveries) and checking the intrinsic endogeneity of further 
monetary integration of the East African economies. Applying dynamic regression, cluster 
method based on principal component analysis, SVAR, impulse response function and 
variance decomposition methods, findings from this empirical research showed that though 
there are some similarities in the structures of the EAC economies, shocks over past decades 
are country-specific and cross-country economic growth rates lack synchronicity indicating 
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limited economic convergence. The evidence of dissimilarities across these economies as 
revealed by the cluster analysis points to the conclusion that EAC is not an OCA. For all 
countries (apart from Burundi), exchange rate absorbed asymmetric shocks thus necessitating 
the need for additional tools for further economic stability if country-specific (nominal) 
exchange rate seizes to serve as shock absorber. Further findings from this study revealed that 
exchange rate shocks are sources of disturbance to inflation, but with no material effects on 
output.  
Going further, the review of empirical literature on monetary cooperation in the South 
African bloc of Africa are discussed in the next subsection, under the three strands adopted 
for this and  previous reviews. 
2.4.3  Review on Monetary Integration of the South African Monetary Bloc 
The assessment of the South Africa’s Common Monetary Area (CMA) as an OCA and the 
costs-effects analysis of membership of the CMA were performed by Grandes (2003) who 
applied cointegration and costs-effects analysis methods to identify common long run trends 
which asserted that the CMA is an OCA exhibiting common long term tendencies in their 
bilateral RER and high levels of openness and common diversification which would impact 
the monetary integration positively. Patroba and Nene (2013) also evaluated the readiness of 
the CMA members for a monetary union through the evaluation of the established 
convergence criteria and concluded that it will be beneficial for the CMA to form a monetary 
union. Debrun and Masson (2013) carried out a quantitative welfare gain analysis of the 
SADC to assess the welfare impacts from the CMA (though, extended to some SADC 
countries) and got evidence to establish that: (a) the symmetry in SADC economies will 
benefit all member countries (apart from Mauritius); (b) all members of the SADC (apart 
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from Angola, Tanzania and Mauritius) will benefit if they join the CMA; and (c) it will be 
beneficial for all members of the CMA to participate in the monetary cooperation. 
Within the ‘conditional feasibility’ strand, Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) examined 
divergences in fiscal and monetary policies of the SADC countries by employing the use of a 
GARCH model of RER of these SADC member currency against the South African currency 
to reveal RER shocks. Findings here revealed evidence to suggest that although variations in 
the RERs (caused by country-specific monetary policies) would be hugely eliminated by 
monetary integration, not all members of the SADC should form the monetary union due to 
how the benefits of joining are outweighed by the cost of joining. The degree of the 
convergence of interest rates, inflation and exchange rates within the SADC was examined by 
Jefferies (2007) who observed heterogeneities in full labour and capital mobility, huge 
political constraints and intra-regional trade and evidence to suggest ‘selective expansion’ in 
which member countries are stratified into two groups (i) core convergence group; and (ii) 
non-convergence group. When Wang et al (2007) investigated the feasibility of the monetary 
integration of the CMA by applying integration convergence as well as shock and adjustment 
analyses, they got the proof of feasible monetary integration, which is conditional upon more 
symmetries in responses to shocks within the bloc. Going against the findings and 
conclusions in Khamfula and Huizinga (2004), Bangake (2008) came up with the application 
of GMM and system of simultaneous equation to evaluate monetary integration in some Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and concluded that structurally within the SADC, monetary integration 
is only feasible between three countries (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe). A recent study of 
eleven SADC member countries by Zehirun et al (2015) applied cointegration and VECM to 
gather evidence that the G-PPP hypothesis holds for SADC members (except Angola and 
Mauritius) thus indicating the feasibility of monetary cooperation in SADC without these two 
countries.  
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The only known empirical investigation of the South African bloc which concluded that 
monetary integration is not feasible for the economic bloc was undertaken by Agbeyegbe 
(2009) who performed time-varying estimation of convergence of macroeconomic and 
monetary indicators to gather an evidence of non-convergence in CPI inflation and nominal 
exchange rate within the SADC, thereby suggest the non-viability of monetary integration of 
countries within the SADC. 
The end goal of the monetary integration of African sub-region is the achievement of the 
establishment of an African Monetary Union (AMU) for the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries. Therefore, it is important to conclude the review of literature on the proposed 
monetary integration of African regions by analysing some existing literature assessing the 
feasibility of the AMU initiatives. These are discussed in the next subsection. 
2.4.4 Review on Monetary Integration of the Sub-Saharan Africa 
An exploratory politico-economic analysis of the SSA was made by Guillaumen and 
Stasavage (2000). The investigation found out that monetary integration is the panacea for 
sound commitment towards macroeconomic policy implementation since Africa lacks 
political institutions that can guarantee credible commitment towards establishing financial 
stability. The study recommended the design of monetary unions if better policies are to be 
instituted in maximising effective enforcement of monetary rules. Tsangarides et al (2006) 
employed a tobit gravity model to gather evidence leading to the conclusion that in terms of 
substantial trade benefits, membership of AMU would be beneficial. Yehoue (2005) analysed 
the co-movements of output and price, inflation and trade using historical data of 53 African 
countries to draw the conclusion that the journey to an AMU would be gradual without 
essentially evolving a common currency for the continent as a whole. This implies the 
feasibility of the three economic blocs of Africa as monetary unions, but not for the continent 
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Africa. An augmented gravity model that included measures of currency unions and pegged 
regimes was built by Tsangarides and Qureshi  (2015) to generate results that suggested that 
the effects of conventional peg is large as that of currency unions in Africa, and that currency 
unions (and direct pegs) promote bilateral trade in Africa. What these connote is that African 
countries stands to benefit from fixed exchange regime and that these benefits are comparable 
to those derivable from typical monetary integration.  
Bayoumi and Ostry (1997) analysed sizes and correlation of intra-regional trade real cross-
country disturbances in the SSA in investigating the consistency of currency arrangements in 
SSA with OCA theory. The study got evidence to suggest that SSA as a whole is not feasible 
for monetary integration because of the little proof of rewards for larger currency union in the 
nearest future. Karras (2007) carried out macroeconomic costs-benefits analysis in a study of 
37 African countries. The empirical findings in the research work revealed heterogeneous 
benefits of monetary cooperation across the continent. When the empirical results were 
applied in comparative analysis of net benefits for individual countries, it showed that Nigeria 
in more a promising candidate for AMU membership, even more than Kenya, the largest 
economy in the EAC. 
2.4.5 Summary on Monetary Integration of Some Regions of the World 
Further efforts were made in this chapter to essentially survey the OCA and monetary 
integration empirical literature on some other regions of the world including Asia, Gulf, Latin 
America, the Caribbean, North America and the United States regions. Table 2.1 below 
summarises the empirical literature on the feasibility as an OCA, the ten-member Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, with extension to Asian Big Three (China, Hong-Kong and 
Japan); the East Asian bloc, and South East Asian region. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of Empirical Literature of the Feasibility of Monetary Integration of Asian 
Countries 
No Author (s) Region Methodology 
1  
Bayoumi & Eichengreen 
(1994) 
 
9 Countries  
Blanchard-Quach extraction technique to extract 
and quantify demand and supply shocks; and pair 
correlation of shocks to determine degree of 
integration using EMU as benchmark. 
2 Eichengreen & Bayoumi 
(1999) 
8 Countries Regression of exchange rate volatility and output 
variability and correlation analysis. 
3 Loayza, Lopez & Ubide 
(2001) 
7 Countries Error components model decomposing real value-
added growth to assess shocks and co-movements 
of shocks. 
4 Yuen (2000) East Asia Hierarchical clustering of some macroeconomic 
indicators. 
5  
Bayoumi & Mauro (2001) 
9 Countries Analysis of size and speed of disturbance, using 
EMU as benchmark. 
6  
Ngiam & Yuen (2001) 
9 Countries Using Bayoumi & Eichengreen (1994) 
methodology, but without the use of impulse 
response function and EMU as benchmark. 
7 Lee, Park & Shun (2004) 10 Countries Dynamic factor model of common shocks and 
output co-movements. 
8 Kawai & Takagi (2005) East Asia SVAR model to study the impulse response 
function of real output and price to depreciation of 
exchange rates. 
9 Kawai & Motonishi (2005) 11 Countries Correlation analysis of real variable activities. 
10  Font-Vilalta & Costa-Font 
(2006) 
5 Countries Correlation study of the synchronisation of 
exchange rate. Business cycles, interest rates, 
exports and imports. 
11 Ahn, Kim & Chang (2006) ASEAN 4 GPPP model of RER (Japan as reference currency) 
to study pattern of responses to shocks. 
12 Sato and Zhang (2006) 8 Countries Cointegration tests in assessing real output co-
movements; including Vahid tests and Engle tests. 
13  Nguyen (2007) 10 Countries Fussy cluster analysis of synchronisation of some 
OCA properties (business cycles, volatility of 
RER, openness and inflation differentials). 
14 Rana (2007) 11 Countries Analysis of 10-year moving correlation of real 
output growth of assessed countries and the group 
as a whole. 
15 Jeon & Zhang (2007) North East 
Asia 
SVAR model of macroeconomic shocks to analyse 
the correlation of the extracted shocks. 
16 Bacha (2008) 12 Countries SVAR and correlation analysis of some 
macroeconomic indicators and variables 
17 Ibrahim (2008) 7 East Asian 
Countries 
Hierarchical and fussy clustering method to assess 
OCA and ‘adjusted’ Maastricht Treaty 
convergence criteria. 
18 Kawai (2008) 10 Countries Multi-facet study on various aspects of the region’s 
integration and comparative analysis of the region 
with the post-Euro EMU and other parts of the 
world. 
19 Sato, Zhang & Allen (2009) ASEAN 5 & 
Japan  
Johansen cointegration analysis of long-run co-
movement of real output. 
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20 Quah (2009) 17 Countries Comparison of OCA properties in Asia with those 
of the EMU and dollarised economies. 
21 Han & Lee (2010) East Asia Analysis of OCA (incorporating post-crisis 
structural changes) and composite index of OCA 
criteria. 
22 Volz (2010) East Asia Combination of theoretical and empirical tools to 
analyse various policy options. 
23 Lee & Azali (2012) East Asia Bayesian state-space technique for shock 
symmetry assessment. 
24 Kawasaki (2012) East Asia GPPP model of RER to assess equilibrium 
relationships and common trends. 
25 Lee & Koh (2012) East Asia SVAR method to assess the nature of 
macroeconomic disturbances. 
26 Sharma & Mishra (2012) East & 
South Asia 
Cointegration analysis of real output, impulse 
response and decomposition analysis of shocks and 
GPPP model analysis of RER movements. 
27 Alvarado (2014) ASEAN& 
ASEAN +3 
Construction of OCA indices to assess OCA 
properties. 
28 Navarro (2015) East Asia +3 Simple analysis of OCA properties (factor 
mobility, openness and product diversification) 
Sources: Author’s compilation and various literature. 
Highlights of empirical studies and methodologies employed in some extant literature on the 
feasibility of monetary union in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)44 are summarised in 
Table 2.2 below. 
Table 2.2: Summary of Empirical Literature of the Feasibility of Monetary Integration of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries 
No Author (s) Methodology 
1 Kamar & Bakardzhieva 
(2006) 
Cointegration method of Engle-Granger and 
dynamic ECM to estimate the model of RER and 
its macroeconomic determinants. 
2 Abu-Qarn  & Abu-Bader 
(2008) 
SVAR to assess degree of shock asymmetry and 
test for common trend and common business 
cycles. 
3 Kamar & Naceur (2007) Pooled Mean Group method to assess the long run 
determinants of RER behaviour. 
4 Buiter (2008) Exploratory analysis of economic, political and 
institutional criteria. 
5 Thorpe (2008) Exploratory costs-benefits analysis. 
6 Benbouziane & Benamar 
(2010) 
Multivariate threshold autoregressive (MVTAR) 
model and generalised response functions to 
estimate shocks symmetries. 
7 Loius, Balli & Osman (2012) Bivariate SVAR with long run restrictions to 
assess symmetries in aggregate non-oil supply 
shocks. 
                                                          
44 The GCC six member countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate. 
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8 Kandil and Trabelsi (2012) Multivariate SVAR method to capture patterns of 
shock co-movements. 
9 Alshehry & Slimane (2013) 4-variable SVAR based on Blanchard & Quah 
(1989) to identify structural shocks symmetries and 
some informal tests based on OCA criteria. 
10  Marzovilla (2014) Analysis of OCA criteria to assess cost 
implications of single currency. 
11 Gulzar (2015) Multidimensional scaling (MDS), Scree Tests, 
regression, and correlation analysis to assess 
macroeconomic and financial factors relating to 
Islamic beliefs; and Hofstede Cultural Index to 
evaluate cultural homogeneity 
12 Hamid, Ali and Sbia (2015) Panel cointegration, FMOLS, DOLS, CCR 
techniques to assess cointegrating long run 
equilibrium relationships between money demand 
and its determinants. 
13  Medhioub & Jedida (2017) Temporal correlation to analysis of business cycle 
synchronisation. 
14 Essaadi (2017) Time-varying coherence function to test co-
movement dynamics and synchronisation of 
business cycle. 
Sources: Author’ compilation and various literature. 
Table 2.3: Summary of Empirical Literature of the Feasibility of Monetary Integration of Latin 
American and Caribbean Countries 
No Author (s) Region Methodology 
1 Bayoumi & Eichengreen (1994) Latin America 
(and some 
world regions) 
VAR of supply and demand disturbances to assess 
symmetrical distributions across regions. 
2 Eichengreen (1998) MERCOSUR45 Regression of alternative measures of exchange rate 
volatility on four OCA criteria. 
3 Grabows & Horvath (1999) CARICOM46 SVAR to assess exogenous shock symmetry. 
4 Kendal (2000) CARICOM Cointegration and time-varying parameter (Kalman 
filter) analysis to test exchange rate convergence. 
5 Edwards (2006) Latin America Probit modelling of sudden stops and current account 
reversals in investigating the probability of these 
adverse events on membership of currency union. 
6 Moreira & Mendoza (2007) CARICOM Canonical gravity model of intra-regional trade to assess 
the viability of monetary integration. 
7 Foresti (2011) Latin America SVAR estimation of pattern and similarities of temporal 
shocks. 
8 Ghartey (2008) CARICOM VECM and cointegration methods to assess economic 
shocks 
9 Augustine (2008) CARICOM Simple correlation and concordance statistics of Harding 
& Pagan (1999) to examine business cycle 
synchronisation. 
10  Augustine & Hunte (2008) Selected 
Caribbean 
Kalman filter method to derive time-varying estimates 
of degree of shock convergence. 
                                                          
45 MERCOSUR is made up of five member countries: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay and Venezuela. Recently, 
notification of suspension of membership was handed down to Venezuela. 
46 Members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) include Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Associate members are: Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, 
the Cayman Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.   
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11 Turner & Pentecost (2010) CARICOM SVAR to estimate demand and supply shocks 
correlation. 
12 Cuestas & Dobson (2013) 12 Caribbean 
countries 
Unit root, fractional integration and club convergence 
test to assess similarities of shocks and inflation 
convergence. 
13  Zhao & Kim (2014) Eastern 
Caribbean 
2-variable SVAR to estimate degree of shock symmetry 
14 McKnight & Sanche (2014) 7 Latin 
American 
Countries 
Cointegration, VECM, Granger causality and rolling-
window techniques to investigate shock symmetry (in a 
REER model) and long-run and short-run interactions 
and degree of heterogeneity in monetary policy 
transmission 
15 Colley (2015) CARICOM OLS estimation of augmented gravity model of 
international trade; and Poisson pseudo maximum 
likelihood and least square dummy variable estimations 
to assess viability of the proposed Caribbean Monetary 
Union (CMU).  
16 Kappel (2015) NAFTA47 and 
MERCOSUR 
Correlation and SVAR model of output and price to 
investigate similarities in demand and supply shocks in 
the evaluation of the two blocs’ monetary integration. 
17 Braithwaite (2017) CARICOM Long run VAR approach to examine correlation of 
demand and supply to assess the feasibility of the 
proposed CMU 
Sources: Author’ compilation and various literature 
Agreement (NAFTA) countries. 1 The summary of some relevant empirical literature on the 
feasibility of monetary cooperation of countries within these region and sub-region are 
highlighted in Table 2.3 above: 
There are very scanty literature on the prospects of the monetary integration of Latin 
America1 (including members of the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR), 
and the Andean Community) and the Caribbean (including the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) members and its associate members), including the North American Free Trade 
Having reviewed several literature on monetary integration and OCA analyses of the regions 
of Africa and some regions of the world, the next section and subsections of this chapter 
review of the assessment of the monetary integration of the EMU, bringing out the OCA 
design flaws in the creation of the Eurozone as revealed by the Eurozone crisis. 
                                                          
47 NAFTA countries are Canada, Mexico and United States. 
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2.5 EMU Design Flaws and Eurozone Crisis  
The history of monetary integration in the Europe continent can be traced back to the 
emergence of the Austro-German Monetary Union which commenced in 1857 and lasted till 
1861. Some of the other monetary unions among the European nations were the Latin 
Monetary Union which was in existence for sixty one years (1865-1926) and the 
Scandinavian Monetary Union that existed between 1873 and 1931. The German Monetary 
Union which came into creation in 1876 after many stages of transformation, leading to the 
creation of the Reichmark and the Reichsbank which were precursors of the former German 
currency, the Deutsche mark (DM) and the German central bank, the Bundesbank 
respectively. Genuine efforts towards monetary integration in Europe were made after the 
World War II which Sanchis i Marco (2014) quoting Triffin (1962) describes as the period of 
European ‘liberalism triumphant’. The two major monetary agreements followed: (i) Intra-
European Payments and Compensation (which existed for two years – 1948-1950) and (ii) 
the European Payment Union (which lasted for seven years - (1950-1956) and this was 
regarded as the ‘first step towards convertibility' (Sanchis i Marco, 2014). 
The enthusiasm to have a stronger European monetary union (of single currency) grew 
between late 1960s and early 1970s with various plans (The Barre Plans of 1969, The Schiller 
Plan, and The Werner Plan of 1970). The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) was preceded by the European Monetary Snake which lasted for six 
years between 1972 and 1978. However, the 1969 initial plan for a single European currency 
was stalled by the 1971 collapse of the Bretton Wood System and the 1972/73 oil crisis; thus 
culminating into postponement until the momentum was gathered around the late 1980s and 
early 1990s with the 1989 Jacque Delors Report on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
igniting the course by drawing a 3-stage plans towards realising the formation of EMU. This 
ten-year period (1992-2002) three-stage plan was set towards adopting the single currency 
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(the euro) with the particular aim of fostering the EU economies as regards inflation rates, 
interest rates, exchanges rates, budget deficits and public debts as stipulated by the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992. Eventually, by 1 January 2002, the euro single currency became operational 
as the single currency of twelve (of the fifteen) EU members.  
Around the inception of the euro (the third stage of EMU development), academic literature 
offered a measure of convergence to be met by prospective members of the Eurozone. The 
expected characteristics of the EMU member states in determining the likely success or 
failure of the Eurozone (as offered by the OCA theory) are as summarised in Table 2.4 below 
which shows how the entire Eurozone fared in the achievement of some of the crucial 
convergence factors at the start of the Eurozone: 48 
Table 2.4: Summary of the Posture of the EMU in the Context of OCA Theory and Convergence Factors 
 Convergence Criteria Narration of Achievement in Eurozone 
 Labour Mobility 
 
A variety of measures pointed to the conclusion that labour mobility 
and the speed of labour market adjustment are lower in Europe 
when compared with the United States. Furthermore, in a 2007 
economic survey of the EU, the OECD established that geographic 
labour mobility was low as only 4% of the EU workforce have 
worked lived outside their domestic environments, while language 
barrier was a crucial issue.49 
 Degree of Commodities Market 
Integration 
This relates to the similarity in production structures of the 
Eurozone member countries. There were evidence to support the 
inference that there is dissimilarities in production structures of the 
countries analysed.  
 Openness and Size of the 
Economy 
Many literature on EMU got the evidence to suggest that this is a 
criterion fulfilled as the degree of openness within the Eurozone 
were high across member countries. Willett et al (2010) in 
investigating the endogeneity of the OCA theory observed the rapid 
growth in the intra euro trade/GDP ratios of the Eurozone countries, 
moving from the mid-90s 25% to above 40% by 2000.50 The 
evidence got by Trichet (2006) shows increase in total intra 
Eurozone trade in goods and services from 31.5% to 37.5% between 
1998 and 2005.51 
                                                          
48With reference to Brian Burkitt as quoted by The New Europe Research Trust (2001).  
49 Eichengreen (1991) in an assessment of labour mobility and the incidence of shock in Europe, made the comparison of 
comparable measures between Europe on one hand and Canada and the United States of the other hand. 
50 Though, the test of the assumption of the OCA theory failed in this respect. 
51 This is from a paper presented by Jean-Claude Trichet, the President of ECB at the 15th European Regional Conference of 
the Board of Governors in Paris on 31st March 2006  
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 Degree of Commodity 
Diversification 
Because most Eurozone countries are industrialised nations, it 
would be very easy for these countries to fulfil this condition of 
high level of commodity diversification. 
 Fiscal Integration Eichengreen et al (1990) and Feldstein (1992) established that as at 
the time of going into the EMU, the least satisfied condition was the 
fiscal federation criteria, a flaw described by De Grauwe (2014) as a 
'major design failure'. Pasimeni (2013) making references to the 
'Marjolin Report' of 1975 and the 'MacDougall Report' of 1977 
highlights that the problem of a common fiscal capacity at the 
European level was well noticed. MacDougall (1992) concluded 
that for a foreseeable future, there may not be significant 
development of intra-Eurozone fiscal transfer subsequently after the 
start of the Eurozone. 
 Degree of Political Integration Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) among other literature on the 
establishment of the Eurozone concluded that as at the 
commencement of the Eurozone, monetary union was placed above 
political union. 
 Similarities in Inflation At the stage of entering the EMU, most Eurozone member state 
(courtesy of their ERM membership) took on economic policies that 
strategically caused them to achieve similarities in inflation rates, 
though this was at the cost of high employment rated across the 
whole of Europe (Baimbridge et al, 1998). 
 Price and Wage Flexibility Results from many studies on price and wage flexibility show that 
there were evidences to support the claims that as at the time of 
going into EMU, there were substantial wage-price rigidity across 
Europe.52  
Source: The New Europe Trust (2001) 
The inference drawn from these is that many Eurozone’s member countries failed to meet the 
criteria of the OCA as specified by the theory and as expressed above. 
2.5.1  Eurozone Crisis in the Light of OCA Design Flaws 
Deficiencies and incompleteness of the construction of the Eurozone were exposed by the 
financial crisis which clearly revealed that the euro area is not an OCA. The Eurozone crisis 
is better understood from the view point of the EMU's unique institutional set up in which 
member countries of the Eurozone came together operating common monetary policy with 17 
macroeconomic and fiscal policies. This implies a single currency area made up of many (17) 
sovereign member countries (one money, many economic and fiscal policies). These 
                                                          
52 Blanchard and Katz (1992), Eichengreen, (1991), (1993), Calmfors and Driffil, (1998) and Goodhart (1995) 
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sovereign states were given freedom that is sufficiently enough to safeguard their individual 
diversity, establish their own business model, formulate their own fiscal policies and tailor 
their institutional and other economic and political policies in tune with their respective 
national preferences which are very likely to differ in many respects (like income 
distribution, roles played by the government in manipulating the economy). Member 
sovereign governments bear the consequences of these actions, creating members' 
vulnerabilities while the option of public debt mutualisation among the sovereigns were ruled 
out. In the first instance, the above factor combined together, caused the partial shift of fiscal 
recklessness from one sovereign to the others thus leading to fiscal deficit bias. For the 
monetary union as a whole, a country’s lack of fiscal sustainability has consequences arising 
out of the harmful nature of excessive public debts. In the Eurozone, excessive public debt 
caused upward movements of the long term interest rate for all member. The second instance 
was that Eurozone members' public debts were issued in a currency they cannot create.  A 
favourable implication of the creation of the Eurozone and the introduction of the euro is the 
abundance of capital coming out of the elimination of exchange rate risks. These beneficially 
stimulated real estate investment and consumption (public and private). However, over time, 
there were decline in competitiveness while there were sharp increase in unit labour costs 
within the Eurozone. For instance, during the pre-euro crisis period following the formation 
of the Eurozone, there were per annum increase of 3.0% in Spain's unit labour cost, while 
Germany recorded -0.1% decline over same period. The 2007 financial crisis opened up 
fiscal vulnerabilities apparent in sharp increases in affected member's interest rate and shift in 
investors' sentiment. These trigger the Eurozone crisis. 
Nevertheless, the crisis in the Eurozone could be described as ‘systematic’ in nature, 
springing from the consequences of the flaws in the design, construction and implementation 
of the EMU project. The crisis can be described as self-inflicted crisis which could have been 
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avoided. Specifically, the crisis is a repercussion of the failure to put some essential 
components in place for the formation of a monetary union viz: (a) failure to establish a 
banking union that should accompany the monetary union; (b) failure to institute a lender of 
last resort (LOLR) for sovereign borrowings;53 (c) inadequacy of surveillance and regulatory 
mechanism that should be expected to guide against potentially destabilising effects of credit 
flows within the monetary union and the build-up of members' states' current accounts 
imbalances; (d) too narrow focus on price stability (inflation moderation) on the overall at the 
monetary union's level and at the expense of other macroeconomic targets like economic 
growth, employment, financial stability etc. Going by these, a thorough consideration of 
trends of events in the Eurozone since its design and take-off reveal three main flaws in the 
design of the Eurozone as discussed in the following paragraphs.  
Major Flaw 1 - Absence of Effective Economic Governance Mechanism: This is 
Eurozone's design failure to provide a mechanism for effective economic governance in 
which monetary policy adjustment could be imposed (at the monetary union level) on 
members that are out of line.54 In the practical sense, economic and employment policies 
meant for individual member countries were not enforced but largely ignored, hence the lack 
of effective tools to correct macroeconomic imbalances. Because of the irrevocably fixed 
exchange regime in the Eurozone, and with the assumption of high level of flexibility within 
the economy, it is only prices and costs adjustments that could correct cross country 
differences in competitiveness. However, output and employment should be adjusted (as 
federal funding is lacking in assistance) in situations of slow downward rigidity of prices and 
costs when there is slow implementation of structural reforms that are meant to address the 
                                                          
53 The LOLR as an institution should have been with the responsibility and authority having the resources to 
fund borrowers face with liquidity crisis in order to avoid liquidity problem turning to solvency crisis within the 
monetary system and safeguard against moral hazards. 
54 Even as the Maastricht Treaty revealed an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the 'economic' part was 
missing (Riet, 2013).   
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rigidities in supply. It was observed that macroeconomic divergences in the Eurozone was 
also aggravated when competitive member nations enjoyed better economic growth.55  
Consequently, in the wake of the financial crisis, Eurozone countries that recorded recurring 
current account deficits, weak competitiveness, excessive private/public debts and other 
economic imbalances specifically experienced the financial market vulnerabilities. Public 
sector funding stood as replacements for the reversed private sector capital flows. Although, 
in the aspect of fiscal policies, the Treaty specified limits of public sector deficits (budget 
balance and gross debts), including sanctions against erring members, the correction of 
excessive budget deficit was however sluggish while the enforcement of appropriate sanction 
was avoided. There were apparent resistance in 2003, by German and France to correct their 
excessive budget deficits. This caused a dent on the Eurozone's fiscal governance as 
incentives meant to ensure sound public finances were further undermined when more 
flexibilities in response to country-specific mitigating conditions were introduced in 2005 by 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).  
In the Eurozone, the after-effects of these (as the global financial crisis set in) were high 
levels of public sector debt rising further due to subsequent bank rescues, fiscal stimulus and 
austerity measures including economic recession. There were increases in sovereign bond 
yield and concerns for solvency due to liquidity stress resulting from the spread of market 
volatility to vulnerable Eurozone countries. 
Major Flaw 2 - Retaining Banking Supervision and Resolution at National Levels: This is 
about the retention of the Eurozone’s banking supervision and banking resolution within 
Eurozone in the hands of sovereigns at national levels. This ignored the trade-offs in the 
financial trilemma.  The Eurozone's financial integration (particularly in retail banking), due 
                                                          
55 Delor's Report admitted the underestimation of the Eurozone as a single market with a single currency 
exacerbating divergences among members. 
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to its incomplete nature, allowed the accumulation of foreign short term liabilities and debt-
based interbank liabilities, but concentrated their assets with real estate borrowers at home 
rather than diversifying the risks involved (Draghi, 2014). Banks' balance sheets were 
consequently made vulnerable to asymmetric shocks, external contagion effect due to the 
mismatch; and eventually, the sovereign governments bore the bail-out burden. Also, cross-
border inter-country financial interaction further made the preservation of financial stability 
at natural levels worse. This caused the Eurozone's sovereign government to: (a) act in line 
with their individual own banking rules in banking supervision within their domains; (b) use 
their local judgments in applying the European banking laws; and (c) make their own self 
decisions in recapitalising banks that were over-burdened with debts and in determining if 
forbearance is needed in handling non-performing loans in banks' portfolios. 
In a single market (like the Eurozone), when financial policies are formulated and 
implemented at national levels, close coordination of member states is necessary when 
handling international banks. Unfortunately, this failed to work well for the Eurozone during 
the crisis, when the need to maintain financial stability within the EMU caused the breaking-
up (or restructuring at short notice) of cross-border banks. There were no enough fiscal space 
in many member countries to the rescue of ailing banks. In some countries having large 
number of unviable retail banks, private sector was over-indebted in addition to recording 
excessive liabilities, while the size of the banking sector in some over-banked countries 
enormously exceeded their GDP. The differing features of the Eurozone's financial system 
propelled a 'vicious feedback loop' between troubled banks that had their balance sheets 
reflecting large volumes of sovereign debts and the vulnerable sovereign governments that 
had fiscal spaces that were not enough for the rescue operations. The consequent increase in 
interest rates (lending and borrowing) resulted in huge creditworthiness fragmentation of 
Eurozone's financial market along national lines. The financial crisis also exposed the 
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absence of the tools for the management of cross-border flows of capital and for the 
prevention of regional credit boom, and the Eurozone's common central bank could not 
handle these. There was also a lack of macro-prudential policies at the national levels (or 
coordinated at the union-wide levels). The EMU design shifted this to a future time. 
Major Flaw 3 - Lack of Financial Back-stops and Crisis Resolution Mechanisms at the 
Union Level: The third major faults rests of the failure of the EMU design to institute 
financial back-stops and crisis resolution mechanisms. At the Eurozone level, there was: (i) 
the lack of built-in financial backstops that could give supports to a sovereign government 
experiencing serious liquidity quagmire; (ii) the absence of a mechanism that would give 
room to insolvent national governments to organise the restructuring of their debts. The 
Eurozone's common central bank is forbidden from financing sovereigns as well as 
prohibiting measure that forced banks to preferentially finance national governments.56  Even 
with good purpose, convergence (entry) criteria and rules, the Eurozone architecture failed to 
incorporate crisis resolution mechanism in situation when a member country encounters 
harsh problems and could not access international financial markets. What such design 
depicted was a Eurozone of fair weather that could not be sustained in stormy weather. 
Owing to the heavy cross-border finance received by some Eurozone members during the 
first decade of the union, the sudden stop of these capital inflow made these countries to be 
vulnerable during crisis. So, when the high interest rates and funding difficulties came 
calling, sovereign governments fell into self-fulfilling defaults.57  
                                                          
56 At the EU level, its members (or the EU itself) are not permitted to assume public sector commitment of a 
member country; although, a facility for assistance in time of balance of payment crisis are available outside the 
EZ, but at the EU. 
57 Gros (2012) revealed the noticeable gap between the uncontrollable default in the EZ crisis era and the partial 
default (attributed to inflation) during the EMS crisis period when countries participating in EMS then had their 
monetary policy independence and respective currencies and could devalue their currency for the avoidance of 
the tension in the financial market. 
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The essential 'sudden backstop' of official funding for Eurozone countries facing the sudden 
stop in international funding was lacking. These are the reasons why De Grauwe (2012) 
concluded that euro was characterised by a 'systematic fragility' because member countries of 
the Eurozone exposed to erratic capital inflow were opened to vulnerabilities and contagion. 
These countries lack the crisis-time support of a federal state and the option to seek for bail-
out from other members of the union. Whenever these countries face huge shock, they rely on 
market expectations because they lack a central bank that could print the fiat currency needed 
for the redemption of their debts. It is therefore necessary to put in place, a process of getting 
rid of unsustainable debt and prevent contagion within Eurozone.58 
Discussions in Literature: Many authors and researchers on the OCA theory evidently 
concluded that the Eurozone is not an OCA. They gave warnings about the dangers of a 
single monetary policy for the zone because of the zone’s inability to fulfil the OCA 
theoretical preconditions for an optimal currency area.59Initially, from the second half of the 
1980s, a large body of monetary integration researches could reveal: (a) how the EMU was to 
be designed; (b) the conditions that were necessary for the success of the ‘proposed’ 
monetary union; and (c) the impending dangers of not establishing a true and genuine 
monetary union in Europe.60De Grauwe (1992) developed the first monetary integration 
model while Fratiani and von Hagen (1992) and Gros and Thygessen (1992) gave some 
insights on the benefits and costs of monetary unifications. As Eichengreen and von Hagen 
                                                          
58 As observed by Riet (2013), though the euro successfully maintained price stability, at the EMU level, 
'complacent national policy making, accumulated national supervision of financial industry and the absence of 
macro-prudential tools to counter a credit-driven boom in overheating economies' of the EZ all came together to 
undermine the achieved price stability. 
59 Some these research works are carried out by Krugman (1993), Decressin and Fatas (1995), McKinnon 
(2001), Wyplosz (2006), among others. 
60Some of these research works were contained in ‘The European Monetary System’ edited by Giavazzi, Micoss 
and Miller (1998); ‘A European Central Bank?’ edited by de Cecco and Giovaninni (1998) and various editions 
of ‘Monitoring European Integration’ and annual reports produced by the Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR) from 1990-2003 as referenced by de la Dehesa (2012). 
 
103 
 
(1995) raised fiscal policy and fiscal federalism issues in a monetary union, de la Dahesa and 
Krugman (1993) and Krugman and Venables (1993) revealed the ‘regional and 
agglomeration effects of a monetary union’. 
There were research evidence from Schwarts, (2013) to conclude that there was failure in 
realizing the great hopes surrounding the euro (at its inception) as a currency intended to be 
as strong as the deutschemark; and also that the hopes for the euro to serve as European’s 
unity symbol were dazed by the financial crisis which has created discords among the EU 
members, thus indicating defected design of the euro. Originally, the euro was intended to be 
fashioned as ‘a kind of gold standard for a system of fiduciary money, but with the escape 
clauses to make it less automatic, given the impossibility of devaluation (as under the gold 
standard) as the main building condition for the Eurozone member countries (Schwarts, 
2013). One further design issue raised Schwarts (2013) was that the euro was based on the 
idea of high degree of neutrality of money in Europe, thus giving room for the euro to be able 
to adapt to changing circumstances through relative price movements and not by means of 
monetary management. As the head of the Eurosystem, the ECB was conferred with the 
single mandate of maintaining price stability by the 2008 Treaty on the functioning of the 
EU. These caused the conclusion that the present parlous situation of euro indicated that at its 
conception, the currency suffered from fundamental defects and that these design flaws were 
capitalised upon by the Eurozone members to finance unsustainable fiscal policy (Schwarts, 
2013). 
Gathering conclusions from economic research papers and books before and after the 
commencement of the euro, de la Dehesa (2012) highlights main dangers that could be faced 
by Eurozone as: (i) because capital and labour do not move freely among Eurozone member 
countries; and because prices and wages are not flexible within the Eurozone as they manifest 
in Canada and the United States, Eurozone is by implications, not an OCA. There were 
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general awareness in 1999 that Eurozone members did not fulfil the conditions for a 
monetary union; (ii) consequent from (i) above, if Eurozone is not an OCA, a ‘one-size-fits-
all monetary policy can be too tight for the matured Eurozone members witnessing slow 
growing internal demand couple with lower inflation rate, and such policy can be too loose 
for the ‘catching-up’ and fast growing Eurozone members that are characterised by higher-
than-average inflation rate; (iii) given the Eurozone’s evident production specialisation, some 
member countries can suffer asymmetric shock that does not affect other member because of 
the build-up of growing internal and external imbalances and exogenous shocks; (iv) there 
may be a mix of negative  and positive asymmetric shocks in Eurozone’s member countries 
as a result of the ‘agglomeration’ of different productive sectors in some special areas within 
the euro area. This would be as a result of internal and external economies of scale produced 
by the combination of a common and free internal market and the single currency, the euro. 
De Grauwe (2012) got evidence to show that members of the Eurozone experienced 
asymmetric shocks reflecting clear divide among the northern and southern Eurozone 
countries; (v) there is the possibility for Eurozone member nations to have incentive to adopt 
huge fiscal deficits/public debts and therefore ‘free ride on other members’ of the monetary 
zone which eventually finance them, provided exchange rates risks are not incurred;61(vi) in 
the Eurozone, there would be asymmetric shocks that could be avoided (or its effects 
reduced) if a single or common fiscal policy is in place either through a large common 
treasury or a common budget of a large European fund with the purpose of helping affected 
members. This is one of the essentials for a single currency. The point raised here was that 
the whole of Europe lacks fiscal integration; (vii) if a monetary union as depicted by the 
Eurozone was to flourish, this could not be made possible without a high-flying fiscal union. 
                                                          
61This opens the flaws of a single fiscal authority in Eurozone as necessitated by the need fiscal discipline on all 
Eurozone members. 
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Eventually, such fiscal union is expected to lead to a political union manifested by a common 
parliament and executive powers or a confederation of states. 
Gibson, Palives and Tavlas (2013), while presenting an analytical overview of the euro area 
crisis, gave the following three reasons for the optimism of European political leaders and 
economists on the success of a monetary union  (like the euro area) even despite the presence 
of asymmetry shocks and the absence adequate adjustment mechanism, thus: (a) if at the 
national levels, sound fiscal policies are maintained, the incidence (and the resultant effects) 
of fiscal-induced asymmetric would be minimised (Krugman, 2012); (b) towards reducing 
impacts of symmetric shocks, national policy makers would apply structural reforms (given 
the reduced ability to use the demand side policies to counter asymmetric shocks) which may 
include the freeing of labour and products markets; (c) it would be easier to evaluate the 
nature of risks and consequently appraise investment opportunities within the euro area due 
to the belief that the euro would eliminate exchange rate risks from national interest rates.62  
Coming from the novel explanations of the Eurozone crisis in relation with the augmented 
logic of the Mundell-Fleming Policy Trilema’, Dymski (2013) raised some points on factors 
neglected by the design of the monetary zone stating that in relation to the Mundell-Fleming 
trilema, the Eurozone neglected the Fleming’s Keynesian modelling but took after Mundell’s 
approach, thus implying the emphasis of the Eurozone on pre-determined rules guiding the 
behaviour of government and a ‘wide flow of market forces, disciplined by financial flows’. 
He identified the second flaw in this respect as the failure of the Eurozone to pay attention to 
the growing powers of the globalised finance. Stemming from these are bank regulation/bank 
behaviour trilema which reveals the consequences of the economic architecture of the 
Eurozone precluding ‘adequate bank and financial market supervision’ and prohibiting the 
                                                          
62Fernadez-Villaverde, Garciano and Santos (2013). 
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‘lender-of-last-resort intervention’ despite simultaneously enabling ‘hyper-competition 
among financial intermediaries’. These are some of the principal factors that led the 
Eurozone’s financial system into crisis as the configuration of the Eurozone is such that could 
not calm the financial sectors of the euro area down and while burdened by problematic 
banking sectors, financial stability could not be ensured (Dymski, 2013). Though there were 
global financial deregulation and revolution in macroeconomic theory and policy making as 
at the time of designing the Eurozone, Feldstein (1997) observed that out of the Mudell’s four 
criteria for an OCA, the Eurozone met just one (which is labour mobility) and failed the other 
three tests.63 
De Grauwe (2013) restated his 1999 comparison of the Eurozone as ‘a beautiful villa in 
which Europeans were ready to enter. Yet, it was a villa that did not have a roof. A long as 
the weather was fine, we would like to have settled in the villa. We would regret it when the 
weather turned ugly’; adding that the Eurozone’s design failure have ‘become even more 
manifest as the ones that were perceived before the start’. It was further highlighted that ‘the 
Eurozone look like a wonderful construction at the time it was built, yet it appeared to be 
loaded with design failures’ De Grauwe (2013) traced the origin of the design failure to two 
factors: (i) booms and bust dynamics; and (ii) lack of stabilisers (De Grauwe, 2013). The first 
argument was that the endogenous dynamics of booms and busts continued to work at the 
national levels and these were not incorporated into the union-wide dynamics. While money 
and monetary policies in the Eurozone were fully centralised, other macroeconomic policies 
were left firmly in the hands of the national governments, thus causing ‘idiosyncratic 
movements’ which the existence of euro could not constrain. Consequently, the Eurozone has 
very little to make the booms and the busts converge at the Eurozone’s level. These booms 
                                                          
63 These three areas of failures manifested in: (i) inflexible domestic prices and wages; (ii) minimal fiscal 
transfers across Eurozone member countries’ borders; and (iii) heterogeneity in shocks , in which shocks do not 
have similar effects. 
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and busts have the origins of their own lives at the national levels and could not become a 
‘common boom-and-bust dynamics at the monetary union’s level. The worse scenario 
highlighted by De Grawe (2013)  was how Eurozone level booms and busts can be affected at 
the national levels given the fact that the union’s single interest imposed on all Eurozone’s 
members by the ECB is ‘too low for the booming countries and too high for the countries in 
recession’. In the booming countries, the union-wide single interest rate translates to low real 
interest rate, in effect magnifying the boom. On the other hand, the single interest rate yield 
high real interest rates in countries with recession/low growth, thereby causing further 
economic devastation. The fact is that single interest rate exacerbates the feasible difference 
between ‘the booming’ and ‘the busting’, making the booming countries to be further 
boomed while the busting countries moves further into recession than when a monetary union 
is not in existence. The second argument of De Grauwe was that the stabiliser that existed at 
the national levels before the beginning of the monetary union was stripped away from the 
Eurozone members ‘without being transposed at the monetary union level’. The lender-of-
last-resort function of central banks is the fundamental stabilising force existing at the 
national levels at the start of the Eurozone. What came suddenly, by the implication is that 
Eurozone’s member countries had to issue debt in euro on which they no longer have control. 
National governments, thereafter, were unable to guarantee the availability of cash to roll its 
debts over.64This made the Eurozone member states to be ‘naked’ and ‘fragile’ and unable to 
deal with coming national disturbance (De Grauwe, 2013). What the architects of the 
Eurozone could not understand in the design was that the lack of guarantee could trigger self-
fulfilling liquidity crises caused by a ‘sudden stop’ which could plunge member countries 
further into solvency problem.65 Apart from liquidity problems turning into solvency crisis, 
                                                          
64 This was possible before the start of the Eurozone when member states were issuing debts in their national 
home currencies and were able to guarantee the availability of cash to repay debt at maturities. 
65Ireland, Spain and Portugal experienced this. 
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affected Eurozone members were forced to switch off the automatic stabiliser in the budget, 
scramble for cash, go into austerity, hence cutting expenditure and raising taxes and 
revenue.66 
A view brought to the fore by Colombatto (2000) was that ‘in sharp contrast with historical 
precedents, the euro was not perceived a symbol of a common European identity, either at the 
beginning of the 1990s or back in the 1960s when the project for a Europe common currency 
was first conceived’. This was based on the premise in the contributions of Cohen (1993) and 
Bordo and Jonung (1999) as these literature are able to show that political unification 
preceded all past monetary unions that later adopted common currency; but contrary in the 
case of the Eurozone, the justification for monetary union was provided just by the idea of 
political union. The contrast picture of the support for the Eurozone in the 1990s as painted 
by Feldstein, (as cited by Colombatto, 2000) emanated from the ‘desire to replace discredited 
national policy makers with foreign, allegedly independent technocrats or from the Franco-
German desire to establish political hegemony’.  In this same light, further conclusion was 
that the euro lacks the legitimacy.67 It was claimed that the euro has scanty legitimacy 
because the European political ideal itself lack legitimacy. The proposal for the euro (and 
Eurozone) was seen to tend to be ‘assimilated to a matter of monetary coordination, a concept 
with long tradition and little effectiveness in the European debate’. From the viewpoints of 
European public, the common currency was regarded as something vague, which is 
temporarily remote, thus causing the gradual neglect of the implication of the euro for 
centralized policy making.68 Colombatto pointed out that many literature affirmed the idea of 
the EMU became political when the ‘questionable legitimacy’ of the euro became obvious 
                                                          
66 De Grauwe (2013) 
67 De Jasay (1995) considered an institutional arrangement to be legitimate if it is accepted in the absence of 
incentives or sanctions. 
68 (Colombatto, 2000) 
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just as some European countries (like the UK, Scandinavia) perceived the euro as a political 
phenomenon from the beginning. Colombatto (2000) further claimed that the principle of 
harmonisation and the introduction of the euro were not independent in the context of the EU 
where the single currency ceased to be mere monetary technicality, but only became political 
matter for the sake of harmonisation. In this context, the principle of harmonisation relates to 
the manifestation of two properties of the OCA: (i) harmonisation – bringing about 
homogeneities in production structures and in institutional conditions which make 
asymmetric shocks less disruptive; (ii) harmonisation – where substantial transfer from one 
group of member nation to another would compensate and smooth out potential divergences 
with the currency area. Obradovic (1996) explained that most European countries are 
characterised by different traditions and history, value systems, institutions and myths and 
that across countries in Europe, huge variance between the ‘actual condition’ and the ‘rule of 
law ideal’ caused the proliferation of different systems of informal rules and consequently, 
different culture (particularly, in the Western Europe); adding that the elimination of these 
differences would take time and highly possible to be catastrophic. Attempts to force 
institutional homogeneity in the Eurozone through the introduction of new and common 
system of codified rules that ignore local traditions and cultures in Europe would result in 
tension and crisis within Eurozone.69 One further source of ambiguity in the establishment of 
the Eurozone and the introduction of the euro is the heterogenous perception (within Europe) 
of the political consequences of the EMU. A group of countries (within the EU) aimed at 
achieving ‘continental supremacy and world status through political integration.70The other 
group of countries (within the EU) gave support to the EMU project with the view of EMU as 
                                                          
69 (Colombatto, 2000) 
70 Once the euro area integrated into a new federal organisation, these countries hope to emerge as much 
stronger contenders in the international community. Their leaders would have enhanced their own prestige and 
authority in the domains of ordinary policy making and law bargaining as well as their importance in historical 
perspective, being the founding fathers of a new political entity with a crucial role in the world (Colombatto, 
2000) 
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‘a means of promoting their allegedly incompetent (national) political elites (citing Italy); and 
also projected the view that monetary integration is protective devise to avoid catastrophic (or 
less desirable) scenarios’.71 
2.5.2 The Incompleteness of the EMU and the Revelations of the Financial Crisis. 
There were further discussion on the deficiencies and incompleteness of the construction of 
the Eurozone as exposed by the financial crisis in clearly revealing that the euro area is not an 
OCA. 
Some of the defects and flaws in the design of the EMU were made manifest during the 
2008/2009 financial crisis. The OCA theory (Mundell, 1961) provides that a complete 
monetary union is optimal if there are similarities in economic structures of member state 
which would cause similar (symmetric) reactions to shocks. The Eurozone crisis was the 
form of asymmetric shock highlighted by the OCA theory. According to Eichengreen (2009), 
when there were downward movements in housing prices, these falls were more dramatic in 
some member countries than others and the resultant increase in the rate of unemployment 
were not similar in the Eurozone countries. Due to the ‘widening spreads and the associated 
credit default swaps’, public finances of many Eurozone member countries were strained.72 
Eichengreen further explained that governments in the Eurozone recorded dramatic increases 
in public debts as a result of the need to act in avoidance of domestic banking collapse and 
ensure the sustenance of their various national economies, and that presumably, given these 
situations, many Eurozone countries would have preferred different policy responses to the 
                                                          
71 Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal would have certainly considered the cost of staying out of the Eurozone 
as greater that the cost of staying within. 
72‘Spreads’ means the differences between 10-year government bond rate of Germany and those of each 
European country. 
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crisis situations. Eichengreen concluded that this depicts that the ‘one-size-fits-all monetary 
policy’ should have been out of the Eurosystem's design.  
Although, one of focuses of the OCA theory is on the mechanisms for adjustment after 
exogenous shock, the design of the EMU produced some operating endogenous factors that 
reinforce asymmetry in business cycles and enhance instability. A single monetary policy of a 
single interest rate across the entire Eurozone implies too low interest rates in countries where 
inflation and growth are relatively higher, thereby causing domestic demand to grow further. 
On the other hand, Eurozone members with sluggish growth would experience the real 
interest as too high (De Grauwe, 2012). Ederer and Weingartner (2013) pointed out that the 
real interest rates effect outweighed the competitiveness effect working in the opposite direct, 
and that which generated sizable current account surpluses and deficits  
On financial integration being very vital for the smooth functioning of a monetary union 
where mortgage markets, bond markets, equity markets and  banking markets should be 
essentially integrated in providing different channels of risk-sharing within such monetary 
union and serving as an insurance mechanism that facilitates adjustment to symmetric shocks, 
De Grauwe (2014) explained that unfortunately, the design of the EMU underestimated the 
consequences of financial market integration which would have made it possible for the 
residents of the Eurozone hit by a negative shock (in ‘bust’ countries within the monetary 
union) to comparatively keep the level of their income higher than the level of output; while 
residents of countries experiencing positive shock (in ‘boom’ countries within the monetary 
union), as counterpart in risk-sharing comparatively keep the level of their income lower than 
their output.73 
                                                          
73 De Grauwe (2014) quoted Asdrubali et al (1996) as having evidence to conclude that financial markets in the 
US allows for considerable risk-sharing among US regions and that this risk-sharing through financial market 
(integration) is about twice as important as the risk-sharing provided by the US government budget. 
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Further to the above, identified areas of EMU design flaws exposed by the financial crisis 
are: (a) absence of integrated financial framework (that would have ensured Eurozone’s 
stability, minimised costs of bank failure to citizens of Europe, provided common 
mechanisms to resolve failing banks and provided guarantees to customers’ deposits; (b) 
absence of integrated budgetary framework (that would have ensured sound fiscal policy-
making at the national and Europe (union-wide) levels, provided different forms of fiscal 
solidarity and provided ‘coordination, joint decision-making, greater enforcement and 
commensurate steps toward common debt issuance’;(c) absence of economic policy 
framework with sufficient mechanisms (that would have promoted sustainable growth, 
competitiveness and employment through national and union level policies that would cause 
smooth functioning of EMU; (d) absence of the necessary democratic legitimacy of decision 
making with EMU, based on the joint exercise of sovereignty for common policies and 
solidarity.74  
Drawing from various discussions on the future of the Eurozone during and after the financial 
crisis, and based on the premise that the ‘existing EMU’ was deficient and incomplete, the 
European Commission acknowledged those architectural flaws that were predicted at the 
outset of the Eurozone project as:  
i. lack of mechanism that would have forestall “the accumulation  (in some Eurozone 
member countries) of large private and public debts, losses in competitiveness and 
macroeconomic imbalances that caused financial vulnerability of member countries 
when the financial crisis struck”;  
                                                          
74 These were assertions made by Herman Va Rompuy, the President of European Council in a report for 
discussion in June 2012. 
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ii. lack of “EMU’s unique status that would have combined centralised monetary policy 
with decentralised responsibility for most economic policies and with no centralised 
fiscal policy function or fiscal capacity (that is, federal budget); 
iii. lack of mechanism to contain/curtail global liquidity excess and the consequential 
mispricing of risks of both private and public sectors within the Eurozone; 
iv. lack of the responsibility for prudential supervision and crisis management at the 
Eurozone levels, even as the pace of financial integration accelerated sharply at its 
inception, creating opportunities and accelerating shocks transmission across national 
borders; 
v. lack of an integrated EU level framework and a mechanism to mutualise the banking 
sector risks. This caused powerful and damaging loops (‘vicious circle’) between the 
banking system and sovereign states within EMU and further compounded the debt 
crisis. This lack of crisis management frameworks resulted in the absence of ‘an 
effective mechanism to provide liquidity to the distressed Eurozone member states 
and thus the failure to manage contagion risks and safeguard financial stability in 
Eurozone;  
vi. the coordination of national economic policies based on peer pressures and 
recommendations (tagged ‘soft instruments’) which has limited impact on industrial 
Eurozone member countries; causing failure in closing the growing gaps in growth 
and competitiveness between member countries. Further, the euro area wide effects of 
national measures were not given good degree of consideration.75 
Praet (2013) was of the view that, “the euro area lacked certain institutional elements which 
are associated with federations and which acts as crisis prevention mechanism ex ante as well 
                                                          
75 From the November 2012 Report of the European Commission titled: ‘Genuine Economic and Monetary 
Union’ 
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as shock absorber ex post”.76   Firstly, on crisis prevention, excessive risks built up due to too 
complacent policy regulations in the financial sectors within EMU. Risk accumulation 
occurred when the existence of the monetary union made it easier for the deficit countries to 
apply cross border capital inflows in the finance of their macroeconomic imbalances for time 
period longer than necessary. With the post-2008 economic deterioration brought about by 
the financial crisis, when the capital inflows turned into outflows, these imbalances resulted 
into problems for the affected countries as well as the contagion effect union-wide, thereby 
causing ‘a twin crisis’ as private sector debts were rapidly turned into public debts, leading to 
onward transmission into ‘negative feedback loop between sovereigns and banks (Preat, 
2013). The following similar positions were raised by Ederar and Weingartner (2013): firstly,  
in the wake of asymmetric shock experienced within the Eurozone, the strong increase in 
cross-border capital flows and of financial assets within the zone worked toward destabilising 
the monetary union. They added that these could have been forestalled by a common banking 
supervision mechanism as well as a common monetary authority applying strong tools for 
bank resolution. The revelation brought to the fore by the financial crisis is that financial 
stability is a common good necessitating preservation by shared responsibility. Secondly, the 
prolonged differences in macroeconomic (current account) imbalances and competitiveness 
were regarded as irrelevant. The postulation adopted is that, saved from surveillance of fiscal 
issues, it is not necessary to monitor macroeconomic imbalances closely. The financial crisis 
reflected how strong the effect of negative externalities of a monetary union member country 
on the entire union. Thirdly, fiscal policy coordination and surveillance framework existing at 
the beginning of start of the Eurozone was to not strong enough prompting its implementation 
by the member countries to be ‘insufficiently strict’; and consequently, budgetary policies 
                                                          
76The claim was made in a speech delivered by Peter Praet, a member of the Executive Board of the European 
Central Bank on 17 April 2013 in Beijing. 
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with the Euro area were not sufficiently constrained. There were no emphases on the need to 
preserve fiscal space, ensure fiscal discipline and therefore allow automatic stabiliser to come 
to play in times of financial turmoil.  
Broadly on the other hand, Praet (2013) highlighted that the lack of effective crisis 
management mechanism at the strike of the Euro crisis was manifested in the instance of the 
assumption of the presence of huge automatic stabilisation at national levels as depicted by 
the design of the EMU. What the financial crisis was able to reveal here was insufficient 
shock absorbers at national levels. The scale of the post-2008 financial-crisis-shock was 
unprecedented in many euro area countries as they glaringly exceeded shock absorption 
capacity at national levels. One great design pitfall revealed by the financial crisis is the 
reliance on the national levels of the union for the fulfilment of the stabilisation functions 
since at the union-wide level, there were no mechanism that could give financial supports to 
the monetary union’s member countries that experienced problems as well as lack of 
provision of efficient risk sharing mechanism that could have prevented contagion across 
borders. These became pronounced as there were no union-level institutions with the 
responsibility of ensuring that severe domestic banking systems problems would not impact 
fiscal sustainability within Eurozone. The second instance of revelation by the financial crisis 
was the lack of effective mechanisms or tools to mitigate contagion, because financial 
contagion was not seen as an intended consequence of financial integration. There were no 
‘circuit-breaking’ crisis management tools or instruments that could limit feedback loops.77 
Discussions up to this point stressed that from what the euro crisis could reveal, though the 
architects of the euro took the OCA theory with all seriousness, they had the belief that 
                                                          
77Explanations here were largely borrowed from Peter Praet’s speech of 17 April 2013. 
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asymmetric shocks would not pose a major problem. The sudden cessation of the massive 
private capital movements from core countries of EU to the periphery countries left the 
economies of the periphery countries with high inflation rates and labour costs that were not 
in line with those in the core countries. This caused the euro area to face major problem of 
adjustment which the OCA theory had forewarned to be too hard to handle through the 
restoration of competitiveness through wage cuts.  
De Grauwe pointed out that further exposures made by the financial crisis were the two 
overlooked ‘fault lines’ that marred the foundation of the Eurozone: (i) absence of 
mechanism that would have ensured the convergence of the competitive positions of member 
countries, and would have gone ahead to avert major trade imbalances within the monetary 
union;78 (ii) absence of mechanism to resolve the chaos caused by the members’ competitive 
positions and trade imbalances. These ‘fault lines’ were brought to the bare because the 
Eurozone was not, at the on-set embedded with a political union that was sufficiently strong 
enough. A political union is characterised with   a centralised budget that would have, in 
times of crisis, provided these lacking automatic stabilising mechanisms. One further point 
raised by De Grauwe (2010) was that in designing the Eurozone, there was a complete 
rejection of ‘any form of automatic insurance mechanism’ simply because any insurance 
mechanism incorporated would be accompanied by moral hazard risk, a risk that would have 
encouraged national governments to take advantage of such insurance mechanism by creating 
excessive budget deficits and public debts; and that consequently, ‘the absence of any 
insurance mechanism in the design of the Eurozone was caused by the need to avoid moral 
hazard. However, the financial crisis clearly forced national governments to provide such 
insurance, particularly when the banking crisis surfaced. Unfortunately, when Eurozone 
                                                          
78 This emanates from way member countries firmly hold on to the formulation of economic policies (fiscal 
policies, social policies and wage policies etc), but failed to coordinate these policies (De Grauwe, 2010). 
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countries were (due to the forces of the financial crisis) essentially expected to provide 
solidarity, no mechanism was in place for smooth running of such supports (De Grauwe, 
2010). 
One surprise thing is that it was not foreseen that there were possibilities of countries facing 
adverse asymmetric shocks to simultaneously face fiscal burdens that would query the 
solvency of national governments. The Eurozone’s adjustment problems swiftly transformed 
into many degrees of fiscal emergencies at both at the nation and union-wide levels. The euro 
crisis also revealed the little attention paid by the OCA theory to banking issues by giving 
little thoughts to how crucial bank guarantees at the union level are. In the US, bank deposits 
are guaranteed at the Federal level, thus removing the task of bank bailout from saddle of 
governments at the state levels; but in Europe, national governments abruptly assumed bank 
debts in bailout and this led to sudden increase in public debts (showing up in increase public 
debt/GDP ratios, at the national levels). 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 below offer summaries and explanations on problems and flaws revealed 
by the financial crisis, of the design of Eurozone. 
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Table 2.5: Pre-Crisis Problems and Flaws Manifested by the Eurozone Financial Crisis 
Problem/Flaw Explanations and Narration 
Failure of  the 
Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) 
*SPG is the monetary union’s cornerstone of 
fiscal prudence. 
*As at six year after the introduction of the 
euro (but before the euro crisis), between 
2001 and 2006, one-third of Eurozone’s 
member countries violated the two fiscal 
criteria of the SGP – (i) 3% budget deficit 
ratio and (ii) 60% public debt ratio. 
*This violation, leading to high public debt, 
reduced trusts in the effectiveness of rule-
based surveillance. 
Disregard of private 
sector vulnerabilities 
*The sole emphasis on fiscal issues during the 
pre-crisis era led to the neglect of the need to 
be conscious of the behaviour of private 
sectors and the watch for vulnerabilities. 
*Consequently, there were unsustainable 
credit and housing booms in some countries 
(Ireland, Spain) as well as structural 
imbalances (high current account deficits). 
Absence of effective 
tools to foster 
structural 
adjustments 
*There was lack of proper mechanism to 
propel microeconomic and macroeconomic 
structural adjustments within the monetary 
union. 
*Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal demonstrated 
this lack. 
*Appropriate microeconomic adjustments 
should have been in the area of regulations 
and policies affecting businesses, market 
flexibility, banking etc.  
*Examples of appropriate macroeconomic 
adjustments tools are price and wages, 
external balances, aggregate changes in 
productivity. 
Absence of 
mechanism for crisis 
resolution 
Sovereign debt crises within the Eurozone 
evolved as a surprise, causing policy makers 
of the currency area to improvise. 
*Though, there was post-crisis creation of 
financing mechanism (like the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the 
European Financial Stability Mechanism 
(EFSM) which both provided €500 billion). 
Such medium-term crisis resolution financing 
would have preferably been in a design in 
which the monetary union member state 
would not need to lend money to each other.  
*Banking union and centralised fiscal 
capacity would have been better appropriate. 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Table 2. 6: Post-Crisis Problems and Flaws Manifested by the Eurozone Financial Crisis 
Problem/Flaw Explanations and Narration 
Interdependence of 
banks and 
sovereigns 
*It is evident that there was ‘poisonous correlation’ between banking and 
sovereign debt crises due to the national bank resolution regimes and the 
home country bias in bank’s government bond holdings. Whenever a 
Eurozone member banking system falls into problem, the government of 
such country follow suit (as in the case of Ireland) and verse versa (as in 
the case of Greece). 
*Most Eurozone countries showed large size of their bank’s portfolio of 
domestic government bond larger than what obtained in the US (Meller 
and Pisani-Ferry. 2012) 
*A banking union would solve the problem. 
Interdependence of 
countries 
 
 
 
 
 
*There was stronger interdependence of countries than what was generally 
perceived before the crisis. 
*Defaults by governments and private sectors in a small member country 
can lead to ‘contagion’ as a larger country’s default could result in ‘melt 
down’. A bankrupt Italy, for instance, would lead to a bankrupt Germany 
banking which would meltdown other banking systems within the union, 
with an accompanying disruptive effect outside the monetary union. 
Absence of lender 
of last resort 
*This indicates that governments of the monetary union’s member states 
borrow as if they borrow in foreign currencies when there is, in principle, a 
prohibition of monetary financing within the monetary union. 
*When the level of debt is low, such lack of a lender of last resort may not 
be a problem. 
Lack of union-wide 
integrated fiscal 
policy 
*There is no institution responsible for the management of the monetary 
union’s fiscal stance. 
*Member countries implement fiscal policies that are deemed appropriate 
for their individual economies.  
*The aggregate of these decentralised fiscal policies would not result in a 
fiscal policy that is optimal for the monetary union as a whole. 
Darvas (2012) got evidence to show that the aggregate fiscal position of 
the Eurozone was much better than that of the US in a study that covers a 
period between 1990 and 2017 projections, and that while the economic 
outlook was much more fragile in the euro area, there was the incidence of 
much stronger consolidation bias in the euro area as a whole than in the 
US. 
Downward spiral and 
negative feedback 
between the crisis 
and growth 
*In the Southern Europe adjusting countries where fiscal accounts are hard-
pressed, there is ‘downward spiral’. 
*Fiscal adjustments in each of these countries lead to weaker economy which 
reduces public revenues and create further fiscal adjustment needs. 
*The negative feedback loop between the crisis and growth in the economically 
strong Eurozone countries is pronounced. 
* An economic automatic stabilisation tool is needed as solution in this respect – 
just like the employment insurance in the US. 
Executive and 
democratic deficit 
*The crisis reveals governance problems (apart from sovereign debt, growth and 
banking issues). 
*European policymakers’ responses were inadequate, partial and belated, 
consequently undermining credibility to resolve crises. 
*There was lack of decisive decision making processes that would have prevented 
the problem that surfaced. 
*Agreements on comprehensive solutions to issues and problems are technically 
and politically out of reach. 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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From the perspectives of Eurozone’s financial systems, Table 2.7 below highlights the major 
crisis-revealed problems of the zone, the effects of these problem and would have served as 
preventive measures. 
Table 2.7: Crisis-Revealed Problems of Eurozone’s Financial System 
 
Problems 
 
Effects 
What would have prevented 
the occurrence of the 
problems 
Cross-border financial 
intermediation (caused hugely 
by debt-based wholesale 
banking market integration 
*Vulnerability of member 
countries to shocks increased. 
*Caused sudden-stop problem. 
Comprehensive equity 
market integration. (This 
would have absorbed shocks 
confronted by the monetary 
union. 
High level of risk exposure 
(relative to loss absorbing 
capital) and debt within the 
banking system in the 
currency area. 
*Demand for bail-outs as well as 
many needs for public financial 
assistance increased. 
*Prudential guidelines. 
*Lender of last resort. 
The contrast between the ‘pre-
crisis high degree of wholesale 
banking market integration 
and the absence of a system 
for the stability of the 
financial system. 
*The resolution of problems faced 
by the banks was delayed. 
*The economy of the entire 
monetary union was slowed down 
Banking union with three 
pillars: (i) a single 
supervisory mechanism; (ii) 
a single resolution 
mechanism; (iii) a common 
system of deposit insurance. 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Before the 2007/2008 global financial crisis manifested, the structure of Euro area 
governance was believed not to be insufficient. The financial crisis could apparently reveal 
the three principal parties involved in the crisis as banks, national governments and the 
common central bank. The awkward structure of governance (reflecting the relationships 
among the common central bank (ECB), banks and national governments) was the root cause 
of the vulnerability of Eurozone to sovereign debt crisis. A key error of omission in the 
Maastricht Treaty was the failure to consider banking issues. This was further to the failure to 
establish coherent relationships among banks, governments and the common central bank 
(the ECB). These are relationships that would have been robust enough to face such financial 
crisis. Table 2.8 below apparently shows the central elements of what was lacking in the 
bank-government-common central bank relationships in Eurozone before the crisis. 
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Table 2.8: Governance Relationship Flaws exposed by the Eurozone crisis 
 Relationship Flaws Features 
1 Government to government In the Maastricht Treaty: 
*There was a provision with ‘no bail out’ clause. 
*This clause indicates that member governments in the 
Eurozone could not be requested to bail out a member 
government that is in trouble.  
2 Common central bank (ECB) 
to government 
In the Maastricht Treaty: 
*There was a provision with ‘no monetary finance’ clause. 
*This clause stated that the common central bank, (ECB) 
would not make credit available to member government; 
*This implies no ‘lender of last resort’ by the common central 
bank in favour of the member government.  
 Source: Author and Carlin and Soskice (2015). 
Table 2.9: Pre-crisis Governance in the US and the Eurozone 
Governance factors The USA The Eurozone 
(i)Common shock; (ii) 
Financial stability; 
and (iii) Lender of last 
resort  
(i) Federal Reserve stabilises 
common shocks. 
(ii) Federal Reserve has the 
responsibility for financial 
stability 
(iii)The Federal Reserve serves 
as the lender of last resort to the 
Federal government and to the 
banking system, 
(i) ECB stabilised common shocks 
(in reaction to the crisis). 
 (ii) The ECB was not responsible 
for financial stability. 
(iii) The ECB was not the lender 
of last resort to member (national) 
governments. 
(iv) ECB served as the lender of 
last resort to the banking system, 
though this was not entrenched 
(explicitly) in the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
Budgetary provision 
for stabilisation in 
times of asymmetric 
shocks 
*The federal budget provides 
stabilisation to the states 
whenever they encounter 
asymmetric shocks (for instance, 
through contributions to 
unemployment benefits and 
federal taxes). 
*There was no central (federal) 
government. 
*There was no stabilisation 
through European budget; because 
there was no European budget. 
Budget rules *The states have balanced 
budget rules. 
*Member nations had no national 
fiscal autonomy which is subject 
to rule.  
Bank failure and 
government 
responsibility 
*States are not responsible for 
the failure of banks 
headquartered in their respective 
states. This is the  responsibility 
of the federal regulators and the 
federal government 
*Member countries are responsible 
for the failure of banks 
headquartered in their respective 
countries. This is nether the 
responsibility of the Eurozone, 
federal regulators or a non-existing 
Eurozone government. 
Bail-out *The federal government does 
not bail-out delinquent states 
which are however allowed to 
default. 
*A ‘no bail-out’ clause was 
explicitly entrenched in the 
Maastricht Treaty which provides 
that member government would 
not be bailed out in times of crisis. 
 Source: Author and Carlin and Soskice (2015). 
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In order to drive home the understanding of Eurozone’s governance problems, it is useful to 
distinguish between the pre-crisis governance structures in a one-state monetary union (the 
US as a good illustration) and a multi-nation monetary union (like the Eurozone). Table 2.9 
above shows these comparisons. 
 
2.6  Conclusions 
Theoretical and empirical literature on monetary integration and OCA and design flaws of 
Eurozone in the light of the OCA theory were reviewed in this chapter to make theoretical 
expositions of the underlying notion and concepts of this study to reveal various criteria, 
methods, tools and techniques employed in literature in the evaluation of monetary 
integration around the world. Further efforts were made to discuss the findings and 
conclusions of various authors and researchers on the architectural flaws of the Eurozone 
both from the financial crisis and OCA theoretical perspectives. What is apparent in the 
various empirical analyses is that established empirical literature known to this author, and 
those reviewed in this chapter did not employed some criteria and analytical tools in their 
analyses. Particularly, for the African monetary integration evaluation, they failed to connect 
some of these identified relevant and essential criteria to the investigation of the monetary 
integration. Some of these unexplored criteria identified by this author are the monetary 
perspective of money neutrality, similarity in the pattern on monetary reactions, monetary-
fiscal policies interactions to determine the significant monetary dominance, degree of loss of 
monetary independence, suitability of a common monetary policy, and exchange rate 
perspectives of the uniformity of exchange rate determination by fundamentals and 
homogeneity of patterns of exchange market behaviours and exchange rate volatilities. These 
are gaps in knowledge exposed by this chapter, identified by this author and filled as 
appropriate by this research study. These are in addition to further in-depth analysis of some 
known OCA criteria performed in this research study. From the review of various discussions 
on Euro crisis, there were three major identified design flaws from which lessons for 
proposed monetary integration initiatives of regions of the world were drawn.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Macroeconomic and Financial Stylised Facts in the 
WAMZ  
3.1 Introduction 
Stylised facts are consistent empirical findings which are accepted as truth and basis for 
theories. Nevertheless, there are usually, inaccuracies in these empirical regularities. This 
chapter examined some macroeconomic and financial stylised facts in the context of the 
developing economies of the WAMZ so as to determine if these facts hold in these 
economies. This is significant in highlighting the characteristics of the behaviours of these 
economies as precursor to specific empirical assessments of the feasibility of the region’s 
monetary integration.  
Over time, large body of literature in macroeconomic quantitative analytical research had 
established a good number of stylised facts in macroeconomic fluctuations and business 
cycles in many countries. These empirical regularities have been adapted as empirical basis 
for the formulation of many related theoretical models. This sub-section established some 
regularities in macroeconomic fluctuations in the WAMZ as a matter of significance and 
necessity for these countries coming together in monetary integration. Essentially, this 
chapter is a precursor chapter that laid some bedrocks foundation for empirical analyses and 
assessments performed in this research work as a whole by providing empirical tests that 
generated vital broad information about the characteristics of the economies of the WAMZ. 
The objective of this chapter was to reveal some macroeconomic and financial characteristics 
and behaviours of the WAMZ member countries from the view-points of some relevant 
stylised facts and theories while simultaneously testing the validity of the stylised facts and 
theoretical proposition within the context of the developing economies of the WAMZ. 
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Informal economic activities which are strong features of the WAMZ economies were 
discussed to some extent in order to bring out the nature of the informal economies of the 
zone.   
The first part of the analyses here was about macroeconomic stylised facts and some 
theoretical relationship propositions regarding macroeconomic fluctuations and business 
cycles, international parity relationships in purchasing power parity (absolute and relative), 
international Fisher effect and uncovered interest parity as well as Phillips curve and Lucas 
output-inflation trade-off. The second part dealt with some empirical regularities in exchange 
rates and the behaviours of foreign exchange markets while the last session looked into the 
banking sector characteristics as proxy for financial systems. These tests are all based on the 
WAMZ countries’ economies. 
3.2 Informal Economic Activities in the WAMZ 
Informal economic activities are those market-based production of goods and services (legal 
or illegal) that are hidden from official authorities, and thus, escape detection in the official 
estimates of national income/products for regulatory, institutional and monetary reasons. 
Generally, the avoidance of governmental bureaucracy or regulatory burden are some of the 
regulatory reasons for informal economic activities. Monetary reasons may be about the 
avoidance of the payment of taxes and levies while institutional reasons may be weak legal 
system, weak rule of law, poor quality of political institutions and corruption.  
For an economy, the degree of unreported/unrecorded economic activities causes lots of 
concerns because the high extent of the involvements of firms and households in activities 
that are hidden from government, the more the distortions in fundamental economic analyses. 
For instance, informal activities limits tax revenues as well as create bureaucratic and 
regulatory burdens. Apart from these, informal economic activities can have negative effects 
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on the efficiency and effective functioning of the formal economic sector as there is bound to 
be discrepancies between national expenditure and national income as well as discrepancies 
between official and actual labour force. Going by these attributes of an informal economic 
activities, it suffice to state that the WAMZ countries exhibit significant traces of informal 
economy which is concentrated in services, commerce, distribution, construction or locally 
sourced food production or raw materials. This informal sector provided a large proportion of 
employment and income for the WAMZ countries. 
Although, it is believed widely that firms operating in informal sectors are usually small 
(family-operated) businesses, a striking feature of the West African informal sector is the 
presence of large informal firms/enterprises which are hugely successful in various weak 
business environments characterised by absence of regulations enforcement that encourages 
and allows these large firms in the informal sector to operate with impunity in many cases. 
There are cases of tax evasion and payment of pre-emptive tax within the informal sector. 
Because of lack of improvement in the African business environments in the real sense, many 
people prefer to operate in the informal sphere of the economy. It is suffice to add that it is 
expensive to be legal within African economies. 
 The incidence, size and magnitude of the informal economic activities in the WAMZ 
economies have serious economic (and political) consequences for the proposed monetary 
zone and its member economies. Some of these implications could be summarised as: 
declining tax revenue (owing to untaxed transactions), bias of social, economic and financial 
information, efficiency and productivity losses (arising from the competitive advantage of 
these informal activities), underreporting of income (due to large number of poor people 
which declare low income, but have substantial expenditure), distortions in the allocation of 
resources and significant welfare losses. However, some literature argued in favour of some 
potential benefits of informal economic activities which are apparent within the developing 
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economies of the WAMZ where around 66% of income generated from the informal 
economic activities is spent instantly in the formal economies (Schneider and Enste, 2002). 
Nevertheless, for the WAMZ economies, informal activities are sources of overall economic 
growth. 
Worldwide, with the avoidance of government regulations (on minimum wages, taxation), the 
informal economy is more flexible and is better able to respond to market conditions and 
rapid changes than as obtained within the formal economy (Smith, 1994). Informal activities 
propel structural changes necessary for economic development because of the informal 
economy’s quick adaptation to changes in economic situations. Furthermore, lower prices of 
goods and services within the informal economy may likely have some positive distributional 
effects when such informal activities are in favour of low-income earners (Portes et al, 1989). 
Because of deficiency in planning for reallocation of resources, some jobs are only available 
because their full cost (income tax) are too expensive to balance-off their consistently low 
level of productivity (Reyneri, 2003; Prager, 1983; and Carter, 1984). 
Commonly, informal economy depicts small and unorganised producers operating on the 
fringes of the formal economy. However, in the case of Africa in general and the WAMZ 
specifically, reverse are the cases in which informal economies dominate the stagnant and 
static formal economies. In the WAMZ, informal economic activities play dominant roles 
(particularly in the area of employment) where small operators co-exist with very large 
politically well-connected informal enterprises that operate with impunity, as well as 
organised networks, with very little information on who is involved and the nature of 
involvement or business.  
Due to the prominence of informal economic activities in the WAMZ, some of the 
discrepancies that manifests are: (i) underground hidden production (within the sphere of 
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legal activities) that create value-added but are deliberately hidden from government in order 
to avoid tax payments or to avoid meeting certain legal standards (minimum wages, 
maximum labour hours, health and safety issues and so on), or to avoid compliance with 
administrative procedures (completion of administrative forms and statistical questionnaire); 
(ii) illegal production which are productive activities that generate goods and services whose 
sales, distribution or possession are forbidden by law, or productive activities which are 
usually legal, but are illegal when performed by unauthorised procedures/producers; (iii) 
production by household (for own final use) which are productive activities that result in 
goods or services consumed or capitalised by the households that produce them. It is 
therefore suffice to state that the WAMZ’s informal sector is a symptom of institutional 
deficiencies. Specifically, the large informal activities within the monetary zone are caused 
by failure of government to enforce regulation appropriate for large firms involved as well as 
the burden-some nature of regulation and taxation that inhibit compliance.  
The reality of the informal economy in Africa holds constantly as the sector plays a central 
role in African economies. Studies revealed that sub-Saharan Africa (where informal 
activities account for around 80% of non-agriculture labour and nearly half of the GDP) is the 
most informal continent of the world. This sector accounts for a large share of GDP and huge 
share of employment. ILO (2014) estimation revealed that the sector employs around 90%  of 
rural African employees, accounts for 80% of total labour force in African countries and 
77.2% of workers in the sub-Saharan Africa were self-employed or own-account workers or 
contributing family workers while 66% are in non-agricultural employment. 
Most key sectors of the WAMZ economies which are within the ‘informal sector’ are: 
commerce, handicrafts (artisans), agriculture, most manufacturing and transportation etc. 
Specifically, in the WAMZ, informality drives employment. Some largest and fastest 
growing sectors are informal economic sector as reflected in wholesale trade, retail trade (the 
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largest locus of informal activities), real estate, transportation, hospitality, construction, 
agriculture, artisan activities (carpentry, mechanics, painting, tailoring etc) as key. Most 
informal economic activities are highly mobile without fixed place of work, particularly, in 
the cases of street hawkers, traders on street pavements, travelling salesmen, including 
carpenters, mechanics, small scale business owners who generally, do not own or rent their 
workplace but occupy unused spaces and vacate whenever such spaces are needed by the 
rightful owners. This predominant nature of informal economic activities in the WAMZ 
serves as major factor inhibiting development in the sub-region. However, the informal sector 
only contribute as low as 3% of total tax collection, despite its economic relevance. The 
existence of large informal firms (which, though, meet the criteria for formal status) 
manifests the WAMZ’s state failures as evident by corruption, weak enforcement capabilities 
of government, adverse business environment etc. These factors, among others, increase the 
costs (thus reduce the benefits) of businesses that operate formally within the monetary zone. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to accurately determine how the informal sector drives the 
economies of the WAMZ countries. This is due to lack of data and absence of critical 
understanding of self-manifestation of informal activities in the region. Data on informal 
employment in Africa in general are scarce or not even available For instance, in the WAMZ, 
commercial motorcyclists are very core part of the whole economy, but there have been 
difficulties in capturing their value-added as well as harnessing their potentials. These and 
other factors thus make compilation of data of on these informal activities difficult and not 
properly handled as the trade hawker has no trading permit, many firms do not have regular 
and up-to-date books of account for the purposes of easy monitoring and taxation. According 
to Smith (1994), many large informal firms are skilful in producing falsified financial 
statements, misleading accounting certificates and several versions of financial statements 
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(differently for banks, government, their businesses) with the assistance of dubious 
accounting firms that specialise in these versions of accounting reports.79  
Furthermore, from the financial services perspective, the WAMZ’s informal sector is 
characterised by limited access to bank credit facilities and this causes operators in this sector 
to resort to informal credits from families and friends; and the critical factor causing this is 
the demand by banks for loan documents before loan applications are considered as it is 
practically difficult for operators in the informal sector to make those required documents 
available. 
Discrepancies that are usually created by informal economic activities in the WAMZ 
countries are: (a) gaps between statistics on national expenditure and national income of the 
WAMZ countries if for tax purposes, operators in the informal sector can hide their income 
but not their expenditure. Large tax burden can likely encourage economic activities in the 
informal sector); (b) gaps between figures for official labour forces and actual labour force if 
official labour force participation declines while the total labour force participation is 
assumed constant. Unemployment (which is the lack of work in the formal sector) would 
prompt or force some people to work in the informal economic sector; (c) gaps between cash 
payment and increase in currency demand. This can be reveal in the currency outside 
bank/narrow money fraction of broad money because those involved in informal economic 
activities usually conduct their activities in cash. 
Apart from domestic informal activities, informal cross border trade (which are international 
flows of goods that are not reported (or incorrectly reported) by customs authorities of a 
country) is a major form of overall informal economic activities in the WAMZ countries 
where goods pass through border posts with false customer declarations. Goods cross borders 
                                                          
79 Versions of these accounts are evolved according to specific uses and they are easily certified by accounting firms who are 
usually part of the arrangement. 
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(either through border posts or elsewhere along the borders) without the knowledge of 
custom authorities. Within the WAMZ, casual observations reveal that informal cross border 
trade (ICBT) is thriving. 
As it affects Africa continent generally and the WAMZ specifically, Golub (2014) 
established that a significant component of ICBT activities are re-exports in which goods are 
imported formally into a low-tax/low cost country with the intent of clandestinely trans-
shipping them thereafter into the neighbouring countries with higher taxes, restrictive import 
quotas, costly trade facilitation services or higher regulatory standards. It is a long-time 
tradition to trade local primary products across borders in order to balance local shortages and 
stabilise prices, due to the need for livelihood and life sustenance caused by limited and 
shrinking formal employment opportunities. Generally, in West Africa, recorded intra-
regional trade is small, but ICBT is pervasive, with re-export being particularly significant 
form of intra-regional trade. In recent days, ICBT in the WAMZ is viewed to be around 50% 
of intra-regional trade (Benjamin et al, 2015). More often, estimates of ICBT is in multiples 
of official cross-border trade. For instance, World Bank (2013) reported that in 2011 the 
bilateral trade of domestically-produced goods between Nigeria and Cameroon was $230 
million, in comparison with officially-recorded flows of $10 - $40million.  
Two features of African national boundaries (which as well, reflect in WAMZ’s national 
boundaries) from which ICBT can be fully understand are: (i) the huge divergence in 
economic policies between neighbouring countries; and (ii) the ease of cross-border shipment 
of goods by informal operators. Consequently, due to these factors, smuggling flourishes in 
the WAMZ as a result of the contradictions between hugely unchallenged state authorities 
over borders and the ease with which informal operators evade borders. In West Africa, 
common re-export goods  which are banned or are subject to high taxes in some countries 
within the sub-region are cars, clothes and clothing materials, cigarettes, sugar, rice, 
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vegetable oil, frozen poultry etc. Significantly, Benin and Togo are hubs for unofficial and 
illegitimate cross-border trade (due to their proximity to Nigeria, the largest economy in the 
region), serving as gateway to other countries within the sub-continent.  
Medina and Schneider (2018), in a study on ‘shadow economy’ of 158 countries of the world 
over the period between 1991 and 2015, came up with robust estimates of the sizes of 
informal economic activities of the countries covered by the research study, adopting the new 
macro methods of Currency Demand Approach (CDA) and the Multiple Indicators Multiple 
Causes (MIMIC) approach. The results of the statistical estimations of the sizes of informal 
economies of the WAMZ, as percentages of the formal GDP, using the MIMIC method is as 
presented in Table 3.1 below. 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of MIMIC Estimations of Sizes of Informal Economy (as Percentages of 
GDP) in the WAMZ (1991-2015) 
Year Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone WAMZ 
1991 50.60 46.07 41.22 42.08 56.95 38.20 45.85 
1992 49.38 46.12 41.34 43.89 58.17 41.77 46.77 
1993 49.46 47.71 41.16 44.70 58.82 43.77 47.60 
1994 53.55 46.18 41.88 45.25 66.61 43.67 49.52 
1995 56.73 44.98 41.75 45.55 62.21 44.51 49.29 
1996 55.31 46.87 42.03 46.67 61.09 46.36 49.72 
1997 54.35 44.65 41.32 45.12 60.69 46.60 48.79 
1998 51.61 45.70 39.73 45.95 62.33 45.96 48.55 
1999 48.35 44.58 40.14 44.64 59.87 48.49 47.68 
2000 45.10 41.90 39.70 43.20 57.90 48.60 46.07 
2001 43.36 42.62 39.12 42.23 57.64 50.14 45.85 
2002 51.76 42.66 38.09 41.84 59.93 47.76 47.01 
2003 42.85 42.60 39.01 43.02 57.19 45.34 45.00 
2004 38.90 42.90 28.77 42.31 56.72 43.88 42.25 
2005 45.77 43.16 37.54 42.47 55.84 43.45 44.71 
2006 48.19 41.68 37.41 39.95 51.95 42.96 43.69 
2007 47.90 41.51 38.30 42.71 54.96 40.92 44.38 
2008 45.28 41.41 38.94 43.09 53.06 40.87 43.76 
2009 39.78 40.61 42.16 43.45 53.98 40.60 43.43 
2010 35.17 40.03 43.89 41.57 52.80 39.34 42.13 
2011 48.57 40.64 39.60 41.52 51.51 36.12 42.99 
2012 42.64 40.99 37.51 42.23 51.56 32.36 41.21 
2013 40.95 39.25 38.32 42.37 51.70 25.69 39.71 
2014 43.81 38.50 38.18 42.45 50.64 26.47 40.01 
2015 43.64 39.37 41.58 43.67 52.49 34.18 42.49 
Average 46.88 42.91 39.95 43.24 56.67 41.50 45.19 
Source: Medina and Schneider (2018). 
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To generate these estimates, the predictor variables employed in the structural equation 
model of MIMIC were  fiscal freedom, cash (currency), unemployment, rule of law, 
corruption control, per capita income growth, labour force participation, government stability, 
and trade openness in these countries. For the WAMZ member economies, the inclusion of 
these variables are justified. All things being equal, for instant, on per capita growth, a bigger 
informal economy can be associated with more economic activities getting off the formal 
economy thus resulting in decrease in economic growth. Lower official labour force 
participation signals higher informal activities while the more the cash (currency) used, the 
greater the extent of informal economic activities. The possibility of increased informal 
economic activities could also be caused by high unemployment rate. Corrupt practices are 
always associate with unofficial/informal activities while good rule of law enhances formal 
economic activities and reduces the level of informal activities. 
 
3.3 Stylised Facts of Macroeconomics of the WAMZ 
For the WAMZ countries, this section considers some macroeconomic stylised facts and 
theoretical propositions. These are: (i) some macroeconomic fluctuations in relation to 
business cycles from the view-point of the developing economies of the WAMZ and the 
developed economies of Germany, the UK and the US; (ii)  international parity relationships 
in purchasing power parity (PPP) and international Fisher effect (IFE); (iii) Phillips curve; 
(iv) Lucas short-run output-inflation trade-off.  
3.3.1 Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Business Cycles 
In this study, fluctuations in macroeconomic variables were examined at the frequency of 
business cycle. This necessitated decomposing of these variables into trend (non-stationary) 
and cyclical (stationary) components. The reason for this is that specific empirical features of 
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these data (such cross-correlation) can only be valid if data are stationary. To de-trend the 
variables used here, and decompose these series into trend and cyclical components so as to 
remove long term trend and derive cyclical components which are stationary, the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filtering method (with lambda=100 for annual data) was applied.  The cyclical 
components of the variables of interest were applied to estimate volatility and co-movements 
(correlation) towards verifying the relevant stylised facts. These are meant to establish pro-
cyclicality, a-cyclicality and counter-cyclicality in these variables. Within the context of the 
assessment here, volatility was taken to be aggregate fluctuations measures by standard 
deviation, while co-movement measure was by the magnitude of correlation coefficients. 
Positive correlation indicate pro-cyclicality while counter-cyclicality was deduced from 
negative correlation. Acyclicality is the situation of zero correlation. 
Six major areas of stylised facts considered here for the WAMZ countries ( as developing 
economies) and Germany, United Kingdom and the United States (as developed economies) 
are for: (1) output and income (real GDP and nominal GDP); (2) fiscal variables (government 
expenditure and revenue and fiscal impulse); (3) money and credit (money supply and 
velocity of money); (4) price (consumer price, inflation and nominal interest rates); (5) 
exchange rates (nominal US dollar exchange rates, nominal effective exchange rates and real 
effective exchange rates); and (6) foreign trade (merchandise trade balance). Velocity of 
broad money supply was derived by dividing nominal GDP by money supply (M3) while 
government expenditure was divided by government revenue to derive fiscal impulse. 
Merchandise trade balance was taken to be the difference between imports and exports of the 
countries evaluated. Variables evaluated were generally over the period between 1991 and 
2015. 
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The results of the correlation of business cycles and the cyclical component of some 
monetary and exchange rates, fiscal and external trade variables in the nine countries assessed 
are as exhibited in Table 3.2 below 
Table 3.2: Results of Correlation of Cyclical Components of Macroeconomic Variables and Business 
Cycles in the WAMZ and Three Developed Economies 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone Germany UK US 
Government 
Expenditure 
 
0.33 
 
0.78 
 
0.19 
 
0.93 
 
0.03 
 
0.27 
 
0.14 
 
0.17 
 
0.55 
Government 
Revenue 
 
0.50 
 
0.76 
 
na 
 
0.03 
 
0.007 
 
0.69 
 
0.61 
 
0.73 
 
0.82 
Fiscal Impulse 0.19 -0.14 na -0.68 0.11 -0.09 0.13 0.05 0.11 
Broad Money 
Supply (M3) 
 
0.13 
 
0.62 
 
0.25 
 
0.41 
 
0.21 
 
0.64 
 
na 
 
0.12 
 
0.09 
Velocity of 
Money 
 
0.44 
 
0.11 
 
0.61 
 
0.66 
 
0.09 
 
0.68 
 
na 
 
0.08 
 
-0.41 
Domestic 
Credits 
 
0.35 
 
0.31 
 
0.61 
 
0.99 
 
0.39 
 
0.30 
 
0.05 
 
0.33 
 
0.59 
Price (CPI) 0.02 0.004 0.46 0.66 0.006 0.46 0.35 0.64 0.05 
Inflation Rate 0.35 0.09 0.08 0.22 0.03 0.76 0.03 0.17 0.64 
Nominal 
Interest Rate 
 
0.43 
 
-0.30 
 
0.19 
 
0.98 
 
-0.28 
 
-0.08 
 
0.72 
 
0.67 
 
0.55 
Nominal (USD) 
Exchange Rate 
 
0.15 
 
0.28 
 
0.20 
 
0.70 
 
0.20 
 
0.42 
 
na 
 
0.66 
 
na 
NEER 0.02 0.47 na na 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.73 0.13 
REER 0.09 0.44 na na 0.30 0.83 0.36 0.73 0.24 
Imports 0.41 0.52 0.45 0.62 0.09 0.14 0.50 0.47 0.60 
Exports 0.53 0.72 0.63 0.97 0.12 0.93 0.53 0.37 0.13 
Merchandise 
Trade balance 
 
0.47 
 
0.17 
 
0.16 
 
0.91 
 
0.12 
 
0.80 
 
0.45 
 
0.34 
 
0.83 
Source: Author’ Estimation, EIU Database and EViews 9.5Output 
 
For the fiscal variables, the results for all the WAMZ countries revealed pro-cyclicality of 
fiscal variables of government expenditure and government revenue. However, both variables 
appeared acyclical in the case of Nigeria. Similar results were obtained for the three 
developed economies assessed. Although, the economic intuition here is that fiscal policy 
should be countercyclical, there have been evidences of fiscal policy pro-cyclicality being a 
stylised fact. When the fiscal impulse measure was analysed to reveal the net effect of 
government expenditure and revenue on real output, the correlation coefficients were 
negative (counter-cyclicality) only for Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone while other WAMZ 
countries, Germany, UK and the US exhibited pro-cyclicality. These indicate that during 
economic boom, governments of these countries increase expenditure and reduce tax revenue 
and in recession reduce expenditure and increase revenue. The correlation of monetary 
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variable (broad money) were pro-cyclical for all the countries evaluated, suggesting positive 
transmission of monetary shock to real economic activities. Pro-cyclicality of monetary 
variables is, however, a stylised fact. For the evaluation of velocity of money, the results 
showed pro-cyclicality for all countries, with the exemption of the US. The postulation of the 
QTM is that, given the pro-cyclicality of broad money, velocity of money is expected to be 
counter-cyclical. However, this holds only for the US which tended towards a-cyclicality in 
broad money. There was positive correlation in the cases of domestic credit for all the 
WAMZ developing economies and the three developed economies. This was expected as it 
indicated that domestic credits were made available for domestic economies in these 
countries, though very low (and tending towards a-cyclicality) for Nigeria. 
In literature, the results of the tests of correlation between price and output have been mixed. 
In this respect, estimations in this study yielded positive correlation of domestic real output 
and both price and inflation rates, thus depicting pro-cyclical variations of price in the 
WAMZ countries and the developed economies under assessment. These showed that supply 
shocks dominantly influenced macroeconomic fluctuations in these economies. However 
inflation appears to be closely a-cyclical in Ghana, Guinea Nigeria and Germany. Nominal 
interest rate was expectedly pro-cyclical in the advanced economies of Germany, UK and the 
US and also in The Gambia, Guinea and Liberia. While the nominal US dollar exchange rate 
was pro-cyclical for all the countries examined; and both NEER and REER were equally 
positively correlated with domestic real output for the four WAMZ countries whose data for 
these analyses were available. This same result was obtained for the three developed 
economies examined. The positive correlations of these exchange rate variables are stylised 
facts. Nevertheless, the positive correlation for The Gambia in NEER and REER were low 
and tending towards a-cyclical status for these variables. For the foreign trade variables of 
imports and exports, the relationships with domestic output were positive for all the nine 
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countries. However, merchandise trade balance is deemed to be an adequate measure of 
foreign trade transactions; and the correlation of this series with real domestic output for all 
the WAMZ countries and three developed countries were pro-cyclical. There might be a link 
between domestic output and exports or this might be due to the insensitivity of imports of 
these countries to fluctuations in domestic demands. This positive relationship is very strong 
in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the US. 
Table 3.3 below highlights the results of the assessment of the stylised facts on the volatility 
of cyclical components of seven selected macroeconomic variables estimated for the WAMZ 
countries and the developed economies of Germany, the UK and the US. In this context, it is 
a stylised fact that the cycles of macroeconomic variables are more volatile in developing 
economies than in developed economies. 
Table 3.3: Results of Volatility (Standard Deviations) of Cyclical Components of Macroeconomic 
Variables of the WAMZ and Three Developed Economies 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone Germany UK US 
Nominal 
Interest Rate 
 
4.34 
 
5.06 
 
2.51 
 
0.38 
 
3.11 
 
10.41 
 
1.02 
 
1.10 
 
1.42 
Nominal (USD) 
Exchange Rate 
 
3.24 
 
0.10 
 
401.74 
 
8.47 
 
15.57 
 
175.17 
 
na 
 
0.04 
 
na 
NEER 25.79 144.44 na na 113.40 66.67 2.88 7.41 0.52 
REER 13.74 13.48 na na 45.49 10.74 3.90 7.57 5.04 
Velocity of 
Money 
 
63.09 
 
8.50 
 
5.05 
 
26.39 
 
10.63 
 
30.13 
 
na 
 
2.11 
 
1.67 
Price (CPI) 2.76 4.06 4.49 2.54 2.59 2.27 0.86 1.10 0.76 
Inflation Rate 20.50 13.69 7.72 6.17 68.56 19.19 0.72 1.56 0.52 
Source: Author’ Estimation and EViews 9.5Output 
It is apparent and clear from the results displayed above that variabilities of the 
macroeconomic series examined were lower in the developed economies of Germany, the 
UK and the US than the developing economies of the WAMZ, thus supporting this stylised 
fact. 
On the overall, results generated through estimations and analyses here were mixed, however, 
there some appreciable volumes of supports for the stylised fact assessed in this sub-section. 
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3.3.2 International Parity Relationships – PPP, IFE and UIP 
Parity condition gives intuitive explanations of the movements in price and interest rates in 
different markets in relation to exchange rate. Theoretically, exchange rate (spot and forward) 
are influenced by interest rates and inflation. Therefore, international parity conditions 
(which are core to international finance) are economic theories linking exchange rate, price 
levels and interest rates together. They are key relations applied in predicting movements in 
exchange rates. Four (4) parity conditions exhibiting interlinkages are: (i) Relative 
Purchasing Power Parity, (ii) Fisher Effect (close); (iii) International Fisher Effect (open); 
and (iv) Interest Rate Parity. Commodity market inflation (changes in price level) affect 
market interest rate which in turn, through interest rate parity, affect exchange rates. Though, 
to some degree, these theories logically explain exchange rate fluctuations, however, they are 
not too strong because they are based on some assumptions that could be challenged. Some of 
these assumptions are: free flow of goods, services and capital which do not hold true in the 
real world. Nevertheless, parity conditions are expected to hold in the long run, but not 
always in the short run.  
The law of one price (LOOP) states that in a competitive market (free of transportation costs 
and official trade barriers – tariffs), identical goods sold in different countries must sell for 
same price when their prices are expressed in terms of the same currency. This law buttresses 
the important principle in trade theory that in a situation of ‘open trade’ and ‘costless trade’, 
identical goods must trade at same relative prices regardless of where they are sold (Krugman 
et al, 2015). The tendency of identical goods to sell for identical prices globally generates a 
link between exchange rate and prices. As prices change globally, it is necessary to exchange 
rate to also change in order to keep the prices measured in a common currency equal across 
countries. This adjustment of exchange rate to offset differing inflation rates between 
countries is the reason for exchange rate changes (Husted and Melvin, 2013). This 
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relationship between exchange rate and price level is the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
which explains the movement in the exchange rate between currencies of two countries by 
price level changes in these countries. 
Purchasing Power Parity: The PPP theory states that the exchange rate between two 
countries’ currencies equals the ratio of the countries’ price levels. The prediction of PPP is 
that an increase (decrease) in the purchasing power of the domestic currency (as depicted by 
decrease (increase) in the domestic price level) will be associated with a proportional 
currency appreciation (depreciation) in the foreign exchange market. The PPP theory can be 
expressed in an equation as: 
𝐸 = 𝑃 − 𝑃∗                                                             3.1 
where 𝐸 is exchange rate, 𝑃 and 𝑃∗ are price levels in the domestic and foreign countries 
respectively. The assertion of PPP is that there is equality in price levels of all countries when 
measures in terms of same currency.80  
Although, the PPP equation may reflect the idea of LOOP, they are however, different. While 
LOOP applies to the individual commodity, PPP relates to the general price level. For every 
commodity, if LOOP hold true, PPP must hold automatically so far the reference basket of 
goods that estimates price levels in different countries are the same. An affirmation of PPP is 
that even when the LOOP is true literally, economic forces behind it will assist it to equalise 
purchasing powers in all countries (Krugman et al, 2015). 
There is absolute PPP and there is relative PPP. Absolute PPP (which is the strong-form-PPP) 
is the expression in Equation 3.1 that exchange rate is equal to relative price levels where the 
variables involved are transformed into logarithmic forms. This version of PPP holds that by 
                                                          
80 This is a crucial assertion for an economic bloc aiming at monetary integration and a common currency. 
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comparing prices of a bundle of goods in two different countries (with conversions by 
exchange rate into a common currency measure), the price will then be equal. Drawing from 
Equation 3.1, the algebraic expression of the absolute PPP is: 
𝐸 =
𝑃
𝑃∗
                                                                       3.2 
where the variables are not transformed into logarithm. Relative PPP (which is the weak-form 
PPP) states that the percentage change in the exchange rate between two currencies over a 
period of time equals to the difference between the percentage changes in national price 
levels. What this denotes is that that relative PPP begins with absolute PPP and then 
transform Equation 3.2 into percentage changes thus: 
%∆𝐸 = %∆𝑃 − %∆𝑃∗                                                           3.3 
Relative PPP accounts for market imperfections. As acknowledged by the proponents of the 
PPP theory, the absolute PPP is not likely to hold because of the existence of transport costs, 
trade impediments, distortion effects of tariffs, quotas and protections, imperfect information 
and competition etc., while it is argued that relative PPP can hold even in the presence of 
these highlighted problems. The argument of relative PPP is that exchange rate will adjust by 
the amount of inflation differentials between two economies. In the consideration of market 
imperfection, relative PPP, which is the long run path on which exchange rate moves with 
inflation is tested in this chapter. 
Many empirical studies have reached the conclusion that PPP hold better in the long run than 
in the short run and that there can be prolonged and substantial deviations in the long run 
(Ardeni and Lubian, 1991). On the overall, it was argued that PPP holds better for traded 
goods than for non-traded goods (Officer, 1976). A stylised fact and major empirical 
regularity is that non-traded goods are usually more expensive in rich countries than in poor 
countries once the prices are converted into a common currency (Pilbeam, 2018). This is a 
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vital point. Furthermore, the PPP theory holds better for relatively high inflation countries 
and underdeveloped capital markets. High-inflation countries’ currencies (relative to their 
trade partners) tend to experience rapid depreciation that reflects such high inflation, thus 
suggesting that PPP is a dominant foreign exchange rate determinant in such countries.  PPP 
may not hold generally because of confounding effects through other factors that are 
determinants of exchange rate. 
Husted and Melvin (2013) stressed that developing economies have very low prices for many 
goods and services when measured in terms of developed countries’ currencies (such as the 
US dollar). In these developing economies, when overall economic activities are measured at 
market exchange rate, domestic products are understated. Furthermore, common findings 
show that PPP holds better for countries having high trade openness and perform poorly for 
countries with significant trade barriers. Because of the postulation that PPP holds better 
when countries concerned are geographically close and trade linkages are high (according to 
Frankel, 1981), in testing the validity of international parity relationships, this study generates 
thirty (30) pairs of bilateral nominal exchange rates in which all the six WAMZ countries, 
each serves as home economies to each other five member countries.  
Because price level data are non-existing, the available consumer price indices (which is 
index numbers whose value is 100 during the base year of the data) are commonly used. For 
both domestic and foreign countries, consumer price index (CPI) are constructed as: 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡
𝑃0
                                                               3.4 
where 𝑃𝑡 and 𝑃0 are the consumer price level at time t and the base year respectively. If the 
home country’s CPI is divided by foreign country’s CPI, this results into: 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
∗ = (
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡
∗) 𝑋 (
𝑃0
∗
𝑃0
)                                                               3.5 
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where ∗ depicts the foreign country. Assuming the absolute PPP in Equation 3.2 holds in the 
base year, the actual exchange rate in the base year equals to the PPP exchange rate for the 
base year. An empirical measure of PPP exchange rate by cross multiplying terms in 
Equation 3.5 thus: 
𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝐸0 (
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
∗)                                                               3.6 
 As a commonly used technique which involves the correlation of the actual exchange rates 
movements and the PPP counterpart, Equation 3.6 allows for the test of the validity of PPP 
(Husted and Melvin, 2013). This PPP exchange rate which re-establishes PPP relative to the 
base period offsets the relative inflation between a pair of countries, in consideration of the 
base period. 
A further way of assessing long run PPP is to investigate the stationarity of real exchange rate 
(RER). The assumptions of absolute PPP is that RER is constant. The RER is nominal 
exchange rate adjusted for national prices. If the RER is stationary, any percentage change in 
price levels would be offset by equal magnitude of nominal exchange rate 
depreciation/appreciation. If RER contains unit roots, this then means that RER shocks are 
permanent with a further implication that PPP does not hold. For this purpose, bilateral RER 
were estimated for the WAMZ countries as: 
𝑞 = 𝑠 (
𝑝
𝑝∗
)                                                           3.7 
where 𝑞 is real exchange rate. 
Here, PPP is tested under the null hypothesis that RER is a random walk (that is, RER 
contains unit root and not stationary) against the alternative hypothesis that RER is stationary 
(Messe and Rogoff, 1988 and Mark, 1989). Although, the unit root tests of RER were 
performed ‘with and without time trend’, it is more appropriate to apply the model without 
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trend in determining the stationarity of RER. This is because the inclusion of linear time trend 
is not theoretically consistent with long run proposition of PPP. Some empirical studies also 
suggested the inconsistency of time trend in RER with the PPP hypothesis (Culver and 
Papell, 1999; Holmes, 2002; Zhang and Lowinger, 2006; Acaravci and Acaravci, 2007) 
International Fisher Effect:  According to the Quantity Theory of Money (QTM), in the long 
run, money supply growth causes changes in price, while it is a general consensus among 
economists that money supply growth does not affect real variables in the long run. 
Consequently, real interest rate should not be impacted by money supply growth. If this 
holds, all inflation changes must be reflected in the nominal interest rate. The explanations of 
the ‘Fisher Effect’ is on how the nominal interest rate is affected by changes in inflation, in 
response to money supply growth. This thus reflects the effect of money supply growth on 
the nominal interest rate as clearly expressed in the QTM and Fisher equation. Fisher effect is 
therefore an expression that allows for the impact of inflation on nominal interest rate, in 
which increasing inflationary expectations causes increasing nominal interest. The Fisher 
equation is expressed as: 
𝑟 = 𝑖 − 𝜋𝑒                                                                       3.8 
Where 𝑟 is real interest rate, 𝑖 is nominal interest rate and 𝜋𝑒  is expected inflation. ‘Fisher 
Effect’ depicts one-to-one relationship between nominal interest rate and inflation rate. This 
was brought to the fore by Irving Fisher who theorised a direct relationship between inflation 
rate and nominal interest rate. According to this postulation, all things being equal, a rise in a 
country’s expected inflation rate will eventually cause an equal rise in interest rate, and vice 
versa. A currency with high rate of inflation should also bear interest rate higher than a 
currency with lower rates of inflation.  
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This is the one-to-one relationship between nominal interest rate and inflation in ‘Fisher 
Effect’ expressed thus: 
𝑖 = 𝜋𝑒                                                                       3.9 
 
This Fisher effect for a domestic economy while the foreign version of this equation can be 
stated as: 
𝑖∗ = 𝜋𝑒∗                                                                 3.10 
 
From the UIP condition and the Fisher hypothesis, there is a theoretical suggestion that 
currencies with higher interest rates depreciate because higher nominal interest rate reflects 
higher expected inflation. This is what the international Fisher effect (IFE) suggests. In order 
to clearly understand how relative nominal exchange rates changes among countries affect a 
country’s currency, it is necessary to recollect and consider the implications of the theories of 
PPP and Fisher effect. The implication of PPP is that exchange rate will move in order to 
offset changes in inflation rate differential. Therefore, a rise in a domestic inflation rate 
relative to that of a foreign country should associate with a fall in the value of the home 
country’s currency. Secondly, this should also associate with a rise in the domestic country’s 
interest rate. When these two conditions are put together, there will be IFE which is also 
known as Fisher effect (open). It can therefore be stated that IFE equals to the combination of 
the PPP and Fisher effect (closed).  
International Fisher Effect (IFE) hypothesises that interest rate differentials in based on 
inflation differences. The higher the interest rate, the higher the inflation rate which subjects a 
currency to the weaker condition of depreciation. IFE therefore portends that differences in 
nominal interest rate between two countries should be proportional to depreciation or 
appreciation of the currencies of the two countries. The international Fisher effect (IFE) is an 
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economic and exchange rate model applied in predicting nominal exchange rate movements 
between two or more foreign currencies based on the relationship between the prevailing 
interest rate in these countries. 
Just like the PPP theory, IFE conjectures that interest rate differentials (and not inflation 
differential) influences exchange rate changes. IFE also states that an estimated change in the 
current exchange rate between any two currencies is directly proportional to the difference 
between the nominal interest rate of these two countries as a particular time. As earlier 
indicated, there is the hypothesis is that the real interest rate in an economy is independent of 
monetary variables and with the assumption that rates are calculated across countries, it can 
be inferred that a country experiencing lower (higher) interest rate will also experience lower 
(higher). Consequently, IFE estimated exchange rate are equally based on nominal interest 
rates relationships. If IFE theory explains the relationship between interest rates and 
exchange rate, it impliedly proposes interest rate differential as a prediction of the future 
changes in spot exchange rate. 
Automatically, nominal interest rate differentials reflects inflation differential by a no-
arbitrage system or by a PPP. This depicts that there is close relationship between PPP and 
IFE due to the high degree of correlation between interest rate and inflation rate. What IFE is 
therefore saying is that the currency of a country reflecting lower (higher) interest rate should 
experience appreciation (depreciation) relative to the currency of the country bearing higher 
(lower) interest rate. These show that there is proportional relationship between 
depreciation/appreciation of currency, prices and nominal interest rate differential. This link 
between interest rate, inflation and exchange rate is provided by IFE. 
However, the validity of IFE depends largely on capital market integration which implies free 
flows of capital across markets. This is however problematic in developing economies like 
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the WAMZ economies (unlike developed economies). Given the foregoing explanations, 
international Fisher Effect can be expressed as: 
%∆𝑒 = (
1+𝑖𝑑
1+𝑖𝑓
) − 1                                                     3.11 
or 
%∆𝑒 = (
𝑖𝑑−𝑖𝑓
1+𝑖𝑓
)                                                            3.12 
where ∆𝑒 is the percentage change in exchange rate, 𝑖𝑑 and 𝑖𝑓 are the domestic and foreign 
nominal interest rates respectively. ∆𝑒 will be positive if 𝑖𝑑 > 𝑖𝑓, implying that domestic 
currency will depreciate relative to the foreign currency due to high inflationary expectations 
in the domestic country. On the other hand, if 𝑖𝑑 < 𝑖𝑓, ∆𝑒 will be negative. These therefore 
connote positive relationship between exchange rate changes and interest rate differentials. 
The position of IFE is that the nominal exchange rate between two countries should adjust for 
nominal interest rate differentials. These adjustment can occur either through (i) international 
capital flow (international money market) or trade and flow of goods. Therefore, free capital 
mobility is a condition for IFE to hold. Because the IFE theory is based on the PPP theory, 
the IFE theory might not hold due to the same reason that caused the PPP theory not to hold 
in the presence of other factors (other than inflation) affecting exchange rate movements and 
thus prevent exchange rate from adjusting according to the dictates of inflation differentials. 
Figure 3.1 below reflects the interlinkages between these international parities. 
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Figure 3.1: Interlinkages in International Parities Relationships 
 
Going by the foregoing analyses and the interconnectivity of the parity conditions and with 
the consideration of model Equations 3.9 and 3.10 above, IFE can be expressed and estimated 
as the relationship between relative nominal interest rates and relative inflation thus: 
(𝑖 − 𝑖∗) = (𝜋 − 𝜋∗)                                                      3.13 
where * indicate the foreign variables. 
Interest rates parity is state that interest rate differential between two countries is equal to the 
difference between the spot and forward exchange rates. The covered interest rate parity 
(CIP) is a condition that the price of risk-free asset having an identical maturity should be 
equal across countries after being translated into a common currency. This is arbitrage 
condition. The uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) occurs when the difference between 
interest rates equals to the difference in the spot exchange rate. If IFE states that change in 
exchange rates have to do with expected differences in interest rate, which means that the 
market will react in trying to achieve the UIP. 
Uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) states that exchange rate will change at a rate that offsets 
the interest rate differential. The UIP condition is such that expected rate of depreciation or 
appreciation of an exchange rate is equal to the interest rate differential between two the 
countries affected. Thus, UIP is expressed as: 
%∆𝐸 = 𝑖 − 𝑖∗                                                    3.14 
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Where ∆𝐸 is the expected rate of depreciation or appreciation of the domestic country’s 
currency in a direct quotation system while 𝑖 and 𝑖∗ are the domestic and foreign interest rates 
respectively. Higher interest rate is expected to cause depreciation while low interest rate 
leads to currency appreciation. What UIP says is that expected change in foreign exchange 
price offsets the difference in the nominal rates of returns. Nevertheless, UIP does not imply 
CIP. The requirements of UIP goes beyond friction-free financial markets. Investors may be 
indifferent about currency denomination of their financial assets so far these assets have same 
expected returns, even regardless of the volatility of these returns. Specifically, the investor 
may care less about currency risks involved. Such risk neutrality stance denotes ‘perfect 
substitutability’ of financial assets which is the implication of the UIP. Therefore, UIP is a 
relationship that must hold when domestic and foreign financial assets are perfect substitute 
in the situation of capital mobility. This is an assumption of monetary models of exchange 
rate determination. 
Suppose an investor within the WAMZ is considering buying an assets denominated in a 
foreign currency within the region has options of investing this fund in either Nigerian bonds 
or Ghanaian bonds having same risk and maturity postures. With these options before the 
investor, he/she should therefore bear two factors in mind: (i) the interest rate on the Nigerian 
bonds and the Ghanaian bonds; and (ii) the expectation of what happens to the naira-cedi 
exchange rate.  Because these bonds have equal risks, he/she can instantaneously switch 
between the two bonds. What make the difference between the two financial assets in this 
case is the currencies in which they are denominated and the related interest rates. If such 
international investor is a Nigerian who is contemplating the purchase of a Ghanaian bond 
while expecting the Nigerian currency (naira) to depreciate (lose its value) against the 
Ghanaian currency (cedi) as he holds the bonds, this will cause a rise in his expected Nigerian 
naira returns from holding the Ghanaian bond. These are the ideas of UIP. The real return 
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from holding the Nigerian (domestic) interest bearing asset is the difference between interest 
rate and inflation (𝑖 − 𝜋). Therefore, this real return from domestic interest bearing assets is 
transformed into the deviation of domestic inflation from the sum of foreign inflation and 
expected exchange rate appreciation/depreciation (𝑖∗ + ∆𝐸 − 𝜋). This is what UIP entails. 
Data and Methods: To serve as a precursor to the empirical assessments of exchange rate 
determination in the WAMZ countries, efforts in this section was limited to the test for the 
validity of the Absolute and Relative PPP as well as the IFE postulations. Investigations of 
simultaneous validity of these theories in the cases of the six WAMZ countries were 
performed. In these respects, these necessitated the investigation of both directions of 
bilateral relationship of the six countries of the WAMZ in which these countries at one point 
or the other, serve as ‘domestic country/currency’ against respective ‘foreign 
country/currency’. These constitute thirty pairs or bilateral relationships.  
Quarterly data of money market interest rates, consumer price index (CPI) for a period of 21 
years between 1995 and 2015 were sourced from the databases of World Bank, IMF and EIU 
and applied for this study. For the WAMZ countries assessed, absolute PPP should imply 
cointegration between the nominal exchange rates and relative foreign and domestic prices; 
relative PPP should connote cointegration of changes in nominal interest rates and changes in 
relative foreign and domestic prices; while IFE should require cointegration between nominal 
interest rate differentials and inflation differentials.  As an initial step, Equation 3.7 was 
estimated to generate the PPP exchange rates for the WAMZ countries in order to investigate 
the levels of equality of PPP exchange rates and market exchange rates of the WAMZ and 
further establish the degree of deviations (if any) of these rates from each other and as well 
establish the degree of association (correlation) of these two exchange rates over the 15-year 
period (between 2001 and 2015) covered by the validity tests. For the purpose of the 
cointegration estimations, the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) and Phillip-Perron (PP) unit 
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root tests were performed at the first stage to check for the order of integration of the 
variables employed in the cointegration analyses because residual-based cointegration tests 
require all variables (at least the dependent variable) to be to an integration order of one. 
Fully modified least square (FMOLS) cointegrating regression were performed for each of 
the 30 bilateral relationships and the residuals of these FMOLS estimation results were tested 
for unit root/stationarity under the residual-based single equation cointegration methods 
which require the residuals to be stationary if the variables are cointegrated to be The 
econometric variants of Residual-based cointegration tests (Phillips Ouliaris and Park’s 
Added Variables Tests) and the statistical methods of Pearson Moment Correlation and were 
appropriately applied. While Phillips Ouliaris tests the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration, Parks’ Added Variable Tests were applied 
to test null hypothesis of no cointegration.  The cointegration tests were performed at 1% 
level of significance. 
Results and Findings: The deviations of the estimated annual PPP exchange rates and market 
exchange bilateral exchange cross-rates across the WAMZ countries as well as the results of 
estimates of the strength of association of these two forms of exchange rates over a period of 
fifteen years are exhibited in Table 3.4 below. The Pearson Product-moment correlation 
estimation of the degrees of association of the two classes of exchange rate (reported in 
percentage translations of the correlation coefficients) were very high (at over 90 
percentages) and positivity moved towards same direction. These portend close linear 
association of the market exchange rates and the PPP theoretically predisposed exchange 
rates across the WAMZ. 
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Table 3.4: Deviations of PPP Exchange Rates from Market Exchange Rates and Correlation Estimates in 
the WAMZ (2001-2015) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
2001 0.22 -2.68 na 12.50 45.51 na 
2002 0.23 0.27 na 21.21 47.55 na 
2003 0.17 6.05 na 15.64 47.80 na 
2004 0.13 5.02 118.72 8.97 41.69 na 
2005 0.06 3.22 943.99 7.85 27.31 na 
2006 0.00 3.00 1625.19 6.81 19.64 -129.89 
2007 -0.04 -0.80 -10.69 5.81 14.12 -371.06 
2008 -0.03 -3.63 -196.23 0.46 -1.46 -515.84 
2009 0.09 -0.45 -239.52 0.64 14.56 -386.34 
2010 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2011 0.00 1.00 -77.93 -2.86 -6.75 231.03 
2012 0.21 3.01 -618.34 -5.08 -20.05 43.58 
2013 0.21 5.67 -1477.43 -5.81 -32.50 -139.75 
2014 0.91 10.16 -2038.88 -5.83 -43.29 -81.14 
2015 1.35 8.82 -2293.78 -10.20 -27.33 173.00 
% Correlation 95.98% 96.65% 94.06% 96.45% 90.11% 96.72% 
Source: Author’s Estimations  
Regarding the investigations of the PPP (absolute and relative). IFE and UIP, results of the 
various unit roots tests of variables employed in the tests of validity of the international parity 
conditions are reported in Appendices 3.1 to 3.4.   
Virtually all the WAMZ countries’ variables for the cointegration tests of relative PPP were 
stationary, and this makes cointegration tests inappropriate in these respects. Consequently, 
this study resorted to the application of the Pearson Product-Moment correlation estimations 
of the terms of relative PPP for the 30 bilateral relationship across the WAMZ in order to 
establish the strength of linear association between percentage changes in exchange rates and 
percentage changes in inflation differentials. The stronger the association of these two 
variables of relative PPP, the closer the Pearson correlation coefficient will be to either +1 or 
-1 depending on whether the relationship is positive or negative, respectively. 
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Table 3.5: Results of Residual-based Cointegration Tests of Absolute PPP in the WAMZ  
 Phillips-Oualiaris Tests Park’s Added Variable Tests 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
 
tau-statistics 
 
z-statistics 
 
Chi-square 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.587 
-2.631 
-2.450 
-2.750 
-2.336 
-12.845 
-9.963 
-9.635 
-12.999 
-10.365* 
4.361 
95.023* 
133.507* 
14.341* 
12.748* 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.756 
-0.682 
-1.766 
-1.222 
-2.213 
-9.396 
-2.126 
-6.416 
-4.560 
-8.730 
23.709* 
185.207* 
76.931* 
25.446* 
32.718* 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.205 
-1.568 
-2.693 
-2.816 
-2.857 
-7.813 
-5.824 
-12.656 
-15.684*** 
-15.327*** 
76.586* 
99.751* 
20.389* 
9.118* 
7.328** 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-8.634 
-3.218*** 
-3.111 
-3.827** 
-1.812 
-2.270 
-14.280 
-13.590 
-21.751** 
-6.325 
113.668* 
52.801* 
33.036* 
14.939* 
21.964* 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
-2.199 
-3.323*** 
-3.169*** 
-4.159* 
-2.735 
-8.990 
-20.677** 
-16.066*** 
-24.895* 
-12.381 
10.900* 
10.627* 
8.900* 
13.671* 
6.387** 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-2.331 
-1.893 
-2.846 
-1.773 
-2.664 
-10.310 
-6.645 
-15.424** 
-6.345 
-11.481 
7.311* 
14.412* 
3.661 
19.971* 
5.013*** 
 Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 10 Output 
The outcome of the Phillips-Ouliaris and Park’s Added Variable residual-based cointegration 
tests for absolute PPP across the WAMZ are highlighted in Table 3.5 above. For most 
bilateral absolute PPP relationships (except for The Gambia/Sierra Leone and 
Nigeria/Liberia). The test statistics (tau and z) yielded by the Phillip-Ouliaris tests failed to 
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration (that is, unit roots in the residuals) at 1% level 
of significance. Apart from The Gambia/Ghana and Sierra Leone/Guinea relationships, the 
chi-square statistics produced for all the WAMZ countries revealed that the Park’s Added 
Variable tests reject the null hypothesis of cointegration of the series at 1% level of 
significance. These two residual based cointegration tests consequently provided evidence to 
suggest that the absolute PPP does not hold across the WAMZ. The results of further ADF 
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and PP (with constant only) unit roots tests of  bilateral RER as exhibited in Table 3.6 below 
show that the null hypothesis of unit roots cannot be rejected for virtually all the WAMZ 
countries at 1% level of significance (except for some cases of three The Gambian-based 
RER and Liberia/ Guinea RER).  
Table 3.6: Results of ADF and PP Unit Roots Tests of Real Exchange Rates 
  ADF  PP 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-8.059* 
-6.448* 
-1.847 
-7.032* 
-2.554 
-4.493* 
-4.457* 
-3.468*** 
-5.886* 
-2.459 
-15.018* 
-7.897* 
-1.881 
-6.948* 
-2.306 
11.576* 
-5.285* 
-2.190 
-5.816* 
-2.010 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
3.441 
-3.918* 
2.876 
0.743 
0.473 
2.108 
-4.564* 
0.395 
0.935 
1.935 
4.033 
-2.519 
3.017 
1.485 
0.872 
2.173 
-2.308 
0.305 
-0.511 
-1.059 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.847 
-2.414 
-2.086 
-2.523 
-1.785 
-1.499 
-2.525 
-1.527 
-2.342 
-2.492 
-1.824 
-1.908 
2.060 
-2.337 
-2.028 
-1.648 
-1.837 
-1.527 
-1.555 
-2.103 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.863 
-1.658 
-4.940* 
-2.805** 
-3.313** 
-2.069 
-5.991* 
-3.420** 
-3.221** 
3.416** 
-1.951 
-0.243 
-5.035* 
-2.850* 
-2.181 
-2.158 
-3.704** 
-3.457** 
-3.282*** 
-2.193 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
-1.585 
-2.390 
-6.589* 
-3.044** 
-2.871*** 
-2.175 
-3.900** 
-8.228* 
-3.380** 
4.800** 
-1.619 
-2.357 
-7.269* 
-3.032*** 
1.950 
-2.295 
-3.076 
-4.932* 
-3.435*** 
-2.401 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-2.361 
-1.334 
-2.221 
-3.458** 
-2.743** 
-2.312 
-2.973 
-3.614** 
3.540** 
3.894** 
-2.050 
-0.580 
2.815*** 
-2.156 
-1.966 
-1.950 
-1.908 
-3.498*** 
-2.101 
-2.401 
 Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 10 Output 
This consonance hugely confirmed the residual-based cointegration test results that the long 
run absolute PPP does not hold in WAMZ countries. The relative PPP correlation tests results 
in Table 3.7 below generally reflected low and medium linear association between changes in 
exchange rates and in relative price changes differentials. These results are not encouraging 
in giving supports for relative PPP across the WAMZ.  
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Table 3.7: Results of Correlation Tests of Relative PPP in the WAMZ  
Home Country Foreign 
Country 
Correlation Home Country Foreign 
Country 
Correlation 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.35 
0.64 
0.40 
0.07 
0.00 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.36 
-0.00 
0.36 
0.20 
0.17 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.33 
0.56 
0.01 
0.10 
0.34 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
0.04 
0.05 
0.54 
0.23 
-0.21 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.63 
0.58 
0.38 
0.56 
0.49 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-0.02 
0.34 
0.42 
0.19 
-0.19 
Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 10 Output 
 
On the overall, these PPP tests indicate that the validity of both absolute and relative PPP 
could not be established in the WAMZ, thus making PPP to be irrelevant in the exchange rate 
determination throughout the WAMZ. 
In Table 3.8 below, the results of Phillips-Ouliaris and Park’s Variable Added residual-based 
cointegration tests for IFE depict that across the WAMZ, the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration of nominal interest rate differentials and inflation differentials cannot be 
rejected at 1% significance level in the Phillips-Ouliaris tests which thus produced evidence 
to infer that IFE failed to hold for these WAMZ’s bilateral relationships. It is significant to 
state at this point that these results yielded supports for the conjecture that if PPP fails to 
hold, IFE will not hold. However, there were mixed (and contradictory) output yielded by the 
Chi-square statistics of the Park’s Variable Added tests at 1% significance level. 
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Table 3.8: Results of Cointegration Tests for International Fisher Effects in the WAMZ 
  
Phillips-Oualiaris  
Tests 
 
Park’s Added 
Variable Tests 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
tau-statistics z-statistics Chi-square 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.273 
-1.617 
-2.100 
-2.222 
-1.061 
-10.169 
-7.309 
-9.110 
-10.222 
-4.476 
0.346 
0.577 
46.700* 
5.367** 
4.405** 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.273 
-0.993 
-2.208 
-2.983 
-1.383 
10.169 
-3.134 
-10.479 
-15.925 
-5.803 
0.346 
0.182 
35.007* 
0.066 
1.079 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.616 
-0.993 
-1.310 
-1.593 
-2.338 
-7.309 
-3.134 
-3.164 
-4.901 
-9.626 
0.577 
0.082 
26.331* 
5.348** 
11.572 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.100 
-2.208 
-1.310 
-3.165*** 
-2.399 
-9.110 
-10.479 
-3.164 
-17.105*** 
-12.945 
46.700* 
35.007* 
26.331* 
9.447* 
0.001 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
-2.222 
-2.983 
-1.594 
-3.165*** 
-1.477 
-10.222 
-15.925 
-4.901 
-17.105*** 
-5.806 
5.368** 
0.066 
3.673** 
9.447* 
1.483 
S/LEONE Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-1.062 
-1.383 
-2.339 
-2.399 
-1.477 
-4.476 
-5.803 
-9.626 
-12.945 
-5.806 
4.405 
1.079 
11.572* 
0.001 
1.483 
Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 10 Output 
The results of the tests of Pearson moment correlation for UIP in the WAMZ are as exhibited 
in Table 3.9 below. The results revealed weak positive and negative correlations between 
exchange rate changes (appreciation and depreciation) and interest rate differentials across 
the WAMZ. The strongest of the linear association of 0.56 was recorded in the case of 
Guinea/Nigeria.  
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Table 3.9: Results of Correlation Tests for Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) in the WAMZ 
Home Country Foreign 
Country 
Correlation Home Country Foreign 
Country 
Correlation 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.14 
-0.04 
0.04 
-0.01 
-0.06 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-0.01 
0.24 
0.04 
-0.01 
-0.06 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.15 
0.23 
0.27 
0.16 
0.11 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
0.08 
0.06 
0.07 
0.05 
-0.16 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-0.03 
0.27 
0.11 
0.56 
-0.31 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-0.07 
-0.04 
-0.27 
-0.09 
-0.14 
Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 10 Output 
 
Nevertheless, on the overall these results gave evidences to infer that UIP does not hold 
across the WAMZ. 
3.3.3 Inflation-Unemployment Relationship – Phillips Curves 
Philips Curves indicate the relationship between inflation and unemployment rates in an 
economy. The notion here is that changes in the level of unemployment have direct and 
predictable effect of price inflation. This was propounded by A.W. Philips in his study of 
annual wage inflation and unemployment in the United Kingdom between 1860 and 1957 in 
which Phillips found a consistent and stable inverse relationship between these two variables 
when he plotted the related scatter diagram. This had since been adopted as macroeconomic 
tool. Many economists (after Phillips) who performed similar studies based on other 
economies got similar results thus making Phillip’s proposition a stylised fact. The basis of 
the logical argument behind Phillip curve is that (i) a fiscal stimulus and increase in aggregate 
demand would sequentially increase demand for labour as government spending grows; (ii) 
there would be fall in pool of unemployed; (iii) firms would compete for the few workers by 
increasing nominal wages; (iv) there would be greater bargaining for labour to seek increase 
in nominal wages; (v) cost of wages will increase; and (vi) the increased cost of wages will 
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be passed on to increases in price levels. This thus became a stylised fact which is verifiable 
in many economies.  To verify if the Phillip curve relationship hold in the WAMZ 
economies, statistical estimations of Pearson Moment Correlation of the CPI inflation rate 
and unemployment rates across the WAMZ were performed applying annual data covering 
the period between 1991 and 2015. The resulting coefficients of correlation revealed the 
direction (and strength) of the relationship between the two variables involved. Table 3.10 
below displays the results of the correlation estimation to establish if the Phillip curve 
relationship hold in the WAMZ countries (as developing countries) and the US (as a 
developed economy).  
Table 3.10: Results of Correlation Analysis of Phillip Curve Relationship in the WAMZ 
 Inflation/Unemployment 
Correlation Coefficient 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
US 
0.05 
-0.02 
0.36 
0.17 
0.13 
0.006 
-0.28 
Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 9.5 Output 
Among the WAMZ countries, the results revealed very weak inverse relationship only for 
Ghana at -0.02 (apart from the negative relationship in the case of the US at -0.28). These are 
evidence to conclude that the Phillip curve relationship does not hold in the WAMZ (apart 
from Ghana) over the period covered by this study.  
 
3.3.4 Lucas Short-run Output/Inflation Trade-off  
Lucas (1973) hypothesised that average output will not be altered by the rate of inflation. The 
Lucas’ Phillips Curves Hypothesis’ implies that the condition for the output-inflation trade-
off was the misinterpretation by economic agents, of their observed price movements. In his 
cross-country study of 18 countries for the period between 1953 and 1967, Lucas found out 
that in high inflation countries, there is a quick reflection of changes in aggregate demand on 
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price while the effects on output are relatively small. In countries with low inflation or rather, 
price instability, the initial effect of increase in nominal incomes on real output are large 
while the positive effects on inflation rate is small. The simple indication of these is that as 
there is increase in the variance of inflation, the trade-off between output and inflation will 
deteriorate because of the ability of economic agents in high inflation countries to distinguish 
between nominal shocks and real shocks. Lucas (1973) was of the view that unanticipated 
inflation is the condition upon which there can be a trade-off between output and inflation. 
His position was that there will be alteration to the behaviours of economic agents if the 
general price level movements are erroneously taken to be an indication of relative price 
changes. Such change in the behaviour of economic agents will cause employment and real 
output to fluctuate around their ‘natural’ levels. The moment these economic agents are able 
to know that changes in price are not market specific but general, each of the real variables 
would be forced to move back to the initial level because of homogeneity of degree zero of 
the supply functions. What the Lucas model of Phillips curves connotes is the inverse 
relationship between the real output response and the variability of inflation and aggregate 
demand. The objective of this section was to test the validity of the Lucas model of Phillips 
curve and determine if it holds in both the formal economies and the informal developing 
economies of the WAMZ. 
For the assessment of output/inflation trade-off which covers the period between 1991and 
2015, annual data for nominal GDP, and real GDP were collected for the six WAMZ 
countries. Estimations of output/inflation trade-off for the WAMZ countries were carried the 
model suggested by Lucas (1973): 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝜏∆𝑥𝑡 + 𝜆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑇 + 𝜀𝑡.                                      3.15 
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Where 𝑦𝑡  is log of real GDP; ∆𝑥𝑡 is first difference of the log of nominal GDP; 𝜆𝑦𝑡−1 is one-
period lag of log real GDP; 𝑇 is time trend (0 < 𝜏 < 1 and 𝜆 < 1). Equation 3.15 has been 
widely used by the new classical (Lucas, 1978) and new Keynesian economists (Schultze, 
1984; Ball et al, 1998 etc.) as an empirical fact. The parameter of interest (which is the trade-
off parameter and a measure of the slope of Phillips curve) is the parameter of change in 
nominal output (𝜏∆𝑥𝑡). It determines how much of shock to nominal income shows up in real 
output. A large coefficient indicates that changes in nominal output growth are associated 
with real output in the short run. A coefficient close to unity indicates a shallow Phillips 
curve, meaning that all changes in nominal output show up in real output growth while a 
coefficient value close zero depicts a very steep Phillip curves which indicates that all 
changes in nominal income show up in price. This theoretical model suggests that in 
countries experiencing high variances in inflation rate and nominal output growth rate, the 
trade-off parameter should be low, hence a steeper Phillip curves.  
The results of the OLS estimations of output-inflation trade-off in the WAMZ (including the 
diagnostic tests) are displayed in Table 3.11 below. Nominal output growth (the parameter 
interest) reported positive coefficients for all the countries assessed, but significant only for 
The Gambia and Liberia. The diagnostic tests show that for all the estimations, there are no 
residual serial correlation and heteroscedasticity problems while normality problem are 
established in the cases of Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria. 
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Table 3.11: Results of the Estimation of Short-run Output-Inflation Trade-Off for the WAMZ Countries 
‘Formal’ Economies  
Dependent Variable: Real Output  
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Constant 
∆Nominal Output  
Lagged Real Output  
Time Trend 
 
R2 
DW-Statistics 
F-Statistics 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
JB Statistics for 
Normality  
 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Autocorrelation  
 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Heteroscedasticity 
13.1839* 
0.2771* 
0.4289** 
0.0193 
 
0.99 
1.92 
0.00 
 
 
0.5637 
(0.75) 
 
0.0193 
(0.98) 
 
0.6751 
(0.57) 
1.5221 
0.0183 
0.9346 
0.0052 
 
0.99 
1.25 
0.00 
 
 
20.379 
(0.00) 
 
1.5417 
(0.24) 
 
1.2086 
(0.33) 
1.4544 
0.0062 
0.9516* 
0.0002 
 
0.99 
2.10 
0.00 
 
 
0.3581 
(0.84) 
 
1.3242 
(0.29) 
 
0.9109 
(0.45) 
-1.1136 
1.1197* 
1.0592* 
-0.0085 
 
0.98 
1.52 
0.00 
 
 
12.7078 
(0.00) 
 
1.3916 
(0.27) 
 
1.0929 
(0.38) 
7.0958** 
0.0415 
0.7665* 
0.0170** 
 
0.98 
1.76 
0.00 
 
 
111.974 
(0.00) 
 
0.1267 
(0.88) 
 
1.3018 
(0.30) 
9.1765** 
0.1571 
0.6779* 
0.192* 
 
0.95 
1.92 
0.00 
 
 
4.6689 
(0.10) 
 
0.9447 
(0.41) 
 
0.7230 
(0.55) 
Source: Author’ Estimation and EViews 9.5Output 
Note: *, ** and ** denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. The p-values are in parentheses. 
 
Table 3.12 below exhibits the rates of variations in inflation and GDP growth as well as the 
OLS estimated trade-off parameter. 
Table 3.12 Variabilities and Trade-off Parameter in WAMZ Countries’ ‘Formal’ Economies (1991-2015) 
 
Variability& Trade-off Parameter 
 
Gambia 
 
Ghana 
 
Guinea 
 
Liberia 
 
Nigeria 
 
S/Leone 
Nominal Income Growth  5.82 15.60 9.85 23.75 31.31 13.88 
Inflation Rate  4.60 14.90 9.84 7.92 31.28 20.23 
Trade-off Coefficients 0.28 0.02 0.01 1.12 0.04 0.16 
Source: Author’s Estimations 
To verify the stylised fact of the positive correlation of high output growth/inflation 
variabilities and low output-inflation trade off parameter over the period covered by this 
assessment for the formal economies of the WAMZ, it is evident in Table 3.6 above that this 
could well be established for Ghana and Nigeria exhibiting high variations in output and 
inflation and corresponding low output-inflation trade-off coefficients. However, this failed 
in the cases of Guinea with low variabilities of inflation (9.84) and nominal GDP growth 
(9.85) displaying the lowest trade-off parameter. For Liberia, reporting the highest significant 
trade-off parameter of 1.12, the stylised fact holds only for the country’s inflation variation of 
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7.92 and not for the high variability of 23.75 in nominal output growth. For the Gambia 
having the WAMZ lowest variabilities in both nominal output (5.82) and inflation (4.60), it is 
expected that the trade-off parameter be higher than 0.28 generated, if the stylised fact is to 
hold. On the other hand, for this same reason it is expected that the trade-off parameter for 
Sierra Leone be higher than the 0.16 yielded. 
Further to the investigations of the output-inflation trade-off for the formal economies of the 
WAMZ, assessments of the informal economies were equally performed. Data for nominal 
income, real income and inflation were generated for the informal economies of the WAMZ 
in relation to informal activities estimations as percentages of GDP, derived by Medina and 
Schneider (2018) and presented in Table 3.1. The results of the OLS estimations of the trade-
off coefficients for the informal economies are presented in Table 3.13 below, highlighting 
the trade-off coefficients as significant at 1% level of significance for Ghana and Nigeria 
respectively. The coefficients for Sierra Leone was not statistically significant. The 
diagnostic tests revealed residual normality problem only for The Gambia and Guinea. While 
there were no heteroscedasticity issue for these OLS estimations, autoregression of the 
residuals was reported only for The Gambia. The goodness-of-fit were reasonable and the 
estimations are all jointly significant.  
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Table 3.13: Results of the Short-run Output-Inflation Trade-Off Estimations for the WAMZ’s Informal 
Economies   
Dependent Variable: Real Output  
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Constant 
∆Nominal Output  
Lagged Real Output  
Time Trend 
 
R2 
DW-Statistics 
F-Statistics 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
JB Statistics for 
Normality  
 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Autocorrelation  
 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Heteroscedasticity 
5.1841 
0.6641* 
0.7229* 
0.0635 
 
0.99 
1.53 
0.00 
 
 
19.5446 
(0.00) 
 
6.3929 
(0.00) 
 
0.7921 
(0.51) 
2.2468 
0.2434** 
0.8979* 
0.0071 
 
0.93 
1.10 
0.00 
 
 
0.5018 
(0.78) 
 
2.3375 
(0.12) 
 
1.4194 
(0.74) 
-4.7285 
0.5961* 
1.2226* 
-0.0777 
 
0.94 
1.76 
0.00 
 
 
9.4054 
(0.00) 
 
0.5158 
(0.61) 
 
1.7848 
(0.18) 
-3.4909 
1.0683* 
1.1744* 
-0.0038 
 
0.97 
2.27 
0.00 
 
 
0.2037 
(0.90) 
 
1.9757 
(0.19) 
 
2.6485 
(0.10) 
9.1143* 
0.2864*** 
0.6307* 
0.0243* 
 
0.98 
2.08 
0.00 
 
 
6.007 
(0.05) 
 
0.9415 
(0.41) 
 
3.7680 
(0.37) 
9.4870* 
0.1342 
0.5270 
0.1561* 
 
0.95 
2.02 
0.00 
 
 
0.3126 
(0.85) 
 
0.3888 
(0.68) 
 
1.2546 
(0.32) 
Source: Author’ Estimation and EViews 9.5Output 
Note: *, ** and ** denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. The p-values are in parentheses. 
 
Comparative results of the OLS estimated trade-off coefficients, rates of variations in 
inflation and GDP growth as reported in Table 3.14 below glaringly reveal that the Lucas 
output-inflation trade-off conjecture could not hold clearly in the informal economies of the 
WAMZ.  
Table 3.14 Variabilities and Trade-off Parameter in WAMZ’s ‘Informal’ Economies (1991-2015) 
 
Variability& Trade-off Parameter 
Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Nominal Income Growth  9.97 9.66 19.19 11.09 15.51 12.57 
Inflation Rate  13.29 6.36 7.61 3.75 17.97 12.29 
Trade-off Coefficients 0.66 0.24 0.60 1.07 0.29 0.13 
Source: Author’s Estimations 
Although, the closest, Nigeria and Sierra Leone generated high nominal income growth 
variabilities of 15.51 and 12.57 respectively and the corresponding high inflation variabilities 
of 17.97 and 12.29 respectively, these two countries could only yield trade-off coefficients of 
0.29 and 0.13 respectively. These results were not as sharp and ‘clear-cut’ as what were 
generated for the formal economies.  
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Consequent upon these, it could be inferred here that the Lucas output-inflation trade-off hold 
better in the formal economies of the WAMZ than the informal economies.  
 
3.4 Stylised Facts of Exchange Rates and Foreign Exchange 
Markets Behaviour  
 
As background to the study of exchange rate and markets behaviours within the WAMZ, it is 
essential to have initial insights into the trends in the historical developments of foreign 
exchange markets and regimes with which the six WAMZ countries operated over the years. 
Table 3.14 below summarises the historical trend of exchange rate regimes across the 
WAMZ. The historical developments of exchange rate regimes of the WAMZ countries (as 
highlighted above) reveal that the WAMZ countries adopted various mixed exchange rate 
regimes over the years, particularly during the post-1973 floating exchange era. The common 
feature is that virtually all the WAMZ economies operate floating exchange rate regime 
(pure, free or managed) over the period covered by various assessments and analyses in this 
thesis. The full narratives of these historical developments of foreign exchange markets and 
exchange rate regimes in the WAMZ are in Appendix 3.5 of this thesis reports. 
Financial markets generally trend in manners in which yields or prices of financial market 
instruments usually show some behaviour, characteristics and features that can be 
generalised, given the nature of the time series (univariate or multivariate). Exchange rates 
are time series of foreign exchange markets within financial markets. Many empirical studies 
on the behaviour of exchange rate and foreign exchange market across developed, emerging 
and developing economies have established many regularities which are stylised facts. The 
common trend in literature is that stylised facts of exchange rates and market development 
are drawn mainly from empirical findings based on researches on developed and few 
emerging economies. 
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Table 3.15: Summary of Historical Development of Exchange Rate Determination and Regimes in the WAMZ 
The Gambia 
Exchange Rate Regime/Method of Exchange Rate Determination Period 
Fixed Exchange Rate System 1955-1985 
Floating Exchange Rate System (IFEM) 1990 
Introduction of Parallel Market – Bureau de Change (BDC) and dual Exchange System 1990-2003 
Dual Exchange Rate System Scrapped 2003 
Ghana 
Exchange Rate Regime/Method of Exchange Rate Determination Period 
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime (Pegged to British Pound) 1957-1966 
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime (Pegged to US Dollar) 1966-1982 
Multiple Exchange Rate System  1983-1986 
Dual Exchange Rate System – Dual Retail Auction 1986-1987 
Dutch Auction System 1987-1988 
Foreign Exchange Bureaux 1988-1989 
Wholesale and Interbank Systems 1990-1992 
Interbank Foreign Exchange Market 1992 
Guinea 
Exchange Rate Regime/Method of Exchange Rate Determination Period 
Fixed Exchange Rate System (pegged to dollar and SDR) 1958-1985 
Creation of Second Foreign Exchange Market/Weekly Auction 1985 
Flexible Exchange Rate Regime and IFEM Weekly Auction 1994-2000 
Monthly Auction System 2000-2002 
Fixed Exchange System (pegged to dollar) 2002-2004 
Stoppage of Monthly Auction/Reintroduction of Weekly Auction and Arithmetic Average 
Exchange Rate System 
2005 
Liberia 
Exchange Rate Regime/Method of Exchange Rate Determination Period 
Dollarised Economy – Extensive use of Foreign Currency 1847-1980s 
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime (pegged to US dollar) 1981-1997 
Free Floating Exchange Rate System  1998-2000 
Managed Floating Exchange Rate Regime 2000 
Nigeria 
Exchange Rate Regime/Method of Exchange Rate Determination Period 
Fixed Exchange Regime (Pegged to British pound sterling/US dollars)  1960-1986 
Floating Exchange Rate System & Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) April 1987 
Creation of Interbank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM)  January 1989 
Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market  1995 - 1999 
Interbank  Foreign Exchange Market 1999-2002 
Dutch Auction System (DAS)  2000- 2006 
Wholesale Dutch Auction System (wDAS) 2006-2013 
Retail Wholesale Dutch Auction System (rDAS)  October 2013 
Interbank Foreign Exchange Market (Closure of Official Window)  February 2015 
Sierra Leone 
Exchange Rate Regime/Method of Exchange Rate Determination  Period 
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime (Pegged to British Pound) 1964-1978 
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime (linked to the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights) 1978-1982 
Dual Exchange Rate Regimes 1982-1983 
Fixed Exchange Rate (Unification of the Dual Rates) 1983-1986 
Managed/Floating Exchange Rate Regimes 1986-1990 
Free Floating Exchange Rate Regime 1990 to date 
Source: Author’s compilation 
164 
 
The following sub-sections discuss eight of these known stylised facts and empirical 
regularities of exchange rates and foreign exchange markets as well as what obtain about 
them in the WAMZ countries. 
(I) Absence of Normality: It is a known assertion that percentage changes in nominal 
exchange rate and exchange rate returns do not exhibit normal distribution.  
Table 3.16: Statistical Properties of US Dollar Nominal Exchange Rate Returns and Percentage Changes 
for the WAMZ Countries (1995M1-2015M12) 
Nominal US Dollar Exchange Rate Returns 
 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
JB Stat.(p-values) 
Observations 
Ghana Gambia Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
0.29 -0.67 -0.36 -0.71 13.24 1.28 
14.77 11.01 21.63 13.27 197.48 10.33 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
298 298 298 298 298 298 
Nominal US Dollar Exchange Rate Percentage Change 
 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
JB Stat.(p-values) 
Observations 
Ghana Gambia Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
0.76 -0.24 0.64 0.13 15.53 1.64 
12.51 10.47 22.45 13.17 254.62 11.31 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
298 298 298 298 298 298 
Nominal US Dollar Exchange Rate 
 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
JB Stat.(p-values) 
Observations 
Ghana Gambia Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
1.45  0.36  0.53  0.49 -0.39  0.16 
5.00  1.99  1.69  2.13  1.66  1.89 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
299  299  299  299  299  299 
Source: Author’s Estimation, EIU Database and Eviews 9.5 Output 
The summary statistics of the properties of monthly nominal exchange rates and exchange 
returns (1995M1 to 2015M12) for the WAMZ countries are shown in Table 3.16 above. 
The J-B statistical tests of normality clearly confirm with the stylised fact in all the cases of 
the WAMZ countries where they yielded p-value of 0.00 for nominal exchange, exchange 
rate returns and exchange rate percentage changes in which the null hypothesis of normal 
distribution is rejected. 
(II) Persistence and Clustering of Volatility: Volatility of exchange rate is persistent. High 
and low variations in exchange rates can last for some period and this causes volatility 
clusters which are observed periods of high and low volatility. The reason attributed to 
volatility clustering in many research studies is ‘fat tail distribution’ which emanates from 
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excess kurtosis in non-normal distribution, which are on the overall prompted by the nature 
of the financial data (Clark, 1973) and switch from the ideas of fundamental and technical 
analysts in times of uncertainties (Lux and Marchesi, 2000). Evidences that this stylised fact 
holds are apparent in the plots of percentage changes of the WAMZ countries in Figure 3.2 
below. 
Figure 3.2: Plots of Monthly Nominal US Dollar Exchange Percentage Change for the WAMZ Countries 
(1991M1 to 2015M12) 
 
Source: Authors Estimation and EViews 9.5 Output 
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Figure 3.3: Plots of Annual Nominal US Dollar Exchange Percentage Change for the WAMZ Countries 
(1991-2015) 
 
Source: Authors’ Estimation, EIU Database and EViews 9.5 Output 
 
(III) Volatility and Frequency of Data: The nature of volatility of explained by specific 
frequency of data. Some characteristics of percentage change or exchange rate return as well 
as volatility clustering show-up in the uncertainties in the market aggregates in low frequency 
time series (Diebold, 1988). Figure 3.3 above exhibits annual percentage changes in the 
nominal US dollar exchange rates of the WAMZ countries over same period covered by 
higher frequency (monthly data) in Figure 3.2 above. The fact in this empirical regularity are 
apparent when comparison is made between the volatility in both plots (covering same period 
of time), given the different frequencies. 
(IV) Asymmetric Effects: Generally in financial markets, it is established that there are 
always ‘leverage effects’ which are indications of when high volatilities are always preceded 
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
GAMBIA
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
GHANA
-20
0
20
40
60
80
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
GUINEA
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
LIBERIA
-100
0
100
200
300
400
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
NIGERIA
-40
0
40
80
120
160
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
SIERRA_LEONE
167 
 
by currency depreciation, which is a downward movement in percentage change in financial 
data which may be due to financial risks emanating from fall in prices. These are made very 
clear in Figure 3.3 virtually in all the countries except for Nigeria where this is less 
pronounced.  
(V) Presence of Unit Roots (Non-stationary) in Floating Nominal Exchange Rate: For two 
freely floating currencies, the nominal exchange rate and the logarithm of the nominal 
exchange rate are non-stationary, but stationary at the first difference.  
Table 3.17: Results of the ADF Unit Root Tests of Annual US Dollar Nominal Exchange Rates of the 
WAMZ Countries (2000-2015) 
 Nominal Exchange Rate (at 
Level) 
Log of Nominal 
Exchange Rate (at 
Level) 
First Difference of Log. 
Nominal Exchange Rate 
Gambia -2.5618 -0.5374 -5.3469* 
Ghana -1.5119 -0.7038 -5.1798* 
Guinea -1.8510 -0.6442 -4.9862* 
Liberia -2.1408 -3.8378* -12.1478* 
Nigeria -2.1345 -1.7711 -4.9348* 
S/Leone -1.9765 -7.4731* -4.3683* 
Critical values of ADF Unit Roots Test 
1% 5% 10% 
-3.9591 -3.0810 -2.6813 
Source: Author’s Estimation, EIU Database and EViews 9.5 Output 
The output in Table 3.17 above reflect the stylised facts in point apart from the cases of 
Liberia and Sierra Leone which have stationary logarithm of their nominal exchange rate. 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone were known to have some forms of fixed arrangement in 
the par relationship with the US dollars in the history of exchange rate system developments 
trends, up till the 1980s and 1990s. This is a further confirmation of this stylised fact.  
(VI) Calendar Effects or Regular Events: Empirical studies have established that the time of 
trade effects are significant in foreign exchange markets. Weekends and holidays are regular 
events that impact the volatility of exchange rates. It is empirically established that exchange 
rate volatility is lower during holidays and weekends than what obtain during trading week 
days because of the accumulative effects of information during holidays and weekends 
(Miller, 1988 and Abraham and Ikenberry, 1994). In developing economies (as the WAMZ), 
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exchange rate volatility is commonly influenced by general elections and effects of politics 
when monetary and fiscal policies are relaxed to appease voters, particularly during an 
election year.   
Figure 3.4: Plots of Monthly Nominal US Dollar Exchange Percentage Change for the WAMZ Countries 
(2008-2015) 
 
Source: Author’s Estimations, IMF Database and Eviews 9.5 Output 
Figure 3.4 above displays plots of US dollar monthly nominal exchange rate percentage 
changes across the six WAMZ countries between 2008 and 2015. Seasonal celebrations like 
Christmas is a regular event as the close of the year in most WAMZ countries. These charts 
establishes the empirical regularity of seasonal holidays causing exchange rate to witness 
different degrees of volatility before and beyond the festive period. This are usually caused 
by high levels of demand for imported goods around this period, thereby causing exchange 
rate to depart from its equilibrium point due the excess demand for foreign exchange. 
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(VII) Dominance of the Effects of Macroeconomic News: It is stylised fact that there is link 
between information and news about macroeconomic fundamentals (like inflation, money 
supply, interest rate and output) and volatility of exchange rate. The significant connection 
between German deutschemark/US dollar exchange rate and announcement made on 
macroeconomic fundamental of the US was established by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998). 
However, the evidence gathered by Kim et al (2004) is that it is the contents of 
macroeconomic news that influence exchange rate behaviours and market reactions and not 
the actual release of the news. Findings by Laakkonen (2007) relate to the nature of the 
macroeconomic news in which evidence was gathered to conclude that exchange rate 
volatility is increased by bad news than by good news; and that volatility is increased by 
conflicting news than by consistent news. Furthermore, this stylised fact was verified in the 
case of the Nigerian US dollar bilateral nominal exchange rate returns by estimating the 
Threshold GARCH (TGARCH) and the Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) models of this 
exchange returns.  
In the TGARCH (1,1), the conditional variance for the WAMZ countries is specified as: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛿 + 𝛼1𝜇𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽1𝜇𝑡−1
2 𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝜎𝑡−1
2                                        3.16 
where 𝑑𝑡−1 takes the values of 1 if 𝜇𝑡 < 0, and the value of 0 if 𝜇𝑡 ≥ 0. 𝛽1 is the asymmetry 
or leverage term. The positive shocks (good news) and the negative shock (bad news) have 
different effects. When there is positive shock, the effect on volatility is 𝛼1, while in the case 
of negative shock, the effect of volatility is 𝛼1 + 𝛽1. Therefore, there is larger effect of bad 
news (negative shocks) on the conditional variance 𝜎𝑡
2 than positive shocks. If  𝛽1 > 0, this 
indicates asymmetry while 𝛽1 = 0 means the effect of the news is symmetric and the model 
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collapses to the standard GARCH model.81 Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) allows for 
asymmetries testing. The specification of EGARCH (1,1) could be modelled as:  
log(𝜎𝑡
2) = 𝛿 + 𝛽1 ln(𝜎𝑡−1
2 ) + 𝛾1 (
𝜇𝑡−1
√𝜎𝑡−1
2
) + 𝛼1 [
|𝜇𝑡−1|
√𝜎𝑡−1
2
− √
2
𝜋
]                            3.17 
where 𝛿, 𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝛾 (the leverage term) are the parameters to be estimated. The left hand side 
of the equation is the log of the conditional variance series. This makes the leverage effect to 
be exponential rather than quadratic and thus makes the estimates of the conditional variance 
to be non-negative. The implications of the signs of the symmetry parameter in these two 
asymmetric GARCH model (TGARCH and EGARCH) is that there is larger impact of bad 
news or negative shocks on volatility foreign exchange returns than good news or positive 
shocks when the asymmetry parameter  (𝛾) yields significant positive signs in TGARCH and 
significant negative signs in EGARCH. Table 3.18 below displays the results of the GARCH 
(1, 2), TGARCH (1, 2) and EGARCH (1,2) models estimations for the Nigerian naira/US 
dollar exchange returns. 
Table 3.18: Results of the Estimations of the TGARCH (1,2) and EGARCH  Models for US Dollar/ 
Nigerian Naira Exchange Rate Returns 
Parameters TGARCH (1,2) EGRACH (1,2) 
𝛿 
 
𝛼 
 
𝛽 (-1) 
𝛽 (-2) 
 
𝛾 
 
Log likelihood: 
No of Observations: 
1.26E-06** 
 
0.334* 
 
0.573* 
0.133 
 
-0.140** 
 
21149.76 
5064 
1.261* 
 
0.374* 
 
0.825* 
0.082 
 
0.056 
 
20937.90 
5064 
Source: Author's estimations and Eviews 7 Output 
Note:*At 1% Significance level; ** at 5% Significance level; *** at 10% Significance level.  
                                                          
81 Another simple extension of GARCH is the GJR model which incorporates additional term to account for possible 
asymmetries. The conditional variance GJR GARCH (1,1) is expressed as  = δ + α1μt−1
2 + β1σt−1
2 + γ1μt−1
2 It−1, where It−1 
takes the value of 1 if μt−1 < 0 and the value of when otherwise. For the WAMZ countries, the GJR GARCH model is not 
employed.  
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The TGARCH (1,2) for the Nigerian naira/US dollar exchange returns estimation results 
show negative and significant (at 5% level of significance) coefficient of asymmetry (𝛾) of -
0.140 and a positive but insignificant coefficient of asymmetry (𝛾) of 0.056 in EGARCH 
(1,2). The inference from these is that there are asymmetries in the news/shocks in the 
Nigerian foreign exchange markets. Bad news has larger influence on the volatility of foreign 
exchange returns in Nigeria than good news. This stylised fact holds in this case. 
(VIII) Non-isolation of Exchange Rate from Markets Volatility: Economic and political 
uncertainties as well as volatilities in different financial markets impact exchange rate and 
exchange market volatilities.  This means that there are penetration into and influence on 
foreign exchange markets, of information and economic disturbances emanating from some 
other markets. Calvert et al (2006) got evidence of covariance towards the same direction, of 
exchange rate volatility and prices of gold and oil with a suggestion that these primary 
commodities are like proxies for worldwide economic risks.  
Table 3.19: Nominal US Dollar Exchange Rate Percentage Changes in the WAMZ (2001-2015) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
2001 22.6 31.4 11.7 18.8 9.4 -5.1 
2002 27.0 10.6 1.23 27.0 8.4 5.7 
2003 43.2 9.4 0.4 -3.8 7.2 11.9 
2004 5.26 3.8 13.0 -7.5 2.8 151 
2005 -4.8 0.7 62.4 4.0 -1.2 7.0 
2006 -1.8 1.1 41.3 1.6 -2.0 2.5 
2007 -11.4 2.1 -18.5 5.6 -2.2 0.8 
2008 -10.8 13.1 9.6 3.1 -5.8 -0.1 
2009 20.1 33.2 4.3 8.0 25.6 13.6 
2010 5.1 1.6 19.3 4.6 0.9 17.5 
2011 5.2 5.6 16.3 1.1 2.4 9.3 
2012 8.9 18.8 4.9 1.8 2.4 -0.1 
2013 12.1 8.8 -1.1 5.5 -0.1 -0.3 
2014 16.1 31.4 1.53 8.2 0.8 4.4 
2015 22.7 10.6 6.7 2.7 21.4 12.3 
Source: Author’s Estimations and EViews 9.5 Output 
The decline and dwindle in the prices of primary commodities over the last decade may have 
been the reason for continued depreciation in the currencies of these primary commodity 
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exporting WAMZ countries over same period as exhibited in Table 3.19 above showing 
percentage depreciation of the currencies of the WAMZ countries between 2001 and 2015. 
Although, The Gambia, Liberia and Nigeria’ currencies experienced annual appreciation of 
currency one year or the other, around 2003 and 2007, the movements in the value of the 
WAMZ countries’ currency  during the global financial crisis period between 2008 and 2009 
and thereafter reflect significant sharp depreciation, these confirmed that this stylised fact 
holds in the WAMZ. 
 
3.5 Banking Sectors and Financial Systems of the WAMZ 
In developing economies, the banking sector serves as the dominant sector and the most 
important link within the financial system. This is because bank financing is the most 
requested form of financing in countries within this category. WAMZ countries are bank-
based are economies in which banking activites within retail banking thrive and spread over 
member countries.  
Banking sectors of the WAMZ are small in size (absolutely and relatively), but account for a 
big share of assets and services of the financial sectors. Most banks exhibit low loan/deposit 
ratios while government securities is the greater proportion of banks’ assets. These banking 
sectors are generally diverse, showing high rates of banking concentration and penetration, 
inefficiency, small size and low financial intermediation and are characterised by low 
competition, little barrier to entry and exits (causing the evident dominance of foreign banks), 
lowest access to finance (causing obstacles to business growth and curtailing the WAMZ’s 
full economic growth potentials).  
A large proportion of the WAMZ’s population is unbanked, thereby making the access to 
credit by small and medium scale enterprises very tight. The nature of bank lending in the 
region is short term with over two-third of bank advances having maturity period of below 
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one year. Branches of banks are concentrated in few urban areas, yet there are high costs of 
banking operations as reflected in high fees and high interest rates spreads across banking 
sectors with the WAMZ. Lack of banking innovation, under-performances and inability to 
generate returns of scale are root causes of the lack of the capabilities of making banking 
environments healthy and competitive. These banking sectors settle for financial activities 
that are of low risks within a market displaying the niche for high profitability. This could not 
have serious impact on the finance of private sectors.  
Another salient feature of the WAMZ’s banking sectors is that banking systems within the 
monetary zone operate significantly excessive liquidity which implies the scarcity of 
creditworthy fund users. Further consequences of this factor for monetary policies in these 
countries is the effectiveness of policies in serving as instrument that could be applied in 
influencing bank lending, inflation and other monetary variables. The basic funding bases of 
banking systems in the WAMZ are domestic economies in which non-residents funding are 
negligible. Viewing this as a demand-side phenomenon, creditworthy borrowers constrain 
bank lending growth in the region. 
Generally, the stylised feature of African banking systems are evident in the combination of 
some factors: (i) small absolute sizes of banks and the entire banking systems, (ii) low level 
of income, (iii) low financial literacy levels, (iv) large informal sectors, (v) infrastructural 
weaknesses, (vi) weak judicial enforcement mechanisms, (vii) weak contractual frameworks 
for banking activities weak, (viii) creditors’ rights and political risks (Mlachila et al, 2013). 
However, across the WAMZ, there are significant variances in economic importance of 
banking as shown by differences in legal codes, laws and regulations, economic sizes, 
dependence on resources, public policies, history and population density. 
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Traditionally, banking sectors in the West Africa are dominated by banks having their roots 
in the UK and France due to the colonial control effects. Nowadays, banking sectors within 
the sub-continent are generally dominated by the combination of banks made up of domestic 
and pan-African banks.82 Pan-African banks now account for increasing proportion of 
domestic banking in Africa. Nigeria has six of the seven largest banks in the Sub-Sahara 
Africa and this makes Nigeria’s banking sector to be competitive, with the ability to offer 
substantial financial services. Nigeria banks (United Bank for Africa (UBA), GT Bank, 
Zenith Bank, Access Bank) now play dominant roles in the WAMZ member countries. 
The banking sectors in the six WAMZ countries are predominantly made up of big domestic 
commercial banks, international banks’ subsidiaries or branches (pan-African banks) and 
small banks (microfinance banks). Table 3.20 below dspalys the generic features of banking 
sectors across the WAMZ between 2011 and 2013 and the number of banks at the end of 
2015. While Ghana has the highest number of commercial banks, he number of the bank 
branches in Nigeria is comparatively huge and enormous within the monetary zone. 
Table 3.20: Some Structural Elements of Banking Sectors of the WAMZ (2011-2013) 
 Total Number of Banks Number of Foreign Banks Number of Bank Branches 
 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 
Gambia 13 13 13 12 12 11 74 75 80 
Ghana 25 26 27 14 14 15 814 862 892 
Guinea 12 14 15 12 14 15 76 96 109 
Liberia 8 9 9 8 8 8 78 79 82 
Nigeria 20 21 22 4 4 4 5850 5050 5072 
S/Leone 13 13 13 10 10 10 83 87 95 
Number of Commercial Banks in the WAMZ Countries (as the end of 2015) 
Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
13 28 15 9 21 12 
Source: Author’s compilation and West African Monetary Institute  
In assessing the stability of banking systems of the WAMZ, Bank Z Score of solvency and 
probability of default was considered in the cases of the six banking sectors in the zone. This 
evaluation yardstick, applied here, causes a banking sector to be unstable or fragile when its 
                                                          
82 Pan-African banks are subsidiaries of foreign banks, but operating in many African countries. 
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Z score is below the threshold of 2.0 which is the mid-point between the extremes of the 
Altman Z Score Model's Grey Zone of Discrimination. Over the 20-year period of 
assessment, the six banking sectors within the WAMZ were stable, (except for Liberia and 
two cases for Ghana after the mid-90s) as highlighted in Table 3.21 below.  
Table 3.21: Instances of Banking System Stability/Fragility in the WAMZ - Bank Solvency/Probability of 
Default 
Dependent Variable: (Bank Z Score) 
Year Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Stable 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Fragile 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Stable 
Source: Author's estimations 
Note: A banking system is defined as 'fragile' when its Z score is below the threshold of 2.0 (the mid-point 
between the extremes of the Altman Z Score Model's Grey Zone of Discrimination); and 'stable' if otherwise 
On the overall, these trends in the Z Scores signify positive implications for the confidence in 
the banking sectors of the proposed currency union. Trend in Z-Scores of the six banking 
systems in the WAMZ are revealed in Figure 3.5 below.  Z-Scores reflected in these charts 
are weighted based on the WAMZ countries individual banks’ total assets. It is apparent in 
the charts that from 2000, Sierra Leone displayed downward trend in banking system 
probability of default over the period cover by the analysis while other countries record up 
and down fluctuations in this respect. 
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Figure 3.5: Z-Scores of Banking the Systems in the WAMZ (1996-2015) 
 
         Source: World Bank Database and Eviews 9.5 Output 
 
Figure 3.6: Boone Indicators of the Banking Systems in the WAMZ (2000-2015) 
 
Source: World Bank Database and Eviews 9.5 Output 
Trends in Boone indicators for the WAMZ countries between 2000 and 2015 are reflected in 
Figure 3.6 above. No information was reported for Liberia due to lack of data. The 
information in these charts indicate the various degrees of the WAMZ’s banking markets 
competitions based on profit efficiency estimated as the elasticity of banks’ profits to 
marginal costs. An increase in the Boone indicator indicates a deterioration of the competitive 
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conduct of financial intermediaries within the financial system. The rationale behind the 
indicator is that banks with high level of efficiency record higher profits. Therefore, the more 
negative the Boone indicator recorded by a WAMZ country’s banking system, the higher the 
degree of competition, due to stronger effect of reallocation within the system.  These charts 
generally reflect fluctuations over the period covered except for stable trend in the case of 
Ghana between 2007 and 2012. 
  Figure 3.7: Bank Capital/Assets Ratio of the Banking Systems in the WAMZ as at 2015 
 
Figure 3.8: Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans Ratio of the Banking Systems in the WAMZ as at 2015 
 
Figure 3.9: Commercial Banks Branches Per 100,000 Adults in the Banking Systems in the WAMZ  
as at 2015 
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Pictorial presentations of Capital/Assets Ratios, Non-Performing Loans/Gross Loans Ratios 
and Commercial Bank Branches per 100,000 Adults as the end of 2015 are as displayed in 
Figures 3.7 to 3.9 above to highlight comparative positions and status of banking systems in 
the WAMZ. Information on Liberia and Sierra Leone could not be reflected in the bank 
capital and non performing ratios charts due to the lack of data for these. Ghana had the 
highest non-performimg loan ratio while Guinea had the lowest spread of commercial bank 
branches over the country’s population. Futher description of the banking sectors of the six 
WAMZ countries are provided in Appendix 3.6 of this research report.  
3.6  Conclusions  
This chapter evaluated some stylised facts and theoretical propositions in the cases of the 
WAMZ economies. Efforts were made to consider some popular macroeconomic empirical 
regularities and theories relating to international parity conditions (PPP, IFE and UIP), 
Phillips curves and Lucas output/inflation trade-off relationships as well as the relationships 
between domestic cyclical output and some macroeconomic variables in order to determine if 
there are supports for those stylised facts and theoretical conjectures and assumptions. Across 
the WAMZ and the selected developed economies (Germany, The UK and the US), the 
results yielded from this exercise were mixed in confirming or refuting the stylised facts 
evaluated. In spite of this, what was significantly achieved here was the exposure of the 
relevant nature and features of salient aspects of the economies of the WAMZ under 
monetary integration assessments. There are evidences here to draw conclusion that co-
movements of cyclical components of macroeconomic series with real output as well as the 
fluctuations and variability of these macroeconomic variables follow similar patterns in the 
developing economies (of the WAMZ) and the developed economies sampled in this study. 
There were evidences that the theoretical propositions and assumptions of PPP (absolute and 
relative), IFE and UIP all failed to hold in the WAMZ. These have some negative 
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implications for the monetary models of exchange rate determination for the WAMZ 
economies. Other empirical finding also revealed that virtually all the stylised facts of 
exchange rates and exchange market behaviour got supports from the WAMZ countries.  In 
addition to these, characteristics and performances of the banking sectors of the WAMZ (as 
proxy for the zone’s financial systems) were highlighted, revealing stability of the banking 
sectors of the WAMZ countries over the 20-year period covered by the study. 
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Chapter 4 
Optimum Currency Area Empirics Perspectives 
4.1  Background 
Investigations based on the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory would always point 
towards answering questions bothering on common characteristics that have to be shared by 
countries aiming at forming a monetary union. A conclusion of the OCA theory is that if 
independent monetary policies for countries within a geographic area is to be necessary, it 
would be consequent upon meeting some certain conditions. Monetary policy and exchange 
rate policy are macroeconomic tools that can alleviate asymmetries in shocks which are 
specific to a country. If there are similarities in shocks hitting a country and some other 
countries within an area, then, there may not be the need to implement different monetary 
policies (in this case, a common monetary policy will suffice). Based on this, there may be 
justification for the formation of a monetary union between these countries. However, on the 
contrary, the more asymmetric the economic shocks, the less efficient and effective the 
stabilisation mechanism (that serves as an alternative) and accordingly, the more costly the 
participation of the countries in such monetary integration. 
Right from the early 1960s when the theory of optimum currency area came to limelight, 
several authors, through their various seminal contributions have been able to come up with 
various properties of an OCA. Most of these properties, which many regarded as 
prerequisites, features attributes or criteria of an OCA are summarised in the Table 4.1 below: 
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Table 4.1: Properties/Criteria of an Optimum Currency Area and Implications 
Properties/Criteria Implications 
Flexibility of Nominal 
Wages and Price 
(Friedman, 1963) 
 Flexibility of wages and prices within/between members 
of a common currency area will make asymmetric shocks 
to be overcome easily because the movement adjusting for 
the shocks will not be linked with inflation in one country 
and/or sustained unemployment in another and thus 
bringing in higher degree of stability in the common 
currency area  
Mobility of Factors of 
Production - Including 
labour (Mundell, 1961) 
 There will be reduction in the need to alter real factor 
prices and nominal exchange rate between member 
countries when responding to disturbances, if factors of 
production are mobile within the common currency area, 
even if factor costs are rigid.  
 It will be more difficult to maintain a fixed exchange rate 
regime when the capital mobility is higher.  
 Simply put, adjustments to asymmetric shock are 
facilitated and the pressures for adjustments in exchange 
rates are reduced when the degree of labour mobility is 
high. 
Degree Openness of the 
Economy (McKinnon, 1963) 
 The higher the degree of economic openness of a member 
country of a common currency area, the more the 
likelihood of the transmission of the changes in 
international prices of tradables to domestic prices. 
 If the higher share of domestic outputs of a country are 
generated from trades within the common currency area, 
such country will benefit from membership of the currency 
union. 
Size of the Economy 
(McKinnon, 1963) 
 Large economies have the tendencies to be attracted by the 
flexible exchange rate regime implying that medium or 
small-sized countries find fixed exchange rate regime (as 
desired by monetary union) attractive. 
Diversification of 
Production, Exports and 
Consumption (Kenen, 1969) 
 The higher the diversification of production and 
consumption by member countries of a currency union, the 
more likely the reduction in costs due from discarding 
nominal exchange rate changes between these countries, 
thus finding a common currency as valuable.  
 The impact of shocks that are specific to a particular sector 
of the economy would be diluted by high level of 
diversification in production and consumption.  
 Consequently, diversification shields economy against 
series of disturbances and causes reduction in the needs for 
changes in terms of trade through nominal exchange rate.  
  It is more difficult to maintain a fixed exchange rate 
regime in situations of inflation rate differentials between 
member countries of a common currency area.  
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Similarities in Inflation or 
Differences in Inflation 
(Flemming, 1971) 
 External imbalances can crop up due to continuous 
differences in inflation rates of nations within the common 
currency area.  
 Terms of trade will remain fairly stable when Inflation 
rates between countries are similar over time and at the 
same time low. 
Fiscal Integration (Kenen, 
1969, De Bandt & Mongelli, 
2000) 
 When countries share supranational fiscal transfer system 
in redistributing funds to those member countries that are 
affected by adverse asymmetric shocks, such countries 
would also have smooth adjustments to such negative 
shocks and would require reduced adjustments in nominal 
exchange rate.   
 This fiscal integration requires the needs to share the risks 
involved and necessitates a high level of political 
integration.  
 Asymmetric shocks are counteracted through fiscal 
transfers – (When there are shocks,  affecting  particular 
member countries within a common currency area in 
different ways, fiscal transfers from prosperous member 
countries to non-prosperous member countries would 
counteract the effects of the shocks).  
 High degree of policy integration leads to low inflation. 
Political Integration (Mintz 
1970; Harberler, 1970; and 
Cohen, 1993)  
 Several authors see economic integration to be so far in 
front of political integration.  
 The political determination of countries to integrate is a 
significant condition for sharing a common currency.  
 Cooperation on common economic matters, adherence to 
joint commitments, and more international linkage will all 
be strengthened and enhanced by political will of member 
nations within the common currency area.  
 In transforming a group of nations to a successful common 
currency area, it essential that there is similarity of 
attitudes to politics and policies among member countries 
of the common currency area. 
Financial Market 
Integration (Ingram, 1969) 
 The higher the level of financial integration, the greater the 
extent of the need to establish an optimum currency area 
across geographical blocs.  
 The need for exchange rate adjustments can be reduced by 
financial market integration.  
 Through capital market inflows, temporary adverse 
disturbances can be cushioned.  
 With financial market integration, there will be reduction 
in the need to change inter-regional or intra currency area 
terms of trade through fluctuations in exchange rate.  
 For the sustainability of a successful common currency 
area, tight financial market integration is essential. 
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  
Similarities of Shocks and 
Similarities in Policy 
Responses to the Shocks 
(Bayoumi & Eichengreen, 
1996; Masson &Taylor, 
1993; Demertizis, Hughes 
&Rummel, 2000; Alesina, 
Barro & Tenreyro, 2002. 
 If member countries of an optimum currency area record 
similarities in demand and supply shocks and the speed of 
at which their respective economy adjust as well as the 
speed of policy responses, there will be loss of monetary 
policy autonomy and fall in the cost of loss of direct 
control over the nominal exchange rate.  
 Member countries of an optimum currency area showing 
large co-movements of output and prices would incur the 
lowest cost of dumping monetary independence vis-a-vis 
other member countries.  
 This implying that the higher the similarities in shocks 
between members of a common currency area, the lower 
the costs of losing independence monetary policy. 
Similarities in Monetary 
Policy Transmission 
(Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon 
and Terlizzese, 2001) 
 Similarities in monetary transmission mechanism among 
member countries of an optimum currency area speak 
volume about the similarities in financial structures of 
these countries.  
External Nominal Shocks  Fixed exchange rate regime will not be attractive to a 
potential member of an optimum currency area, if such 
country faces external nominal shocks. A flexible 
exchange rate system would be more appropriate. 
Monetary Shocks  Fixed exchange rate regime will be more attractive to a 
potential member of an optimum currency area, if such 
country faces monetary shocks. A flexible exchange rate 
system would not be attractive. 
Real Shocks  Fixed exchange rate regime will not be attractive to a 
potential member of an optimum currency area if such 
country faces real shocks. A flexible exchange rate system 
would be more appropriate. 
Business Cycle 
Synchronisation  
 Flexible exchange rate regime will not be appropriate if 
the group of countries forming an optimum currency area 
has synchronised business cycle. 
 
Central Bank’s Credibility 
 If the central banks of the prospective member of a 
common currency area lack the credibility to moderate 
inflation, fixed exchange rate regime would be more 
advantageous, rather than flexible exchange rate. 
Monetary Policy 
Effectiveness 
 For a prospective member of a common currency area, the 
cost of monetary independence is low (and not a high cost) 
such country’s monetary policy is ineffective.  
Sources: Author’s compilations 
It is apparent that the theory of OCA points to two major directions in the assessment of the 
economic usefulness of the existence of an OCA. In the first direction, the assessment can 
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focus on whether the asymmetries that exist between different countries are substantial and 
sizeable enough to justify and validate the use of both independent monetary policy and 
alternative alleviation mechanisms. In the other direction, the assessment could be in the form 
of examining whether independent monetary policy and floating exchange rate policy can be 
applied in isolating the effects of external disturbances from the economy. A collection of 
countries will form an OCA if conclusions derived can show that independent monetary 
policy as well as the isolation of external shocks through floating exchange rate policy are 
unnecessary. In this case, the formation of a monetary union between the countries will not 
be characterised and hampered by any substantial macroeconomic disturbances. Coming 
from the theoretical background of an optimum currency area (OCA), this chapter 
empirically evaluated seven (7) OCA properties towards gathering evidences in determining 
the extent to which the WAMZ constitutes an OCA. These properties are: (i) macroeconomic 
dynamics and uniformity in macroeconomic performances; (ii) synchronicity of business 
cycles; (iii) homogeneity of inflation patterns; (iv) similarities of production structure; (v) 
degree of trade and investment openness; (vi) financial integration and financial systems 
convergence; and (vii) factor market flexibilities.  
Consequently, going by the various underlying theoretical propositions of the OCA, the 
research objective of the chapter was to investigate if there are synchronicity, uniformity 
similarities and homogeneities in the properties of the OCA across the WAMZ. Specifically, 
this chapter was meant to provide convincing answers to the following research questions: (i) 
are trends in macroeconomic performance of the WAMZ countries homogeneous? (ii) what is 
the degree of symmetry of economic dynamics of the WAMZ countries? (iii) are business 
cycles across the WAMZ well synchronised? (d) are the properties and patterns of inflation 
and inflationary behaviours in the WAMZ uniform? (iv) how similar are the production 
structure of the WAMZ countries? (v) how open are the WAMZ countries in terms of trade 
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and investments? What are the degrees of bilateral trade intensities in the WAMZ? (vi) are 
there financial systems convergence in the WAMZ? What is the magnitude of financial 
systems integration in the WAMZ? (vii) what are the degrees of factor market flexibilities 
across the WAMZ? Are labour markets in the WAMZ flexible? Answers to these research 
questions produced various evidences in assisting to draw useful inferences in making 
relevant suggestions about the feasibility of monetary integration of the WAMZ. 
 
4.2 Macroeconomic Indicators and Dynamics 
Evidence of potential problem and possible costs of single monetary and exchange rate policy 
could be gathered from the study of the uniformity of macroeconomic policies and 
performances, the level of economic development of a monetary union’s member economies 
as well as the patterns of economic dynamics within the WAMZ. Economic and monetary 
integration of countries should be easier if there are similarities in past economic 
performances and development. While policy preference of a country is a reflection of past 
economic policies, the level of economic development is depicted by developments in 
macroeconomic and financial structures. The case for, and the essence of monetary autonomy 
would be reduced if there are similarities in economic priorities of countries involved in such 
monetary integration. The more the degree of uniformity or homogeneity of the economic 
performances of a monetary union’s member countries, the more it would be easy for 
stability of the single currency of the union whenever the union is faced with economic 
shock.  
In the OCA theory, a popular criterion is the symmetry of economic dynamics as established 
by classical and contemporary theorists. It is vital to incorporate the homogeneity of 
economic dynamics into the OCA related assessment of monetary integration of the WAMZ. 
If there are structural differences in growth, these potentially point to stabilisation costs of 
186 
 
monetary integration. When a group of countries adopt a single currency and/or a common 
monetary policy, these countries relinquish the opportunity to adjust their monetary 
conditions according to the desires of economic monetary policy. In a monetary union, this 
‘lost opportunities’ are of greater value, the higher the degree of difference in output. For 
instance, the more economic growth and marginal return on capital are heterogeneous across 
a monetary union, the more a common central bank would have problems in setting the real 
interest rate in order to deal with various degrees of growth in money and credit. In many 
respects, it is usual that there will always be differences in economic dynamics of prospective 
members of a (proposed) monetary union. Such differences may be in average growth rate, 
amplitudes and timing of fluctuations.  In this study, the evaluation of economic dynamics of 
the WAMZ here was based on empirical analyses of growth differences in the WAMZ by 
giving an overall measure of economic dynamics through the estimation that generates 
growth inequality coefficients for these countries. Consequent upon these, this section 
investigated the uniformity of some relevant macroeconomic indicators of the WAMZ 
countries and assessed the macroeconomic dynamics with the monetary zone. 
Data and Methods:  In the first aspect, the assessment of the degree of similarities in the 
behaviours of macroeconomic indicators of the WAMZ countries was carried out through the 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests. The result of this test would be employed to determine 
if the economic variables being assessed are similar among the monetary union members.  In 
this sub-section, macroeconomic variables of output growth, output gaps, inflation (GDP 
deflator and consumer price index), nominal exchange rate and fiscal policy ratios of budget 
balance/GDP, government expenditure/GDP and government revenue/GDP) were analysed. 
Relevant data employed here span between 1980 and 2014. 
The test of output growth and output gaps investigated if there is a wide growth rate variation 
or similarities in the deviation of real output from its potential levels within the WAMZ, 
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given the theoretical short run difficulty in stabilising economic growth. Regarding inflation, 
if there is any significance difference within the WAMZ countries, it would be difficult for 
the single currency to function effectively due to the contradictory effect of applying the 
necessary macroeconomic policies across the six economies by the single monetary authority.  
On the various exchange rate ANOVA tests, it is the wish of the WAMZ  to have a single 
currency that would be able to trade at par with other world’s strong convertible currencies, 
particularly, the US dollar. This may be difficult to achieve if there is a wide variance in the 
WAMZ’s member s’ US dollar exchange rate as this may portend high possibility of 
significant future fluctuation between the proposed single currency and the US dollar taking 
cognisance of inflation trends. Further to the consideration of the monetary elements, the 
synchronisation of money supply/GDP ratios, money supply growth rates, real interest rates 
and real effective exchange rates were also evaluated.  Fiscal harmony is indispensable 
towards establishing a fiscal union which is very crucial for a successful monetary union. 
Therefore, to test for the presence of fiscal harmony within the WAMZ, the variability in the 
six fiscal ratios were investigated. In addition to these, homogeneities in balance of payment 
accounts and external trade ratios were assessed by applying current account/GDP, total 
balance/GDP, income balance/GDP, imports-exports/GDP, inflow of foreign direct 
investment/GDP and international reserves/GDP ratios. 
The ANOVA tests carried out here show the statistical significance of the differences (or 
otherwise) in a variable of member countries being analysed. The statistical assumptions in 
an ANOVA test are independence of errors, normality and equality of variance. The one-way 
ANOVA is appropriate in a statistical model in which no restriction are imposed on means of 
the population group and the outcomes for each group in the analysis are normally distributed 
displaying common variances while it is assumed that the deviations of these individual 
outcomes from the means of the population group are independent.  Generally, the null 
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hypothesis for an ANOVA test is a ‘point hypothesis’ which states that ‘there is nothing 
interesting happening’. In a one-way ANOVA test, the null hypothesis with j group is: 
H0 = μ1 = μ2 =........... μj   
The alternative hypothesis is: 
HA = μ1 ≠ μ2≠........... μj   
Where: 
 μ = the population mean. 
Specifically for this analysis, the null hypothesis is: 
H0 = The Gambia = Ghana =Guinea = Liberia = Nigeria = Sierra Leone  
and the alternative hypothesis is: 
HA = The Gambia ≠ Ghana ≠ Guinea ≠ Liberia ≠ Nigeria ≠ Sierra Leone 
The null hypothesis was that the mean of the macroeconomic variables and fiscal ratios in the 
six WAMZ countries are equal. For the analysed variables/ratios, at 95% level of confidence, 
the rule here is that if the p-value obtained from the test should be less than the 5% level of 
significance, the difference in the variable/ratio among the WAMZ countries is statistically 
significance and so, we reject the null hypothesis.  
Further attempt made here is the estimation of economic dynamics across the WAMZ by 
shrinking these dynamics into a single indicator of Theil Coefficient of Inequality which 
compares the differences in growth in each member country as well as growth in: (a) the 
entire WAMZ economies; (ii) the WAMZ economies (without the lead economy, Nigeria); 
and (iii) the lead economy of Nigeria. Generally, Theil coefficient of inequality relates to 
economic growth convergence and it measures inequality within regions rather than equality 
among individuals within a region. Specifically, the application of Theil coefficient allowed 
for the comparison of the WAMZ economic dynamics. Data on economic growth of the six 
WAMZ countries, spanning between 1987 and 2015 were applied in these estimates. 
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Theil (1967) developed two popularly employed measures of inequality which satisfy all the 
ideal and standard properties of an inequality measure. Theil 1 statistics (𝑈1) adapted from 
Theil (1958) is expressed as: 
𝑈1 = (
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Theil 2 statistics (𝑈2) adapted from Theil (1966) is given as: 
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the economic growth of WAMZ country 𝑖 and 𝑥𝑡 is the economic growth of the 
WAMZ (as well as economic growth of WAMZ without Nigeria and economic growth of 
Nigeria). 𝑁 is the number of observations. The values of Theil 1 (𝑈1) of lie between zero (0) 
and unity (1). It is assumed that at the minimum value of zero, there is perfectly fit complete 
equality. If at the extreme of the value of 1, there is no fit, thus depicting complete inequality. 
For Theil 2 (𝑈2), though there is also lower boundary of zero as in Theil 1(𝑈1), but there is 
no definite upper boundary. The minimum value of zero is also a perfect fit. Values yielded 
by 𝑈1 and 𝑈2 are not expected to be same. By implications, maxima inequality is achieved at 
the upper boundaries. 
Theil measures have several properties that make them to be superior measures of 
inequality.83 Two conveniences derivable from Theil coefficient of inequality are that: (a) 
within the broad inequality concept, they give rooms for the comparison of pairs of economic 
variables at different scales. Particularly in this study, this enables the measurement of how 
                                                          
83 Theil statistics are symmetric, replication invariant, mean independent and satisfies the Pigou-Dalton property and they 
are Lorenz-consistent. 
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individual WAMZ countries glaringly behaved differently from the monetary zone’s average; 
(b) it allow time series inequality to be decomposed into main statistical factors (mean 
difference, variation differences and covariance (correlation) differences). Consequently, in 
describing the difference between two variables by statistical properties, inequality can be 
decomposed into three factors: (i) mean proportion (MP); (ii) variance proportion (VP); and 
(iii) covariance proportion (CP). These three properties must add up to be unity (1). MP 
shows the sample mean difference between the two variables involved. A large element is an 
evidence to suggest that the inequality stems from different scales of the two series. VP 
reveals the sample deviation from actual and forecast. A large VP implies that higher 
variability of one variable (than the other) explains much proportion of the inequality. When 
the CP is large, it indicates that the correlation coefficient between the two variables is small; 
and this measures trend differences and the degree of absence of fluctuation synchrony 
around trend because it reveals the effect biases in mean biases and variance biases. These 
three components of inequality can be derived mathematically as: 
𝑀𝑃 = (
(?̅?−?̅?)2
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where 𝜌𝑁 is [(
1
(𝜎𝑦,𝑁).(𝜎𝑥,𝑁)
) . ∑ (𝑦𝑡 − ?̅?)
𝑁
𝑡−1 . (𝑥𝑡 − ?̅?)]  
and 𝑀𝑃 + 𝑉𝑃 + 𝐶𝑃 = 1. 
Results and Findings: Information on the dispersion of four macroeconomic indicators of the 
WAMZ countries are exhibited in Figure 4.1 below. This reveals the pattern of coefficients of 
variation of output growth, inflation, current account balance/GDP and fiscal balance/GDP 
ratios over a 35-year period between 1980 and 2014. 
Figure 4.1: Plot of Coefficients of Variation of Historical Macroeconomic Performances of WAMZ 
Countries (1980-2014) 
 
Source: EIU Database and Author's Estimations 
Note: Liberia's estimations for GDP annual growth and fiscal balance start from 1994 and 2007 respectively. 
 
Generally, GDP growth and inflation revealed dissimilar patterns as Liberia, Sierra Leone 
and Ghana standing out clearly. Current account and fiscal balance (both as ratios of GDP) 
show some close similarities across the WAMZ apart from the case of The Gambia (in 
current account ratio) and Liberia in fiscal balance ratio. The results of the one-way ANOVA 
test are presented in the Table 4.1 below which shows clearly that output gaps and growth 
rates of real GDP and money supply (M1 and M2) displaed uniformity among the WAMZ 
countries implying that it may not be difficult for the zone’s money supply growth and 
economic growth to be stabilised the short run. The uniformity in money supply (M1) growth 
rate is an indication that common monetary policy with money supply as instrument will not 
be inappropriate for the WAMZ. The results for inflation rates indicated that if the single 
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
GDP Annual Growth (%) Annual Inflation (%) Current Account
Balance/GDP (%)
Fiscal Balance/GDP (%)
Gambia: Ghana Guinea: Liberia: Nigeria: S/Leone:
192 
 
monetary authority would want to moderate inflation within the single currency area, the 
policy objective may not be achieved due to the contradictory effects that may result. The 
suggestion from the analysis of the nominal dollar exchange rates was that it would be 
difficult to avoid the possibility of future fluctuations between the US dollar and the 
WAMZ’s proposed single currency which may be unable to compete at par with the US 
dollar.  
Table: 4.2: Results of ANOVA Tests of Uniformity of Economic Variables/Ratios of WAMZ Countries 
 
Variables/Ratios 
 
p-value 
 
F-ratio 
 
Critical 
value 
 
Decision 
 
Uniformity of 
Variable/Ratio 
Real GDP Growth Rate 0.12 1.82 2.34 H0 
accepted 
YES 
Output gap 0.99 0.002 2.32 H0 
accepted 
YES 
Inflation (GDP Deflator) 0.00 3.64 2.34 H0 rejected NO 
Inflation (CPI) 0.00 5.63 2.34 H0 rejected NO 
Nominal Dollar Exchange Rate 1.74E-24 60.87 2.34 H0 rejected NO 
Real Effective Exchange Rates* 5.37E-16 38.73 2.52 H0 rejected NO 
Real Interest Rates 0.003 3.97 2.34 H0 rejected NO 
Money Supply (M2)/GDP Ratio 2.48E-08 11.82 2.34 H0 
accepted 
YES 
Money Supply (M1) Growth 0.39 1.05 2.34 H0 
accepted 
YES 
Money Supply (M2) Growth 0.39 1.05 2.34 H0 rejected NO 
Budget Balance/GDP  2.68E-06 8.40 2.34 H0 rejected NO 
Primary Balance/GDP 1.46E-06 8.81 2.34 H0 rejected NO 
Public Debt/GDP  6.63E-13 21.04 2.34 H0 rejected NO 
Debt/Export Ratio 2.37E-05 7.12 2.35 H0 rejected NO 
International Reserves/Debt  1.62E-09 13.93 2.34 H0 rejected NO 
Govt. Expenditure/GDP 6.88E-07 9.34 2.34 H0 rejected NO 
Government Revenue/GDP  0.00 4.12 2.34 H0 rejected NO 
Current Account Balance/GDP  4.56E-16 29.2 2.34 H0 rejected NO 
Income Balance/GDP  0.00 5.11 2.34 H0 rejected NO 
Total Balance/GDP  7.27E-15 25.91 2.34 H0 rejected NO 
Imports/Exports  3.71E-25 69.46 2.35 H0 rejected NO 
Inflow FDI/GDP * 0.14 1.82 2.52 H0 rejected NO 
    Source: Author’s calculation and the EIU database 
* Due to lack of data, estimations were made leaving out Liberia.  
 
The fiscal ratios undoubtedly exhibited lack of fiscal harmony within the WAMZ and this is a 
cause for concerns so as to avoid possible sovereign debt problems just as none of the 
external trade/balance of payments ratios show uniformity. 
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Out of the twenty two variable/ratios assessed in the ANOVA tests, only four exhibited 
homogeneous characteristics. There were significant differences in the other eighteen 
variables/ratios examined. This indicates that WAMZ countries have individual economic 
characteristics that are different from each other. These heterogeneities signify that a policy 
meant to solve the problem of WAMZ country many have a transmittal effect that may cause 
other member countries within the zone to experience a consequential secondary effect that 
may be hugely negative. On the overall, although, variables relating to money supply and 
output are positive, other indicators have negative implications for the monetary integration 
of the WAMZ.  
The results of economic dynamics estimations of Theil 1 and Theil 2 coefficients of 
inequality as well as the variance and covariance proportions for the three benchmarks 
indicated in this study are displayed in Table 4.3 while the related plots are in Figures 4.2 to 
4.7 below. The comparison of economic growth in the six WAMZ countries with the 
aggregate WAMZ’s economic growth over the 28-year period covered by the estimations are 
highlighted in Table 4.3. Nigeria, the lead economy shows the lowest coefficients of 
inequality in both Theil 1 and estimations. Sierra Leone and The Gambia displayed the 
highest inequality with the WAMZ’s aggregate in Theil 2 results as revealed in pictorial 
representation in Figure 4.2 below. The rates of inequality of the other five WAMZ countries 
in Theil 1 estimation results reveal close similarities with Ghana yielding the lowest of all.  
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Table 4.3: Theil Coefficient of Inequality on Nominal GDP Growth for WAMZ Countries (1987-2015) 
Nominal GDP Growth Relative to WAMZ Average 
 Theil 1 
Coefficient 
Variance 
Proportion 
Covariance 
Proportion 
Theil 2 
Coefficient 
Gambia 0.72 0.85 0.15 1.53 
Ghana 0.54 0.39 0.61 0.85 
Guinea 0.63 0.92 0.08 0.87 
Liberia 0.77 0.86 0.14 0.95 
Nigeria 0.07 0.01 0.99 0.12 
S/Leone 0.64 0.93 0.07 1.64 
Nominal GDP Growth Relative to WAMZ Average (Excluding Nigeria) 
 Theil 1 
Coefficient 
Variance 
Proportion 
Covariance 
Proportion 
Theil 2 
Coefficient 
Gambia 0.69 0.70 0.30 1.33 
Ghana 0.11 0.02 0.98 0.63 
Guinea 0.57 0.52 0.48 0.79 
Liberia 0.78 0.93 0.07 0.96 
S/Leone 0.60 0.61 0.39 1.03 
Nominal GDP Growth Relative to Nigerian Average 
 Theil 1 
Coefficient 
Variance 
Proportion 
Covariance 
Proportion 
Theil 2 
Coefficient 
Gambia 0.71 0.78 0.22 1.54 
Ghana 0.59 0.51 0.49 0.82 
Guinea 0.64 1.00 0.00 0.87 
Liberia 0.77 0.89 0.13 0.95 
S/Leone 0.63 0.84 0.16 1.58 
         Source: Author’s calculation and the EIU database 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Theil 1 Coefficients of Inequality for Output Growth Relative to WAMZ  
Average 
 
Source: Author’s calculation and the EIU database 
 
When the equality of economic dynamics in the WAMZ without Nigeria was estimated, 
Ghana returned the lowest degree of inequality in both Theil coefficient estimations as 
highlighted in Figure 4.3 below. However, these degrees of inequality were more pronounced 
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in Theil 2 coefficient results. When the WAMZ’s lead economy, Nigeria was served as the 
benchmark for the other five countries within the zone, the levels of inequality were high as 
reflected in the output of both Theil measures of inequality, but more similar in Theil 1 
estimation results where Ghana recorded the lowest of the degrees of inequality as Figure 4.4 
below shows. These denote that patterns of economic dynamics in the five other WAMZ 
countries are not same as in the case of the lead economy, Nigeria, thus justifying the results 
generated in the estimations in which the aggregate WAMZ economy was the reference.  
Figure 4.3: Theil Coefficients of Inequality for Output Growth Relative to WAMZ Average 
(without Nigeria) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation and the EIU database 
 
The overall implication of these results is that the economy of WAMZ revolves around a 
single country, Nigeria. 
 
Figure 4.4: Theil Coefficients of Inequality for Output Growth Relative to the Lead Economy - 
Nigeria 
 
Source: Author’s calculation and the EIU database 
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The statistical components of the dynamics of economic growth estimated under the three 
benchmarks are exhibited in Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 below. Because the WAMZ countries 
were fully evaluated against these over the estimation period, the mean proportion (MP) in all 
estimation is zero, while the variance proportion (VP) and the covariance proportion (VP) 
yielded values that added up to unity. These results reflect the relationship of the inequality to 
different variance and lack of covariance. 
Figure 4.5: Components of Theil 1 Coefficients of Inequality for Output Growth Relative to 
WAMZ Average 
 
Source: Author’s calculation and the EIU database 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Components of Theil 1 Coefficients of Inequality for Output Growth Relative to 
WAMZ Average (excluding Nigeria) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation and the EIU database 
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Figure 4.7: Components of Theil 1 Coefficients of Inequality for Output Growth Relative to 
Nigerian Average  
 
Source: Author’s calculation and the EIU database 
 
Figure 4.5 above reveals that Nigeria has a very high variability of economic growth at 0.99 
with the WAMZ aggregate economy. Apart from Ghana, other WAMZ countries reported 
low variability. Nigeria has the lowest level of lack of synchrony (0.01) of fluctuations 
around trend when the WAMZ was the benchmark; and this implies strong correlation 
between Nigeria and the WAMZ aggregate economy. The analysis of the WAMZ economy 
without Nigeria revealed Ghana as having the highest level of variability at 0.98 if Nigeria 
would not be part of the WAMZ economy as well as having the highest degree of correlation 
with such economy as shown in Figure 4.6 above. The results of the inequality of growth 
estimations in relation to the Nigeria’s economy are displayed in Figure 4.7. This reveals that 
Guinea has the lowest variability of economic growth with Nigeria (the lead economy) and 
the highest lack of synchrony around trend with the Nigeria’s economy. Ghana recorded the 
highest variability of economic growth with Nigeria at 0.49. The patterns of the dynamics of 
these five WAMZ economies are not close to that of the lead economy, Nigeria. This has 
serious implications for a future common monetary policy formulation and implementation in 
the WAMZ.  
Despite the fact that the ANOVA test of GDP growth in the WAMZ yielded an encouraging 
result in the evaluation carried out in this chapter, further steps were taken in this study to 
investigate business cycles within the WAMZ in order to establish the feasibility of forming a 
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currency union. In the ‘Modern OCA Theory’, synchronicity of business cycles and shocks 
(demand, supply and monetary) are the two major pillars in determining an OCA. This is the 
basis for the assessment performed in the next session of this chapter. 
4.3 Business Cycles 
Separate economic policies are not necessary if countries within a monetary union have 
similar business cycles or rather experience identical shocks. On the other hand, asymmetries 
in output fluctuations and shocks would appropriately necessitate individual policy responses. 
Within the context of the OCA theory, countries are better suited to form a currency union 
the more their business (output) cycles are synchronised or symmetric. Negative correlation 
of business cycles and shocks however, weakens the case for a common currency. 
Theoretically, if there is a considerable divergence in the business cycles of a countries 
coming together to form a monetary union, the future common monetary policy will not be 
optimal for these countries and ‘one size would not fit all’. An expansionary monetary policy 
will then be more appropriate for the union’s member countries experiencing downward 
moving cycle while the upward trending cycle countries with moderate business cycle 
fluctuations would employ the contractionary monetary policy stance. However, countries 
with moderate business cycle fluctuations do not require contractionary or expansionary 
monetary policy. These are issues that undermine the supports for the formation of a currency 
union hence the necessity for the presence of business cycle synchronicity before the 
formation of a monetary union.  
Data and Methods: The approach of this study to the assessment of the business 
synchronisation of the WAMZ countries was to investigate the similarity and the co-
movements between the two main components of business cycles: (i) the classical business 
cycles and (ii) the deviation business cycles. The classical business cycle, through 
examination of the swings in the real GDP growth rates, pays attention to the upward and 
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downward movements in economic activities of the WAMZ countries while the emphasis of 
the deviation business cycle is on the investigation of the output gap, which is the deviation 
of the real GDP from a trend, and this is synonymous with the concept of recessions and 
booms.  
The assessment of classical and deviation business cycles in this study applied annual data 
real GDP and real GDP growth respectively for the WAMZ countries employing simple 
correlation analyses and the analysis of variance (ANOVA). The ANOVA method would 
check how significantly different are the means of the two components of business cycles in 
the WAMZ countries under investigation. The correlation analysis investigates synchronicity 
while ANOVA examines homogeneity. Further efforts in the investigation was made in 
measuring synchronicity of business cycle through the observation of the closeness of 
coefficient of variations of classical and deviation business cycles of individual WAMZ 
country. It is important to compare patterns of business cycles in the WAMZ countries in 
times when there were no necessities for meeting criteria for memberships of a monetary 
union (pre-convergence period) and the monetary union member run-on period when 
convergence criteria are to be met (convergence period). The business cycle assessment was 
therefore split into two periods: (i) pre-convergence period (1981-2000); (ii) convergence 
period (2001 -2012). The comparison of the results in these two periods is necessary because 
of the possibility of these WAMZ countries behaving ‘artificially’ in their business attitudes 
during the convergence era, when efforts were being made to meet the convergence criteria. 
The HP filtering method (at lambda=100) was applied in filtering and decomposing the real 
output (GDP) of individual WAMZ countries into transitory and permanent components 
required for the assessment of classical and deviation business cycles in these countries.  
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Results and Findings: The patterns of the variations in the real GDP of the WAMZ countries 
for the Pre-convergence period (1991 to 2000) and the Convergence Period (2001-2015) was 
displayed in Figure 4.8 below. Liberia recorded the highest degree of dispersion from the 
mean in both periods, and followed by Ghana. Although, The Gambia appears a bit steady, 
the pattern of variations demonstrated by the WAMZ countries in these two periods were 
heterogeneous, 
Figure 4.8: Coefficients of Variation of Real GDP of the WAMZ Countries  
 
Source: EIU database and author’s calculations 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 below reveal that the degrees of correlation of the classical business cycles 
in the two periods under study were evidently weak generally, given the low coefficients of 
correlation. There was a mix of negative and positive correlations in the two periods.  
Table 4.4: Correlation Matrix of Classical Business Cycles in the WAMZ (Pre-Convergence Period) 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.37 1     
Guinea -0.05 -0.01 1    
Liberia 0.22 0.36 0.27 1   
Nigeria 0.17 -0.09 -0.46 0.20 1  
Sierra Leone 0.18 0.33 -0.25 -0.25 0.31 1 
       
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database and Eviews 7 Output 
Table 4.5: Correlation Matrix of Classical Business Cycles in the WAMZ (Convergence Criteria Period) 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana -0.52 1     
Guinea -0.57 0.34 1    
Liberia -0.41 -0.05 0.41 1   
Nigeria 0.24 0.26 -0.54 -0.83 1  
Sierra Leone -0.42 -0.30 0.62 0.39 -0.55 1 
       
       
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database and Eviews 7 Output 
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In Table 4.4, in the PC phase, the highest degree of correlation of 37% was between Ghana 
and The Gambia while 61.5% correlation between Guinea and Sierra Leone was the highest 
in the CC period as shown in Table 4.5  
Table 4.6: Correlation Matrix of Transitory Component Business Cycles in the WAMZ  
(Pre-Convergence Period) 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana -0.06 1     
Guinea 0.38 0.43 1    
Liberia 0.50 -0.08 0.15 1   
Nigeria 0.47 -0.27 -0.07 0.69 1  
Sierra Leone -0.14 -0.10 0.01 0.40 0.59 1 
       
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database and Eviews 7 Output 
Table 4.7: Correlation Matrix of Transitory Component Business Cycles in the WAMZ (Convergence 
Criteria Period) 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana -0.17 1     
Guinea -0.38 0.48 1    
Liberia 0.49 0.40 0.29 1   
Nigeria -0.49 -0.48 -0.05 -0.87 1  
Sierra Leone -0.57 0.38 0.89 -0.14 0.272546 1 
       
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database and Eviews 7 Output 
For the de-trended business cycle which is the transitory component (cycle) of output, the 
correlation for the PC and the CC periods were also characterised by weak and negative 
correlation coefficients among the WAMZ countries. For the transitory business cycles, 
Table 4.6 and 4.7 above display the correlation in the PC and CC periods. In the PC period, 
as revealed in Table 4.6, the highest correlation of 68.6% was between Liberia and Nigeria 
and this fell to a negative of -87% in the CC period. Table 4.7 also shows that the 89% 
correlation between Guinea and Sierra Leone was the highest for the PC period; followed by 
The Gambia/Liberia 49% correlation. When output gaps were applied in the test of 
synchronicity of deviation cycles, there were evidences of weak correlation as 
Nigeria/Liberia association displays the highest of 68% followed by 59% of Nigeria/Sierra 
Leone and 59% of Liberia/The Gambia as exhibited in Table 4.8 below. For the CC period, 
the results in correlation of output gaps in Table 4.9 also reveal many negative and weak 
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positive correlations. The highest in this phase was the Guinea/Sierra Leone 86% and the 
Gambia/Liberia 52%. Owing to the implications of high degree of correlation for 
synchronicity, the results for the PC and the CC periods brought forth the evidences that the 
classical business cycles, the transitory business cycles and the deviation business cycles in 
the WAMZ were not synchronised over the period covered by the investigations. This has 
negative implications for the feasibility of the proposed currency union the West African 
region in facing business cycle shocks.  
Table 4.8: Correlation Matrix of Deviation (Output Gaps) Business Cycles in the WAMZ  
(Pre-Convergence Criteria Period) 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.01 1     
Guinea 0.38 0.50 1    
Liberia 0.59 0.23 0.39 1   
Nigeria 0.53 -0.14 0.06 0.68 1  
Sierra Leone -0.16 -0.04 -0.03 0.33 0.59 1 
       
       
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database and Eviews 7 Output 
Table 4.9: Correlation Matrix of Deviation (Output Gaps) Business Cycles in the WAMZ  
(Convergence Criteria Period) 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.07 1     
Guinea -0.32 0.33 1    
Liberia 0.52 0.49 0.36 1   
Nigeria -0.53 -0.61 -0.10 -0.88 1  
Sierra Leone -0.55 0.07 0.86 -0.11 0.32 1 
       
       
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database and Eviews 7 Output 
Evidences gathered from the analyses of variances (ANOVA test) under the three business 
cycle scenarios and for the PC and the CC periods are specified in Table 3.10 below.84  
 
 
                                                          
84The decision to reject the null hypothesis is taken by examining the probability values (p-values) in the results 
of the tests. At 5% level of significance, if the resulting p-value is less that that 0.05 or 5%, the null hypothesis 
is rejected, implying statistical significant difference in the means of the business cycles under investigation. 
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Table 4.10: Results of ANOVA Tests on Business Cycles in the WAMZ Countries 
 F-statistic Probability 
Classical Business Cycles: 
* Pre-convergence period 
* Convergence 
 
0.5694 
1.7411 
 
0.723 
0.137 
Transitory Components Business Cycles: 
* Pre-convergence period 
* Convergence 
 
9.85E-24 
1.91E-25 
 
1.000 
1.000 
Deviation (Output Gaps) Business Cycles: 
* Pre-convergence period 
* Convergence 
 
0.0008 
0.0030 
 
1.000 
1.000 
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
For the classical business cycles, with the p-values of 0.723 for the PC period and 0.137 for 
the CC period, we cannot reject the null hypothesis to conclude that the means of the classical 
business cycles (the output growth paths) of the WAMZ countries were similar during the 
two periods.  
Table 4.11: Results of Tests of Homogeneity of Variance (Levene Statistics) in Business Cycles  
 (Levene) F-statistic Probability 
Classical Business Cycles: 
* Pre-convergence period 
* Convergence 
 
9.8379 
4.0693 
 
0.000 
0.002 
Transitory Components Business Cycles: 
* Pre-convergence period 
* Convergence 
 
9.7211 
73.9075 
 
0.000 
0.000 
Deviation (Output Gaps)Business Cycles: 
* Pre-convergence period 
* Convergence 
 
13.3961 
7.1337 
 
0.000 
0.000 
    Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
Since this p-value is greater than 0.05 (for the 5% significant level), the null hypothesis of 
equality in means of these business cycles cannot be rejected implying that they do not differ 
significantly in transitory and deviation business cycles in the WAMZ. However, Table 4.11 
above shows the Levene’s tests of homogeneity of variance among the WAMZ countries 
under the three scenarios of business cycles reporting p-values of 0.00 for both periods.  
A brief summary of evident derived from the correlation and ANOVA tests carried out 
suggest that while business cycles in the WAMZ were not well synchronised as evident by 
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the correlation analyses,85ANOVA tests revealed homogeneity of business cycles in the zone, 
though there was heterogeneity in the variances of the zone’s business cycles.  
Table 4.12: Standard Deviations of the Classes of Business Cycles of the WAMZ Countries (Pre-
Convergence Criteria and Convergence Periods) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Classical Business Cycle: 
* Pre- convergence period 
* Convergence period 
 
3.018 
3.942 
 
0.678 
2.650 
 
0.934 
1.632 
 
41.827 
15.715 
 
9.7135 
1.329 
 
8.468 
7.240 
Transitory Component 
Business Cycle: 
* Pre- convergence period 
* Convergence period 
 
 
0.026 
0.030 
 
 
0.733 
0.781 
 
 
0.033 
0.049 
 
 
0.097 
0.110 
 
 
0.930 
8.689 
 
 
0.053 
0.066 
Deviation(Output Gap) 
Business Cycle: 
* Pre- convergence period 
* Convergence period 
 
 
5.857 
4.400 
 
 
8.849 
3.801 
 
 
1.597 
1.590 
 
 
54.251 
18.232 
 
 
1.539 
8.665 
 
 
6.918 
4.804 
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
Another look into business cycle synchronicity in the WAMZ was the investigation of the 
transitory and deviation (output gap) business cycles so as to determine the extent of cyclical 
convergence of members of the proposed monetary union, which is relevant for the conduct 
of the future common monetary policy in the zone. This test was carried out through the 
evaluation of the evolution of (dispersions) standard deviations of these classes of business. 
The smaller the degree of dispersion (measured by standard deviation) over the period 
investigated, the closer the clustering of individual WAMZ countries’ business cycle. This 
measures absolute degree of dispersion. Table 4.12 above shows that for all the WAMZ 
countries, the standard deviations of the transitory business cycles for the PC and the CC 
periods generally were low and less than unity while the deviation (output gaps) business 
cycles and the classical (growth) business cycles for all the WAMZ countries exhibit single 
digits standard deviation apart from Liberia which recorded for the deviation (output gaps) 
business cycle, highs of 54.25 and 18.23 standard deviations in the PC period and the CC 
                                                          
85Correlation is an indicator of business cycle synchronisation. 
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period respectively as this country displayed 41.83 and 15.71 standard deviation for the 
growth business cycle in the two periods. 
Table 4.13: Results of Estimates of Euclidean Distances between Output Gaps in WAMZ Countries 
 Euclidean Distances (Pre-
Convergence Period) 
Euclidean Distances 
(Convergence Period) 
Gambia-Ghana 0.002617 0.12601 
Gambia-Guinea 0.001836 0.001689 
Gambia-Nigeria 0.51388 0.00578 
Gambia-Liberia 0.001957 0.297233 
Gambia-Sierra Leone 0.04867 0.00603 
Ghana-Guinea 0.00078 0.127698 
Ghana-Liberia 0.5165 0.12023 
Ghana-Nigeria 0.00066 0.423242 
Ghana-Sierra Leone 0.05129 0.132039 
Guinea-Liberia 0.51572 0.00747 
Guinea-Nigeria 0.000121 0.295544 
Guinea-Sierra Leone 0.05051 0.004341 
Liberia-Nigeria 0.515839 0.303012 
Liberia-Sierra Leone 0.465208 0.011809 
Nigeria-Sierra Leone 0.05063 0.2912 
          Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
From Table 4.13above, the evidences gathered from the estimates of the fifteen bilateral 
Euclidean distances between output gaps in the WAMZ further revealed the degree of 
business cycle co-movements among member countries. The rule is that the lower the value 
of the bilateral Euclidean distance, the higher the degree of similarities in business cycles of 
the two countries.  
In the PC period, Guinea/Nigeria had the highest degree of business cycle similarity as 
evident by the lowest Euclidean distance of 0.000121, followed by Ghana/Nigeria, 
Ghana/Guinea and The Gambia/Guinea recording 0.00066, 0.00078 and 0.001836 bilateral 
Euclidean distances respectively. The lowest degree of business cycle similarity in the PC era 
is displayed by Liberia/Nigeria at 0.51584 bilateral Euclidean distance. For the CC period, 
Gambia/Guinea produced the highest degree of business cycle co-movement at 0.001689 
Euclidean distances as Guinea/Sierra Leone (0.00434), The Gambia/Sierra Leone (0.00603) 
and Guinea/Liberia (0.00747) follow. Displaying a Euclidean distance of 0.42324, 
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Ghana/Nigeria implies the lowest degree of business cycle co-movement in this era. The tests 
of Euclidean distances showed that in the PC period, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria were prominent 
with high degrees of business cycle co-movements while Guinea, Sierra Leone and The 
Gambia reflected same during the CC era. However, many of the bilateral Euclidean distance 
obtained for the PC period differ from the evidence got for the CC period. The results for the 
PC period were more encouraging than those of the monetary union run-up CC period. For 
instance, Guinea/Nigeria showing the highest degree of co-movement in the PC period fell to 
the group of the ‘least’ during the CC period. Nevertheless, it is encouraging that the results 
of the monetary union run-up CC period exhibits seven (7) ‘drops’ in the Euclidean distances 
when compared to what obtained for the PC period. This depicts appreciable journey towards 
business cycle co-movements in the WAMZ. The conclusion for the estimates of Euclidean 
distances between output gaps is the failure of these countries to exhibit many desired low 
bilateral values that would have suggested reasonable extent of business cycles similarities 
and co-movements in the WAMZ as this would have arouse the confidence in concluding that 
the zone is feasible for a monetary union.  
4.4 Inflation 
Similarities in inflation is one of the properties of an optimum currency area (OCA). 
Literatures on inflation (as a property of an OCA) have been able to spell out the implications 
of inflation rates similarities among members or would- be members of a monetary union. If 
a common currency area has differences in the trends of inflation rates among its member 
countries, there would be more difficulties in maintaining the fixed exchange rate regime as 
required of a monetary union due to the underlying general price level persistence behaviour 
and variability factor. Apart from this, the heterogeneous inflation patterns in a monetary 
union can propel external imbalances and at the same time, lead to unstable terms of trade. 
However, if terms of trade in member countries are stable, the need for various individual 
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exchange rate in the currency union would be down played. Further emphasis of inflation 
convergence was made by Mundell (2000) who asserted the importance of inflation rate 
similarities for a currency union in fixing exchange rate easily 
Dissimilarities in inflation rate connote strong signals of differences in economic structures 
and in the conducts of individual country’s economy and if these inflation dissimilarities 
becomes wider and persistence, this has an implication of 'one size does not fit all'. 
Additional point in favour of the essence of inflation rates similarities for a currency union is 
the presumable low cost of being a member of the union because fiscal and monetary stance 
similarities are the root causes of inflation similarities. Divergences in the inflation rates will 
make currency union members to face 'real interest rate differentials'. The high inflation 
member countries with sound economic growth may take advantage of the implied 'low 
interest rate' which further stimulates those economies concerned, but to the disadvantage of 
the low inflation-low growth member countries.  
Data and Methods: Annual data of consumer price index and GDP deflator inflation for the 
WAMZ countries, the United States (US) and the EMU employed here spans between 1980 
and 2015. Data analyses were performed into six-fold. At first and second stages, analyses of 
the descriptive statistics and inflation correlation among the WAMZ countries were made. At 
the third stage of analyses, inflation convergence was investigated towards checking the 
feasibility of exchange fixation in the monetary zone through the measure of absolute 
inflation rate differentials generated by the deviations of the US and the Eurozone's inflation 
rates from the WAMZ's individual member's inflation rate.86 The differential inflation rates 
for each country were averaged over the periods covered. Low average inflation deviations 
                                                          
86 Absolute values of these deviations are taken in order to avoid the opposite sign value cancellations. 
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translate into high level of inflation convergence. A WAMZ country exhibiting high 
differential inflation in these assessments are not feasible for exchange rate fixation with the 
US dollars or the euro (as appropriate).  
The absolute inflation rate differential measure of inflation convergence were generated for 
each WAMZ country as: 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐷 = 𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑈𝑆𝑡/𝐸𝑀𝑈𝑡                                     4.6 
where 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐷 is inflation differential, 𝜋𝑡 is the inflation rate for the assessed WAMZ country 
and 𝜋𝑈𝑆𝑡/𝐸𝑀𝑈𝑡 is the inflation rates for the US or EMU (as appropriate). Due to data 
constraints, these analyses were split into two sub periods: (i) the 12-year pre-convergence 
period (1989-2000) and (ii) the 12-year period convergence period (2001-2012). In the fourth 
aspect of analyses, differentials between WAMZ's member countries inflation rates and the 
reference value of 5% inflation rate (expressed as the convergence criterion) were estimated 
and evaluated. This assessed the degree of divergence from the inflation target of the future 
common central bank for the zone. These were estimated as: 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐷 = 𝜋𝑡 −  𝜋
∗                                                          4.7 
where 𝜋∗ is the convergence criterion policy inflation target rate of 5%. Inflation rate 
differential analyses under this approach cover the 12-year convergence period (2001-2012). 
The fifth approach was to check inflation rates misalignments by calculating the annual 
inflation rate differentials as deviations for the WAMZ's average inflation over the 
convergence 12-year period of 2001 to 2012. These were generated as: 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐷𝐹 = 𝜋𝑡 −  𝜋𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍
𝐴𝑉                                                                4.8 
where  𝜋𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍
𝐴𝑉  is the average inflation rate for the WAMZ over the convergence period (2001-
2012). Effort were made to analyse the correlation of the inflation differentials under the three 
approaches so as to establish similarities (or otherwise) inflation trends and patterns in the 
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WAMZ countries. The sixth and final approach was to appraise the time series properties of 
the inflation rate deviations under the three approaches emphasising the deviations from the 
convergence benchmark of 5% inflation rate as this establishes if there are evidence of 
consistent/persistent impacts of idiosyncratic shocks that affects inflation rates in the WAMZ 
countries. Here, unit root tests were carried out to determine the order of integration of the 
inflation deviation and to reveal if they are stationary or not.  
Results and Findings: The pattern of the coefficients of variation of 4-periodic inflation are 
displayed in Figure 4.9 below. Over the pre-convergence periods (1981-1990 and 1991-2000) 
and the convergence periods (2001-2010 and 2011-2015), it is interesting to note that the 
degree of dispersion subsided during the second phase of the convergence period despite 
higher degrees of dispersion in the previous three periods. Ghana recorded the lowest 
dispersion in this latter period. What happened during the last phase is a reflection of 
improvements in the convergence of inflation variations with the WAMZ.  
 Figure 4.9: Inflation Periodic Coefficients of Variation for the WAMZ Countries  
 
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
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Figure 4.10: WAMZ Countries' Inflation Deviations from EMU and US Inflation Rates 
(Pre-convergence Period) 
 
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
 
 
Figure 4.11: WAMZ Countries' Inflation Deviations from EMU and US Inflation Rates 
(Convergence Criteria Period) 
 
        Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
The results of inflation convergence investigated by the means of measuring absolute 
inflation rate differentials generated through deviations of the US and the Eurozone's 
inflation rates from the WAMZ's individual member's inflation rate are shown in Figures 4.10 
and 4.11 above.  
It is necessary to state that high variation in Liberia during the 1991-2000 period was due to 
the 1998 huge war-time inflation of 3,737.22%. If this outlier is expunged from the country’s 
inflation estimation, the country’s position would have been much more different.  
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Table 4.14: Correlation Matrix of WAMZ Countries' Inflation Deviations from Eurozone Inflation Rates 
 Pre-convergence Criteria (PC)Period 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.12 1     
Guinea 0.65 -0.32 1    
Liberia -0.11 -0.42 -0.25 1   
Nigeria -0.14 0.40 0.07 -0.23 1  
Sierra Leone 0.74 -0.25 0.90 -0.15 0.004 1 
       
       
Convergence Criteria (CC)Period 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.71 1     
Guinea -0.39 -0.65 1    
Liberia -0.13 0.01 -0.34 1   
Nigeria -0.23 -0.28 0.08 -0.18 1  
Sierra Leone -0.40 -0.63 0.33 -0.22 0.07 1 
       
       
Sources: Author's Estimation, EIU Database and EViews 7 Output  
These exhibit the pattern and extent of inflation deviation of the WAMZ countries in terms of 
feasibility in exchange rate fixation with the euro and the US dollars. Simple interpretation of 
these results is that the lower the differential, the higher the inflation convergence with the 
respective currency (the euro/US dollar) and the stronger the argument in favour of exchange 
rate fixation with the respective currency. A country displaying high inflation deviation from 
these currencies is not feasible as a part of the monetary union, for exchange rate fixation 
with the single currency.   
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Table 4.15: Correlation Matrix of WAMZ Countries' Inflation Deviations from US Inflation Rates 
Pre-convergence Criteria (PC)Period 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.10 1     
Guinea 0.71 -0.36 1    
Liberia -0.28 -0.41 -0.20 1   
Nigeria 0.08 0.48 0.17 -0.37 1  
Sierra Leone 0.76 -0.27 0.90 -0.14 0.04 1 
       
Convergence Criteria (CC)Period 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.75 1     
Guinea -0.39 -0.66 1    
Liberia -0.11 0.02 -0.36 1   
Nigeria -0.17 -0.23 -0.01 -0.25 1  
Sierra Leone -0.40 -0.62 0.34 -0.19 -0.02 1 
       
Sources: Author's Estimation, EIU Database and EViews 7 Output 
 
Table 4.16: Correlation Matrix of WAMZ Countries' Inflation Deviations from Convergence Criterion 
Inflation (5%) Rate (Convergence Criteria Period) 
 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.77 1     
Guinea -0.49 -0.61 1    
Liberia -0.25 -0.45 0.03 1   
Nigeria -0.24 -0.35 0.04 -0.07 1  
Sierra Leone -0.42 -0.63 0.52 0.19 -0.23 1 
       
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database and Eviews 7 Output 
An important feature of the results is the similarities in the Eurozone/US deviation results for 
the WAMZ countries displayed in Tables 4.14 and 4.15. In the pre-convergence period, The 
Gambia was the most feasible member of the proposed single currency for the euro and US 
dollar exchange rate fixation just as Liberia was the least feasible. In the convergence era, 
The Gambia was consistence with her number one ranking and Liberia moved up to the 
second position while Ghana is the least candidate for exchange rate fixation with the 
euro/US dollar. Table 4.16 above gives the correlation matrix of the deviation of the WAMZ 
countries' inflation rates from the target rate during the convergence period. The results 
revealed negative correlation among the WAMZ countries while those positive correlation 
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were very weak. The correlation matrix of the target rate differentials in Table 4.17 below 
reflects many negative correlation coefficients indicating huge dissimilarities among the 
WAMZ countries in this regard.  
Table 4.17: Correlation Matrix of WAMZ Countries' Inflation Deviations from WAMZ's Average 
Inflation (Convergence Criteria Period) 
 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.66 1     
Guinea -0.42 -0.64 1    
Liberia -0.13 -0.54 0.15 1   
Nigeria -0.29 -0.13 -0.09 -0.28 1  
Sierra Leone -0.38 -0.65 0.54 0.24 -0.28 1 
       
       
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
Table 4.18: Ng-Perron Unit Root Tests on Deviations of WAMZ Inflation from Inflation in Eurozone and 
US. 
Pre-convergence Period (WAMZ/Eurozone) 
Country MZa MZt MSB MPT Decision 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
-2.433 
-18.332 
-2.277 
-5.419 
-5.453 
-6.414 
-1.012 
-3.026 
-1.026 
-1.642 
-1.651 
-1.708 
0.416 
0.165 
0.450 
0.303 
0.303 
0.266 
9.487 
1.340 
10.432 
4.531 
4.493 
4.054 
Non-stationary 
Stationary 
Non-stationary 
Non-stationary 
Non-stationary 
Non-stationary 
Pre-convergence Period (WAMZ/US) 
Country MZa MZt MSB MPT Decision 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
-2.321 
-16.730 
-2.880 
-5.419 
-5.420 
-6.519 
-1.016 
-2.891 
-1.175 
-1.641 
-1.646 
-1.722 
0.438 
0.173 
0.407 
0.303 
0.304 
0.264 
10.098 
1.468 
8.403 
4.532 
4.520 
3.998 
Not stationary 
Stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Convergence Period (WAMZ/Eurozone) 
Country MZa MZt MSB MPT Decision 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
-3.391 
-84.453 
-4.055 
-5.122 
-4.912 
-2.360 
-1.264 
-6.482 
-1.416 
-1.589 
-1.550 
-0.610 
0.373 
0.077 
0.349 
0.310 
0.315 
0.258 
7.177 
0.320 
6.045 
4.805 
50.19 
7.667 
Not stationary 
Stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Convergence Period (WAMZ/US) 
Country MZa MZt MSB MPT Decision 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
-3.321 
-141.086 
-4.017 
-5.189 
-3.811 
-1.652 
-1.246 
-8.387 
-1.409 
-1.601 
-1.362 
-0.444 
0.375 
0.059 
0.351 
0.308 
0.357 
0.268 
7.315 
0.191 
6.102 
4.742 
6.428 
8.426 
Not stationary 
Stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Source: Author's Computation, Eviews Output and EIU Database 
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As the future common central bank for the WAMZ requires information on time series 
properties on inflation when giving future inflation targets and designing monetary policy, 
evidence of the unit root behaviour of the properties of inflation differentials under the three 
approaches in this study are exhibited in Tables 4.18 above and 4.19 and 4.20 below as 
derived from the Ng-Perron unit root tests with constant and trend at 5% significance level. 
Table 4.19: Results of Ng-Perron Unit Root Tests on Deviations of WAMZ Inflation from Convergence 
Criterion (5%) Inflation Rate 
Convergence Period Only 
Country MZa MZt MSB MPT Decision 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
-3.041 
-37.342 
-3.925 
-4.379 
-3.577 
-2.474 
-1.198 
-4.294 
-1.394 
-1.480 
-1.323 
-0.746 
0.394 
0.115 
0.355 
0.338 
0.370 
0.301 
7.965 
0.728 
6.243 
5.595 
6.840 
7.984 
Not stationary 
Not Stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
          Source: Author's Computation, Eviews Output and EIU Database 
Apart from Ghana under the deviation from euro/US dollar, these properties produce evidences 
that the null hypothesis of unit root could not be rejected under the four scenarios for all the 
WAMZ countries, implying non-stationary deviations suggesting that shocks to inflationary 
trends in the WAMZ would have permanent and long lasting effects on inflation rates in the 
zone as inflation may not return to the trend path overtime.  
Table 4.20: Ng-Perron Unit Root Tests on Deviations of WAMZ Inflation from WAMZ's Average 
Convergence Period Only 
Country MZa MZt MSB MPT Decision 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
-4.024 
-6.615 
-4.477 
-4.657 
-2.913 
-3.026 
-1.403 
-1.757 
-1.487 
-1.524 
-1.150 
-0.864 
0.348 
0.265 
0.332 
0.327 
0.395 
0.285 
6.096 
3.885 
5.484 
5.263 
8.232 
7.268 
Not stationary 
Not Stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Ng-Perron 5% Critical Values 
MZa MZt MSB MPT 
-8.100 -1.980 0.233 3.170 
 
Source: Author's Computation, Eviews Output and EIU Database 
What these suggest is that the cost implications of following disinflationary policies in WAMZ 
countries may be high while it is very likely to be difficult forecasting or predicting future 
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inflation movements which are based on past inflationary behaviours. These properties of 
integration of inflation rate differential are very revealing for inflation rate convergence among 
WAMZ member countries. 
 
4.5 Production Structures 
As indicated earlier, the OCA criteria for joining a monetary union centre on the probability 
of potential members facing similar economic disturbances which will enable a common 
monetary policy to successfully adjust to such shocks. A fundamental position in economics 
is that similar structural economic shocks could be handled within a monetary union if there 
are similarities in the production structures of members. This is a key property on the OCA 
theory. It is therefore significant if this criterion is assessed in the context of the WAMZ 
countries in order to determine if output market shocks that may affect a member country as 
well as other members of the monetary integration would be minimised by an indication of 
production structure similarities.  
Data and Methods: Employing annual data of agricultural, industrial manufacturing and 
service sectors of the respective WAMZ economies over a period between 1997 and 2015, 
this study evaluates the degree of similarities in the production structures of the WAMZ 
countries. A statistical measure of structural synchronicity initiated by Krugman (1991) was 
applied and computed thus: 
𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍 = ∑ (𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑖 − 𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍)
𝐽
𝑘=1                                              4.9 
where 𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍 is the extent of similarity in production structure between country 𝑖  and the 
WAMZ, 𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑖 is the weight of gross value added by sector 𝑗 in the total valued added for 
country 𝑖, 𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍 is the weight of the gross valued added by sector 𝑗 in the total valued 
added for the whole of the WAMZ. 𝐽 is the number of the sectors of the economy employed 
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in the study. Agriculture, industry, manufacturing and services were the sectors considered 
for this evaluation. The rule for the determination of synchronicity here is that the closer 
𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍 is to zero, the more the extent of similarity in economic characteristics of country 𝑖 
and the WAMZ. 
Results and Findings: Table 4.21 below reveals information on 20-year averages and 3-year 
moving averages of the value added by agriculture, industry and services sectors of the 
WAMZ economies, (scaled by GDP). The sharp contrast revealed by the averages in the three 
sectors was the heavy dependence of The Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria on service sector as 
against Sierra Leonean strong dependence on the agricultural sector. Sectorial dependence 
were above 50% of the GDP in these countries. Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria bear similarities 
in reliance on agriculture. 
Table 4.21: Similarities in Production Structure: Value Added by Agriculture, Industry and Services as 
Annual Percentage of GDP (20-year Average and 3-year Moving Averages) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Agriculture: 
2012-2014 
2011-2013 
2010-2012 
1995-2014 
 
22.24 
23.23 
25.92 
24.11 
 
23.05 
24.26 
26.82 
32.14 
 
20.30 
20.95 
21.55 
22.42 
 
35.08 
39.54 
42.71 
64.85 
 
21.09 
21.78 
22.74 
22.39 
 
59.22 
57.71 
56.61 
54.82 
Industry: 
2012-2014 
2011-2013 
2010-2012 
1995-2014 
 
14.66 
15.01 
14.34 
15.11 
 
28.45 
27.97 
25.00 
23.20 
 
38.99 
41.42 
43.80 
36.21 
 
15.00 
13.23 
9.91 
7.45 
 
26.10 
27.23 
27.00 
34.52 
 
7.61 
8.18 
8.28 
15.59 
Services (%): 
2012-2014 
2011-2013 
2010-2012 
1995-2014 
 
63.10 
61.76 
59.93 
60.77 
 
52.10 
50.87 
51.38 
44.08 
 
40.71 
37.63 
34.62 
41.37 
 
44.08 
45.51 
47.38 
26.83 
 
52.81 
50.99 
50.26 
43.09 
 
33.17 
34.10 
35.10 
29.60 
    Source: EIU Database and Author's Estimations 
The Gambia and Liberia on one hand and Ghana and Nigeria on the other hand exhibit 
respective similarities in the industrial sector. For the WAMZ economies at large (apart from 
Sierra Leone), it was evident that the service industry was of the highest importance 
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generating between 44% and 63% of the GDP. It can therefore be inferred here that there 
were few similarities in the WAMZ production structures.  
Table 4.22: Similarities in Production Structure: Value Added by Agriculture, Industry and Services 
Annual Percentage Real Change (20-year Average and 3-year Moving Averages) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Agriculture: 
2012-2014 
2011-2013 
2010-2012 
1995-2014 
 
-1.31 
-6.58 
-2.27 
2.93 
 
4.21 
2.94 
2.81 
3.56 
 
2.68 
5.47 
4.07 
3.93 
 
2.51 
3.93 
5.71 
8.74 
 
4.64 
4.19 
5.14 
7.67 
 
3.13 
4.43 
4.10 
5.15 
Industry: 
2012-2014 
2011-2013 
2010-2012 
1995-2014 
 
0.74 
5.43 
5.53 
2.98 
 
6.16 
19.78 
19.88 
7.58 
 
1.79 
2.81 
3.07 
3.65 
 
38.97 
54.88 
46.78 
23.53 
 
3.78 
4.33 
5.71 
3.35 
 
6.17 
9.51 
10.63 
2.76 
Manufacturing: 
2012-2014 
2011-2013 
2010-2012 
1995-2014 
 
3.71 
3.19 
2.27 
2.57 
 
0.21 
6.15 
8.85 
4.04 
 
0.29 
2.10 
2.01 
2.60 
 
4.73 
6.14 
5.73 
12.98 
 
16.66 
17.69 
12.96 
7.57 
 
-0.22 
7.15 
9.36 
0.41 
Services: 
2012-2014 
2011-2013 
2010-2012 
1995-2014 
 
5.98 
5.18 
4.44 
4.17 
 
9.22 
10.49 
10.43 
10.67 
 
2.80 
4.45 
2.75 
2.05 
 
6.18 
8.71 
9.14 
14.91 
 
6.40 
5.75 
6.82 
7.91 
 
4.62 
6.26 
6.52 
5.88 
     Source: EIU Database and Author's Estimations 
Table 4.22 above reveals the averages of the annual percentage of real changes in production 
structures of the WAMZ countries. In the agricultural sector, only The Gambia exhibits 
negative real changes in the 3-year moving averages, while other member countries show 
close similarities in values between 2% and 6%. In the service sector, Liberia demonstrates 
high degree of annual change than other WAMZ countries which exhibit unit increases. 
There were highest degree of annual changes in value added to national production by 
Nigeria and Ghana respectively in manufacturing and services sectors.  
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Figure 4.12: Plots of Index of Similarity of Production Structures in the WAMZ 
 
Source: EIU Database and Author's Estimations 
Apart from these double digit outliers, there are no tangible differences in the rate of annual 
changes in the value added to production by the three sectors in the WAMZ economies. 
Figure 4.12 above reveals that the index of production structure similarity generated for all 
the six WAMZ countries are very close to zero, indicating huge similarities of these countries 
production structure and that of the WAMZ as a whole. There were some disparities up till 
2010, but from 2011 to 2015, there were huge degree of convergences as these economies 
were more closely similar to that characterised by the WAMZ. This significant results of 
similar production characteristics have positive implication for the synchronicity of economic 
disturbances within the WAMZ as this will make a common monetary policy to suffice in 
addressing adjustments to economic shocks. 
4.6 Openness to Trade and Investments 
One of the important criteria of the traditional OCA theory is trade openness emphasised by 
Kenen (1969). This extends to exports diversification and intensities of intra-regional and 
intra-industry trade among member countries of an OCA. Intra-regional trade intensity is the 
degree of trade linkages between countries within a region and the degree of this linkage in 
trade is revealed by the analysis of the bilateral trade intensity ratio (BTIR). This ratio 
measures the extent of bilateral trade between two countries relative to the trade of a 
particular country with the world. It goes on to show how large or small trade transactions 
are, relative to what is expected, considering the share of each country in world's trade. This 
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section of the research aims at exposing how closely linked are trades among the members of 
the WAMZ as a proposed monetary union as well as revealing if the feasibility of the future 
currency union would be guaranteed by the empirically determined the OCA property of 
trade intensities between these economies. It is believed that when there is high degree on 
intra-regional trade intensity, countries involved would be subjected to symmetric shocks that 
may emanate from synchronised business cycles. Nevertheless, exchange rate risks and 
uncertainties are eliminated inasmuch these member countries face reduced transaction costs. 
It is therefore significant to assess intra-regional trade intensities with the WAMZ. 
Data and Methods: Relevant trade data for the six WAMZ countries were sourced from the 
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database. These exports and imports data cover 
the period of analysis, which is 1995-2012. Apart from BTIR, trade openness (derived as the 
sum of exports and imports, deflated by GDP) were estimated for the WAMZ countries. The 
measure of BTIR constructed for the WAMZ countries in this study was export-proxy BTIR, 
restricted to export data. Consequently, the WAMZ specific bilateral trade intensity ratio was 
constructed as the share of a WAMZ country's export going to a partner WAMZ country, 
divided by the share of WAMZ's total exports to the partner. This is expressed as: 
𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑅(𝑖, 𝑗, 𝜏) = (
𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑖+ 𝑥𝑗
) 𝜏                                                 4.10 
where 𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑅(𝑖, 𝑗, 𝜏) is the bilateral trade intensity ratio between country 𝑖 and country 𝑗 for 
average trade over the period, 𝑥𝑖𝑗  is the total annual nominal exports of country 𝑖 to country 𝑗; 
𝑥𝑖  is the total annual nominal exports of country 𝑖 to all other WAMZ countries; 𝑥𝑗 is the total 
annual nominal exports of country 𝑗 to all other WAMZ countries and 𝜏 is the average of 
exports over the period investigated. The higher the BTIR between two WAMZ countries, the 
higher the degree of trade linkage between the two countries.  
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Results and Findings: The trade openness results estimation exhibited in Table 4.23 below 
gives evidence to conclude that Liberia is the most opened economy within the WAMZ. 
Figure 4.13 below shows the plot of the degree of openness of these countries.  
Table 4.23: Trade Openness in the WAMZ Countries (2000-2015) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
2000 56.36 116.05 53.48 53.01 71.38 57.53 
2001 46.93 110.05 58.60 58.03 81.81 35.78 
2002 59.64 97.49 55.45 65.53 63.38 38.83 
2003 68.86 97.49 51.14 130.19 75.22 46.39 
2004 69.05 99.67 50.44 93.86 48.45 46.14 
2005 70.31 98.17 69.90 100.07 50.75 47.52 
2006 61.95 65.92 83.21 173.54 64.61 41.91 
2007 56.80 65.35 65.18 153.76 64.46 40.30 
2008 56.05 69.51 75.01 179.12 64.97 39.21 
2009 64.61 71.59 57.33 91.69 61.80 41.44 
2010 69.81 75.38 64.88 101.28 42.65 51.27 
2011 80.64 86.19 78.38 120.32 52.79 72.35 
2012 86.44 92.54 91.69 121.88 44.38 85.27 
2013 87.80 79.66 83.06 122.63 31.03 90.25 
2014 64.42 88.45 80.62 136.97 30.88 83.19 
2015 54.19 99.25 78.10 126.02 21.12 66.80 
              Source: World Bank Database and Author's Estimation 
 
Figure 4.13: Plot of Trade Openness in the WAMZ Countries (2000-2014) 
 
Source: World Bank Database and Author's Estimation 
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Table 4.24: Intra-WAMZ Bilateral Trade Intensity Ratios (BTIR) for WAMZ Countries 
Exports: 
from:                                                 to: 
 
The Gambia Ghana 0.20 
The Gambia Guinea 14.03 
The Gambia Liberia 0.17 
The Gambia Nigeria 0.06 
The Gambia Sierra Leone 1.12 
Ghana The Gambia 2.44 
Ghana Guinea 1.85 
Ghana Liberia 2.18 
Ghana Nigeria 8.30 
Ghana Sierra Leone 2.05 
Guinea The Gambia 1.65 
Guinea Ghana 0.43 
Guinea Liberia 16.22 
Guinea Nigeria 0.31 
Guinea Sierra Leone 20.01 
Liberia The Gambia 1.06 
Liberia Ghana 0.57 
Liberia Guinea 2.05 
Liberia Nigeria 0.03 
Liberia Sierra Leone 7.83 
Nigeria The Gambia 0.04 
Nigeria Ghana 88.44 
Nigeria Guinea 0.71 
Nigeria Liberia 1.69 
Nigeria Sierra Leone 0.25 
Sierra Leone The Gambia 5.51 
Sierra Leone Ghana 0.22 
Sierra Leone Guinea 4.26 
Sierra Leone Liberia 2.36 
Sierra Leone Nigeria 0.14 
Source: World Bank Database and Author's Estimations 
Table 4.24 above gives the 15-year intra-WAMZ bilateral trade intensity ratios information 
on trade openness for the period spanning between 2000 and 2014, showing close 
similarities. Guinea appears to be the highest bilateral trade intense economy within the 
WAMZ as evident by the high BTIR with The Gambia (14.03), with Liberia (16.20) and with 
Sierra Leone (20.01). In spite of these, the highest degree of bilateral trade ratio is between 
Ghana and Nigeria with a ratio of 88.44. If Ghana and Nigeria are WAMZ’s big economies, 
this result has positive implication for the monetary integration. 
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4.7 Financial Integration and Financial System Convergence 
The essence of financial market integration assessment of the feasibility of a single currency 
area was stressed by Ingram (1969) in which it was emphasised that the higher the level of 
financial integration, the greater the extent of the need to establish an optimum currency area 
across geographical blocs, and that financial market integration reduces the need for 
exchange rate adjustments as well as the need to change inter-regional or intra currency area 
terms of trade through fluctuations in exchange rate. Therefore, it is essential to have strong 
financial market integration if the sustainability of a currency area is to be assured. Given 
these and in line with suggestions by economic theories and findings from empirical 
assessments, financial integration is likely to enhance economic growth and at same time, an 
important issues for a monetary union. Because the implementation of the single monetary 
policy in a monetary union is implemented through the financial systems, it is necessary that 
various financial systems involved should reflect common characteristics and be efficient as 
much as possible so as to guarantee smooth and effective transmission mechanism of the 
common monetary policy. Therefore, the way monetary policy mechanism may effectively 
work is determined by the extent of financial integration which will in turn, have financial 
stability implications for the financial system.  
It is consequently of high significance to assess the degree of financial integration of the 
WAMZ as a proposed monetary union. The transmission of the WAMZ’s common monetary 
policy will be more effective the more the financial systems within the WAMZ are well 
integrated. This is because if the degree of financial integration within the WAMZ is not 
sufficiently high, there can be problems relating to common economic shock and common 
monetary policy transmission. A higher degree financial integration has the implication that 
the WAMZ-wide shocks dominates and a common monetary policy will be effectively 
suffice to address the common disturbances. On the other hand, if financial market 
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integration in the WAMZ is weak, country-specific-shocks prevails and this reduces the 
effectiveness of the WAMZ’s common monetary policy which will not suffice to address 
common shocks with the proposed monetary union. 
The implementation and conduct of a common monetary policy will be much easier if the 
financial systems within a currency area functions in a like manner. For instance, when the 
monetary authority changes its policy on interest rate, the effect of this will be rapid and 
intense in a country that predominantly indexes loans to short term interest rate than how this 
will be felt in countries that majorly operate fixed interest rate contracts. Basically, this 
entails that if a group of countries operates similar financial systems, the operations of a 
common monetary policy would easily be facilitated and hence such countries are good 
candidates of an OCA. Principally, all the WAMZ economies are bank-based. The 
implication of this is that these countries do not primarily rely on the security markets for 
sourcing of funds and investment of surplus funds as well as the general financial 
intermediation activities. This therefore encouraged the evaluation of the similarities in some 
banking sector indicator of domestic credit granted to private sectors by deposit money banks 
in the WAMZ countries (as scaled by GDP). Further evaluation of interest rate spreads across 
the WAMZ was performed.  
The three broad categories of measures of financial integration are: (i) price-based measures; 
(ii) quantity-based measures; and (iii) news-based measures (Baele et al, 2004). Price-based 
measures which directly investigates the law of one price (LOOP) gauge assets price/returns 
discrepancies caused by the assets’ geographic origin. LOOP must be established if there is 
complete financial integration. This measure may can either be direct price/yield-based 
method (testing is the assets hugely have same characteristics) or country-effect method 
(testing if there are differences in systematic risks factors and other relevant 
features).Quantity-based methods relates to quantifying the effects of frictions faced by 
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demand and supply forces affecting investment opportunities. Ease of market access and 
cross-border holdings of institutional investors are good measures under this category. News-
based method measure information effect as distinguished from other barriers and frictions. 
Specifically here, financial integration should reflect perfect diversification of assets 
portfolios. Therefore, local or regional news is expected to have little impact on prices as 
against relative huge impact of global news, which is of importance; this depicting identical 
degree of systematic risks across financial assets in different countries. By implications, 
financial integration is not perfect if local news greatly continue to have significant influence 
on prices of assets.  
Data and Methods: Because the WAMZ member economies are bank-based economies, this 
(as a crucial factor) constrained this study to employ the assessment of an element of the 
price-based measures (money market measures) in gathering the evidence about the degree of 
financial integration and financial systems convergence in the WAMZ. This is a cost of 
financial intermediation measures of the spread between interest rates of the member 
countries. For the WAMZ countries, interest rates spread was generated as: 
𝐼𝑅𝑆 = 𝑖𝐿 − 𝑖𝐷                                                           4.11 
where 𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑖 is interest rate spread 𝑖𝐿 lending and 𝑖𝐷 deposit interest rates respectively. This 
assessment method is in addition to the evaluation of domestic credits granted to private 
sectors by deposit money banks within the WAMZ (a banking sector activity indicator). The 
evaluation of interest rate spread (the difference between lending and deposit rates) assesses 
level of linkages between national financial markets of WAMZ’s candidate countries. If these 
interest spreads converge, this indicates money markets convergence and financial system 
integration. Downward trends of the spread show financial intermediation efficiency. These 
are methods appropriate for bank-based economies as obtained across the WAMZ. The 
patterns of the coefficients of variation of these indicators were evaluated for both pre-
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convergence and convergence periods. The coefficient variation is the best way to summarise 
and compare variations, particularly when standard deviation increases as average increases. 
Generally, coefficient of variation is expressed as ratio of standard deviation and mean 
calculated thus:  
𝐶𝑜𝑓𝑉 = (
𝜎
?̅?
)                                                              4.12 
where 𝜎 is standard deviation and ?̅? is mean.87 Analysis of financial market integration in the 
WAMZ was performed with the evaluation of the closeness in the size and degree of 
financial development by estimating the correlation of Central Bank Assets/GDP ratios 
across the WAMZ. Further investigation is the closeness of the association of interest rate 
spread of the lead economy (Nigeria) and other WAMZ economies. Data employed in this 
financial integration assessment span between 1980 and 2015. 
Results and Findings: Coefficients of variation of domestic credit granted by WAMZ’s 
deposit money banks in the pre-convergence and the convergence periods are exhibited in 
Table 4.25 below and expressed in diagrammatic forms in Figure 4.14 below. The variations 
during the convergence period reflects patterns far away from divergences unlike what is 
apparent in the pre-convergence era. The degree of convergence during the convergence 
period is an indication of greater degree of financial integration of these bank-based 
economies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
87 Coefficient of variation is specifically useful in making comparison of economic performance and economic indicators 
over different and same period in more meaningful ways in determining the magnitude of dispersion. A less dispersed 
variable is depicted by a small coefficient of variation, unlike the variable with larger coefficient of variation.  
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Table 4.25: Coefficient of Variation of Domestic Credit Granted by WAMZ Banks (Pre-Convergence 
Criteria and Convergence Periods) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
* Pre- convergence period 
* Convergence period 
0.67 
0.25 
0.59 
0.16 
0.13 
0.54 
1.40 
0.56 
0.24 
0.47 
0.44 
0.46 
     Source: IMF and EIU Databases and Author's Estimations. 
  Note: The Domestic Credit Growth average estimations cover the 5-year period between 2010 and 2014. Data for 
the Pre Convergence Period for Liberia span from 1980 to 1989 and 1991 t0 1999, while for Guinea they span 
from 1989 to 1999. For the Convergence Period, data for The Gambia s0pan from 2000 to 2014.  
 
Figure 4.14: Plot of Coefficients of Variation of Credit Granted by the WAMZ Countries 
 
Source: World Bank Database and Author's Estimation 
 
In Figure 4.15 below showing the plot of the coefficients of variation of interest rate spreads 
across the WAMZ, there are convergence and close similarities in the pattern of variation in 
this money market indicator, apart from the pattern exhibited by Guinea.  
Figure 4.15: Plot of Interest Rates Spread Coefficients of Variation for the WAMZ Countries 
 
Source: World Bank Database and Author's Estimation 
 
In spite of the earlier results of financial systems evaluation, the outcome of further tests of 
financial system convergence in the degree of association between interest rates spread of the 
lead economy, Nigeria and those of the five other economies of the WAMZ economies are 
displayed in Table 4.26 below. 
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Table 4.26: Correlation of WAMZ Countries' Interest Rates Spread and Nigeria’s Interest Rates Spread 
WAMZ Country Correlation with Nigeria’s Interest Rate 
Spread 
The Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Sierra Leone 
0.52 
0.69 
0.69 
0.45 
0.57 
Source: IMF and EIU Databases and Author's Estimations. 
 
 The results reveal positive association above average in the cases of the WAMZ countries, 
except Liberia with 45% degree of association with the lead economy. These reasonably 
demonstrate supports for financial integration as supported by LOOP. When evidence of 
financial system integration was sought for from the viewpoint of financial development and 
size, the revelation from the results of the correlation tests of central bank assets (scaled by 
GDP) is displayed in Table 4.27 below. The results of these correlation tests are mixed. There 
were negative correlation in association of other WAMZ countries with Guinea. There high 
degree of positive association in the association between the lead economy, Nigeria and 
Ghana and Sierra Leone, just as Sierra Leone has further above-average degree positive 
correlation with all economies of the WAMZ except with Guinea. Though, with the lack of 
uniformity in the coefficients generated, results of the tests easily reveal that Guinea is the 
odd-one out of all in financial integration of the WAMZ, while The Gambia is negatively 
correlated weakly with the lead economy.  
 
Table 4.27: Correlation Matrix of WAMZ Countries' Central Bank Assets/GDP Ratio  
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Gambia  1.00       
Ghana  0.21  1.00      
Guinea -0.58 -0.22  1.00    
Liberia  0.84  0.48 -0.58  1.00   
Nigeria -0.06  0.85 -0.16  0.23  1.00  
S/Leone  0.57  0.84 -0.28  0.68  0.73  1.00 
      Source: Author's Computation, Eviews Output and EIU Database 
These results above suggest that central banks across the WAMZ lacks uniformity in the 
determination of financial system development, thus depicting absence of the desired degree 
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of financial system convergence  which is necessary because of the significant effects and 
influence of central banks in managing economic growth through the regulation of money 
and bank lending.  
4.8 Factor Market Flexibility 
This study proxy factor flexibility by labour market flexibility, which is the labour ability and 
willingness to respond to market condition changes. For a monetary union, this is vital in the 
evaluation of how labour market operates in adjusting supply to demand. Labour market 
(being part of the supply side of the economy) is very crucial to the overall achievement of 
macroeconomic objectives. ‘Effective functioning of labour market’ is what labour market 
flexibility stands for. A low degree of labour market flexibility can be costly for members of 
a monetary union characterised by this because of the absence of an independent monetary 
policy to serve as adjustment mechanism whenever there are economic shocks. What an 
efficient and flexible labour markets imply for members of a monetary union is higher level 
of employment which by logical interpretation reflects that the lower the official long term 
unemployment rate of a member country, the greater the country’s labour flexibility and on 
the other hand, the higher the long term unemployment rate, the higher the degree of labour 
rigidity. This study deviates from other studies by determining factor flexibility from the 
view-point of labour rigidity in member countries. 
Data and Methods: The estimation of factor flexibility in this research applied annual data of 
unemployment rate as percentage of total labour forces across the WAMZ, spanning over a 
25-year period between 1991 and 2015, sourced from the EIU database. This is in addition to 
the use of the secondary data on labour freedom constructed by the Heritage Foundation and 
collected for this study over a 5-year period from 2011 to 2015. The computation of the index 
of degree of labour freedom applied six equally weighted quantitative factors which are: (i) 
ratio of minimum wage to average value added per worker; (ii) hindrance to hiring additional 
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workers; (iii) rigidity of labour hours; (iv) difficulty in firing redundant employer; (v) legally 
mandated notice period; and (vi) mandatory severance pay. Each of these factors is converted 
to scale of 0 to 100 based on the equation: 
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 50 𝑋 (
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖
).                              4.13 
This reflects the calculation of factor score of country relative to world’s average and 
multiplied by 50. For each country, the scores for the six factors are averaged to yield the 
labour freedom index. From this point, ‘compact’ coefficients of labour rigidity for the 
WAMZ countries were derived by estimating the deviation from 1, of the reciprocal of the 
indices of degree of freedom multiplied by 100 thus: 
𝐿𝑅𝑖 = (
1
𝑓
 𝑋100) − 1                                                     4.14 
Where 𝐿𝑅𝑖 is the coefficient of labour rigidity for country 𝑖, 𝑓 is the index of degree of labour 
freedom. The farther away from zero of the labour rigidity coefficient, the lower the degree 
of labour rigidity and the closer to zero the labour rigidity coefficient, the higher the degree 
of labour flexibility.  
Results and Findings: Information from the Heritage Foundation (2015) about the nature of 
labour markets in the WAMZ are revealed in Table 4.28 below.  
Three-year moving averages for five period as well as the 25-year averages of unemployment 
rates scaled over the total labour force is presented in Table 4.29 and diagrammatically 
represented in Figure 4.15 below.  The Gambia had the highest periodic unemployment 
moving averages all through while Sierra Leone recorded the lowest of these over the 
periods.  
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Table 4.28: Nature of Labour Markets in the WAMZ 
WAMZ Country Nature of Labour Market 
The Gambia Labour regulations have become more flexible, but the labour market remains 
stagnant. Although there is a shortage of skilled labour, the economy is burdened 
with high unemployment as well as underemployment. 
Ghana Labour regulations remain restrictive and outmoded. The non-salary cost of 
employing a worker is moderate, but dismissing an employee is costly and difficult. 
Guinea Employment regulations are flexible, although enforcement is not effective. The 
non-salary cost of employing a worker is moderate, but dismissing an employee can 
be difficult and costly. The formal labour market remains underdeveloped. 
Liberia With a labour market dysfunctional, about 80 percent of the workforce is engaged in 
the informal sector. Labour regulations are rigid. The non-salary cost of employing a 
worker is high, and dismissing an employee is relatively costly. 
Nigeria Labour regulations are relatively flexible, but much of its labour force is employed 
in the public or energy sectors. In the absence of dynamic non-energy growth, a 
more vibrant labour market has not yet emerged. 
Sierra Leone The labour market lacks the capacity to facilitate dynamic employment growth. 
Labour regulations, outmoded and inflexible, are rather futile in application, as much 
of the country’s labour force is employed in the informal sector. 
       Source: The Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal 
Table 4.29: Unemployment Rate as Percentage of Total Labour Force (25-year Average and 3-year 
Moving Averages) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
2013-2015 
2012-2014 
2011-2013 
2010-2012 
2009-2011 
2008-2010 
2007-2009 
2006-2008 
2005-2007 
1991-2015 
29.63 
29.69 
29.62 
29.65 
29.67 
29.82 
29.81 
29.77 
29.72 
29.67 
5.29 
4.81 
4.42 
4.09 
5.54 
6.07 
7.82 
6.21 
5.99 
6.54 
6.94 
6.94 
6.93 
6.90 
6.89 
6.90 
6.90 
6.90 
6.87 
6.84 
3.74 
3.69 
3.72 
3.71 
4.01 
4.48 
5.11 
4.96 
4.90 
4.36 
5.39 
6.50 
7.34 
7.41 
7.29 
7.24 
7.19 
7.15 
7.10 
6.47 
2.91 
2.96 
3.13 
3.15 
3.11 
3.02 
3.06 
3.12 
3.21 
3.06 
     Source: World Bank’s WDI (ILO Modelled Estimates) and Author’s Calculations. 
 
 
Figure 4.16: Plot of Unemployment Rate as Percentage of Total Labour Force (25-year Average and 3-
year Moving Averages) 
 
Source: World Bank’s WDI (ILO Modelled Estimates) and Author’s Calculations. 
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By simple inference, The Gambia, having the highest rate hovering around 30s can be 
regarded as recoding the lowest degree of labour factor flexibility across the WAMZ. And 
failed to fulfil this OCA criterion. For monetary integration of the WAMZ based on this test 
of factor market flexibility, Sierra Leone with the lowest averages of unemployment rates can 
be regarded as the best fit of all four countries that record single digit averages (Ghana, 
Guinea, Liberia and Nigeria). The results of further evaluation of the factor market flexibility 
from the viewpoint of labour rigidity is exhibited in Figure 4.17 below which shows the 
calculated annual coefficients of degree of labour rigidity and the related 5-year average. This 
is a result that put some factors into play. 
Figure 4.17: Plots of Labour Market Rigidity in the WAMZ (2011-2015) 
 
Source: World Bank’s WDI (ILO Modelled Estimates), Heritage Foundation and Author’s Calculations. 
 
All through the analysis over the estimation period (including the 5-year average), Sierra 
Leone displays the most labour rigid economy in the WAMZ which makes the country not to 
be a good candidate for the WAMZ’s monetary integration due to what this suggest for factor 
market flexibility. The lead economy of the WAMZ, Nigeria has the lowest degree of labour 
market rigidity over the period covered by the assessment. This is positive for the proposed 
monetary union.  
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4.9 Results of Related Empirical Studies on OCA Perspectives 
of WAMZ Monetary Integration 
From the perspectives of the properties of OCA, a few number of empirical studies have 
evaluated the feasibility of the monetary integration of the WAMZ as well as the viability of 
the membership of the proposed monetary union for prospective member countries. Findings 
and results of some of these empirical researches are discussed in this section. An evaluation 
of the economic rationale for monetary union in Sub-Saharan Africa was performed by 
Benassy-Quere and Coupet (2003) through the use of cluster analyses of a sample of 17 
countries by adapting variables emanating from the OCA theory (and the fear-of-floating 
literature) to conclude that the creation of the WAMZ around Nigeria is not supported by 
data. The result however, supported the inclusion of The Gambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone in 
an extended WAEMU arrangement or creation of a separate monetary union with the ‘core’ 
of the WAEMU and The Gambia. Further to this study by Benassy-Quere and Coupet (2003), 
Bankage (2008) used the methodology initiated by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) to 
compute OCA indices for 21 African countries. This study got a high-predicted volatility for 
Nigeria in relation to other ECOWAS countries, leading to the suggestion that the inclusion 
of Nigeria in the WAMZ (and in the extended WAEMU) is not suitable according to the 
OCA theory. Cham (2011) assessed the feasibility of the WAMZ as a monetary zone using 
the combination of both macroeconomic convergence and the OCA properties (openness, 
shock synchronisation and labour mobility) to gather evidence towards concluding that the 
degree of labour mobility is low, shocks were not synchronised and the degree of openness of 
members (apart from The Gambia and Nigeria) were below average. Omotor and Niringiye 
(2011) used simple bivariate of vector autoregressive model to assess WAMZ’s feasibility as 
an OCA from the perspective of economic shocks and got results suggesting that the WAMZ 
is feasible to form an OCA. Coleman (2011) investigated business cycle synchronisation in 
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five member countries of the WAMZ (The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone) applying Pearson correlation of trend and cyclical component of GDP to investigate 
co-movements at high frequencies between computed Z-scores for pairings of the five 
candidate countries. The results indicated lack of a consistent pattern of synchronised growth 
cycles, which raised concerns over economic sustainability of the WAMZ. With the 
application of cointegration and fractional cointegration methods, inflation dynamics and 
common tendencies of real GDP of the WAMZ countries were investigated by Alagidede et 
al. (2012) to gather evidence of substantial heterogeneities in these respects, across the 
WAMZ.  Raji (2012) applied dynamic GMM and cross country correlation to assessed the 
real exchange rate misalignments and economic performance of the WAMZ to determine the 
implications of these for economic unionisation of the WAMZ to conclude that the WAMZ 
experiences asymmetrical correlations between real exchange rate misalignments and 
economic performances. The cross-country correlation test however revealed moderate 
degree of symmetrical relationship using some macroeconomic variables such as real 
exchange rate, misaligned real exchange rate, openness, inflation and output. Costs and 
benefits of a common currency in the WAMZ were estimated by Okafor (2013) by means of 
behavioural models to capture costs elements (asymmetric shocks, loss of monetary 
autonomy, fiscal distortion) and benefits (trade creation, financial integration effects and 
policy coordination gain)  to yield evidences towards  suggesting that potential benefits of 
common currency in the WAMZ will likely be lower than marginal costs due to loss of 
monetary policy sovereignty which could be monumental in spite of extended trade creation 
benefits. In a correlation investigation of structural shocks across the WAMZ, Harvey and 
Cushing (2015) concluded that the WAMZ countries responded asymmetrically to common 
supply, demand and monetary shocks and so, will respond differently to a common monetary 
policy. Assessments of the extent of convergence and business cycle synchronisation of 
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business cycles within the WAMZ was performed by Alagidede and Tweneboah (2015) in 
the analyses of growth rate convergence. The results gathered suggested dissimilarities in 
business cycles within the WAMZ. Analyses of trade within the WAMZ and WAMZ’s trade 
with other countries with West Africa, Europe and Asia were made by Mensah (2016) who 
found strong evidence against trade symmetry in the WAMZ as well as some evidences of 
marginal convergence in inflation, real GDP growth and monetary policy rate, with reasons 
to infer that partial convergence in the WAMZ as well as significantly low trade within the 
WAMZ and the WAMZ countries with outside world.  
Results and evidences generated by most of the studies discussed above are in tune with those 
yielded by this thesis in the specific analyses of business cycle synchronisation, trade 
openness, inflation and labour mobility. However, this thesis did not embark on shock 
assessment of the WAMZ.  
4.10 Conclusions 
This chapter evaluated the feasibility of the monetary integration of the WAMZ from the 
perspectives of seven properties of the OCA theory, applying various statistical and 
econometric tools. The analysis of variance assessments of the uniformity of macroeconomic 
indicators revealed that virtually all these indicators do not have similar features across the 
WAMZ. The test of equality of economic dynamics performed with Theil Coefficient of 
Inequality method revealed Nigeria as having the strongest degree of equality of her economy 
with the WAMZ’s aggregate economy in terms of economic dynamics. However, in this 
same respect, when the aggregate economy of the WAMZ without Nigeria was evaluated, 
Ghana exhibited the strongest equality while other four economies had high degrees of 
inequality. What these denote is that in terms of economic dynamics of the whole WAMZ, 
Nigeria stands the only country that hugely share similarities with the WAMZ, while Ghana 
has same feature in a WAMZ without Nigeria. The business cycle analysis of the monetary 
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integration feasibility produced evidences suggesting that the extent of business cycle 
synchronicity was low particularly during the pre-convergence period. The results for the 
convergence period were much better. Investigations here, on the overall, suggest 
unsynchronised business cycles across the WAMZ. The study of inflation revealed improved 
and better similarities during the convergence era. Generally, the inflation deviation and the 
correlation analyses reveal that The Gambia is the most country feasible for the exchange rate 
fixation with the euro and the US dollars. Nigeria, the lead economy yielded unfavourable 
results in the inflation evaluation. The assessment of the time series properties of inflation 
produced evidences to suggest permanent and long-lasting effects of inflation rate and that 
the cost implications of disinflationary measures in a common monetary policy may be high 
since the future inflation may be unpredictable within the zone. The evaluation of production 
structures in the WAMZ brought the conclusion of huge similarities in production structures, 
significantly in the last six years of the period covered by this study. This outcome is in 
favour of a common monetary policy in attending to economic disturbances in the proposed 
monetary zone. The assessment of the openness of the WAMZ countries to trade revealed 
Liberia as the most opened, while other countries demonstrated close similarities in this 
respect. However, the intra-region bilateral trade openness between the two strong economies 
of the WAMZ adds positive values to the feasibility of the WAMZ’s monetary integration.  
Nevertheless, the low degrees of openness of the lead economy (Nigeria) gives concerns. 
Nigeria recorded the lowest degree of openness all through. In the evaluation of financial 
integration and financial system convergence, the results were mixed. The tests of correlation 
of Nigeria bank-based financial system with the five smaller bank-based financial markets 
showed positive association. However, the evaluation of WAMZ’s central banks revealed 
lack of financial systems convergence and lack uniformity in WAMZ’s central banking 
attitudes. This is a key factor for determining financial development within the proposed 
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currency area. The factor market mobility as measured by labour mobility shows that Nigeria 
is the most labour flexible of the WAMZ countries. From the theoretical proposition, this has 
good implications for the proposed monetary zone. Other WAMZ countries are reasonably 
flexible apart from Sierra Leone that exhibited a high degree of labour rigidity. 
Given the mixed results derived from the various assessments of the seven properties of the 
OCA and some poor results yielded by the lead economy (apart from the evidence from 
labour mobility and economic dynamics analyses), on the overall, it can be infer from this 
chapter that the WAMZ may not be an optimum currency area for now, except efforts are 
intensified is those weak areas.  
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Chapter 5 
Monetary Perspectives 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The essence of money and monetary policy in a monetary union necessitates the evaluation of 
the feasibility of monetary integration of a geographic bloc from monetary perspectives.  
The evaluation of some monetary subject-matters within the monetary union is crucial and 
pivotal because common currency will be in use on the take-off of such monetary union, and 
money supply is expected to play a role in influencing real and nominal macroeconomic 
variables in such union.  Going by the notion of the OCA, the success of a proposed currency 
area is positively assured and the monetary union could adjudged feasible if there are high 
degrees of similarities in operation of monetary policies as well as  how macroeconomic 
fundamentals relate with and affect monetary policy instruments in member countries. Such 
feasibility is equally guaranteed if the scale of ease of monetary integration of the member 
countries are high and if the expected single monetary policy would be suitable for national 
stability of member countries that are expected to lose their respective monetary 
independence on the commencement of the monetary union and the establishment of a 
common central bank which would formulate the common monetary policy for the proposed 
monetary union. The WAMZ proposing to be a monetary union equally deserve such 
feasibility assessments in aspects relating to money and monetary policy. One other factor of 
significance is the interactions of monetary policy with fiscal policy in monetary integration. 
This is due to the need to achieve price stability (in the proposed inflation targeting terrain) 
while the two policies (fiscal and monetary) will be in the hands of two separate sets of 
policy makers.  
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Therefore, in drawing appropriate inferences on the feasibility of the monetary integration 
plans of the WAMZ, answers are provided by this research study, to questions that pertain to: 
(i) if money is neutral (or super-neutral) in the WAMZ; (ii) if monetary dominance is 
prevailing across the WAMZ; (iii) if the nature and patterns of monetary reactions of the 
WAMZ countries are similar enough to guarantee a feasible monetary integration of the 
WAMZ countries; (iv) the extent of expected loss of monetary policy independence in the 
case of each prospective WAMZ member states; and (v) the degree of suitability of the 
expected common monetary policy for member countries of the WAMZ. Answers to these 
question provide some unique contributions to existing studies on the WAMZ as a future 
monetary union, and these question are necessarily valuable in answering the major research 
question of this thesis.  
 
5.2 Money Neutrality  
One of the many ways through which the effectiveness of monetary policies could be 
measured is to check the neutrality of money in the economy. A basic issue in 
macroeconomics is the possible link between nominal variables (measured in monetary 
terms) and real variables. A fundamental issue here is whether money has real influence or 
effects. Money neutrality is about what the long run relationship between money and price 
imply for the use of monetary aggregates in the conduct of monetary policy. The argument is 
that if a single monetary policy is prevalent in a monetary union, it is significant that 
members of such monetary integration should exhibit similarities in behaviour of money. The 
main research questions answered in this section were: is money neutral and super-neutral 
across the WAMZ? Does money supply affect real macroeconomic variable? Answers to the 
question are essential as evidence require to draw inferences on the suitability of a common 
monetary policy for the WAMZ countries.  
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5.2.1 Theory and Model 
Monetary neutrality as a concept of classical economics, generally suggests that within an 
economy, changes in a nominal variable (like money supply) do not impact a real variable 
(like real GDP and employment). There are two hypotheses that explain the real/nominal 
variable relationship which specify that in the long run: (i) permanent change in the level of 
money supply has no effect on the level of real variable (this is money neutrality hypothesis); 
(ii) a permanent change in the growth rate of money supply does not influence the level of 
real variables (this is money super-neutrality hypothesis). The generally accepted of the two 
hypotheses is first one which is the long run money neutrality (LMN) proposition. The reason 
for this acceptance is that apart from standing as a core feature of a huge number of economic 
models, LMN is the yardstick for monetary policy effectiveness measurement.  
Over the decades and centuries, across nations and economies with varied monetary and 
fiscal policies, literature have been able to establish the monetarists argument in favour of the 
significance of monetary aggregate in strategising the control of inflation through the robust 
empirical estimations of low frequency or long run association of money growth and 
inflation. The dictum of Milton Friedman is that ‘inflation is always and every time a 
monetary phenomenon’. Therefore, the underlying view of the quantity theory of money that 
portrays money as the determinant of inflation rate, thus makes inflation control 
(maintenance of price stability) as obvious and necessary major objective of a central bank. 
The popular thinking (right from elementary levels) is that a monetary policy that aims at 
inflation control should bother itself with how modest rate of money supply growth can be 
maintained. Though, many academic and policymakers are of the view that money does not 
play a role in the conduct of monetary policy, many schools of thoughts however disagree 
with this issue of de-emphasising  money and money growth as a criteria for assessing how 
sound a monetary policy. A bothering question is if monetary policy decisions can be based 
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on the models of monetary policy transmission mechanism which fail to take cognisance of 
the monetary aggregate. 88 
The fundamental principles of ‘neutrality of money’ (as an economic theory), cast doubts 
over the theoretical coherence of the ‘money-less’ monetary policy models (which apparently 
lacks consistency with the fundamentals of money neutrality’. Woodford (2007) stresses that 
a model that makes reference to money neutrality (or which leaves the general price level to 
be indeterminate) should be applied in predicting the consequences of alternative policies for 
inflation. Monetary economists hold the view that injections of money into an economy have 
certain implications because such change in money stock will only change nominal wages 
and price without any reflection of such change in real output, real wages and real interest 
rates. The effect of the injection of money into the macro economy is neutral on the long run 
because most macroeconomic decisions emanate from real factors within the economy; and 
consequently, there would be no change in economic decisions made because the real 
variables are unchanged. This is why neutrality of money is a postulation that a change in the 
stock of money within an economy, affects just only nominal variables, with no such effect 
on real variables that are inflation-adjusted. Therefore, what money neutrality idea imply is 
that the central bank does not affect the real economy (size of the GDP, employment, real 
investment and real consumption) by printing money; and that any increase in money supply 
would be negated by a proportional rise in price and wages. This is an assumption underlying 
some macroeconomic theories and models (like the classical model, neo classical model, real 
business cycle theory).89  
                                                          
88 The ECB, the common central bank of the EMU always asserts prominent and significant roles of growth in money supply 
within the context of the formulation and of monetary policy strategy. 
89 These theories and models all show that money is neutral and has no effect on real variables within the economy 
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According to the ‘classical dichotomy’, there are different powers having different effects on 
nominal and real variables, thus causing money supply to affect only nominal variables. 
When the velocity of money is constant while the capacity to supply good constrains the 
velocity of activity, money supply changes will cause price changes.90 New classical 
economists posit that even in the short term, perfectly anticipated monetary policy cannot 
affect activity, thus supporting the classical concept of long run money neutrality. As a long- 
run proposition, the classical dichotomy was basic to the views of many pre-Keynesian 
economists (regarding money as a veil) just as the new classical macroeconomic theories. 
Based on the argument that prices are sticky, the classical dichotomy was rejected by the 
Keynesians and the monetarists. Their thinking was that prices fail to adjust in the short run, 
so that money supply increase will cause aggregate demand to rise and thereby altering real 
macroeconomic variables. The view in classical economics and neoclassical economics tends 
towards the notion that as monetary factors (and not real factors) wholly determine nominal 
variables, real factors (not monetary factors) purely determine real variables in the economy. 
Keynesian and monetarist economists however rejected this position.91  
Woodford (2007) points out what the long run relationship between money growth and prices 
imply for monetary policy conduct. Firstly, with the existence of the well-established 
empirical relationship, ‘money-less’ models of inflation are impliedly incorrect. Secondly, 
the long run money-price relationship provides the basis for the argument on the desirability 
of a money-growth target. Thirdly, with the cointegration of money growth and inflation rate, 
one would not need further information in order to forecast average inflation rate over some 
sufficiently long future horizon since one would already possess the knowledge of what the 
average rate of money growth will be over such time horizon. These justify the significance 
                                                          
90This led Friedman to conclude that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” 
91This rejection is based on prices sticky prices arguments that: if prices fail to adjust in the short run, an increase in the 
money supply raises aggregate demand and thus alters real macroeconomic variables (Oxford Dictionary Quick reference) 
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of this study on money neutrality and superneutrality for the assessment of monetary 
integration of the WAMZ, while providing answers to the question on if money matters 
within the proposed monetary zone. 
5.2.2 Data and Methods  
For a detailed investigation of long run money neutrality (LMN) and due to the evidence that 
monetary neutrality tests are sensitive to the underlying monetary aggregates, quasi money 
which has properties resembling M1 money was applied for money supply. Given the 
developing nature of the economy of WAMZ countries in which a high proportion of base 
money does not pass through the formal banking system, there is justification in laying 
greater emphasis on results generated for the assessment of cointegrating relationships 
between real output and M1(which includes physical cash in circulation) in the WAMZ 
countries. The real variables are real output as proxy by real GDP and inflation (as measured 
by GDP deflator). Annual data collected for the six WAMZ countries for the purpose of this 
study span over the period between 1980 and 2014. All the variables are expressed in 
logarithmic transformations.  
The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bound testing approach developed by Pesaran et 
al (2001) was employed to test money neutrality and money superneutrality here. As opposed 
to the traditional Engle-Granger and Johansen cointegration approaches, the ARDL bound 
testing cointegration method is very rare in the investigation of neutrality of money. While 
attention was paid to the integration and cointegration properties of the variables and unit root 
tests of the variables were performed in order to assess the stationary properties of the 
variables. Since the long run relationship between the money stock and real output depends 
on the integration order of each variable, the Dickey-Fuller GLS (DF-GLS) and Phillips-
Perron (PP)  unit roots tests were applied so as to establish that none of the variables is I(2) 
and thus avoid spurious results. The assumption of bound test is that variable employed in the 
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estimation are I(0) or I(1), thus making the Pesaran F-statistics based on I(2) variables to be 
invalid. ARDL bounds test cointegration procedure enables the empirical analysis of long run 
relationship and dynamic interactions between variables of interest. This is a procedure 
developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). An ARDL regression model, in its basic form, 
is stated as: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛼0𝑥𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑡−2 + ⋯ 𝛼𝑞𝑥𝑡−𝑞 + 𝜀𝑡               5.1 
The lag lengths of both the dependent and independent variables should be carefully 
determined. In the ARDL modeling, the 𝑥 terms on the right hand side of the equation is 
usually referred to as ‘𝑞’ while the autoregressive lag length of the dependent is usually 
called ‘𝑝’. The most common method of determining the lag lengths in the ARDL process is 
by information criteria (AIC or BIC). Specifically here, the first stage in the ARDL process in 
the estimation of money neutrality and superneutrality was to establish if long run 
relationships exists by applying the unrestricted error correct model (UECM) representation 
of the ARDL (p,q) thus: 
∆𝜋𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 ∆𝜋𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑞
𝑗=1 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡           5.2 
Where 𝛼0 is the constant, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are long-run relationships parameters, 𝛿𝑖 and 𝛾𝑖 are the 
short run relationships parameters, ∆ is the difference operator and 𝜀𝑡 is the white noise term. 
Biased coefficient estimates will result when an ARDL model is estimated by ordinary least 
(OLS) square method. The OLS will also be an inconsistent estimator because of the 
influence of lagged values of the dependent variable as regressors, if the disturbance term, εt, 
is autocorrelated. This is a reason for the general introduction of instrumental variables in the 
application of an ARDL models. The model is "autoregressive" because of the part 
explanations of the dependent variable by its own lagged value; and contains a "distributed 
lag" component with the successive lags of the explanatory variables on the right hand side of 
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the model. Researchers can efficiently apply the method whether or not the regressors in the 
model are purely I (0) or I(1), but not I(2).  In this ARDL process, the null hypothesis in 
Equation 5.2 above was expressed as: 𝐻0 = 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 0 indicating ‘no long run 
relationship’ against the alternative hypothesis:𝐻0 ≠ 𝛽1 ≠ 𝛽2 ≠ 0, using the F-test. The F-
test which has a non-standard distribution was applied on lagged values of the variables in the 
process of determining the existence of long run relationship among the variables. The F-test 
is conditional upon: (a) if the variables in the ARDL model are I(0) or I(1); (b) the number of 
explanatory variables; (c) if the ARDL model contains an intercept and/or a trend.  
The evaluation of the estimated value of F-statistic were in line with the critical values 
tabulated in Table CI (iii) of Pesaran et al. (2001). Two bounds of critical values are 
generated here as benchmarks for the integration orders of the variables. The upper bounds 
values are for the I(1) variables, while the lower bounds values are for the I(0) variables. 
Cointegration exists if the computed F statistic exceeds the upper critical value. F-statistics 
below the lower critical value bound indicate that there is no cointegration. The test is 
inconclusive when the F-statistic fall in-between the two bounds of critical values. This study 
applied the bound-test small sample size critical value computed by Narayan (2005) rather 
than the Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) critical values which were computed for large samples 
sizes of 500 to 1,000 observations. After the long run relationships were established through 
the bound tests, at the second stage was the estimation of the estimation of the long run and 
short run coefficients of cointegration. If the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected 
(that is, the cointegration of the variables is ascertained), the long run relationship between 
the variables would be estimated by setting the error correction component of Equation 5.2 
equal to zero to derive the long run effects by normalising 𝛽2 on 𝛽1. Diagnostic test for serial 
correlation, misspecification of functional form, normality and heteroscedasticity and 
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parameter stability were performed via CUSUM, CUSUMSQ and other tests on the error 
correction representation of the ARDL model. 
The derivative macroeconomic models applied in this money neutrality and money 
superneutrality evaluation are as expressed below. For money neutrality: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓𝑚𝑡                                                                  5.3 
For the two tests money super-neutrality: 
%∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓%∆𝑚𝑡                                                                  5.4 
and 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑓%∆𝑚𝑡                                                                  5.5 
where 𝑦 is the real GDP, and  𝑚 is the quasi money supply, 𝜋 is inflation and is %∆𝑚 money 
supply growth, all at period 𝑡. Taking the natural logarithm of real output and money supply, 
the investigation of money neutrality and money superneutrality (through the estimations of 
the relationship between inflation, real output real output growth and money supply 
aggregates) and explicitly specified in the estimable econometric functions in Equations 5.6 
to 5.8. 
For the money neutrality tests: 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                          5.6 
and the following two equations for the money superneutrality tests:  
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                          5.7 
𝑦𝑔𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                       5.8 
where 𝑦𝑔𝑡 is output growth rate at time t, and 𝑚𝑔𝑡 is money growth rate at time t. It is very 
likely that the estimates of these ‘St. Louis Equations’ equations may yield results that would 
provide evidence of non-neutrality of money, for instance, when a strong association between 
higher growth in money supply and higher output growth could be established, because of the 
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positive estimated parameter.92 As solution to this problem it was necessary to apply a model 
that will find solution to possible endogenous explanatory variables. This entailed the 
introduction of instrumental variables which makes the use of ARDL model to be more 
appropriate.  
The augmented ARDL model expressed by Pesaran et al (2001) took the following general 
form: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑡=1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                         5.9 
where 𝑦𝑡  is the dependent variable, 𝛼0 is the constant term and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the independent variable 
and 𝜀𝑡 is the disturbance term. In terms of the lagged levels and difference, we can obtained 
the unrestricted error correction version of (for instance) an ARDL (1,1) model as: 
Neutrality with respect to real output: 
 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼𝑜 + ∑ 𝛽1∆𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝛽2∆𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑡=1 + 𝛾1𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡      5.10 
Neutrality with respect to inflation: 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼𝑜 + ∑ 𝛽3∆𝜋𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝛽4∆𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑡=1 + 𝛾3𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                  5.11 
Super-neutrality with respect to real output growth: 
∆𝑦𝑔𝑡 = 𝛼𝑜 + ∑ 𝛽5∆𝑦𝑔𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝛽6∆𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑡=1 + 𝛾5𝑦𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝛾6𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡      5.12 
Super-neutrality with respect to changes in inflation rates: 
∆𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼𝑜 + ∑ 𝛽7∆𝜋𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝛽8∆𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑡=1 + 𝛾7𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛾8𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡      5.13 
While Equations 5.10 and 5.11 estimated money neutrality, Equations 5.12 and 5.13 
estimated money super-neutrality against inflation. All the variables were as defined.  𝛽 and 
𝛾 are the parameters of interest to be estimated. The first part of each equations with 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 
𝛽3, 𝛽4, 𝛽5, 𝛽6, 𝛽7, and 𝛽8 represent short run dynamics while the second part with 𝛾1, 𝛾2 , 𝛾3, 
𝛾4 𝛾5 ,𝛾6, 𝛾7 and 𝛾8 representing the long run relationships. ∆ is the first difference operator 
and 𝜀𝑡 is the ‘while noise error term’. Evaluation made in this study was limited to money 
                                                          
92 This method was used in the 60s by the St. Louis Fed economists Leonall C. Andersen and Jerry Jordan. 
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neutrality tests in respect of real output and money superneutrality tests regarding inflation 
and real output growth. Therefore, the tests of null hypotheses (as against alternative 
hypotheses) of no long run relationships are:  
For Equation 5.10 −  𝐻0 = 𝛾1 = 𝛾2= 0 – no long run relation 
For Equation 5.12 −  𝐻0 = 𝛾5 = 𝛾6= 0 – no long run relation 
For Equation 5.13 −  𝐻0 = 𝛾7 = 𝛾8= 0 – no long run relation. 
The test equation of the unit roots tests of variables of interest (money supply, real output, 
money supply growth and real growth) performed here included trend and intercept as 
appropriate. The Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC) was applied for the automatic lag 
selection in the DF (GLS) tests while for the PP tests, the Newey-West Bandwidth Selection 
was used for the bandwidth automatic selection and the Bartlett Kernel spectral estimation 
method was applied. ARDL bounds tests were performed at 5% level of significance with 
restricted intercept and no trend. In the first test, there was automatic lag length selection by 
the SIC in which the maximum lag was lag 2 were specified for the dependent and 
independent variables while lag lengths of both variables were fixed at 1 in the second 
bounds test. 
5.2.3 Results and Findings  
The results of the unit roots tests and the decision on the order of integration of the variables 
employed (money supply and real output) highlighted in the lower part of Table 5.1 below 
shows that the two macroeconomic variables (money supply and real GDP) for the 
assessment of money neutrality are integrated to the order of 1. Because none of the variable 
is integrated to the order of 2, there was the conviction towards the appropriateness of the use 
of the ARDL method in estimating the neutrality and superneutrality of money in the six 
WAMZ countries. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below give the unit roots tests results for the variables 
employed in the test of money neutrality (super-neutrality) in the WAMZ where it is revealed 
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that all the variables for money neutrality tests are in same integration order of I(1) while 
those for superneutrality tests have similar integration of I(0). 
Table 5.1: Results of the Unit Roots Tests of the Money Neutrality Assessment Variables 
Statistics 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Money Supply 
DF GLS (Level): 
DF GLS (1st Difference): 
 
PP (Level): 
PP (1st Difference): 
 
-2.8260 
-6.2948 
 
-3.1980 
-11.9039* 
 
-1.3779 
-6.0036 
 
-1.407 
-6.0036* 
 
-1.574 
-5.5292 
 
-1.7849 
-5.7842* 
 
-1.6218 
-3.0759 
 
-1.4928 
-3.0076* 
 
-2.3686 
-4.0560 
 
-1.1521 
-6.4622* 
 
-0.8256 
-5.8731 
 
-0.6780 
-6.0092* 
Real Output 
DF GLS (Level): 
DF GLS (1st Difference): 
 
PP (Level): 
PP (1st Difference): 
 
-2.2875 
-5.2149 
 
-1.8319 
-5.3142* 
 
-0.7776 
-5.1525 
 
-0.4961 
-4.9935* 
 
-2.4399 
-5.3009 
 
-2.3606 
-5.5735* 
 
-1.2213 
-5.5173 
 
-2.2905 
-11.1693* 
 
-2.0853 
-4.1206 
 
-2.7227 
-4.2442* 
 
-0.9567 
-4.7293 
 
-0.8654 
-5.0421* 
Implications 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Money Supply 
DF GLS (Level): 
DF GLS (1st Difference): 
 
PP (Level): 
PP (1st Difference): 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
Real Output 
DF GLS (Level): 
DF GLS (1st Difference): 
 
PP (Level): 
PP (1st Difference): 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
I(1) 
Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 9 Output 
Note: For the unit roots tests *, ** and *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively.  
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Table 5.2: Results of the Unit Roots Tests of the Money Super-Neutrality Assessment Variables  
Statistics 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Money Supply: 
DF GLS (Level): 
PP (Level): 
 
-4.6849* 
-4.9827* 
 
-4.7485* 
-4.7991* 
 
-5.4078* 
-5.5721* 
 
-4.7389* 
-4.9473* 
 
-3.4883* 
-4.3864* 
 
-3.9960* 
-4.6980* 
Real Output Growth: 
DF GLS (Level): 
PP (Level 
 
Inflation: 
DF GLS (Level): 
PP (Level): 
DF GLS (Diff.): 
PP (Diff.): 
4.8408* 
-8.1234* 
 
 
 
-5.179* 
-5.2370 
 
 
5.4106* 
-5.3272* 
 
 
 
-3.9765* 
-5.5849 
 
 
2.2455** 
-5.9124* 
 
 
 
2.4179** 
-2.746*** 
-5.7402* 
-6.2360* 
-3.0757* 
-3.0076* 
 
 
 
-4.1326* 
-4.1231* 
 
-2.0476** 
-5.6214* 
 
 
 
-5.666* 
-5.6379* 
 
-5.4192* 
-5.5394* 
- 
 
 
2.7938* 
-2.508*** 
-4.7391* 
12.4090* 
Implications 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Money Supply: 
DF GLS (Level): 
PP (Level): 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
Real Output: 
DF GLS (Level): 
PP (Level): 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
Inflation: 
DF GLS (Level): 
PP (Level): 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
I(0) 
Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 9 Output 
Note: For the unit roots tests, *, ** and *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively.  
Discussions of the Results of Money Neutrality Tests: The results of the SC automatic lag 
selection ARDL models estimations of money neutrality in of WAMZ economies in Table 
5.3 below reveal that the F-statistics exceed the upper bounds in the cases of The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone under the two ARDL bounds tests showing that at 
1%, 2.5%, 5% and 10% significance levels, therefore, we could not accept the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration (and long-run relationships) between real output and money supply in 
these five WAMZ countries. 
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Table 5.3: Results of the ARDL Bound Tests of Money Neutrality with Respect to Real Output in the 
WAMZ (1980-2014) 
Schwarz Criterion Automatic Lag Selection ARDL Model 
 F-statistics Cointegration (at 95% 
Confidence Level) 
The Gambia (ARDL 1,0) 43.4056 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Ghana (ARDL 1,0) 63.7130 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Guinea (ARDL 1,2) 5.2423 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Liberia (ARDL 1,0) 3.3566 No: Accept null hypothesis 
Nigeria (ARDL 2,0) 5.5360 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
S/Leone (ARDL 1,0) 29.0469 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Fixed Lag Selection ARDL (1,1) Model 
 F-statistics Cointegration (at 95% 
Confidence Level) 
The Gambia ARDL (1,1) 22.4078 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Ghana ARDL (1,1) 33.1111 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Guinea ARDL (1,1) 3.5385 No: Accept null hypothesis 
Liberia ARDL (1,1) 3.5194 No: Accept null hypothesis 
Nigeria ARDL (1,1) 22.2421 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
S/Leone ARDL (1,1) 26.7385 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
ARDL Critical Values Bounds 
Bounds 1% 2.5% 5% 10% 
Lower Bound  4.94 4.18 3.62 3.02 
Upper Bound 5.58 4.79 4.16 3.51 
                  Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 9 Output 
 
It is consequently evident that apart from Liberia (in which money is neutral), there are no 
empirical evidences and proof of money neutrality in The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria 
and Sierra Leone. Liberia recorded the lowest coefficients of F-statistics of joint significance. 
What these connote is that the proposed common central bank for the WAMZ can affect the 
real side of the economy (real output, consumption, unemployment etc.) as well as the 
nominal side of the economy (exchange rate, price, wages etc.) with the level of money 
supply in these WAMZ (apart from Liberia) because the equilibrium values of variables in 
the real side of the economies of these countries are independent of money supply. 
Furthermore, the results of the estimation of the parsimonious fixed lag selection ARDL (1,1) 
model for the six WAMZ countries (as revealed in the lower component of Table 5.3) reveal 
money neutrality in Guinea and Liberia, implying that in these two countries, money supply 
does not have influence on the real variables and consequently, the printing of more money 
would not cause the effect on the real economic activities of the two WAMZ countries. This 
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is because the proportional increase in the nominal side of the economy of the country will 
offset money supply increase that may be put in place. 
Table 5.4: Coefficients of Long Run Relationship and Error-Correction in Money Neutrality  
Schwarz Criterion Automatic Lag Selection ARDL Model 
Dependent Variable: Real Output 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Money Supply  
 (Long Run Coefficient) 
 
Error Correction Term 
(Coint. Coefficient) 
5.0085* 
(0.2921) 
 
-0.1498* 
(0.0177) 
2.3975 
(8.8301) 
 
-0.0162* 
(0.0016) 
5.8342* 
(1.1809) 
 
-0.2663* 
(0.0640) 
1.8609 
(4.0640) 
 
0.0236* 
(0.0070) 
5.1086* 
(1.0890) 
 
-0.0485* 
(0.0129) 
0.9083 
(10.1573) 
 
-0.0144* 
(0.0016) 
Fixed Lag Selection ARDL (1,1) Model 
Dependent Variable: Real Output 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Money Supply  
 (Long Run Coefficient) 
 
Error Correction Term 
(Coint. Coefficient) 
4.8670* 
(0.3984) 
 
-0.1376* 
(0.0016) 
2.7590 
(8.5242) 
 
-0.0171* 
(0.0016) 
6.0484* 
(1.4936) 
 
-0.2197* 
(0.0644) 
1.2948 
(2.998) 
 
0.0291* 
(0.0087) 
-29.8040 
(968.694) 
 
0.0017* 
(0.0002) 
1.4991 
(10.6138) 
 
-0.0143* 
(0.0015) 
Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 9 Output 
Note: The standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Table 5.4 above shows the coefficients of the long run relationship and error correction terms 
in the ARDL models estimations. For the SIC lag selection ARDL model, the coefficients of 
long-run relationship which are positive for all the WAMZ countries are only significant at 
5% level of significance only for The Gambia, Guinea and Nigeria in which there are implied 
long run relationship. Only The Gambia and Guinea exhibit significant long run relationship 
in the estimated fixed lag model. For the error correction model of short run relationship 
estimation results of the SIC lag selection model, all the estimation coefficients are 
significant at 5% level and are negative as expected except for Liberia at 0.0236. The Gambia 
and Guinea exhibit significant long run relationship in the fixed lag ARDL model. Only 
Nigeria displays negative long run coefficient of -29.80. The short run relationship estimation 
results show that with the SIC automatic lag selection ARDL model, all the coefficient are 
significant at 5% level and are negative (as expected) except for the positive figures yielded 
by Liberia and Nigeria for 0.029 and 0.0017 respectively.  
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For the assessment of money neutrality ARDL model discussed above, the outcome of the 
three diagnostic tests for normality, serial correlation and heteroscedasticity of the residuals 
are given in Table 5.5 below. For the SC automatic lag selection model estimations, the 
assumption of normality of the residual holds for all the WAMZ countries (except for Ghana) 
where the Jarque-Bera (JB) statistics are insignificant at 5% level of significance at which we 
could not reject the null hypothesis of normality. 
Table 5.5: Results of Post-Estimation Diagnostic Tests for Monetary Neutrality ARDL Model Estimations 
Schwarz Criterion Automatic Lag Selection ARDL Model 
Tests Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
JB Statistics for 
Normality  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM 
 
White 
Heteroscedasticity  
1.4925 
(0.4741) 
 
0.0036 
(0.9524) 
 
2.0498 
(0.1021) 
6.4186 
(0.0404) 
 
0.3253 
(0.5727) 
 
1.6046 
(0.1914) 
0.5742 
(0.7504) 
 
5.0197 
(0.0372) 
 
1.6757 
(0.1805) 
4.2141 
(0.1216) 
 
0.3701 
(0.5479) 
 
1.9700 
(0.1168) 
0.3251 
(0.8499) 
 
0.7439 
(0.3757) 
 
0.8858 
(0.5520) 
4.2072 
(0.1220) 
 
0.4995 
(0.4865) 
 
2.6135 
(10.0463) 
Fixed Lag Selection ARDL (1,1) Model 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
JB Statistics for 
Normality  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM 
 
White 
Heteroscedasticity 
1.8286 
(0.4008) 
 
0.0069 
(0.9344) 
 
0.3541 
(0.9458) 
6.9352 
(0.0312) 
 
0.3340 
(0.5661) 
 
0.9103 
(0.5324) 
0.2469 
(0.8839) 
 
1.5235 
(0.2314) 
 
2.3788 
(0.0720) 
3.9354 
(0.1400) 
 
0.1833 
(0.6720) 
 
1.7390 
(0.1393) 
1.0623 
(0.5879) 
 
2.5933 
(0.1181) 
 
0.8309 
(0.5949) 
4.3364 
(0.1144) 
 
0.4352 
(0.5147) 
 
1.5433 
(0.1895) 
Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9 Output 
Note: The p-values are in parenthesis. 
 
The deviation from normality of the residual may be caused by the presence of outliers in the 
residual. In the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation test including 2 lags, there is residual 
autocorrelation in the case of Guinea where the null hypothesis of serial correlation is 
rejected. For all other WAMZ countries, there is the absence of serial of the disturbance 
terms. However, for the fixed lag selection model, the null hypothesis of serial correlation 
could not be rejected for all the WAMZ countries.  
Discussions of the Results of the Money Super-neutrality Tests with respect to Inflation: 
Results of the ARDL bounds tests of cointegration of inflation rates and money supply 
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growth results are highlighted in Table 5.6 below for the SC automatic lag selection and the 
fixed lag selection ARDL models. Because the estimated F-statistics obtained from the tests 
are I(1), falling outside the upper bound  for the all the WAMZ countries at 5% significance 
level, we rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegrating relationships between inflation and 
money supply growth rate of all the six WAMZ countries, thus suggesting a long run 
relationship between these variables in the countries. What these results of the two estimated 
ARDL model tell us is that for the WAMZ, money is not ‘long run super-neutral’ across the 
entire future monetary zone. Consequently, growth in money supply can influence inflation 
as a real economic variable in the WAMZ, suggesting that with the future single monetary 
policy, money supply tool can impact the real economy. However, these findings for these 
West African developing economies faulted the views of the ‘classical’ and the ‘neo-
classical’ schools of thought. Again, Liberia recorded the lowest coefficients of F-statistics of 
joint significance in these estimations as established in the earlier results. The coefficients of 
money supply growth and the error correction terms exhibited in Table 5.7 reveal that only 
Guinea and Sierra Leone have significant and positive long run coefficients in the two lag 
selection methods. The ECT coefficients are significant for all the countries at 5% level of 
significance and all negative as theoretically established.  
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Table 5.6: Results of ARDL Bound Tests of the Super-Neutrality of Money  
(Inflation and Money Supply Growth) 
Schwarz Criterion Automatic Lag Selection ARDL Model 
 F-statistics Cointegration (at 95% 
Confidence Level) 
The Gambia (ARDL 1,0) 9.756 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Ghana (ARDL 1,0) 10.1327 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Guinea (ARDL 1,0) 5.1849 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Liberia (ARDL 1,0) 4.8911 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Nigeria (ARDL 1,0) 10.2977 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
S/Leone ARDL 1,0) 20.6803 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Fixed Lag Selection ARDL (1,1) Model 
 F-statistics Cointegration (at 95% 
Confidence Level) 
The Gambia ARDL (1,1) 9.2182 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Ghana ARDL (1,1) 9.9146 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Guinea ARDL (1,1) 8.3989 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Liberia ARDL (1,1) 4.3911 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Nigeria ARDL (1,1) 10.0686 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
S/Leone ARDL (1,1) 23.7039 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
ARDL Critical Values Bounds 
Bounds 1% 2.5% 5% 10% 
Lower Bound  4.94 4.18 3.62 3.02 
Upper Bound 5.58 4.79 4.16 3.51 
                  Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9 Output 
 
Table 5.7: Coefficients of Long Run Relationship and Error-Correction ARDL Models of  
Super-Neutrality of Money (Inflation and Money Supply Growth) 
Schwarz Criterion Automatic Lag Selection ARDL Model 
Dependent Variable: Inflation 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Money Supply Growth 
 (Long Run Coefficient) 
 
Error Correction Term 
(Coint. Coefficient) 
-0.4246 
(0.4773) 
 
-0.9767* 
(0.1820) 
-0.1701 
(0.1904) 
 
-0.9433* 
(0.1673) 
0.2142* 
(0.0717) 
 
-1.8341* 
(0.4384) 
0.0073 
(0.04231) 
 
-0.6900* 
(0.1834) 
-0.1021 
(0.2941) 
 
-1.0261* 
(0.1808) 
0.2137*** 
(0.1228) 
 
-1.4085* 
(0.1068) 
Fixed Lag Selection ARDL (1,1) Model 
Dependent Variable: Inflation 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Money Supply Growth 
 (Long Run Coefficient) 
 
Error Correction Term 
(Coint. Coefficient) 
-0.8343 
(0.6113) 
 
-0.9465* 
(0.1739) 
-0.1533 
(0.2555) 
 
-0.9437* 
(0.1673) 
0.1441** 
(0.0574) 
 
-1.2243* 
(0.2320) 
-0.0161 
(0.0634) 
 
-0.6882* 
(0.1824) 
-0.0265 
(0.3631) 
 
-1.0248* 
(0.4803) 
0.4548** 
(0.2035) 
 
-1.4435* 
(0.1654) 
Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 9 Output 
Note: The standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
The post-estimation diagnostic results in Table 5.8 below reveal that in the SIC automatic lag 
selection estimations, with the statistical significance of the Jarque-Bera (JB) statistics at 5% 
255 
 
level of significance, we rejected the null hypothesis of normality of the residuals in the 
ARDL model estimated for the six WAMZ countries, except Sierra Leone. However, there 
were no evidence of serial correlation in the results generated by the Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation LM tests of all the countries and the null hypothesis that no residual serial 
correlation could not be rejected as the estimated models generated statistical insignificant 
coefficients in this test. The White heteroscedasticity tests results suggested that the variance 
of the error terms differs across observations and the null hypothesis that the variance of the 
residual is constant (homoscedasticity) could not be rejected in cases of the countries 
assessed except only in the case of Ghana.  
Table 5.8: Results of Post-Estimation Diagnostic Tests for ARDL Models of Super-Neutrality of Money 
(Inflation and Money Supply Growth) Estimations 
Schwarz Criterion Automatic Lag Selection ARDL Model 
Tests Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
JB Statistics for 
Normality  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM 
 
White 
Heteroscedasticity  
399.1780 
(0.00) 
 
0.5353 
(0.59) 
 
0.9963 
(0.44) 
117.203 
(0.00) 
 
0.0166 
(0.98) 
 
3.2953 
(0.02) 
23.0540 
(0.00) 
 
0.3627 
(0.70) 
 
3.5081 
(0.40) 
14.0599 
(0.00) 
 
0.6464 
(0.53) 
 
0.1552 
(0.98) 
27.6388 
(0.00) 
 
0.1045 
(0.90) 
 
0.3619 
(0.87) 
2.1249 
(0.31) 
 
1.4401 
(0.25) 
 
0.3702 
(0.86) 
Fixed Lag Selection ARDL (1,1) Model 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
JB Statistics for 
Normality  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM 
 
White 
Heteroscedasticity 
271.3881 
(0.00) 
 
1.0603 
(0.36) 
 
5.2196 
(0.00) 
119.093 
(0.00) 
 
0.0132 
(0.99) 
 
2.8549 
(0.02) 
3.4843 
(0.17) 
 
1.0889 
(0.36) 
 
0.5713 
(0.80) 
11.6190 
(0.00) 
 
0.5565 
(0.58) 
 
0.2113 
(0.99) 
28.2664 
(0.00) 
 
1.5698 
(0.23) 
 
0.5005 
(0.86) 
0.1362 
(0.93) 
 
1.7790 
(0.19) 
 
0.6804 
(0.72) 
Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 9 Output. 
Note: The p-values are in parenthesis. 
When the lag selection was fixed at ARDL (1, 1), we rejected the null hypothesis of normal 
distribution of residuals only for Guinea and Sierra Leone given the insignificance of the tests 
statistics. Again, there were no autocorrelation problems in the estimation as evident by the 
insignificant coefficients yielded by the serial correlation LM tests. Nevertheless, The 
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Gambia and Ghana displayed heteroscedasticity problem in the White heteroscedasticity test 
performed.      
Discussion of the Results of Money Super-neutrality Tests with respect to Real Output 
Growth: Results presented in Table 5.9 below indicate the outcomes of the cointegration 
relationship tests of money supply growth rate and real output growth. The outcome of the 
tests of the estimated SC automatic lag selection ARDL model suggested that apart from 
Liberian’s case in which the test was inconclusive (because the test statistic fell in-between 
the lower and the upper bounds), money is not super-neutral in the WAMZ. When lag lengths 
were fixed and an ARDL (1, 1) was estimated for the six countries, the diagnostic tests reveal 
autocorrelation of the disturbance terms in the cases of The Gambia, Ghana and Liberia. In 
order to eliminate these serial correlations, the lag length of the dependent variable (output 
growth) of the affected countries were increased as shown in Table 5.9. The results under this 
estimation show that the null hypothesis of no long run cointegration could be rejected only 
in the case of Liberia, implying money supernuetrality in the country. These denote that the 
growth rates of money supply in the WAMZ countries (except Liberia) have impacts on 
changes in the real variable (in the five countries). These results have further implications for 
the application of money supply as monetary policy instrument under the future common 
monetary policy by the expected common central bank in the proposed monetary integration. 
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Table 5.9: Results of the ARDL Bound Tests of the Super Neutrality of Money with respect to Real 
Output Growth  
Schwarz Criterion Automatic Lag Selection ARDL Model 
 F-statistics Cointegration (at 95% 
Confidence Level) 
The Gambia (ARDL 2,0) 13.2137 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Ghana (ARDL 1,0) 7.2698 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Guinea (ARDL 1,0) 5.0951 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Liberia (ARDL 1,0) 3.7345 Inconclusive 
Nigeria (ARDL 1,0) 8.2360 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
S/Leone (ARDL 1,0) 9.4097 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Fixed Lag Selection ARDL Model 
 F-statistics Cointegration (at 95% 
Confidence Level) 
The Gambia (ARDL 2,1) 14.3932 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Ghana (ARDL 2,1) 6.3177 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Guinea (ARDL 1,1) 4.4007 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
Liberia (ARDL 2,1) 2.8959 No: Accept null hypothesis 
Nigeria (ARDL 1,1) 6.952 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
S/Leone (ARDL 1,1) 8.2998 Yes: Reject null hypothesis 
ARDL Critical Values Bounds 
Bounds 1% 2.5% 5% 10% 
Lower Bound  4.94 4.18 3.62 3.02 
Upper Bound 5.58 4.79 4.16 3.51 
                  Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9 Output 
 
Table 5.10: Coefficients of Long Run Relationship and Error-Correction (Super Neutrality of Money 
with respect to Real Output Growth) 
Schwarz Criterion Automatic Lag Selection ARDL Model 
Dependent Variable: Real Output Growth 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Money Supply Growth 
 (Long Run Coefficient) 
 
Error Correction Term 
(Coint. Coefficient) 
0.0520*** 
(0.0276) 
 
-17071* 
(0.2513) 
-0.0009 
(0.0381) 
 
-0.7684* 
(0.1674) 
-0.0031 
(0.0089) 
 
-0.9277* 
(0.2438) 
-0.0209 
(0.1703) 
 
-0.5715* 
(0.1580) 
-0.0039 
(0.0995) 
 
-0.8454* 
(0.11789) 
-0.0224 
(0.0613) 
 
-0.8657* 
(0.1754) 
Fixed Lag Selection ARDL Model 
Dependent Variable: Real Output Growth 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Money Supply Growth 
 (Long Run Coefficient) 
 
Error Correction Term 
(Coint. Coefficient) 
0.0629*** 
(0.0366) 
 
-1.7046* 
(0.2503) 
-0.0564 
(0.0421) 
 
-0.7829* 
(0.1735) 
-0.0040 
(0.0144) 
 
-0.9270* 
(0.2432)) 
-0.1255 
(0.2277) 
 
0.5623* 
(0.1823) 
0.0211 
(0.1227) 
 
-0.8439* 
(0.1782) 
-0.1052 
(0.0755) 
 
-0.8934* 
(0.1732) 
Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9 Output 
Note: The standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
The SIC lag selection ARDL model estimation results in Table 5.10 above show that the long 
run relationship coefficients of money supply growth were negative and insignificant for all 
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the WAMZ countries, except for The Gambia where it is positive (0.0520) and significant at 
10% level of significance. The short run error correction term coefficients were negative (as 
expected) and are all significant at 5% level. For the fixed lag ARDL models, all the 
coefficients of money supply growth were insignificant and negative for Ghana, Guinea and 
Nigeria. As expected, the short run relationship error correction term (ECT) coefficients were 
significantly negative for all the WAMZ countries assessed. 
Table 5.11 below show the results of the diagnostic tests of the ARDL models of super-
neutrality of money. As obtained in the results of the diagnostic test of monetary neutrality 
estimations of the SIC lag selection ARDL model, the hypothesis of normality of residual 
was rejected at 5% significance level of J-B statistics in the case of Ghana, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. For the fixed lag ARDL model, we could only reject the null hypothesis of normality 
for Liberia and Nigeria.  
Table 5.11: Results of Post-Estimation Diagnostic Tests for Super Neutrality of Money ARDL Model 
Estimations (Real Output Growth and Money Supply Growth) 
Schwarz Information Criterion Automatic Lag Selection ARDL Model 
Tests Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
JB Statistics for 
Normality  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM 
 
White 
Heteroscedasticity  
1.3940 
(0.50) 
 
0.0943 
(0.91) 
 
 
1.3130 
(0.29) 
10.2970 
(0.00) 
 
5.9848 
(0.01) 
 
 
0.5542 
(0.73) 
2.1190 
(0.35) 
 
0.1933 
(0.83) 
 
 
0.8387 
(0.54) 
219.275 
(0.00) 
 
0.0980 
(0.91) 
 
 
0.1219 
(0.99) 
145.307 
(0.00) 
 
0.8981 
(0.42) 
 
 
0.1471 
(0.98) 
6.1007 
(0.05) 
 
2.4942 
(0.10) 
 
 
0.1085 
(0.99) 
Fixed Lag Selection ARDL (1,1) Model 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
JB Statistics for 
Normality  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM 
 
White 
Heteroscedasticity 
1.5694 
(0.46) 
 
0.1843 
(0.85) 
 
1.6752 
(0.16) 
0.5090 
(0.76) 
 
1.7365 
(0.20) 
 
0.4216 
(0.95) 
1.6759 
(0.43) 
 
0.2943 
(0.75) 
 
1.7864 
(0.16) 
150.5912 
(0.00) 
 
0.0116 
(0.99) 
 
15.1452 
(0.00) 
138.69 
(0.00) 
 
1.0122 
(0.38) 
 
0.1075 
(0.99) 
5.7104 
(0.06) 
 
1.3662 
(0.27) 
 
0.6060 
(0.78) 
Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9 Output. 
Note: The p-values are in parenthesis. 
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On serial correlation tests, there was autocorrelation problem for only Nigeria where the 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM tests (including 2 lags) indicated significance at 5% 
level in both lag selection ARDL models estimations. The null hypothesis of 
heteroscedasticity was rejected only for Nigeria at 5% significance level in the White 
heteroscedasticity diagnostic test conducted for the two lag selection ARDL models 
estimations. White heteroscedasticity test is often seen as general test in which null points to 
the conjecture that the variance of the error term is constant. 
Table 5.12: Results of the Parameter Stability Tests 
Money Neutrality in respect of Real Output 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
CUSUM: 
Schwarz: 
Fixed: 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
CUSUMSQ: 
Schwarz: 
Fixed: 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
NST 
NST 
 
NST 
NST 
 
ST 
NST 
 
ST 
NST 
Money Superneutrality in respect of Output Growth 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
CUSUM: 
Schwarz: 
Fixed: 
 
ST 
NST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
CUSUMSQ 
Schwarz: 
Fixed: 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
NST 
NST 
 
NST 
NST 
 
NST 
NST 
 
ST 
ST 
Money Superneutrality in respect of Inflation Rates 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
CUSUM: 
Schwarz: 
Fixed: 
 
ST 
NST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
NST 
NST 
CUSUMSQ 
Schwarz: 
Fixed: 
 
NST 
NST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
NST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
ST 
ST 
 
NST 
NST 
           Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 9 Output. 
           Note: ST stands for ‘Stable’ while NST denotes ‘Not Stable’.  
           The parameter stability tests were within 5% significance lines 
 
A general important note to make at this point is that long run coefficients in the estimated 
ARDL models were statistically insignificant does not denote misspecification since 
indications of cointegration were revealed in the results of the cointegration bounds tests. If 
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the variables fail to affect each other in the long run, they are doing that in the short run when 
the ECM coefficients are expected to be negative and significant in order to establish the 
model convergence which is indirect connotation of significant long run relationship.  The 
closeness of these ECT coefficients (which should be significant) to -1 is the indication of 
how strong the equilibrium was. For all the estimated ARDL models, the plots of the residual 
stability cumulative sums (CUSUMS) and the cumulative sums of square (CUSUMS SQ) of 
the deviation of the value from targets at 5% significance levels are displayed in Appendix 
5.1 of the thesis report.  These give information about the stability of the estimated models. 
The plots reveal parameter instability (or otherwise) in the ARDL model estimations 
performed.  
In spite of the charts, Table 5.12 above summarises the outcomes of these model parameter 
stability. 
The observation at this point is that for some WAMZ countries in the three categories of 
assessments of money neutrality (and money superneutrality), the SIC automatic lag selection 
procedures performed poorly and failed to fix lags for the independent variables (money 
supply and money supply growth); and due to this, at this point this study discarded with the 
outcomes of the SC automatic lag selection ARDL model estimations and consequently 
draws its major conclusions and inferences from the fixed lag selection ARDL models. The 
implications of the results of the fixed lag model estimations for the WAMZ countries are 
highlighted in Table 5.13 below. 
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Table 5.13: Summary of Outcomes of Money Neutrality and Superneutrality Assessments of the WAMZ 
Money Neutrality 
With respect to: Real Output 
The Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
Not neutral 
Not neutral 
Neutral 
Neutral 
Not neutral 
Not neutral 
Money Superneutrality 
With respect to: Inflation Rate Output Growth 
The Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
Not super-neutral 
Not super-neutral 
Not super-neutral 
Not super-neutral 
Not super-neutral 
Not super-neutral 
Not super-neutral 
Not super-neutral 
Not super-neutral 
Super-neutral 
Not super-neutral 
Not super-neutral 
Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 9 Output. 
 
What these results generally denote for the WAMZ as a monetary zone is that money is 
neither neutral nor super-neutral in the West African monetary union, except for Liberia 
which less than 1% in economic size of the entire monetary zone. What this has an 
implication is that a future common central bank with a single monetary policy for the entire 
monetary zone can through money supply (as monetary policy instrument) affect real 
macroeconomic variables to achieve economic objectives and the stability of the monetary 
zone. 
 
 
5.3 Monetary Reactions  
There is a general monetary theory postulation that a dual relationship exists between 
monetary policy actions and how some variables (real/nominal) develop. What this means is 
that although, monetary policy impacts real and nominal variables (at least in the short run), 
monetary policy actions in themselves are however subject to prior realisation of particular 
variables. Monetary policy reaction functions are therefore estimated to account for that 
relationship. Monetary reaction function is the response of policy instrument to movements in 
fundamental macroeconomic variables of inflation and output gap. This section of the thesis 
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examined monetary reaction in the WAMZ and their similarities among member countries. 
The research question answered here was if there are similarities in the reactions of monetary 
policy instruments to the related economic fundamentals in the WAMZ. Results generated 
from this section have information for the design of a future common monetary policy for the 
proposed monetary union. 
5.3.1 Theory and Models 
A policy rule serves as guidance to monetary policy maker in achieving policy objectives. 
Policy rules describe how the monetary authority adjusts the monetary policy in reaction to 
macroeconomic changes. Within the confines of policy rule, a monetary policy can be 
evaluated to recommend present policy actions and predict future policy actions. There are 
two major forms of monetary policy rules: (i) the optimal monetary rules and (ii) the simple 
monetary rules. Optimal monetary rules are generally derived theoretically through the 
analysis of the optimal behaviour of the central bank within the context of its loss function 
and first order condition of its welfare maximisation, subject to macroeconomic model and 
structural restraints. This form of policy rule reflects the minimum welfare loss, given the 
macroeconomic structure and disturbances variability impacting the economy. Therefore, 
optimal rule is very sensitive to specific assumption underlying the macroeconomic model. 
Simple monetary rules are feedback instrument rules involving monetary instrument’s 
reaction to some microeconomic variables like inflation, output gap, nominal output growth 
deviations, exchange rate movements etc. These intuitively have some bearing with monetary 
policy conduct. A simple monetary rule can further be described as a reaction function which 
directs the policy changes in response to the values and nature of changes and movements in 
some key underlying macroeconomic variables. Such rule prescribes a certain course of 
monetary policy action to follow in monetary policy decisions and these prescriptions serve 
as guide for monetary policy makers when setting the monetary policy instrument. Monetary 
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policy is set exogenously under the policy rule system. This means that policy instruments 
are allowed to react to the appropriate variables (like inflation, output gap). This 
‘exogenously’ simple monetary policy rule attracts interests and attention among academics 
and policy makers than the theoretically derived optimal rule because of its close relationship 
with decisions and operations of the actual monetary policy. Taylor rule, McCallum rule and 
other hybrid versions of these rules are the popular forms of simple policy instrument rules.  
Both Taylor rule (TR) and McCallum rule (MR) are simple feedback monetary instrument 
rules derived from the wealth maximisation first order condition of the central bank, which is 
determined by the economic situation within which monetary policy rules operate (Kahn, 
2012). TR is however, more prominent than McCallum (MR). One reason that could be given 
for this is that monetary authorities in industrial countries focus on interest rate (rather than 
base money growth) in designing their monetary policy (McCallum, 2002). As also observed 
by Cochrane (2007), some central banks got interest in the new Keynesian TR to neglect 
monetary aggregate for interest rate target. Nevertheless, Beck and Weiland (2008) 
emphasise the relevance of monetary base (or some other monetary aggregates) as reasonable 
monetary instruments.  
As a simple policy rule, the Taylor Rule (TR) reflects the reaction of short term interest rate 
to the deviations of inflation from its targets as well as the deviations’ of output from its 
potentials. TR is thus a monetary policy reaction function in which the policy interest rate 
reacts to shocks to inflation and also to shocks to output gap. By the implications of the 
reaction function, the version of Hybrid McCallum Taylor Rule (HMTR) reaction function 
developed and applied in monetary reaction assessments here expresses the money supply 
growth rate a function of the output gap growth and inflation gap growth. The notion behind 
this is that whenever the rate at which output exceeds its potential is rising, this signals 
inflationary pressures and consequently, the monetary authority should reduce the rate of 
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money supply growth in order to accommodate such pressure. Similarly, when the degree at 
which inflation rate deviates from its desire rate is fast, the policymaker should reduce money 
supply growth rate.  
The significance of this monetary reaction study to monetary integration is that the degree of 
homogeneity in monetary reactions of member countries of a monetary union reveals the 
degree of similarity of the aggregated shocks hitting these individual economies. In assessing 
the homogeneity of monetary policies of the WAMZ countries, it is therefore necessary to 
estimate such monetary reaction function equations for these WAMZ countries because there 
are tendencies that the zone’s future monetary policy may deviate from rules when aiming at 
accommodate goals other than price stability and economic growth.  
The WAMZ countries are developing economies. Due to the underdevelopment of financial 
markets (money and capital markets) in the developing/emerging countries, it is common that 
the effect of interest rate on inflation as manifested in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms in these countries are very sluggish and should not have attracted much attention 
being offered by the TR. Moreover, in these developing countries of inflation targeting, 
money aggregate may be playing more pronounced significant roles. For these reasons, 
monetary base aggregate is introduced here as a variable. This is perceived to be a more 
appropriate alternative monetary reaction function for developing countries.93 This novel step 
taken here deviated from methods applied in many extant research studies on monetary 
reactions analyses. The central point of this thinking is that the monetary base could better be 
manipulated to control inflation thus: 
  ∆𝑀𝑡 =  𝛼 - 𝑉𝑡 +  𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑡                                              5.14 
                                                          
93 McCallum (1988)  
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Where ∆𝑀𝑡 is the growth rate of monetary base (𝑀1 ), and 𝑉𝑡is the monetary base velocity 𝛾 
is the parameter indicating how output deviation reach its target value with monetary base 
(which is the policy instrument in this case). If the equation (5.14) is adapted into the TR, it 
becomes the variant hybrid McCallum-Taylor rule (HMTR) modelled as: 
∆𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∆𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑡 + ∆𝑦𝑔𝑡                                      5.15 
In lending weight to the views of Goodhart and Hofman, (2002), because the decision making 
process of the policymaker depends on many economic indicators apart from output gap and 
deviations from inflation, there may be spurious and questionable estimation results if some 
relevant variables are omitted. Therefore, for developing and open economies of the WAMZ 
countries, this study considers the inclusion of the deviations of annual percentage change of 
primary commodity price from its potentials, in the model of monetary policy rules 
considered here. The justification for this is the conjecture that such commodity price 
movements cause huge fluctuations in exchange rates and real economic activity for these 
primary commodity exporting countries. For inflation targeting open economies, the reaction 
function respond first to external disturbances, among a collection of extensive information. 
This brought out the relevance of commodity exports in monetary policy. For the purposes of 
money supply growth rate smoothing and the associated inertia, the HTMR was augmented 
with one-period lagged growth rate of money supply. To this effect, the variables of interest 
for the purpose of assessing the similarities in monetary reactions in the WAMZ in this novel 
contributions are the lagged money supply growth, growth rate of output gap, output gap, 
annual change of inflation deviation from its potentials and the growth rate of the deviation of 
the WAMZ country specific average commodity price from its potential.  
Generally, policymakers make policy decisions based on the evaluation of future economic 
condition rather than contemporaneous condition, even as monetary policy is effective only 
with the incorporation of lags. TR is essentially ‘forward-looking’ if the central bank (CB) as 
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policymaker reacts to some expectations of inflation and output.  CBs are able to establish the 
incorporation of past or current economic condition and the significant inclusion of economic 
forecasts in their macroeconomic policy statements. Some authors have asserted the 
consistency of forward-looking monetary policy reaction functions with observed behaviour 
of CBs.94 Therefore, in order to control for past effects and expectations of the growth rates 
of the variables of interest in the monetary reaction model, their one-period leads and lags 
were added to the right hand side of the model as independent variable. Time trend was 
introduced into account from the pattern of the shift in the equation function and to determine 
across the WAMZ countries, the relevance of time in the determination of the influence of 
independent variable as well as the degree of its impact on annual growth rate of money 
supply.  
5.3.2 Data and Methods  
Given the description of the model of monetary reactions described above, the econometric 
equation estimated for the purpose of achieving the research objectives of this section of the 
thesis is expressed thus: 
∆𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑚𝑝𝑔𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑦𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑡−1 +
𝛾3𝑐𝑚𝑝𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝛿1𝑦𝑔𝑡+1 +  𝛿2𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑡+1 + 𝛿3𝑐𝑚𝑝𝑔𝑡+1 + 𝜃𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                              5.16 
where 𝑇 is the time trend. This model of a monetary reaction estimated reflected the leads 
and lags of the four variables. 𝛽1 is the parameter of the degree of ‘monetary policy inertia’; 
this, in addition to 𝛽2 , 𝛽3  and  𝛽4, are the parameters of interest for monetary reaction 
comparison across the WAMZ. 
Annual data of nominal GDP, inflation rate and money supply for the WAMZ countries as 
well as commodity price index were applied in this evaluation. These data cover the period 
                                                          
94 Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000) and Orhanides (1998) 
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from 1980 to 2014. Nominal GDP and money supply data taken in the local currency units 
were expressed in logarithmic form. Inflation rate was taken as the year-on-year changes in 
inflation calculated with the GDP deflator. The country-specific primary commodity prices 
employed in this work were constructed as the average of the prices of the top three exports 
primary commodities of each country; and the annual percentage change in the average 
commodity price were estimated and applied. In the calculation of the deviations from the 
potential, of nominal GDP, inflation rate and the country-specific commodity prices, the 
Hodrick-Prescot (with lambda (λ) =100 for annual data) filter method was applied to filter the 
potential (trend) from the actual data. To ensure the stationarity of the variables used, the 
ADF unit root tests were carried out at the initial stage. The OLS method was employed in 
estimating the functional form econometric Equation 5.6 towards generating the monetary 
reactions coefficients for the WAMZ countries under assessment. In order to ensure 
parameter stability and avoid bias, inefficient and spurious estimations, some post-estimation 
diagnostic tests were carried out and necessary adjustments made.  
Furthermore, monetary reaction functions across the WAMZ were assessed by applying 
quantile regression (QR) to monthly data spanning between 2000 and 2015 in which nominal 
income gap of the formal economy, inflation deviation from targets, commodity price gap, 
nominal income gap of the informal economy and lagged dependent variable were employed 
as explanatory variable in a model in which the monetary policy instrument of money supply 
is the dependent variable. Specifically, informal nominal GDP figures were generated for the 
WAMZ countries by equating these to be proportions of the formal GDP as exhibited in 
Table 3.1. Commodity price index was calculated specifically for each WAMZ country by 
applying the period-average proportion of the top primary commodity exports of each 
country in the total exports of the country as weight, to commodity price index of the 
categories of primary commodities in which the top export commodity of each country falls. 
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Consequently, the four primary commodity categories involved in these calculations were: (i) 
oil and meals (for The Gambia), (ii) precious metals (for Ghana, Guinea and Liberia), (iii) 
metals and mineral (for Sierra Leone) and (iv) energy (for Nigeria). The econometric 
equation estimated for the monthly data here is expressed thus: 
𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑓𝑦𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑚𝑝𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑛𝑦𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                              5.16 
where is 𝑓𝑦𝑔𝑡 and 𝑛𝑦𝑔𝑡 formal nominal output of the formal and the informal economies 
respectively. As a deviation from the previous assessments of monetary reactions above, 
where annual change variables were applied, this assessment with monthly data made use of 
data at their levels. Quantile regression approach was used in the generating the explanatory 
powers the monetary policy reaction fundamentals in these respects. The following 
paragraphs justify the use of this method. 
In econometric modelling, it is possible not to have predictive or strong relationship between 
the mean of the dependent variable and the independent variable distribution because of 
many factors affecting a dependent variable may be omitted in the modelling. In spite of this, 
there may still be some vital predictive relationship with some other components of the 
dependent variable distribution. Since most regression models analyse the conditional mean 
of the response variable, there are now growing interests in the modelling of other portion of 
the dependent variable conditional mean. Quantile regression is a method that does this by 
modelling the quantiles of the response variables by giving the linear relationship between 
explanatory variable and a given dependent variable quantile. Quantile regression (QR), 
initially developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) allows for the influence of the independent 
variable on the median or other quantiles/percentiles of the dependent variable. It is prudent 
regression method (an alternative to the traditional OLS method) characterised by reduced 
sensitivity to the violation of the classical model assumptions (BLUE- best, linear unbiased 
estimators). A fundamental limitation of the OLS is its concentration on the estimation of 
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mean value of the dependent variable, conditional on the given values of the independent 
variables. The observation is that most of the econometric estimations are averagely based on 
mean, whereas, many variables are characterised by continuous distribution which are bound 
to change (either by compression or expansion) in a way that could not be revealed by the 
analysis of the mean, thus preventing the knowledge of how the whole distribution behaves. 
Quantile regression (QR) attends to this shortcoming by assessing fuller description of the 
conditional distribution of the variables rather than just the conditional mean as we have in 
the OLS method (Gujarati, 2015). The QR approach reveals how median, a measure of 
central tendency (central probability distribution) which as an alternative to mean, is 
impacted by independent variables. The median (or the selected quantile) of the dependent 
variable is estimated conditional on independent variable values in QR but the OLS estimates 
the mean of the dependent variable. While the OLS method finds the regression plane that 
minimises the sum of the square residuals, the QR finds the regression plane that minimises 
the sum of the absolute residuals. In high skewed distribution, the median provides more 
information and is less-sensitive to outliers (unlike the mean).  
The least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator is a special form of QR in which the effects of 
independent variables on different parts (not only the median or the mean) of the dependent 
variable distribution are estimated. This came up because of the distortions of the OLS 
estimates by outliers. LAD guides the effects of outliers as a result of the lower extent of 
sensitivity when compared with the OLS estimations. It reduces the rate at which 
econometricians are concerned with ‘undue influence’ of observation in OLS estimates. The 
objective function of LAD is linear, implying that the LAD objective function would 
increases by one unit as a positive residual increases by one unit; but in contrast there is 
increasing importance given to large residuals by the OLS objective function, thereby making 
OLS to be more sensitive to outlying observations (Wooldridge, 2014). The less-sensitivity of 
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LAD to data extreme value changes (compared to the OLS) caused LAD not to give 
increasing weight to disturbance terms that are larger. The design of LAD is in a way that it 
estimates parameters of the conditional median (rather than the conditional mean) of the 
dependent variable, given the independent variables. This buttresses the fact that LAD are 
resilient to outliers since large changes in outliers have no effects on the median. These 
justify the advantage of LAD over the OLS in that partial effects (predictions) can be 
obtained easily, particularly, when data are transformed.  
The conditional quantile function is the basic underlying principle of the quantiles of the QR 
model (which can model any quantile). The approach requires no strong distributional 
assumption about the disturbance term unlike the requirements of error term normality in the 
OLS modelling. Quantiles indicates where an observation lies within an ordered series of 
dependent variable. The median is at the middle, 25th percentile (for instance) is lower in 
value and below the median (which is the 50th percentile).  
To filter the potential (trend) from the actual monthly data on nominal GDP (formal and 
informal) and the commodity price index, the Hodrick-Prescot (with lambda (λ) =14,400 for 
monthly data) filter method was employed. As the first step, the ADF unit root tests were 
performed for these monthly variables involved.  
5.3.3 Results and Findings 
Table 5.14 below, reflects the outcomes of the ADF unit roots tests on the variables 
employed in this section of the chapter. The results reveal that at 5% level of significance, 
inflation gap and commodity price gaps were stationary at their levels. For five WAMZ 
countries (excluding Nigeria), output gap is stationary, but made stationary for Nigeria at the 
second order differencing.  
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Table 5.14: Results of the ADF Unit Roots Tests of Monetary Reaction Variables 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
∆Money Supply 
 (Level): 
 (1st Difference): 
 
-6.9600* 
 
 
-5.3255* 
 
 
-5.9122* 
 
 
-3.030** 
-7.5763* 
 
-3.3691** 
-8.1889* 
 
-5.4827* 
 
∆Nominal Output Gap 
 (Level): 
(1st Difference): 
  (2nd Difference): 
 
-6.4725* 
 
 
-5.6319* 
 
 
-3.8685* 
 
 
-5.3692* 
 
-2.5475 
-2.7687*** 
5.6281* 
 
-5.2661* 
 
∆Inflation Gap 
 (Level): 
 
-6.4505* 
 
-4.6722* 
 
-3.7486* 
 
-5.5274* 
 
-6.6187* 
 
-5.6038 
∆Commodity Price Gap 
 (Level): 
 
-6.6687* 
 
-6.3313* 
 
-6.2279* 
 
-6.3313* 
 
-6.1138* 
 
-6.3313* 
Critical Values of ADF Unit Roots Test 
1% 5% 10% 
-3.9591 -3.0810 -2.6813 
Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 7 Output 
Note: For the unit roots tests *, ** and ** denote 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively.  
Table 5.15: Results of the Estimation of the Augmented HMTR Monetary Reactions  
Dependent Variable: ∆Money Supply  
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
∆Money Supply(t-1) 
∆Output Gap 
∆Inflation Gap 
∆Commodity Price Gap 
∆Output Gap(t-1) 
∆Inflation Gap(t-1) 
∆Comm. Price Gap(t-1) 
∆Output Gap(t+1) 
∆Inflation Gap(t+1) 
∆Comm. Price Gap(t+1) 
Time Trend 
 
R2 
DW-Statistics 
F-Statistics 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
JB Statistics for 
Normality  
 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Autocorrelation  
 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Heteroscedasticity 
 
Ramsey-RESET 
Functional Form 
-0.2613 
0.9122* 
-0.9497 
0.0049 
0.2237 
-0.2462 
-0.0141 
-0.0207 
0.2300 
-0.0044 
0.0004 
 
0.88 
1.57 
13.7778 
(0.00) 
 
5.8675 
(0.05) 
 
3.1045 
(0.08) 
 
12.2058 
(0.35) 
 
0.0909 
(0.93) 
-0.2962*** 
-0.0006 
-0.3213* 
0.0890 
-0.0081 
-0.1690*** 
0.0969 
0.0699 
-0.1552 
0.0491 
0.0025 
 
0.57 
2.19 
2.4358 
(0.04) 
 
2.5983 
(0.27) 
 
3.9608 
(0.05) 
 
11.6859 
(0.39) 
 
1.1924 
(0.25) 
-0.7033** 
0.7538* 
-0.8478* 
0.0216*** 
0.4696 
-0.5078 
0.0147 
-0.2097 
0.1413 
0.0174*** 
-0.0009* 
 
0.88 
1.42 
9.6011 
(0.00) 
 
0.3791 
(0.83) 
 
3.3809 
(0.07) 
 
14.0756 
(0.23) 
 
1.4723 
(0.16) 
-0.4141*** 
0.0210 
0.5450 
-0.0309 
-0.1101 
0.6177 
-0.0812 
0.1561** 
-1.0753 
-0.1258 
-0.000 
 
0.47 
2.20 
1.5283 
(0.20) 
 
14.6123 
(0.00) 
 
1.3028 
(0.25) 
 
4.7036 
(0.94) 
 
0.3498 
(0.73) 
-0.3121 
-0.0689 
-0.0403 
-0.0624 
-0.0441 
-0.0122 
-0.0352 
0.0007 
-0.0050 
-0.0244 
-0.0009 
 
0.29 
2.07 
0.6717 
(0.75) 
 
0.0953 
(0.95) 
 
0.5218 
(0.47) 
 
8.2562 
(0.69) 
 
1.6656 
(0.11) 
0.4103*** 
0.8400* 
-0.9494* 
0.0517 
-0.2811 
0.3529 
0.0465 
-0.0263 
0.0661 
0.0561 
0.0015 
 
0.80 
1.83 
7.4914 
(0.00) 
 
0.7932 
(0.67) 
 
0.1796 
(0.67) 
 
12.5194 
(0.53) 
 
0.6867 
(0.50) 
Source: Author’ Estimation and EViews 7 Output 
Note: *, ** and ** denote 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively. The p-values are in parentheses. 
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The estimations of the augmented HMTR models exhibited in Table 5.15 above show that the 
leads and lags of output gap, inflation gaps and commodity price gaps are generally not 
statistically significant at 5% level. It is also apparent that apart from the statistical 
significance at 10% of commodity price gap, only in the case of Guinea, this variable is not 
significant in other cases. These insignificant variables were consequently deleted from the 
model of HMTR.  
Following the deletion of the insignificant variables from the earlier estimated model, in a 
consequential HMTR model estimated, the results in Table 5.16 below indicate that output 
gap coefficients are positive for all countries apart from the coefficient for Nigeria, while 
inflation gap coefficients displayed negative signs for all the WAMZ countries. The 
coefficients of determination (R2) measuring the goodness of fit of the model are low in three 
countries. The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics testing serial correlation were reasonably 
good. However, the closeness to 2 of the DW statistics might be as a result of distortions 
caused by the inclusion of lagged dependent variable (lagged money supply growth) in the 
model. The post-estimation diagnostic tests however showed that The Gambia, Ghana and 
Liberia failed the essential residual normality tests as revealed by the significance at 5% level 
of significance of J-B statistics and there is serial correlation in the case of Guinea. The 
functional form Regression Error Specification Test (RESET) is significant at 5% level, only 
for Liberia, thus suggesting non-linearity of the explanatory variables. Multicollinearity 
checks were performed with the estimation of the variance inflation factors (VIF) which 
revealed some collinearity, following the standard in which a VIF of more than the value of 4 
calls for further analysis while a VIF of greater than 10 signals high level of collinearity.  
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Table 5.16: HMTR Monetary Reactions Augmented (with money supply growth smoothing and time 
trend) 
Dependent Variable: ∆Money Supply  
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
∆Money Supply(t-1) 
∆Output Gap 
∆Inflation Gap 
∆Time Trend 
 
R2 
DW-Statistics 
F-Statistics 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
JB Statistics for Normality  
 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Autocorrelation  
 
 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Heteroscedasticity 
 
Ramsey-RESET 
Functional Form 
 
Variance Inflation Factors: 
∆Money Supply(t-1) 
Output Gap 
Inflation Gap 
-0.0307 
0.9038* 
-0.9433* 
0.0002 
 
0.86 
2.15 
45.0620 
(0.00) 
 
6.5787 
(0.04) 
 
0.5115 
(0.47) 
 
7.7089 
(0.13) 
 
0.0054 
(0.94) 
 
 
1.928 
30.535 
33.937 
-0.1192 
0.0034 
-0.1928* 
0.0020** 
 
0.35 
1.77 
3.785 
(0.01) 
 
7.4332 
(0.02) 
 
0.0187 
(0.89) 
 
2.1732 
(0.70) 
 
0.0045 
(0.95) 
 
 
1.197 
1.161 
1.127 
-0.2442** 
0.9461* 
-1.0108* 
-0.0007 
 
0.80 
2.53 
22.6849 
(0.00) 
 
2.7208 
(0.26) 
 
3.4044 
(0.07) 
 
3.1987 
(0.53) 
 
1.7502 
(0.20) 
 
 
1.821 
40.977 
42.791 
0.3538*** 
0.0625 
-0.5109 
0.0057 
 
0.35 
2.06 
3.7344 
(0.01) 
 
7.8234 
(0.02) 
 
0.2122 
(0.65) 
 
3.8302 
(0.43) 
 
9.2321 
(0.00) 
 
 
1.795 
1.460 
1.117 
0.3878** 
-0.0423 
-0.0592 
0.0011 
 
0.31 
1.98 
3.0973 
(0.03) 
 
0.9882 
(0.61) 
 
0.6623 
(0.42) 
 
5.5550 
(0.23) 
 
0.4331 
(0.52) 
 
 
1.250 
3.238 
3.522 
0.1839** 
0.9025* 
-1.0128* 
0.0020 
 
0.75 
1.65 
21.2541 
(0.00) 
 
1.4346 
(0.49) 
 
1.4075 
(0.24) 
 
0.6275 
(0.96) 
 
1.2642 
(0.27) 
 
 
1.372 
29.998 
26.835 
Source: Author’ Estimation and EViews 7 Output 
Note: *, ** and ** denote 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively. The p-values are in parentheses. 
 
In proffering solution to problems detected by the post-estimation diagnostic tests, firstly, 
there were checks on the residual plots of The Gambia, Ghana and Liberia in efforts to attend 
to the related non-normality of the disturbance terms. These revealed some outliers. These 
outliers were removed and the model of monetary reaction was re-estimated, resulting in 
outcomes in Table 5.17 below.  
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Table 5.17: Adjusted HMTR Monetary Reactions Augmented  
(with monetary growth smoothing and time trend) 
Dependent Variable: ∆Money Supply  
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
∆Money Supply(t-1) 
∆Output Gap 
∆Inflation Gap 
Time Trend 
 
R2 
DW-Statistics 
F-Statistics 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
JB Statistics for Normality  
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Autocorrelation  
 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Heteroscedasticity 
 
Ramsey-RESET 
Functional Form 
 
Variance Inflation Factors: 
∆Money Supply(t-1) 
Output Gap 
Inflation Gap 
-0.0675 
0.9425* 
-0.9799* 
-0.001 
 
0.97 
1.61 
181.0444 
(0.00) 
 
0.3882 
(0.82) 
 
0.0916 
(0.76) 
 
4.1098 
(0.39) 
 
0.5678 
(0.46) 
 
 
1.1173 
13.5314 
13.1822 
-0.0799 
0.01552 
-0.2033* 
0.0009 
 
0.56 
1.51 
8.0833 
(0.00) 
 
5.2736 
(0.07) 
 
2.2842 
(0.13) 
 
2.4155 
(0.66) 
 
3.5085 
(0.07) 
 
 
1.6335 
1.2732 
1.3019 
-0.2442** 
0.9461* 
-1.0108* 
-0.0007 
 
0.80 
2.53 
22.6849 
(0.00) 
 
2.7208 
(0.26) 
 
3.4044 
(0.07) 
 
3.1987 
(0.53) 
 
1.7502 
(0.20) 
 
 
1.821 
40.977 
42.791 
0.5846* 
-0.0625* 
0.2250 
0.0018 
 
0.80 
1.02 
21.4489 
(0.00) 
 
0.3591 
(0.84) 
 
1.5853 
(0.21) 
 
4.4371 
(0.35) 
 
0.5207 
(0.48) 
 
 
7.5338 
6.4400 
1.5518 
0.3582** 
-0.0477 
0.0175 
0.0011 
 
0.33 
1.91 
3.3203 
(0.02) 
 
3.8664 
(0.14) 
 
0.1594 
(0.69) 
 
3.7520 
(0.44) 
 
0.6581 
(0.52) 
 
 
1.252 
1.360 
1.330 
0.1839** 
0.9025* 
-1.0128* 
0.0020 
 
0.75 
1.65 
21.2541 
(0.00) 
 
1.4346 
(0.49) 
 
1.4075 
(0.24) 
 
0.6275 
(0.96) 
 
1.2642 
(0.27) 
 
 
1.372 
29.998 
26.835 
Source: Author’ Estimation and EViews 7 Output 
Note: *, ** and ** denote 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively. p-values are in parentheses. 
 
The results failed to reveal similarities in monetary reactions across the WAMZ. The output 
gap reactions were negative for Liberia and Nigeria, while inflation gap coefficients were 
significantly negative for four WAMZ countries (The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra 
Leone); and For output gaps and inflation gaps, the magnitudes of reactions were 
significantly higher for The Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. These depicts similarities just 
in three countries of the WAMZ. What these means is that holding inflation gap and the 
effects of past money supply constant, for an increase by one unit of output gap, the change is 
expected to be positive in the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone (but negative in the 
case of Liberia and Nigeria). On the other hand, if inflation gap increases by one (holding the 
output gap and the money supply growth inertia constant), money supply growth would be 
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positive for Liberia and Nigeria, and negative for The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra 
Leone. These changes would all be at the magnitude of the parameter coefficients yielded in 
Table 5.17 above. The low coefficients of time trends across all the WAMZ countries suggest 
that time is not important in the determination of the impact of output gap and inflation gap 
(including the effect of past money supply growth) on contemporaneous money supply 
growth. However, the statistical insignificance in these results were not overlooked as they 
imply the level of confidence with which inferences are drawn here. 
The results of the diagnostic tests showed tremendous improvement over what were reported 
by the earlier estimation. However, with the VIFs in 40s, 20s and 10s, The Gambia, Guinea 
and Sierra Leone still failed the multicollinearity tests evidencing high degree of inflation of 
the variances of the estimated coefficients of output gaps and inflation gaps as well as 
correlation between these two independent variables. Solving these problems at this level, the 
‘centring’ solution was made in which the respective mean of output gaps and inflation gaps 
for these three countries were calculated and new variables of output gap and inflation gap 
generated as the deviation of the original value of these variables from the calculated mean 
value. These efforts yielded no different results. 
Estimations with Monthly Data: For the estimation of the monthly data of monetary 
reactions in the WAMZ, the results of the initial PP unit root (with constant) tests of the 
variables involved are exhibited in Table 5.18 below where is evident that money supply 
variable for The Gambia, and Sierra Leone all the response variables for all the WAMZ 
countries were stationary at their levels. 
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Table 5.18: Results of the PP Unit Roots Tests of Monetary Reaction Variables (Monthly Data) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Money Supply 
 (Level): 
 (1st Difference): 
(2nd Difference) 
 
-4.392* 
 
-2.132 
-3.968* 
 
-1.130 
-3.414* 
 
-0.330 
-2.364 
-13.504* 
 
1.794 
-1.738 
-13.889* 
 
-2.605*** 
-2.768*** 
 
Nominal Output Gap 
 (Level): 
 
-2.909** 
 
-2.713*** 
 
-2.796*** 
 
-3.201** 
 
-3.513* 
 
-3.499* 
Shadow Nominal Output Gap: 
 (Level): 
 
-3.981* 
 
-6.063* 
 
-3.260** 
 
-2.999** 
 
-4.101* 
 
-2.896** 
Inflation Deviation 
 (Level): 
 
-3.093** 
 
-3.258* 
 
-3.223** 
 
-3.440* 
 
-3.417* 
 
-4.763* 
Commodity Price Gap 
 (Level): 
 
-3.721 
 
-4.255* 
 
-4.255* 
 
-4.255* 
 
-4.040* 
 
-3.580* 
Critical Values of PP Unit Roots Test 
1% 5% 10% 
-3.4646 -2.8765 -2.5748 
Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 7 Output 
Note: For the unit roots tests *, ** and *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively.  
The outcome of the quantile regression estimations of the month data were as highlighted in 
Table 5.19 below to clearly show if there are similarities in the nature of monetary reactions 
and if the theoretically postulated signs were yielded by the monetary policy fundaments 
incorporated into the model  variables.  
The use of QR estimation method for monetary reactions here enabled varieties of results. 
Although, the method allows for the estimation results at various quantile points, this study 
limited itself to two quantiles (0.25 and 0.75) and the median. In Table 5.19, the bootstraps 
coefficients of monetary reactions generated for the six WAMZ countries are reported at the 
estimated quantiles and the median. Generally, the results revealed that the signs and the 
magnitude of monetary reactions across the WAMZ were not similar in some respects apart 
from the lagged variable of the policy instrument applied here, money supply. In the WAMZ 
countries, while some reported fundamentals induced monetary expansion, some others 
propelled the contraction of money supply. 
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Table 5.19: Results of Monetary Reactions Model Estimations of the WAMZ Countries  
(2000-2015 Monthly Data) 
Nominal Output Gap (Formal Economy) 
 25th Quantile 
Bootstrap Coefficients 
50th Quantile 
Bootstrap Coefficients 
75th Quantile 
Bootstrap Coefficients 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.303* 
0.056 
0.425 
0.899 
0.079 
0.105 
-1.101* 
0.420* 
-0.551* 
-1.969 
0.070 
-0.517* 
-0.6704* 
0.625* 
-0.466* 
-2.047* 
1.532** 
-0.537 
Nominal Output Gap (Informal Economy) 
 25th Quantile 
Bootstrap Coefficients 
50th Quantile 
Bootstrap Coefficients 
75th Quantile 
Bootstrap Coefficients 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.087 
-1.65* 
-0.602 
-3.618 
-0.984 
0.798** 
-0.222** 
-0.865* 
-0.502 
-0.095 
0.092 
-0.576 
-0.026* 
-0.621** 
-0.352*** 
-0.030** 
1.429 
-0.950 
Inflation 
 25th Quantile 
Bootstrap Coefficients 
50th Quantile 
Bootstrap Coefficients 
75th Quantile 
Bootstrap Coefficients 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
1.241* 
0.057 
0.864* 
0.415 
0.307* 
0.035 
0.778* 
-0.02 
0.764* 
0.917 
-0.138** 
0.112 
0.457* 
-0.096** 
0.926* 
0.945* 
-0.952* 
0.071* 
Commodity Price 
 25th Quantile 
Bootstrap Coefficients 
50th Quantile 
Bootstrap Coefficients 
75th Quantile 
Bootstrap Coefficients 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.005* 
0.020* 
0.457*** 
0.496 
0.051 
0.097* 
0.024** 
0.048 
-0.259* 
-0.066 
0.016 
-0.122* 
0.036 
-0.043 
-0.303*** 
-0.00 
0.021 
-0.094* 
Lagged Money Supply 
 25th Quantile  50th Quantile  75th Quantile  
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.913* 
0.987* 
0.944* 
1.034* 
0.955* 
0.970* 
0.911* 
0.994* 
0.930* 
0.929* 
0.966* 
0.807* 
0.895* 
0.991* 
0.952* 
0.937* 
1.034* 
0.975* 
         Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 10 output. 
          Note: For the unit roots tests *, ** and *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively.  
 
For nominal output of the formal economy, signs of coefficient generated by most WAMZ 
countries at the median and 0.75 quantile were distinct from those positive and insignificant 
coefficients generated by at 0.25 quantile (apart from The Gambia). Most informal economy 
output gaps coefficients were negative, though not statistically significant for some of these 
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countries. Inflations coefficients were all statistically significant at 5% level only at the 75% 
quantile. The one-period lagged money supply variable (incorporated into the monetary 
reaction model as policy inertia) yielded closely-similar positive coefficients of reactions and 
were all significant at 1% for all the WAMZ countries. This asserted the strong influence of 
past money supply and past monetary policy actions on current monetary policies in the 
WAMZ. As established by other variables, the reactions of commodity prices were 
dissimilar, with different signs and magnitude, and were not significant in most cases. 
Because of the size of the Nigerian economy in the WAMZ as well as the possibility of 
building the future common monetary policy of the monetary zone around Nigeria, it is 
significantly necessary to pay specific attention to the results of monetary reactions of 
Nigeria in these estimations. In this respect, the only pleasant results here are from inflation 
across for the median and quantiles 0.25 and 0.75. Although, these coefficients were positive 
at 0.25, but yielded negative signs at the median and 0.75 quantile. These have implications 
for inflation targeting and policy objectives of the future common central bank of the WAMZ 
because increase in inflation rates would easily induce the common monetary authority to 
contract money supply by the magnitude approximate to the coefficient generated by Nigeria 
in this respect. 
Diagnostic tests of the quantile and median coefficients and residuals of the QR were 
performed to test the symmetries in quantiles and slope equality, and normality of the 
regression residuals. The Newly-Powell test of conditional symmetry, the Koenker-Bassett 
test of quantile slope equality and the Jarque-Bera normality tests were carried out in these 
respects. The coefficient diagnostic tests were performed across the median and two quantile 
around the median (0.25 and 0.75) and thereafter compared with median specification. The 
Wald F-statistics of the symmetric quantile test is to test if the average value of the 
coefficient for symmetric quantiles around the median equals to the value of the median 
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coefficient. This is the conditional symmetry here. The results of these test were as exhibited 
in Table 5.20 below.  
Table 5.20: Results of the Coefficient and Residual Diagnostic Tests of the Quantile Regressions 
Symmetric Quantile Test Results 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Wald F-statistics: 
(Prob): 
2.36 
(0.88) 
5.45 
(0.49) 
10.52 
(0.11) 
23.76 
(0.00) 
18.57 
(0.00) 
13.23 
(0.04) 
Quantile Slope Equality Test Results 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Wald F-statistics: 
 (Prob): 
15.91 
(0.10) 
51.12 
(0.00) 
20.37 
(0.03) 
28.30 
(0.00) 
24.68 
(0.00) 
51.27 
(0.00) 
Residual Normality Tests 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
J-B Statistics: 
 (Prob): 
17.13 
(0.00) 
29.37 
(0.00) 
28.48 
(0.00) 
30.21 
(0.00) 
56.37 
(0.00) 
15.91 
(0.00) 
Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 10 
From the QR for the WAMZ countries, this test revealed Wald statistics that are significant at 
1% for Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. These denote strong evidence of asymmetries with 
the median coefficients for these countries. The insignificant coefficients for The Gambia, 
Ghana and Guinea exhibit symmetry which implies little evidence of departure of the 
quantile coefficients generated for these countries from the median. The results of the Wald 
tests for slope equality showed that apart from The Gambia, the F-statistics were significant 
for the other five WAMZ countries at 5% level of significance, thus yielding evidences to 
infer that that coefficients generated for these five countries differ across quantile values. The 
conditional quantiles are not identical, implying that the quantile regression for the five 
countries provided estimates that are superior to estimation procedures that assume that the 
forecast error are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) random variables. The Jarque-
Bera statistic for tests for residual normality were all significant at 5% level for all the 
WAMZ countries. This is an indication of that the residuals of the regressions models were 
not normally distributed. 
The main findings of annual data estimations in this section is that monetary reactions in the 
WAMZ are only significantly similar around The Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone (at 
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similar magnitude) higher than those of the dissimilar results of the other three countries  
(Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria) where we can infer relationships with very low level of 
confidence. On the other hand, the monetary reactions results generated from the higher 
frequency monthly data estimations with quantile regression revealed mixed monetary 
reactions and lack of homogeneity to some extents in this respect. On the overall, the 
monetary reaction assessments here produced evidences to suggest that it may take long term 
adjustment for a single monetary policy to be suitable for all the six countries at a time. All 
things being equal and if past behaviour of the macroeconomic variables evaluated for the 
WAMZ countries are factors to reckon with, single monetary policy may not be suitable for 
the future monetary zone, given the diverse forms of reaction of the monetary policy 
instrument to inflation and output as revealed by the preferred and more reliable higher 
frequency monthly data. 
 
5.4 Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions 
The making of monetary policy and fiscal policy are two distinct functions of government. 
While monetary policy action relates to how a central bank controls nominal interest rates 
and money supply to impact economic conditions, fiscal policy is about the decision of 
government to raise revenue (tax) and about how proceeds from revenues are to be spent. The 
contention here lies in the conflicts of the objectives and targets of these policies and their 
instruments as well as the coordination of the two policies. Two major factors highlighted as 
the causes of the non-alignments in the two policies are: (1) policy’s institutional structure; 
and (2) the credibility of the principal actors. These (and other factors) make the interactions 
of the two policies of government to be cloudy and more complex in the cases of monetary 
unions. As already indicated, the loss of monetary independence is a cost of joining a 
monetary union. If a monetary union is to be successful, price stability of member state 
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should be made paramount. However, with the loss of monetary powers at national levels, 
fiscal policy remains the only instrument available at national levels to maintain price 
stability. The loss of monetary sovereignty thus increases the potential role of fiscal policy as 
instrument of economic output stabilisation. The effectiveness of fiscal policy (in 
counteracting asymmetric and real economic shocks) is a strong determinant of the success of 
a monetary union. 
In a monetary union, respective objectives and functions of common monetary policy and 
several national fiscal policies are clearly specified. Usually, the primary objective of a 
monetary union’s monetary policy is the maintenance of price stability within the area 
covered by such monetary integration. On fiscal policy side, individual national authority is 
responsible for the commitment towards ensuring sound public finance, even if there are 
formal laid-down framework for fiscal coordination and other fiscal policy requirements 
across the monetary union. Towards the achievement of the overall goals of a monetary 
union, it is necessary for monetary and fiscal policies to interact well. One of the instance of 
monetary policy interactions with the fiscal policy is when a well formulated monetary policy 
(with its focus on price stability) promotes the stability of inflation expectations and ensures 
the achievement of low inflation risks premia. These together assist in reducing the level of 
long term interest rates and its volatility which in turn, benefits government’s debt servicing 
costs. On the other hand, there are effects of fiscal policy on monetary policy when the 
supply side of the economy is shaped by tax regime adopted or when long term interest rate is 
influenced through public debt, making the demand side effect of fiscal policy to directly be 
on inflation outlook. Nevertheless, there are complications and complexities arising out of 
these owing to the feature of monetary unions in which there is a single monetary policy for 
many fiscal policies. 
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The formation of a monetary union (or the plan to form a monetary union) would raise some 
question about the combination of (and co-ordination of) monetary policy and fiscal policy as 
well as the determination of the optimal mix of the two economic policies. Member countries 
of such monetary union (or prospective monetary union), each with its own fiscal spending 
and revenue policy, are (will be) joined together by a single monetary policy in countries with 
varied population of private economic agents. Crucial questions that come to mind are: (a) if 
such common monetary policy has (or will have) same impact in each of the member 
countries; (b) if the effects on these countries would be according to their degree of public 
debts and sizes of these countries; and (c) how the separate fiscal policies affect (or will 
affect) the ability of the common central bank to control inflation and achieve its inflation 
targeting objective.  
In spite of all these, a major issue of concern is that in a monetary union, national 
governments face a budget constraints and their decision-making is based on national 
variables while the supra monetary institution focuses on union-wide average variables. This 
makes the reaction of national governments to monetary policy and supply shocks not 
univocal. The main objective of this subsection of this chapter is the investigation of the form 
of the mix of monetary and fiscal policy that has sharpened the past across the WAMZ. These 
questions and concerns necessitate the investigation of policy mix in a monetary union 
member countries (or proposed member countries) in order to reveal in the economic regime 
is monetary dominant or fiscal dominant. 
5.4.1 Theory and Models  
Leeper (1991) classified the behaviours of fiscal and monetary authorities as portrayed by the 
theories in two forms (as further reflected in Leeper (1999)). These are (i) ‘passive 
behaviour’ and (ii) ‘active behaviour’. In general terms, Leeper (2016) connotes ‘active’ as a 
situation where the policy authority has the freedom to pursue its objective while ‘passive’ 
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means the policy authority generates constraints through the active authority’s behaviour and 
the price sector. These are from his view-points of his Fiscal Theory of Price Leve (FTPL), 
highlighting the two fundamental basic tasks of macroeconomic policies as: (i) the 
determination of inflation; and (ii) ensuring debt stability. Leeper (2016) stressed the two 
different mixes of the interplay of monetary and fiscal behaviours that can guarantee the 
delivery of these two fundamental tasks as: (a) active monetary policy with passive fiscal 
policy; and (b) active fiscal policy with passive monetary policy. Under aggressive inflation 
targeting regime (like in monetary unions), the policy combination of active monetary policy 
and passive fiscal policy (depicting monetary dominance) is appropriately necessary because 
under such policies combination, fiscal policy shocks would not be able to affect the price 
level. Simply put, under such regime, central bank raises nominal interest rate sharply 
whenever inflation rises (by the determination of inflation/price level) and then inform fiscal 
authority to ensure that whenever government debt rises, it should raise budget surpluses in 
future in order to finance that debt (in debt stabilisation). When active fiscal policy is 
combined with passive monetary policy, policy makers set surplus largely independent of the 
levels of government debt and inflation condition. The fiscal behaviour eventually determines 
the price level. Debt would then be stabilised when the monetary authority allows the surprise 
changes in inflation and prices of bonds to adjust the value of government debt (revaluation 
of government debt). This results into government debt’s market value being equal to the 
present value of future surplus. Here, the monetary authority does not attempt at fighting 
inflation. 
Monetary Regime (or M-Regime) and Fiscal Regime (or F-Regime) are the two regimes 
borne out of the summary of Leeper’s propositions of the mix of the policies, described as 
‘consistent with a determinant equilibrium’. The equilibrium in the M-Regime relates to the 
conventional assignment of the two tasks of monetary control of inflation (for monetary 
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policy) and fiscal assurance of government solvency (for fiscal policy). This is believed to be 
a common model of central bank. The assignment of the two tasks is flipped in the F-Regime 
in which monetary policy is tasked with debt stabilisation and the price level determination is 
left with fiscal policy, thus altering the roles of the two policies. Table 5.21 below 
summarises the policies mix of price level determination and debt stabilisation. 
Table 5.21: The Regimes of Two-Policy Mix of Price Determination and Debt Stabilisation 
 The Nature of M-Regime The Nature of F-Regime 
Monetary Policy Actions In targeting inflation, nominal 
interest rate is raised more than 
one-for-one with inflation. 
In response to inflation, nominal 
interest rate is weakly adjusted in 
order to ensure that debt is not 
destabilised by interest payments 
on government debts. 
Fiscal Policy Actions Revenues (taxes) are raised when 
there is enough increase in real 
government debt to cover real 
debt services and eventually retire 
the increase in the principal value 
of debt. 
Revenues (taxes) are made 
irresponsive to the state of 
government indebtedness and 
price level. 
Label Active monetary policy and 
passive fiscal policy. 
Monetary Dominance 
Active fiscal policy and passive 
monetary policy. 
Fiscal Dominance 
      Source: Leeper, (2016) 
The central point being stressed by Leeper’s the active/passive framework is that there are 
different ways of determining the price levels, given the parameters of monetary and fiscal 
policy. In the M-Regime of active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy, the 
determination of the price level is governed by the quantity theory of money or the New 
Keynesian view of monetary policy, while in the F-Regime of active fiscal policy and passive 
monetary policy, the FTPL governs the determination of the price level. A very crucial and 
important to state that in both regimes, stability emanates from a passive policy that can 
accommodate the policy actions taken by the active authority. It is therefore necessary for an 
inflation targeting central bank to be confident that the behaviour of fiscal policy would be 
‘passive’. Nevertheless, a vital point to note (particularly, in cases of monetary unions) is that 
the control of inflation by monetary policy requires the appropriate support/backing of fiscal 
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policy, hence the need for the policies to interact well in order to achieve the two 
macroeconomic goals and avert economic crisis.  
Leeper’s model sees monetary policy goal as ‘guiding inflation towards its target’. Therefore, 
a monetary policy is active when it is tight, contractionary and if the policy decisions guide 
inflation to its target. Monetary policy is passive when there is divergence from inflation 
target. On fiscal side, fiscal policy is active when it is loose, expansionary and allows budget 
deficit higher than the sustainable budget deficit; but passive when the policy is tight, 
contractionary and ensures long term equilibrium. What is drawn from these is the distinction 
in the domination of the economy – (monetary domination or fiscal domination). Table 5.22 
reveals the clear distinction between a monetary dominance and fiscal dominance regimes. 
Table 5.22: Distinction between Monetary Dominance and Fiscal Dominance 
Monetary Dominance (M-
Regime): 
*Fiscal policy exhibits 
‘Ricardian equivalence’; 
*Monetary policy follows 
its inflation target path. 
 
Active Monetary 
Policy 
Monetary authority pursues its inflation target 
independent of fiscal policies. 
Tight, contractionary monetary policy 
Passive Fiscal 
Policy 
Fiscal authority determines tax and spending levels, 
independent of GIBC consideration. 
Loose and expansionary fiscal policy 
Fiscal Dominance (F-
Regime): 
*Fiscal policy exhibits 
‘non-Ricardian 
equivalence; 
*Fiscal policy significantly 
affects inflation and price 
stability; 
*Monetary policy ensures 
public debt stability; 
FTPL holds. 
Active Fiscal 
Policy 
Fiscal authority effects tax and expenditure changes in 
order to balance the budget intertemporaly. 
Fiscal policy allows long run unsustainable and 
excessively budget deficit higher than the sustainable 
budget deficit. 
Loose and expansionary fiscal policy. 
Passive Monetary 
Policy  
Monetary authority sets interest rates to accommodate 
fiscal policy. 
Loose, expansionary monetary policy 
Source: Leeper, (2016) 
In an F-regime of fiscal dominance (FD), whenever there is a rise in price level due to 
expansionary fiscal shock, monetary growth would passively increase equally because the 
monetary authority is compelled to accommodate the fiscal shock. If the long term 
government budget balance is to be maintained under this regime in which fiscal policy 
allows long run unsustainable and excessively high budget deficits, the proposition of 
286 
 
Leeper’s model is that inflation target of central bank would be abandoned, and the central 
bank gives room for the emergence of higher inflation (that is, expansionary monetary 
policy). This consequently causes the monetary authority to either inflate the public debt or 
work towards generating seigniorage revenue that could be transferred to the fiscal side 
(budget). This thus reflect FD as a phenomenon of government’s long term sustainability 
(when primary balance is not kept at equilibrium) and higher inflation is generated (than 
warranted) and original target of monetary policy is abandoned when loose (passive) 
monetary policy is adopted. It should be noted that it is an underlying assumption of the 
FTPL that government’s actions are not constrained by budgetary issues; and according to 
FTPL (which holds in a FD regime), fiscal policy determines prices when there are no 
budgetary adjustments in response to fiscal shocks affecting the government intertemporal 
budget constraints (GIBC) thus reflecting the ‘non-Ricardian’ behaviour in which price is 
made to adjust to balance the budget constraints. Hence, fiscal policy plays a more important 
role than monetary policy in ensuring price stability and in determining inflation in a FD 
regime. Therefore, under such regime, fiscal policy changes must impact the price level 
regardless of the degree of monetary authority’s commitment to price stability. In this ‘non-
Ricardian’ fiscal policy situation, there could be high inflation and price instability. This 
appears not to be the best option for monetary unions. In an M-regime of monetary 
dominance (MD), the central bank focuses on its inflation targeting goal while a passive and 
expansionary fiscal policy is in place to avoid the disruption to fiscal policy long term 
sustainability. In targeting inflation, if a monetary policy specifies the form and direction of 
interest rate movement in response to specific inflation and growth deviations, there could be 
stable/low inflation if fiscal policy is not considered when such fiscal policy displays 
‘Ricardian’ behaviour. This is an instance of the implication of the FTPL. Leeper (1999) 
considers this policy mix as ‘default’ and as one that can guarantee stable policy 
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combination. This is deemed more appropriate for monetary unions. However, when both 
policies are active, such expansionary fiscal shocks are addressed by monetary policy to some 
extent. 
In the event of monetary integration when the monetary policy formulation will be 
transferred to a supra-national level and the formulation of fiscal policies (of members states) 
remains at national levels, the competing views or rather, the interactions of monetary and 
fiscal policies and how they affect inflation under two conflicting fiscal dominance and 
monetary dominance regimes are very crucial and relevant for policy makers at both national 
and supra-national levels within such monetary integrated bloc. Specifically, FTPL could be 
of interest to monetary unions (and the WAMZ) because it will contribute in revealing and 
explaining the pattern of price level evolution across such monetary unions, particularly in 
member states. There are fiscal limitations imposed on existing and proposed members of 
monetary unions so as to ensure that the ‘Ricardian regime’ and ‘monetary dominance’ are 
appropriately and justifiably institutionalised. 
In this assessment, the modelling of monetary policy followed the standard Taylor rule which 
makes the nominal interest rate to depend on inflation and output gap. In the monetary 
reaction function, Taylor (1993) proposed short term interest rate as monetary policy 
instrument in which the conjecture was that there would be increase in the Federal Fund rate 
if there is increase in inflation above its target or if there is increase in output gap above the 
value of its trend. The Taylor’s modelling of the nominal interest rate rule is simply given as:  
𝑖 = 𝑓(𝜋 + 𝑦𝑔)                                                                      5.16  
where 𝑖 is nominal interest rate, 𝜋 is inflation and is 𝑦𝑔 output gap. Nevertheless, it is worthy 
of note to state that Taylor (1993) did not perform econometric estimation of the reaction 
function but only attach equal of value of 0.5 coefficients to inflation and output gap. 
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Although, results generated in the estimation of the central bank reaction function by Taylor 
(1993) generated varied results, however, the common interpretation of Taylor rule is that 
inflation gap’s weigh should be greater than unity (1) in order to show that real interest rate is 
raised by monetary authority in responding to higher inflation and the below-normal level of 
output requires lower interest rates. Monetary behaviour and the correlation between 
expected inflation, nominal interest rate and real interest rate (as established by ‘Fisher 
Equation’) could both be captured by this empirical relationship linking nominal interest rate 
with inflation and output. 
On the fiscal side, this study applied the fiscal rule suggested by Davig and Leeper (2005, 
2013) in which government revenue/GDP ratio reacts to government expenditure ratio, public 
debt ratio and output gap in the modelling of fiscal policy. This is depicted as: 
𝑟 = 𝑓(𝑙𝑏 + 𝑦𝑔 + 𝑔)                                                                        5.17 
Where 𝑟 is government revenue/GDP ratio, is 𝑙𝑏 one-period lagged public debt/GDP ratio, is 
𝑦𝑔 output gap and is 𝑔 government expenditure/GDP ratio. Making fiscal revenue to be 
function of lagged debt could say something about how revenue (taxes) are raised by fiscal 
authority to respond to public debt increases and as well establish the positive correlation 
created by GIBC between public debt and future primary surpluses. 
5.4.2 Data and Methods 
This study applied monthly data of monetary and fiscal policy rules. These data for the 
WAMZ countries which span from 2001M1 to 2015M12 were obtained from the databases of 
IMF World Bank and the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU). Inflation rate, defined as log 
difference in GDP deflator was lagged over the past twelve months while public debt GDP 
was lagged in same manner. The nominal interest rate was taken to be the money market 
rates for these countries. Output gap was estimated as log deviation of real output from the 
potential as derived through the application of Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filtering method with 
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lambda (𝜆) = 14,400, which is appropriate for monthly data. Fiscal variables used are 
government revenue, public debt and government expenditure (all, as share of GDP). All data 
employed (sourced as annual data) were converted to monthly values using Eviews’ ‘linear-
match’ specification. For the monetary policy regime estimations, lagged values of dependent 
variable (nominal interest rate) was included on the right hand side of the estimated model in 
order to account for interest rate smoothing. Equally for fiscal regimes, as regressor, lagged 
value of the dependent variable (revenue/GDP ratio) was included so as to remove possible 
residual autocorrelation. In these tests of monetary dominance and assessment of the nature 
of monetary-fiscal policy interactions and to account for possible change in monetary and 
fiscal regimes in the WAMZ, the econometric estimation method employed is the Markov 
regime switching regression models of the Taylor monetary rule (augmented by interest rate 
for smoothing) and of the fiscal rule suggested by Davig and Leeper (2006) augmented with 
lagged values of government revenue scaled by output. Empirical characterisation of policy 
behaviour (according to these rules) were established while allowing for regime changes. 
Monetary and fiscal policy were allowed to switch independent of each other. With the view 
that there is always discrete shift in policy behaviour, we can differentiate between policy 
behaviour that is time variant and other equilibrium conditions that do not display time, but 
which coincides with policy shifts. 
The regime switching regression of monetary policy (Taylor rule) estimated for these WAMZ 
countries is specified in an estimable form as: 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0(𝑆𝑡
𝑀) + 𝛼𝜋(𝑆𝑡
𝑀)𝜋𝑡 + 𝛼𝑦𝑔(𝑆𝑡
𝑀)𝑦𝑔𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡(𝑆𝑡
𝑀)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜎𝑚(𝑆𝑡
𝑀)𝜀𝑡
𝑚               5.18 
Where 𝑖𝑡 is nominal interest rate, 𝜋𝑡 is inflation, 𝑦𝑔𝑡 is output gap, as the lagged value of 
interest rate (𝑖𝑡−1) is for interest rate smoothing meant to address interest rate inertia, 𝑆𝑡
𝑀 
represents the monetary policy regime which follows a two state Markov chain with its 
transition matrix 𝑃𝑀, while 𝜀𝑡
𝑚 is the disturbance with normal distribution and zero mean. 
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Independent of the coefficients in the monetary rule, the variance of the error switches 
between two different values. The assumption here is that parameters 𝛼0, 𝛼𝜋, and 𝛼𝑦𝑔 are 
time varying. The variance of the shock is not constant but has Markov-switching property. 
From the estimation of the above monetary rule, the situation of ‘active’ monetary policy is 
established when the coefficient estimates of inflation is greater than one (𝜋𝑡 ≥ 1). 
Conversely, the monetary rule is ‘passive’ if this coefficient is less than unity (𝜋𝑡 ≤ 1).  
Monetary policy stance changes over time. This prompts the question on how the behaviour 
of fiscal policy would be in the same period. Answer to this question would reveal if these 
policies are ‘accommodative’ or ‘counteractive’ to each other. Therefore, for clear 
understanding of the policy mix in the six WAMZ countries, it is relevant to equally account 
for possible changes in fiscal regimes in these countries. 
There are two broadly used strands of fiscal policy rules: (i) the fiscal rule in which the value 
of the primary budget deficit allows public debt ratio stabilisation (Bohn, 1998) ; and (ii) the 
fiscal rule in which government revenue/GDP ratio reacts to government expenditure ratio, 
public debt ratio and output gap (Davig and Leeper (2005, 2013). This research applied the 
second strand. The fiscal counterpart of Equation 5.18 above wreflects the regime switching 
fiscal policy rule expressed as: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛾0(𝑆𝑡
𝐹) + 𝛾𝑏(𝑆𝑡
𝐹)𝑏𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑦(𝑆𝑡
𝐹)𝑦𝑡 + 𝛾𝑔(𝑆𝑡
𝐹)𝑔𝑡 + 𝜎𝑟(𝑆𝑡
𝐹)𝜀𝑡
𝑟                      5.19 
where 𝑟𝑡 is the government revenue/output ratio, 𝑏𝑡−1 is one-period lagged public debt/output 
ratio, 𝛾𝑔 is the government expenditure, 𝛾𝑦 is the output gap, 𝜀𝑡
𝑟 is the disturbance term with 
normal distribution and zero mean while 𝑆𝑡
𝐹 is the fiscal regime that follows a Markov chain 
with transition matrix 𝑃𝐹. The fiscal rule modeling allows the variance of the errors to switch 
between two values. The assumption here is that parameters 𝛾0, 𝛾𝑏, 𝛾𝑦 and 𝛾𝑔 are time 
varying and that the variance of the shock is not constant but has Markov-switching property. 
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The Leeper’s (1991) FTPL specifies that a fiscal regime is ‘passive’ when the estimated 
coefficient of debt/output ratio is positive and statistically significant (𝛾𝑏 ≥ 1), implying that 
increase in the stock of outstanding public debt would cause significant reduction in 
government deficits. On the other hand, an active fiscal policy regime is established if (𝛾𝑏 ≤
1); and this is when the fiscal authority is not constrained by the level of public debt.  At this 
point, what was brought into this study was the method of joint matrix estimation proposed 
by Davig and Leeper (2009) in which the joint transition probability matrix governing the 
monetary-fiscal regime in the WAMZ was estimated as: 
𝑃𝑀𝐹 = 𝑃𝑀 ⊗ 𝑃𝐹                                                                                5.20 
where 𝑃𝑀𝐹  is the joint transition matrix which indicates the mix of monetary policy and fiscal 
policy, reflecting the interactions between the two macroeconomic policies within the 
WAMZ, 𝑃𝑀 and 𝑃𝐹  respectively, are the transition matrix for monetary policy and fiscal 
policy. From the estimated joint transition matrix, the monetary-fiscal policy interaction 
could be interpreted as reflected in Table 5.23 below.   
Table 5.23: Monetary-Fiscal Policy Mix Implications 
 Active Monetary Policy Passive Monetary Policy 
Active Fiscal Policy Explosive Non-Ricardian (FTPL) 
Passive Fiscal Policy Ricardian Indeterminacy 
Source: Leeper (2007) 
The explosive policy mix is unsustainable as both monetary and fiscal policies are ‘active’. 
The indeterminacy mix is when both policies are ‘passive’. For monetary unions (in which 
monetary policy and fiscal policies are at the supra-national and national levels respectively), 
the ‘Ricardian’ mix of the interactions between the two macroeconomic policies is deemed to 
be the best. 
5.4.3 Results and Findings  
The results of the Markov regime switching regressions for both monetary and fiscal policy 
regimes in the WAMZ are exhibited in Table 5.24 below. 
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Table 5.24: Results of Markov Switching Regressions of Monetary and Fiscal Policies Regimes  
Monetary Rule Regimes Switching 
Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Constant: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
Inflation: 
State1  
State 2 
Output Gap: 
State1:  
State 2: 
Interest Rate Smoothing: 
State1:  
State 2: 
Transition Probability: 
P11: 
P22: 
Expected Duration: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
Standard Deviation (Sigma): 
AIC: 
HQIC: 
SBIC: 
Log Likelihood: 
 
6.3176* 
5.3892* 
 
619.9587* 
358.0398* 
 
-11.6994* 
2.8125 
 
0.4941* 
0.4519* 
 
0.95 
0.98 
 
19.78 
44.23 
0.10* 
3.35 
3.44 
3.56 
-270.66 
 
-0.0366 
7.9482* 
 
518.8409* 
436.6295* 
 
45.3135*** 
-51.4353 
 
0.4081* 
0.4191* 
 
0.96 
0.96 
 
25.72 
30.67 
0.47* 
4.14 
4.22 
4.35 
-337.16 
 
19.7330* 
0.6409 
 
-72.541** 
171.3730* 
 
650.8563* 
98.3488* 
 
-0.080*** 
0.6409* 
 
0.98 
0.97 
 
60.30 
48.53 
0.17* 
3.45 
3.53 
3.66 
-279.03 
 
0.09397* 
0.4074* 
 
-7.3280 
48.8968* 
 
5.1947* 
-3.8306 
 
0.7808* 
0.5985* 
 
0.97 
0.96 
 
38.56 
26.90 
-1.46* 
0.22 
0.31 
0.43 
-8.26 
 
1.2505* 
6.9404* 
 
71.9769* 
-35.7580 
 
116.4321* 
228.1941*** 
 
0.6706* 
0.6370* 
 
0.99 
0.96 
 
68.90 
29.85 
0.28* 
3.66 
3.74 
3.86 
-296.18 
 
-0.5700 
9.2570* 
 
-85.8522* 
728.5705* 
 
-1780.55* 
142.600** 
 
0.6550* 
0.0950 
 
0.97 
0.96 
 
29.23 
26.64 
0.82* 
4.86 
4.95 
5.07 
-397.54 
Fiscal Rule Regimes Switching 
Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Constant: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
Public Debt/GDP: 
State1  
State 2 
Govt. Expenditure/GDP: 
State1:  
State 2: 
Output Gap: 
State1:  
State 2: 
Lagged Govt. Revenue/GDP: 
State1:  
State 2 
Transition Probability: 
P11: 
P22: 
Expected Duration: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
Standard Deviation (Sigma): 
AIC: 
HQIC: 
SBIC: 
Log Likelihood: 
 
4.0109* 
1.2346** 
 
-0.004 
0.0169* 
 
0.4894* 
0.5591* 
 
-30.9041* 
-66.8563* 
 
0.2409* 
0.2043* 
 
0.97 
0.97 
 
37.25 
48.54 
-0.47* 
2.23 
2.33 
2.47 
-174.33 
 
0.7454* 
26.9125* 
 
0.0410* 
-0.1168* 
 
0.2129* 
0.2450* 
 
82.3639* 
122.8293* 
 
0.5986* 
-0.5109 
 
0.98 
0.97 
 
55.01 
35.38 
-1.71* 
-0.25 
-0.16 
-0.01 
34.36 
 
11.4237* 
13.0254* 
 
-0.0010 
-0.0013* 
 
0.4771* 
0.6097* 
 
271.6433* 
40.1287* 
 
-0.6623 
-0.2850* 
 
0.96 
0.98 
 
25.99 
61.60 
-4.10 
2.30 
2.39 
2.54 
-179.93 
 
19.6979* 
-6.3574* 
 
-0.0090* 
0.0072 
 
0.1843* 
0.1893* 
 
25.8408* 
3.0609** 
 
0.1430 
1.0290* 
 
0.97 
0.97 
 
30.51 
29.82 
-0.52* 
2.15 
2.25 
2.39 
-167.44 
 
4.3896* 
0.4661* 
 
-0.0285* 
0.0172* 
 
0.6292* 
0.7474* 
 
-10.9854** 
93.8618* 
 
-0.2579* 
-0.0949** 
 
0.98 
0.99 
 
62.10 
125.16 
-4.82* 
0.08 
0.18 
0.33 
5.87 
 
4.8721* 
4.7851* 
 
-0.0137* 
0.0147* 
 
0.5313* 
0.5666* 
 
-115.523* 
-59.907* 
 
0.0163 
-0.0465 
 
0.94 
0.96 
 
17.40 
27.55 
-1.18 
0.87 
0.87 
1.12 
-60.64 
Source: Author's Estimation and EViews 9.5 Output 
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As reflected in the results of the maximum likelihood estimations of Markov switching 
monetary and fiscal regimes, active and passive regimes across the WAMZ can be 
determined. State of variance (as measured by standard deviation for the policies parameters) 
are not uniform but all positive and significant at 1% level under monetary policy regime and 
all negative and significant at 1% except in the cases of Guinea and Sierra Leone. 
In monetary policy Regime 1, monetary policy is active only in The Gambia, Ghana and 
Nigeria and active in all the WAMZ countries except Nigeria in Regime 2 as highlighted in 
the reaction of nominal interest rate to inflation. These results are statistically significant at 
1% and 10% levels of significance apart from Liberia in State 1 and Nigeria in State 2. The 
estimation results showed high transition probabilities (of between 0.95 and 0.98) of staying 
in Regime 1 and Regime 2. Nigeria, the lead economy in the monetary zone exhibits the 
highest duration of 68.90 months of staying in State 1, while The Gambia came up with the 
highest duration is State 2. Interest rate smoothing was positive (except in Guinea) and 
statistically significant across the WAMZ. The log likelihood values were between -8.26 and 
-397.54. From the results of the maximum likelihood estimations of fiscal policy Markov 
regime switching, fiscal policy was passive in Regime 1 and Regime 2 in all the WAMZ 
countries, though not statistically significant in the cases of The Gambia and Guinea (in State 
1) and Liberia (in State 2) as reflected in the response of government revenue to public debt. 
In fiscal regime switching estimation across the WAMZ, the probability of staying in both 
regimes are very high between 0.94 and 0.99, just as obtained in the monetary rule 
estimations. As evident in the monetary regime, Nigeria (the lead economy) also 
demonstrated the longest expected duration of staying in both fiscal policy regimes with log 
likelihood values of 5.87. However, it is shown that Guinea, Ghana and Liberia recorded high 
and statistically significant attention of fiscal authorities to output stabilisation in State 1 
while such attention were given by Ghana, Nigeria and Guinea in State 2. This shows that 
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Guinea has the possibility of consistency in fiscal attention to output stabilisation. The 
likelihood values are within the space of 5.87 and -179.93 in the fiscal regime estimations.  
The summary the outcome the Markov regime switching regression of the WAMZ countries 
in the two regimes are displayed in Table 5.25 below.  
Table 5.25: Monetary-Fiscal Policy Mix Implications for the WAMZ Countries 
Regime 1 
Country Monetary Regime Fiscal Regime Implications 
The Gambia Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
Ghana Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
Guinea Passive Passive Indeterminacy  
Liberia Passive Passive Indeterminacy 
Nigeria Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
S/Leone Passive Passive Indeterminacy 
Regime 2 
Country Monetary Regime Fiscal Regime Implication 
The Gambia Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
Ghana Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
Guinea Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
Liberia Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
Nigeria Passive Passive Indeterminacy 
S/Leone Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
Source: Author’s Estimations 
This summary reveals that in both regimes, only The Gambia and Ghana exhibit monetary 
dominance (the Ricardian Equivalence) with is the strongest and best option for membership 
of a monetary union. Although, the monetary zone’s lead economy, Nigeria displays 
monetary dominance in Regime 1, the country shows an indeterminacy status in Regime 2. 
All the WAMZ countries (except Nigeria) exhibit monetary dominance in Regime 2. None of 
the WAMZ countries simultaneously demonstrates the ‘indeterminacy’ or the ‘explosive’ 
status in both regimes. Given the implications of the monetary-fiscal policy interactions in the 
mix (in both regimes), one point to highlight regarding the switching is that the probability of 
switching from one regime to the other is very low across the WAMZ, while by implications, 
the probability of remaining in any of the two regimes is very high between 0.94 and 0.99. 
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Table 5.26: Monetary and Fiscal Policies Regimes Transition Probability Matrices of the WAMZ 
Countries 
Country Regimes Transition Matrices 
 
 
 
 
Gambia 
𝑃𝑀 = [
0.9494  0.0506
0.0226   0.9774
  ]             𝑃𝐹 = [
0.9732  0.0268
0.0206   0.9794
  ]      
 
𝑃𝑀𝐹 = 𝑃𝑀 ⊗ 𝑃𝐹=  [
0.9239   0.0254
0.0196   0.9298
0.0220   0.0006
0.0005   0.0221
   0.0492  0.0013
    0.0010   0.0495
    0.9521    0.0262
     0.0201   0.9573
]   
 
 
 
 
Ghana 
𝑃𝑀 = [
0.9411  0.0389
0.0326  0.9674
  ]              𝑃𝐹 = [
0.9818  0.0182
0.0283   0.9717
  ] 
 
𝑃𝑀𝐹 = 𝑃𝑀 ⊗ 𝑃𝐹=  [
0.9436   0.0175
0.0272   0.9339
0.0320   0.0005
0.0009   0.0317
   0.0382  0.0007
    0.0011   0.0378
    0.9498    0.0176
     0.0274   0.9400
] 
 
 
 
 
Guinea 
𝑃𝑀 = [
0.9834  0.0166
0.0206  0.9794
  ]              𝑃𝐹 = [
0.9615  0.0385
0.0162   0.9838
  ] 
 
𝑃𝑀𝐹 = 𝑃𝑀 ⊗ 𝑃𝐹=  [
0.9455   0.0006
0.0159   0.9674
0.0198   0.0007
0.0003   0.0203
   0.0160  0.0006
    0.0003   0.0163
    0.9417    0.0377
     0.0159   0.9635
] 
 
 
 
 
Liberia 
𝑃𝑀 = [
0.9741  0.0259
0.0372  0.9628
  ]              𝑃𝐹 = [
0.9672  0.0328
0.0335   0.9665
  ] 
 
𝑃𝑀𝐹 = 𝑃𝑀 ⊗ 𝑃𝐹=  [
0.9421   0.0319
0.0326   0.9415
0.0358   0.0012
0.0012   0.0360
   0.0251  0.0008
    0.0009   0.0250
    0.9312    0.0316
     0.0322   0.9305
] 
 
 
 
 
Nigeria 
𝑃𝑀 = [
0.9855  0.0145
0.0335  0.9665
  ]              𝑃𝐹 = [
0.9839  0.0161
0.0080   0.9920
  ] 
 
𝑃𝑀𝐹 = 𝑃𝑀 ⊗ 𝑃𝐹=  [
0.9696   0.0159
0.0079   0.9776
0.0330   0.0005
0.0003   0.0332
   0.0143  0.0002
    0.0001   0.0144
    0.9509    0.0156
     0.0077   0.9588
] 
 
 
 
 
S/Leone 
𝑃𝑀 = [
0.9658  0.0342
0.0375  0.9625
  ]              𝑃𝐹 = [
0.9425  0.0575
0.0363   0.9637
  ] 
 
𝑃𝑀𝐹 = 𝑃𝑀 ⊗ 𝑃𝐹=  [
0.9103   0.0555
0.0351   0.9307
0.0353   0.0022
0.0014   0.0361
   0.0322  0.0020
    0.0012   0.0330
    0.9071    0.0553
     0.0349   0.9276
] 
Source: Author's Estimation and Eviews 9.5 Output 
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The transition probability matrices of the two regimes of monetary policy and fiscal policy 
across the WAMZ over the estimation period is displayed in Table 5.26 above. This is the 
joint transition probability matrices estimation of Equation 5.23 for the six countries over the 
period covered by the study. The joint regime transition probability matrices reflect very high 
probabilities of remaining in both regimes. These probabilities are in 90% percentages as 
shown in the estimations. 
 
5.5 Expected Loss of Monetary Independence  
It is not automatic for a country joining a monetary union to lose its monetary autonomy. The 
notion is that one cannot lose what he/she does not have, (or rather he/she can only lose what 
he/she has), so likewise a country. And so, by the implication of the domineering effect of the 
large economy of Nigeria in the WAMZ, countries making up the proposed monetary union 
can only lose monetary autonomy only if they actually have such autonomy, away from the 
influence of the anchor country’s (Nigeria) monetary policy or rather if their respective 
monetary policy is independent of the policy of this possible anchor economy.95   
During the EMU formation period, there were views that when a country abandons its own 
national currency (for a common currency), there would be a loss of a policy instrument.96 
Countries joining a monetary union are expected to incur economic cost of formally adopting 
a common monetary policy by joining the full monetary union. In this research study, this 
hypothesis is interestingly tested in the context of the WAMZ countries and the dominance of 
Nigeria within the monetary zone. For the WAMZ’s five smaller economies, a simple 
                                                          
95 Given the size of the economy of Nigeria, which is close to 90% of the entire GDP of the WAMZ, this study 
consequently regards Nigeria as the potential anchor country for the proposed monetary zone; and for this 
reason, the evaluation of the nature of the reactions of monetary policies of other WAMZ economies to Nigeria's 
monetary policy was carried out. 
96 There were counter opinions in the context of Eurozone creation, indicating that such view was as 'unreal'. 
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McCallum monetary base related model, augmented with Nigerian policy variable, is built 
and appropriately employed in testing the hypothesis in order to determine the degree of 
monetary policy independence loss by the five WAMZ countries. Instead of nominal interest 
rate, McCallum rule applies monetary base as a monetary policy instrument due to: (a) the 
ease of control of monetary base variable by the monetary authority; and (b) the ambiguity in 
contracting or expanding the monetary policy stance when interest rate is the applied 
monetary policy tool.  
Because of the dominance of the Nigerian Naira within the proposed monetary zone, this test 
would check if the change in monetary base of other five members are driven by the change 
in the Nigerian monetary base. The determining logic is that the higher the degree of the 
influence of the Nigerian monetary base change on a WAMZ country's base money supply 
change, the lower the degree of loss of monetary autonomy on eventual formation of the 
monetary union. This investigation into the expected loss (indirectly to Nigeria, a possible 
lead country) of monetary independence is the objective of this monetary perspective section. 
The research question answered here was about the level of monetary independence that 
would be conceded by the other five WAMZ countries to the lead economy. 
5.5.1 Theory and Models 
Coming from the McCallum monetary base theoretical underpinnings, the model built and 
applied centred on how the five smaller economies within the WAMZ (The Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) respond to changes in monetary base of the possible 
anchor economy, Nigeria as expressed, reflects the elongation (on the right hand of the 
model) with the Nigerian base money supply changes, is given as:  
∆𝑚𝑡 =  (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)𝑡 + (𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
∗)𝑡 +  ∆𝑚𝑡
𝑁                              5.21 
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Where (𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
∗)𝑡 is the output gap at time 𝑡, (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)𝑡 is the inflation deviation at 𝑡, ∆𝑚𝑡
𝑁 
is the potential anchor monetary base growth rate (that is, monetary base of Nigeria) while 
∆𝑚𝑡 is monetary base change in the five smaller WAMZ  countries at time 𝑡. There have 
been strong supports for lagged variables to be more appropriate in yield unbiased results.  
5.5.2 Data and Methods 
Annual data of base money, nominal GDP and inflation were collected for the six WAMZ 
countries from the EIU database. These data span between 1980 and 2014. The HP filtering 
method (at lambda=100) was employed to derive the potential output towards estimating 
output gaps while the 5% inflation convergence criterion rate was applied in the estimation of 
inflation of the WAMZ countries from targets. Consequent upon the macroeconomic 
modelling expressed above, for the purpose of determining the expected loss of monetary 
independence by the five smaller WAMZ economies, the contemporaneous and backward-
looking monetary base econometric functional equation estimated with simple OLS method 
are specified as: 
∆𝑚𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
∗)𝑡 +  𝛽3∆𝑚𝑡
𝑁 + 𝜀𝑡                        5.22 
and  
∆𝑚𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛾1(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)𝑡−1 + 𝛾2(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
∗)𝑡−1 +  𝛾3∆𝑚𝑡−1
𝑁 + 𝜀𝑡                        5.23 
In these models, for the purpose of meeting the research objectives here, the parameters of 
interest are 𝛽3 and 𝛾3. The estimation of Equations 5.22 and 5.23 were carried by OLS 
regression method. 
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5.5.3 Results and Findings 
The results of the estimations of the two augmented McCallum monetary base models for the 
WAMZ’s smaller economies are as displayed in Table 5.27 below.97 Generally, in both 
estimations, the standard errors are low in the cases of The Gambia and Liberia while the 
coefficient of determination (R-Squared) is at the lowest in Guinea which also lacks joint 
significance at 5%. The results of interest are those yielded for the response of the monetary 
policy changes in these smaller WAMZ economies to the anchor country’s (Nigerian) 
monetary policy changes.  
Table: 5.27: Monetary Reactions to Anchor Country's (Nigerian) Monetary Base Change (1980-2014) 
Contemporaneous Augmented McCallum Monetary Base Model 
Dependent Variable: Change in Monetary Base 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia S/Leone 
∆Nigerian Monetary Base: 
 
 
Output Gap: 
 
 
Inflation Deviation: 
 
 
R2: 
F-probability: 
Observations: 
0.0004* 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0017 
(0.0021) 
 
0.49 
0.00 
34 
1.4473* 
(0.1253) 
 
-0.0216 
(0.1445) 
 
-3.4812 
(3.8976) 
 
0.83 
0.00 
34 
0.2221** 
(0.1067) 
 
1.6752 
(5.7172) 
 
14.642*** 
(8.3557) 
 
0.26 
0.09 
25 
0.0010* 
(0.0012) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0162 
(0.0216) 
 
0.53 
0.00 
32 
0.1119* 
(0.0224) 
 
0.0895 
(0.2544) 
 
-0.4252 
(0.4131) 
 
0.54 
0.00 
34 
One-period Lagged Augmented McCallum Monetary Base Model 
Dependent Variable: Change in Monetary Base 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia S/Leone 
∆Nigerian Monetary Base: 
 
 
Output Gap: 
 
 
Inflation Deviation: 
 
 
R2: 
F-probability: 
Observations: 
0.0006* 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.0010 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.0020) 
 
0.55 
0.00 
33 
1.3888* 
(0.3725) 
 
-0.0168 
(0.2827) 
 
-6.7631 
(7.6524) 
 
0.37 
0.00 
33 
-0.2670 
(0.1782) 
 
-9.9120 
(6.1776) 
 
-2.871 
(8.8374) 
 
0.16 
0.30 
31 
0.0015* 
(0.0004) 
 
0.000 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0017 
(0.0266) 
 
0.42 
0.00 
31 
0.1547* 
(0.0372) 
 
0.1044 
(0.2770) 
 
-0.4712 
(0.4563) 
 
0.46 
0.00 
33 
Source: EIU and IMF databases, Author’s Estimations and Stata 14 Output. 
Notes: The standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significance at 1% significant level, ** at 5% 
significance level and *** at 10% level of significance. 
 
                                                          
97 Except for Guinea’s 1987-2014 period. 
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These are significant at 1% and 10% levels of significance. It could be observed from the 
results that while output gap and inflation deviation were statistically insignificant at 5% 
level of significance (except for Guinea), the Nigerian policy stance mostly have positive 
influence on monetary policies in all the five WAMZ countries. As expressed above, the 
degree of loss of monetary independence is low when the extent of the influence of Nigerian 
monetary base change is high.  
From the contemporaneous McCallum model results Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone 
demonstrated the lowest degree of expected loss of monetary autonomy because the Nigerian 
policy influence is higher in these two countries. For Guinea, the joint significance is at 0.09 
while the coefficient of determination (R2) reflecting the goodness of fit stands at the lowest 
of 0.26, casting doubt over the ability of the Nigerian monetary policy instrument to explain 
the Guinea monetary policy stance. On the other hand, The Gambia had the comparatively 
highest measure of expected loss of monetary policy autonomy, followed by Liberia. The 
results of the estimated lagged augmented McCallum model again revealed Ghana, Guinea 
and Sierra Leone as exhibiting low degree of expected loss of monetary independence. 
Interestingly, this results showed that at the negative coefficient of -0.2670 (not significant), 
the Guinean monetary policy was not influenced by the Nigerian policy. Again, the ability of 
the independent variables to explain the variations in the Guinean case is minimal at a very 
low R2 coefficient of 0.16 and F-probability of 0.30. The Gambia and Liberia, again display 
the higher degree of expected monetary independence loss, given their lower coefficient of 
the influence of the change in the Nigerian monetary base as policy instrument. Owing to the 
developing nature of African economies and the slow reactions of macroeconomic variables 
in the developing nations, greater emphasis are placed on results generated through the 
estimation of the lagged McCallum monetary base growth model for these WAMZ countries. 
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The summary of the findings here is that the degrees of the expected loss of monetary 
independence would be high in The Gambia and Liberia, with the implication of high costs of 
monetary integration for the two countries. The extent of this loss would be low in the cases 
of Ghana and Sierra Leone, thus signifying low cost of monetary integration for the two 
countries.  
5.6  Suitability of Common Monetary Policy  
Moving from the conclusions of the immediate previous section on the extent of the expected 
loss of monetary autonomy for prospective members of the WAMZ, this section focuses on 
the investigation of the suitability of the expected common monetary policy for these 
countries. The objective here is to construct Monetary Policy Suitability Indicators (MPSI) 
for these WAMZ countries and show the ranking of the levels of adequacy or sustainability 
of a single monetary policy for the proposed monetary union, within the contexts of 
economic sizes and levels of base money supply. Results generated here are indicators of 
ease of monetary integration for the WAMZ member countries. 
5.6.1 Theory and Model 
McCallum (1988) stressed the principles necessary for the design of a monetary rule that: (i) 
a monetary rule should be able to dictate the behaviour of a variable that can directly and 
accurately be controlled by the monetary authority, and further that the behaviour of some 
magnitude which are not controllable (such as the M1 measure of the money stock for 
instance) leaves the task of rule design seriously incomplete; (ii) monetary rule should not 
rely essentially on the presumed absence of regulatory change and technical progress in the 
financial industry; (iii) the paths of both money stock and (nominal) interest rate are not 
important for their own sakes because they are only of relevance to the extent that they are 
useful in facilitating good performance of output and inflation; (iv) a monetary rule should be 
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well designed. In qualitative terms, McCallum proposed a rule that reflects these four 
principles. A principal feature of the McCallum rule is the use of monetary base (rather than 
nominal interest rate in the Taylor rule) as a monetary policy instrument. The argument 
brought forward by McCallum in this respect is that tightening or easing of the policy stance 
are ambiguous when the nominal interest rate is applied as monetary policy stance indicator; 
and consequently because the monetary authority can control the monetary base variable with 
very high degree of accuracy, this monetary base policy rule is 'desirably operational'. 
McCallum hypothesise that monetary rule periodically adjusts the growth rate of base money. 
The base money would increase if nominal GDP is below its target path and vice versa. In its 
functional form, the McCallum monetary rule is stated as: 
∆𝑚𝑡 = ∆𝑥
∗ − ∆𝑉𝑡
𝑎 + 𝜆(∆𝑥∗ − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)                                             5.24 
where is ∆𝑚𝑡 base money growth rate, ∆𝑥
∗is the nominal GDP growth rate target which is 
constant, estimated as the sum of long run average real GDP growth rate and inflation rate 
target, ∆𝑉𝑡
𝑎 is the average base money velocity estimated by dividing base money by nominal 
GDP, and (∆𝑥∗ − ∆𝑥𝑡−1) is the deviation of nominal growth rate. This base money growth 
rate rule is however within the inflation targeting framework. Because (∆𝑥∗ − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)  
depicts pressure on inflation, an economy would display 'overheating' if the rate of GDP 
growth is higher than the rate of inflation target, prompting reduction in the base money 
growth. The McCallum rule is thus an automatic stabiliser in which the growth rate of money 
base is the monetary policy instrument here. The value of coefficient (𝜆) has to be chosen and 
fixed in order to give adequate responsiveness of base money growth to departures of 
nominal GDP from its target path, and prevent the induction of dynamic instability that can 
cause 'too strong' feedback effects. Therefore, a carefully fixed coefficient (𝜆) would give 
automatic adjustment to the money base and growth rates in a way that would on average, 
yield zero inflation in reaction to base 'velocity' alterations caused by regulatory or technical 
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changes. For ∆𝑉𝑡
𝑎 (average base velocity), McCallum used a four-year period, 4.5% for ∆𝑥∗ 
(the nominal GDP growth rate target) and assumed a value of 0.5 for (𝜆), which is the 
coefficient of nominal growth rate deviations. In terms of aggregate demand, even with 
drastic changes in this form, increase in monetary base changes would make monetary policy 
to be expansionary, while on the other hand, there would be contractions when monetary 
policy changes decrease. The McCallum monetary policy rule equation indicates that the 
growth of monetary base depends on the three terms on the right hand side of Equation 5.24. 
The first term is a constant which is the combination of the desired inflation plus the potential 
GDP growth. The second term, the monetary base velocity growth rate which assists in 
preventing the price level from drifts that may be caused by its response to money demand 
permanent shock. Under the assumption that monetary policy is neutral in the long run, if the 
growth rate of base money velocity is steady while the level of nominal GDP and its targets 
are at par, inflation rate would be forced to its target by this monetary rule. The third term 
stabilises the properties of the McCallum rule. Whenever the nominal GDP deviates from 
target, monetary authorities are prompted to adjust the growth of monetary base.   
Basically, there are some characteristics of the McCallum monetary policy rule. First is the 
preference of nominal GDP over monetary aggregates (like M1 and M2) as the principal 
target variable of the monetary authority, since the nominal GDP exhibits correlation with 
real GDP and inflation. Furthermore, within the nominal GDP targeting system, the nominal 
GDP shows some traits that makes it in principle, to be a good guide in monetary policy 
decision making as monetary policy adjusts to offset aggregate demand disturbances and as it 
helps the monetary authority to strike the balance between the inflation and output growth 
stability objectives when the response to aggregate supply disturbances are to be recognised. 
The preference of the nominal GDP over real GDP in this rule is borne out of the view that 
the monetary authorities can neither accurately control nor predict how the nominal GDP 
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growth divides between inflation and real growth. The second element of the McCallum rule 
is the introduction of a constant growth target for nominal income instead of variation in 
target rate over the cycle. This is likely to remove unwanted fluctuations caused by policy 
surprises emanating from the pursuit of an optimal monetary policy decisions by the central 
bank. As a novel effort here, rather  than simply choosing or fixing values of 0.5 for (𝜆), the 
coefficient of nominal GDP deviation as McCallum did, this coefficient for individual 
WAMZ countries were  generated through econometric procedures in order to capture the 
actual behaviour of the related macroeconomics of the WAMZ’s member countries.  The 5% 
inflation target in the WAMZ's convergence criteria was applied. In consideration of these 
and the respective country's constant (the GDP growth rate target) and the base money 
velocity in describing the monetary policy of the WAMZ member countries, the country-by-
country specific monetary base growth rates are therefore expressed as:  
The Gambia: ∆𝑚𝐺𝑀𝑡 = 8.3 − ∆𝑉𝑡
𝑎 + 𝜆(8.3 − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)                                             5.25 
Ghana:  ∆𝑚𝐺𝐻𝑡 = 11.6 − ∆𝑉𝑡
𝑎 + 𝜆(11.6 − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)                                             5.26 
Guinea:   ∆𝑚𝐺𝑈𝑡 = 8.2 − ∆𝑉𝑡
𝑎 + 𝜆(8.2 − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)                                             5.27 
Liberia: ∆𝑚𝐿𝐵𝑡 = 11.2 − ∆𝑉𝑡
𝑎 + 𝜆(11.2 − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)                                             5.28 
Nigeria: ∆𝑚𝑁𝐺𝑡 = 10.8 − ∆𝑉𝑡
𝑎 + 𝜆(10.8 − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)                                             5.29 
Sierra Leone: ∆𝑚𝑆𝐿𝑡 = 8.8 − ∆𝑉𝑡
𝑎 + 𝜆(8.8 − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)                                            5.30 
5.6.2 Data and Methods 
Annual data spanning over the 25-year period between 1990 and 2014 for real GDP, nominal 
GDP, inflation (GDP deflator), base money (M1), annual growth and US dollar nominal 
exchange rates were applied in this evaluation.  The actual real output data was taken as the 
real GDP seasonally adjusted in US dollars at 2006 price, expressed in logarithmic form. 
Potential output was determined by fitting a time trend to actual output. Inflation rate was 
taken as the year-on-year changes in inflation calculated with the GDP deflator. The inflation 
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target of 5% (as prescribed for all the WAMZ countries as a primary convergence criterion) 
was adopted as inflation target for all and with this, deviations of the actual inflation rates 
from this inflation target were calculated for each member country of the zone. The velocity 
of the base money variable was constructed by dividing the nominal GDP by base money 
(M1) while the constant, the nominal GDP growth rate target was an addition of the WAMZ 
convergence criteria inflation target of 5% and average real GDP of each country over the 25 
years covered by the study. For the purpose of computing the average weight employed here, 
the WAMZ countries’ levels of base money supply at the end 2014, expressed at the local 
currency units, were converted to the US dollar units at the 2014-year-end nominal exchange 
rates. This study applied a five-stage process towards determining the suitability of single 
monetary policy in the WAMZ.   
At the first stage, the annual short-term counterfactual base money growth rates, according to 
the McCallum monetary rule specifications in Equations (5.25 to 5.30) were estimated for the 
WAMZ countries.  At the second stage, averages of the estimated counterfactual monetary 
base growth were calculated for each WAMZ country in order to identify the potential 
members of the proposed currency union. The rule here is that countries exhibiting similar 
monetary base growth rates would have the prospect of forming a sustainable currency union 
on the long run. Given the fact that the WAMZ is yet to take off as monetary union with a 
common central bank, area-wide counterfactual monetary base growth rates were calculated 
for the entire monetary zone in stage three. This was based on weighted average of WAMZ 
member country’s base money growth rates. The weighted average takes care of the view that 
when members of a monetary union lose monetary independence, the setting of interest rates 
and the determination of money supply growth for the monetary union were meant to serve 
the interest of countries that have high levels of influence on others. In this respect, the 
average of the 2014 current GDP (in US dollars) for each WAMZ member country and their 
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respective end of 2014 level of base money supply (converted to US dollars) were applied as 
the indicator of weight. The area-wide counterfactual money supply growth rate for the 
WAMZ as a proposed monetary union was consequently estimated with the following 
derived equation: 
𝑚𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍𝑡 = Σ(𝑊𝐶 . 𝑚𝑐𝑡)                                                     5.31 
where 𝑚𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍 is the area-wide counterfactual money supply growth for the WAMZ, 𝑊𝐶 is 
the weight of each WAMZ country, which is the country's GDP share of the total of the GDP 
of the six countries in the monetary zone, and 𝑚 is the monetary base growth rate (calculated 
in stage one). At the fourth stage, the annual stress levels for each member countries of the 
WAMZ were calculated as the difference in the respective country's annual monetary based 
growth rate and the monetary zone's area-wide monetary growth rate both estimated as: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍𝑡                                                             5.32 
where 𝑚𝑡 is the country's annual monetary based growth rate at time 𝑡 and 𝑚𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍𝑡 is the 
area-wide base money growth rate for the WAMZ at time 𝑡. To determine the extent of single 
monetary policy adequacy and suitability for the WAMZ countries and make comparisons, 
monetary policy suitability (MPS) indicators were constructed (for each country) by 
estimating the inverse of the mean squared stress indicator for each country under the money 
supply growth rate monetary rule thus: 
𝑀𝑃𝑆 = (
1
(
∑ (𝑚𝑡−𝑚𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍)
2𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
)
)  𝑋 100                                 5.33                                                     
where 𝑀𝑃𝑆 is the monetary policy suitability indicator, while  𝑇 is the number of years. The 
rule is that the higher the indicator, the more likely the suitable a common monetary policy 
would be. 
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5.6.3  Results and Findings 
The country-by-country weight employed in this study as derived from average of the 2014 
nominal GDP (in US dollars) and the 2014 year-end total money supply (M1) (converted into 
US dollars with the exchange rate at the end of 2014) is displayed in Table 5.28 below 
showing Nigeria as having the heaviest average weight of 87% depicting crucial and 
landmark implications for the determination of the counterfactual and future monetary policy 
stance of the proposed common central bank. These depict the economic sizes of these 
countries. The Gambia has the lowest average share of 0.3%. 
Table 5.28: WAMZ Countries' Weights (as derived from the 2014 Nominal (US dollars) GDP) 
Determinant Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Nominal GDP 0.001 0.062 0.011 0.003 0.915 0.008 
Base Money 0.005 0.115 0.037 0.009 0.825 0.009 
Average Weight 0.003 0.089 0.024 0.006 0.87 0.008 
Source: EIU and IMF databases and author's estimations and EViews 7 Output 
As stated earlier, with the loss of monetary independence by member states of a monetary 
union, the determination of the money supply and money supply growth for the entire union 
would reflect the interests of countries demonstrating high degree of influences on other 
members. In the case of the WAMZ, the weight displayed by Nigeria is heavy enough for the 
country to influence monetary policy decisions (including other financial and economic 
decisions) within the proposed currency union.  
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A diagrammatic representation of weights exhibited by each member country of the WAMZ 
is as shown in Figure 5.1 below in which it is clearly glaring that Nigeria takes the ‘lion-
share’ of all:  
Figure 5.1: Chart of Applied Weight of the WAMZ Countries 
(Average 2014 Nominal GDP and Money Supply) 
 
For the results generated by this study to closely reflect the macroeconomic actuals and 
developments within the monetary zone, the weight/coefficients of indicators in the equations 
applied in deriving the monetary rule base money growth rates were generated by OLS 
regressions of related equations and displayed in Table 5.29 below thus: 
Table 5.29: Econometric Derivation of Weights for Nominal Growth Deviation 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
 Growth Deviation -0.1 -0.9 -1.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 
 Source: EIU and IMF databases and author's estimations and Eviews 7 Output  
Table 5.30: Estimated Monetary Policy Suitability Indicators 
WAMZ Country MPS Indicator 
Nigeria 19.94 
Ghana 4.02 
Guinea 2.61 
Liberia 2.52 
Sierra Leone 2.51 
The Gambia 2.50 
   Source: Author's estimations 
Gambia Ghana
GuineaLiberia
Nigeria
S/Leone
WEIGHTS (2014 NOMINAL GDP AND BASE 
MONEY SUPPLY AVERAGE)
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The degrees of suitability of the future single/common monetary policy for the WAMZ 
countries revealed by the results of the estimated Monetary Policy Suitability Indicators 
(MPSI) applying Equation 5.33 are exhibited in Table 5.30 above: 
The rule is that the higher the MPSI, the more suitable the common monetary policy will 
likely be for national stability and the easier the integration into the monetary union. Nigeria, 
with a wide gap, at the top while The Gambia at the base may not find the single monetary 
policy adequate for the achievement of their respective national monetary policy goals. The 
results in Table 5.30 suggest the order in which the six WAMZ countries would be at ease in 
joining the proposed monetary union and find the single monetary policy suitable. Graphical 
representations of the country-by-country stress indicators are presented in Figure 5.2 below.  
Figure 5.2: Chart of Monetary Policy Suitability Indicators for the WAMZ Countries  
 
From the analyses, there are evidence to suggest that Nigeria has an enormous influence over 
the other five members of the proposed currency union, given the size of her economy as well 
as the level money supply. There is strong likelihood for Nigeria to be the major determinant 
of the single monetray policy stance within the WAMZ. There are evidences to suggest that 
Nigeria is solely guarenteed to find the monetary integration easy as well as the single 
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monetary policy adequate for her national stability in light of this specific monetary 
perspective.  
5.7 Conclusions 
Towards achieving the aim of this thesis, this chapter applied the monetary perspectives of 
money neutrality, monetary reactions, monetary dominance, monetary independence and 
common monetary policy suitability in the evaluation of the monetary integration of the 
WAMZ. Various models and estimation methods of relevance were applied. The monetary 
neutrality which analysed money supply in respect of output, inflation and output growth 
revealed non-neutrality and non-superneutrality of money in virtually all the WAMZ 
countries under assessment. These are results positive enough to give the evidences that 
suggest that a single monetary policy (of money supply as policy instrument) will suffice for 
the WAMZ’s monetary integration in achieving future policy objectives and economic 
stability with the proposed monetary zone. Employing both annual and monthly data, the 
monetary reactions assessments revealed some dissimilarities across the WAMZ with high 
degrees of statistical insignificance. The results of the monetary reaction assessments gave 
evidences to suggest that it may take long term adjustment for a single monetary policy to be 
suitable for all the six countries at a time. Consequently, all things being equal and if past 
behaviour of the macroeconomic variables evaluated for the WAMZ countries are factors to 
reckon with, a single monetary policy may not be suitable for the future monetary zone, 
because of the diverse forms of reaction of the monetary policy instrument to inflation and 
output revealed by the more preferred higher frequency monthly data estimations. The 
evaluation of monetary dominance with the Markov switching regression estimations of 
monetary-fiscal policies interactions revealed good incidences of monetary dominance 
necessary for monetary integration of the WAMZ. Fiscal policies were reported to be passive 
all through while monetary policies were mostly active in the two-state Markov analyses. A 
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displeasure was found in the ‘indeterminacy’ stance of Nigeria in the second regime. 
Nevertheless, the probability of transition between the regimes were reported to be high. 
These results are fairly in favour of monetary integration of the WAMZ. The investigations 
into the degree of expected losses of monetary independence by WAMZ member economies 
produced evidences to suggest that the degrees of the expected loss of monetary 
independence will be high (at high costs) in The Gambia and Liberia, while the extent of this 
loss would be low (at low costs) in the cases of Ghana and Sierra Leone. The assessments of 
the suitability of a single monetary policy for all WAMZ members revealed the huge 
influence of Nigeria over five other members of the WAMZ. It was evidently proved that 
Nigeria will be a major determinant of the future common monetary policy stance in the 
proposed monetary integration. This suggests that Nigeria is solely guarenteed to find the 
monetary integration beneficial; as well as find the single monetary policy adequate for her 
national stability. This is a factor not good enough for other members of the WAMZ and the 
proposed monetary integration project. This had been major concern in literature on the 
WAMZ as an OCA (Benassy-Quere and Coupet, 2003; and Bankage, 2008). 
Generally findings and conclusions from the monetary perspectives assessments are mixed, 
the evidences produced in this chapter still point to a general conclusion that the WAMZ may 
not likely be in a successful future monetary integration. Apart from money neutrality and the 
monetary dominance evaluation that yielded supports for the monetary integration, the huge 
size and the expected enormous influence of Nigeria is a negative factor, even as there were 
reported monetary reaction dissimilarities. 
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Chapter 6 
Exchange Rates Behaviour Perspectives 
 
6.1 Introduction 
When the investigation of exchange rate behaviour is embedded into monetary integration 
feasibility study, this constitutes extension and further alternative to studies on optimality of 
such monetary integration. It is not an attempt to replace the established criteria of an OCA 
and neither does it provide further ‘optimality’ criterion. Such research exercise is about 
overcoming some drawbacks identified within the OCA framework. In determining an OCA, 
there had been flaws in past evaluations of cross-country interdependence of foreign 
exchange markets (as related to exchange rates/markets behaviour). These defects were 
caused by the failure to investigate trends of behaviours and volatilities of exchange rates. 
While generalising exchange rates as flexible rates expected to make equal adjustment (in the 
long run) to country-specific symmetric real shocks, these past studies emphasised currency 
values rather than behaviours and volatilities as factors of high significance that can make or 
mar an ensuing currency union.  
The underlying belief of this chapter is that exchange rate stability and similarities in patterns 
of exchange rates/markets behaviours are implied OCA conditions. Countries meeting the 
OCA conditions to a greater degree exhibit exchange rates that are not prone to currency 
crisis.  This perceives the nominal and real exchange rates as playing positive (or negative) in 
macroeconomic performances of countries proposing to form a currency union. Therefore, in 
the context of a monetary union, macroeconomic determinants of exchange rate should be 
well coordinated if these rates are to be stable. It is therefore important to assess the effects of 
these different determinants on exchange rates behaviour in the WAMZ in attempts to 
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establish the similarities in their patterns of movements and directions. These necessitated the 
analyses of the behaviours of bilateral exchange rates and exchange markets within the 
WAMZ.  In the cases of the WAMZ countries, this chapter assesses: (i) exchange rate 
determination and the associated macroeconomic fundamentals; and (ii) exchange market 
pressures and uniformity in how the external pressures were handled as well as further 
investigation into currency crisis vulnerability of the WAMZ member countries. 
Consequently, these are the two major sub-sections of this chapter and the research questions 
to be answered by this chapter area on: (i) if there are similarities in exchange rate 
behaviours, exchange market pressures and exchange rate determination by the fundamentals 
across the WAMZ; (ii) the uniformity of macroeconomic determinants of exchange rates in 
the WAMZ and their associated explanatory powers? (iii) if the pattern of exchange market 
pressure across the WAMZ justify a common approach in handling currency crisis that may 
erupt in the event of monetary integration characterised by common currency and  common 
central bank. 
6.2  Exchange Rate Determination  
There are various theories and models of exchange rate determination applicable to the 
estimation of the rate of exchange of currencies. These theories and models are very useful 
tools in explaining the behaviour of exchange rates in any given economy. In this chapter, 
this study analysed exchange rate behaviours in the WAMZ in the context of monetary theory 
and models of exchange rates. The monetary theory of exchange rate determination is 
fundamentals-based approach to the modelling of exchange rates which is generally built on 
the construct of the purchasing power parity (PPP). Monetary models of exchange rate 
determination formed out of this approach are also referred to as 'structural models' of 
exchange rate because of their derivation from a system of equation which depict the market 
equilibrium relationships between nominal exchange rate and macroeconomic fundamental 
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variables. These models centres on the assessment of the explanatory powers of these 
macroeconomic fundamentals in the forecast of the nominal rate of exchange. What is 
common to all monetary models of exchange rate determination is that they all emphasise the 
crucial role of relative money supplies in offering explanations about exchange rate. At their 
initial points is the simple view of exchange rate as the price of one currency in terms of 
another. This is further to the argument that movements of exchange rates can be explained 
by the demand for and supply of national stocks of money.  Out of the various models offered 
by monetarists in explaining exchange rate behaviour, this study limited itself to two variants 
of the exchange rate monetary models of exchange rate determination in the case of  the 
WAMZ countries under evaluation. These are the flexible-price monetary model (FPMM) 
and the real interest differential monetary model (RIDMM). Exchange rates behaviour in the 
WAMZ are therefore modelled in accordance with the dictates of the theories behind these 
two models. 
6.2.1 Theory and Models  
The analyses and assessments of the international parity conditions are essential precursor to 
the monetary approach to the modelling of exchange rate determination. These were given 
good attention in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Although, the PPP is of great relevance, a major 
defect of the PPP theory is that it does not hold for all types of goods and that it is just about 
goods arbitrage and says nothing about international capital movements. Nevertheless, 
despite this, PPP still has a role to play in exchange rate determination; and this is the basis of 
the motivation for the assessments in this chapter in spite of evidences gathered in Chapter 3 
of thesis towards the conclusion that PPP, IFE and UIP do not hold across the WAMZ. 
In the asset models of exchange rate determination, the interrelationship between the demand 
and supply of the specified assets determine exchange rates as the relative price of two 
currencies. The measurements of these relative prices is in terms of the relative demand for 
315 
 
and supply of money. The assets model approach of exchange rate (with perfect capital 
mobility as basic assumption) can be broken down into two major categories: (i) monetary 
models approaches (with perfect capital substitutability as core assumption) and (ii) portfolio 
balance approaches (with imperfect market substitutability as core assumption). The 
monetary approach to exchange rate determination (which is direct outgrowth of the PPP 
theory and the quantitative theory of money) suggests that exchange rate is the relative price 
of two monies. This monetary model of exchange rate determination reflects real interest rate 
as exogenous in the long run and as a variable which is determined in the world markets due 
to the perfect capital mobility implicit assumption. These imply that the monetary approach 
two exchange rate determination hinges on two basic assumptions: (i) perfect capital 
mobility; and (ii) perfect market substitutability of domestic and foreign assets. Perfect 
substitutability of domestic and foreign bonds infers that the rate of return must be equalised 
across currencies. Therefore, the common assumption shared by the asset market models is 
perfect capital mobility which entails the absence of significant transaction costs, capital 
control or international capital flows impediments. 
There six aggregate markets in the open market macroeconomics. These are: (i) good 
markets; (ii) money markets; (iii) labour markets; (iv) foreign exchange markets; (v) 
domestic bonds (no-money assets) markets; and (vi) foreign bonds markets. The 
concentration of the monetary model is directly on only one of these markets, which is money 
markets. The assumption of perfect market substitutability of domestic and foreign assets 
essentially converts the domestic and foreign bonds markets to a single market. This 
accordingly brings the number of aggregate markets to five markets out of which three 
markets are cleared when perfect market flexibility of prices and wages would equilibrate 
supply and demand in the goods market as well as labour market, while exchange rates freely 
adjust in order to equilibrate supply and demand in the foreign exchange market. Given these, 
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the equilibrium of the full system in monetary market is determined by equilibrium 
conditions for the money market (Walras Law). 
The three relationships in a standard monetary model are: (i) money market equilibrium; (ii) 
purchasing power parity (PPP) and (iii) the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). The element 
of an open market is derived from the relationships of the PPP and the UIP. The postulations 
of the PPP is that an exchange rate is subject to transaction costs such that prices of 
homogeneous goods in both the domestic and foreign markets are equalised when they are 
expressed in a common currency. For the UIP, interest rate differential is equated to the 
expected depreciation of the domestic currency over the term of deposits/bonds to which the 
interest rates apply. UIP hypothesises that there will be appreciation of currency if domestic 
interest rate is lower than the foreign interest rate, this implies negative differential while 
currency appreciation occurs if this differential is positive (that is when domestic interest 
rates are higher than foreign interest rates). PPP is driven by trade in good and it mainly 
propels currency transaction in developing economies and accounts for small proportions of 
developed markets’ currency trading. Perfect substitutability of domestic and foreign bonds 
suggests UIP (as an assets market arbitrage relationship) where domestic interest rate must 
differ from foreign interest rate by a value exactly equal to the expected rate of currency 
depreciation.  
Generally, developing economies are characterised by ‘embryonic’ economic terrains and 
financial markets which are however integrated within international financial markets. In 
these developing economies, currency demands are hugely driven by trade in goods and 
services as opposed to developed and emerging economies and financial markets where 
demands are propelled by large volumes of trade in currencies which can be explained only 
by currency speculations and hedging activities of market participants. These are micro-
structure effects that cause simple monetary models to be unable to fully explain exchange 
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rate swings in developing economies (Lyons, 2011). Hence, for developing economies (like 
the WAMZ), in which high price impact of trade may cause the magnitude of exchange rate 
to be large, there are infrequent currency movements when compared with developed 
economies. Macroeconomic fundamentals are therefore very likely to play more important 
role in exchange rate determination in the WAMZ if emphasis is not placed on interest rate 
parity (IRP) condition. Aron and Ayogu (1997) got evidence to suggest that in developing 
economies (like those of the WAMZ), IRP is not theoretically realistic assumption and not 
also an empirical fact. Domestic and foreign assets are never near perfect substitutability 
while currency and fixed income markets are characterised by high degree of illiquidity. 
Generally (and specifically for the WAMZ), financial markets are at the rudimentary levels. 
Theoretical motivations for the arbitrage-based IRP is not applicable in developing 
economies characterised by nascent or less-developed financial markets. Thus, for the 
WAMZ, in consideration of the monetary model of exchange rate determination as proposed 
by Frankel (1976), Mussa (1976) and Frankel and Rose (1995), only money market 
equilibrium.  Consequent upon the foregoing discussions, the monetary models of exchange 
rate employed in this study do not assume the UIP. Because of the developing nature of the 
WAMZ economies and the under development of their financial markets, PPP is otherwise 
considered as the international parity condition. Further evaluation is placed on PPP here in 
order to explore currency relationships for the monetary zone and assess similarities in the 
characteristics of exchange rates underlying fundamentals among the WAMZ countries 
towards the adoption of a future common currency. 
The flexible-price monetary model (FPMM) assumes that goods prices are perfectly flexible, 
implying that the PPP holds instantaneously at all times. This model was first developed by 
Frenkel (1976), Mussa (1976) and Bilson (1978).  According to Bilson, the approach reflects 
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the quantity theory of money and strict PPP.98 The FPMM incorporates the effect of 
inflationary expectation and its major argument is that within an economy, all prices (wages, 
exchange rates, prices etc.) are in both the long run and short run flexible (upwards and 
downwards). Therefore, the reduced form exchange rate equation for the FPMM could be 
derived from the major assumptions that: (a) prices, nominal interest rates and nominal 
exchange rates adjust instantaneously to clear goods, money and foreign exchange markets; 
(b) there are stability in monetary conditions (meaning that the Quantity Theory of Money 
holds at all times); (c) money demand function is stable; and (d) PPP holds continuously. 
These assumptions can be expressed thus: 
𝑝 = 𝑚𝑠 − 𝑚𝑑                                                         6.1 
𝑝∗ = 𝑚𝑠
∗
− 𝑚𝑑
∗
                                                     62 
𝑚𝑑 = 𝛼𝑦 − 𝛽𝑖                                                         6.3 
 𝑚𝑑
∗
= 𝛼𝑦∗ − 𝛽𝑖∗                                                     6.4 
𝑝 = 𝑠 + 𝑝∗                                                                6.5    
where 𝑝 is the price level,  𝑚 is the money supply, 𝑦 is the real income and 𝑖 is the nominal 
interest rate, 𝑠 is the exchange rate while superscript 𝑑 is the demand variable and superscript 
𝑠 is the supply variable while superscript ∗ indicate the corresponding foreign variable. 
Equation (6.1) represents the proposition of a stable monetary condition while Equation (6.2) 
stands for the proposition of stability in the foreign monetary condition. Equations (6.1) and 
(6.2) indicate the implication of instantaneous adjustment in the price levels towards bringing 
equality between demand for money and supply of money as well as further implication of 
the essence of QTM where, given the real demand for money, the nominal money supply 
                                                          
98 In the Quantity Theory of Money, monetary equilibrium between nominal money supply and real money 
demand determines fully flexible prices. 
 
319 
 
determines the price levels. Equation (6.3) indicates that the demand for nominal money 
balance is a stable function of real income and nominal interest rate in the domestic country 
as well as in the foreign country as shown in Equation (6.4). Parameter 𝛼 measures income 
elasticity of demand while parameter 𝛽 measures the interest rate semi elasticity of demand 
for money. Equation (6.5) shows the PPP condition in which: (a) there is one-to-one 
movement in the domestic price level and the exchange rate adjusted foreign price level; and 
(b) the adjustment of the exchange rate to offset the inflation differential. Under a flexible 
exchange rate regime, money supply is exogenous; and through equations (6.1) and (6.2), 
price is determined. Equations (6.3) to (6.5) determine the nominal interest rate and exchange 
rate. On the other hand, under a fixed exchange rate system, money supply is exogenous, 
where the domestic price level is determined by Equation (6.5), while Equations (6.1) to (6.4) 
determines the real money balance in the domestic and foreign countries. What these indicate 
is that without alterations to the underlying structure of a model of exchange rate, the 
underlying regime of exchange rate specifies the set of independent variables. 
With the assumption that money supply could be exogenously determined by the monetary 
authorities in the domestic and foreign countries (that is 𝑚𝑠 = 𝑚 and 𝑚𝑠
∗
= 𝑚∗), if 
Equations (6.1) to (6.4) are combined, we will have: 
𝑝 − 𝑝∗ = (𝑚 − 𝑚∗) − 𝛼(𝑦 − 𝑦∗) + (𝑖 − 𝑖∗)                                              6.6 
The information in Equation (6.6) is that in consideration of the real domestic and foreign 
demand for money, price level in the domestic country will be lower (higher) than the price 
level in the foreign country by the extent to which the money supply in the domestic country 
is lower (higher) than money supply in the foreign country. If Equation (6.5) is substituted 
into Equation (6.8), we will obtain: 
𝑠 = (𝑚 − 𝑚∗) − 𝛼(𝑦 − 𝑦∗) + (𝑖 − 𝑖∗)                                               6.7 
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This is the Flexible-price monetary model of exchange rate determination which leads to an 
exchange rate equation depicting the nominal exchange rate as the relative price of two 
national monies (dependent variable) being determined by the independent variables which 
are the relative money supply, relative income and relative interest rate differential. This is a 
model which introduces the role of money supplies, inflationary expectations and economic 
growth as exchange rate changes determinants but based upon the premise that all prices 
within an economy are fully flexible. The model simply posits that what matter for exchange 
rate determination is money demand in relation to money supply and that this causes 
countries with high monetary growth to develop high inflationary expectations leading to 
reduction in demand to hold real money balances, increased expenditure on goods, increase 
in domestic price level and depreciation in currency so as to maintain the PPP (Pilbeam, 
2010). 
The assumption taken by Dornbusch (1976) is that prices are not perfectly flexible 
continuously. His argument is that in the short run, prices are very likely to be sticky thereby 
causing nominal interest rate changes to reflect in the contractionary monetary policy. Further 
assumption is that the PPP does not hold in the short run, but in the long run.99 This means 
that the PPP condition is temporarily violated when the short run price stickiness sets in, and 
consequently, the exchange rate has to reflect the monetary policy’s short term liquidity 
effect. Recalling the Fisher effect as indicating that the nominal interest rate is made up of 
real interest rate and expected inflation, if the differential of the spot exchange rate and the 
long run equilibrium rate as well as the differential of expected long run inflation between the 
domestic and foreign countries positively explain expected depreciation of the exchange rate, 
the following relationship evolves: 
                                                          
99 This follows Dornbusch (1976) and Frankel (1979). 
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𝐸(𝑠) = −𝜆 + (𝑠𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡) + 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 − 𝜋𝑡
𝑒∗                                        6.8 
where is 𝜆 the speed of adjustment to equilibrium while the bar over the variable denotes long 
run equilibrium. If the Fisher equation (𝑖 = 𝑟𝑡 + 𝜋
𝑒) and its foreign version are combined, 
they yield: 
𝑠𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡 =
1
𝜆
{(𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
𝑒) − (𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝜋𝑡
𝑒∗)}                                                6.9 
The simple explanation of Equation 6.9 is that the gap between spot rate and its long run 
equilibrium level is proportionate to the real interest rate differentials between two countries. 
As already stated, a stiff monetary policy is therefore required so as to raise interest rate 
differentials. The short run interest rate captures the liquidity effect. If PPP holds in the long 
run, this is represented as: 
?̅?𝑡 = ?̅?𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡
∗                                                              6.10 
It is further assumed that the differentials of interest rate and expected inflation must be equal 
thus:  
?̅?𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡
∗ = 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 − 𝜋𝑡
𝑒∗                                                           6.11 
We can consequently re-state equation (6.11) as: 
?̅?𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡 =
1
𝜆
{(𝑖?̅? − 𝑖𝑡) − (𝑖?̅?
∗ − 𝑖𝑡
∗)}                                              6.12 
The implication of equation (6.12) is that whenever nominal interest rate increases over and 
above its equilibrium level, exchange rates overshoots its long run rate. If equations (6.7), 
(6.11) and (6.12) are combined, they produce:  
𝑠𝑡 = (𝑚𝑡
∗ − 𝑚𝑡) − 𝛽𝑦(𝑦𝑡
∗ − 𝑦𝑡) + 𝛽𝜋(𝜋𝑡
𝑒∗  − 𝜋𝑡
𝑒)                                        6.13 
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By substituting equation (6.13) into (6.12) we obtain the sticky price monetary model 
(SPMM) thus: 
𝑠𝑡 = (𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑡
∗) − (𝑦 − 𝑦∗) − (𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗) + (𝜋𝑡
𝑒−𝜋𝑡
𝑒∗  )                             6.14                                       
The major innovation of the SPMM is that it emphasises capital-market arbitrage as major 
short-run determinant of exchange rates (rather than goods-market arbitrage which is viewed 
as medium to long run determinant). The model offers good explanations on why movements 
in international prices and changes in international money stocks account for exchange rate 
changes while clarifying that such movements are due to rationale foreign exchange market 
that yields exchange rates which exhibit deviations from PPP based on the realities of 
economic fundamentals and not in isolation from these fundamentals. This model also assists 
in explaining the reason why exchange rates experience volatility more than supposed 
determinants like money supply. 
Frankel (1979) developed the real interest differential monetary model (RIDMM) which 
accommodates here (FPMM and SPMM), with the introduction of interest rate differentials 
as additional explanatory variable that allows for the role of differences in secular inflation 
rates. The argument here is that changes in long term nominal interest rates serves as measure 
of changes in inflation expectations. His view is that it is only short term interest rate 
differential that moves independently of inflation. Long term interest rate differential is 
introduced into exchange rate models either because long term interest rate serves as the 
measure of the cost of holding money or rather because long term interest rate proxies for 
interest rate differential. From any of the two points of views, whenever domestic long term 
interest rate differential rises, there would be reduction in real money demand and 
consequently, higher prices and depreciation of currency. Drawing from the SPMM, the 
RIDMM assumes that the PPP is valid in the long run even if it fails to hold in the short run. 
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The mechanism of the postulation of the RIDMM points to the determination of the expected 
change in the exchange rate as: (a) the gap between the current spot rate and the long run 
equilibrium rate; and (b) the expected long run inflation differential. These could therefore be 
expressed in two-fold. Firstly as: 
𝐸(∆𝑠) = 𝑖 − 𝑖∗                                                            6.15 
which indicate that in the absence of uncertainty, but in situation of perfect capital mobility 
and neutrality of market participants, expected rate of domestic currency depreciation equals 
interest rate differential. Secondly as: 
𝐸(∆𝑠) = 𝜃(?̅? − 𝑠) + (∆𝑝𝑒 − ∆𝑝∗
𝑒
).                                 6.16 
which states that exchange rate is expected to return to its long run equilibrium value ?̅? at a 
proportional rate of  the current gap. The long run implication of ?̅? = 𝑠 is that the expected 
change to exchange rate is at a rate equal to the long run inflation  differential (∆𝑝𝑒 − ∆𝑝∗
𝑒
), 
and this equals the expected long run relative monetary growth rate. If equation (6.15) and 
(6.16) are combined in solving for 𝑠, we obtain: 
?̅? = 𝑠
1
𝜃
[(𝑖 − ∆𝑝𝑒) − (𝑖∗ − ∆𝑝∗
𝑒
)]                                            6.17 
Equation 6.17 specifies that when prices of goods are sticky in the short run, exchange rate 
overshoots its long run value only to converge on this long value when prices of goods adjust 
in the long run. What this equation is saying is that as tight monetary policy would lead to the 
rise in nominal interest differential above its long run level, capital inflow prompt rise in 
domestic currency above its equilibrium value in proportion to the expected real interest rate 
differential. 
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RIDMM as a general model combining the traits of the FPMM and SPMM, can be derived 
from Equation (6.17) through the identification of the long run equilibrium exchange rate 
determinants (the equilibrium relative price (?̅? = ?̅?*) which have the domestic and foreign 
equilibrium monetary conditions as the principal determinant). With the assumption of 
money market equilibrium (where 𝑖̅ = 𝑖̅∗ = ∆𝑝𝑒 − ∆𝑝∗
𝑒
 indicating that nominal interest rate 
differential is equal to inflation differential), we can express the expected equilibrium relative 
prices as a function of the relative money supply, relative income and the long run expected 
inflation differential, yielding: 
(?̅? − ?̅?∗) = (?̅? − ?̅?∗) − (?̅? − ?̅?∗) + 𝛽(∆𝑝 − ∆𝑝∗)                               6.18 
with the assumption that the equilibrium relative money supply and income are given by the 
current actual levels, if equation (6.17) is substituted into equation (6.18), we will have an 
equation representing the RIDMM thus: 
𝑠 = (𝑚 − 𝑚∗) − 𝛼(𝑦 − 𝑦∗) +
1
𝜃
(𝑖 − 𝑖∗) + (
1
𝜃
+ 𝛽) − (∆𝑝𝑒 − ∆𝑝∗
𝑒
)                     6.19 
If some right hand terms of equation (6.19) are rearranged, it can lead to a specification that 
reveals the RIDMM having a resemblance of FPMM, only for the inclusion of the real 
interest rate differential on the right hand side of the FPMM thus: 
𝑠 = (𝑚 − 𝑚∗) − 𝛼(𝑦 − 𝑦∗) + 𝛽(∆𝑝𝑒 − ∆𝑝∗
𝑒
)
1
𝜃
[(𝑖 − ∆𝑝𝑒) − (𝑖∗ − ∆𝑝∗
𝑒
)].                6.20 
If Equation 6.19 is rewritten, we obtain the reduced form of RIDMM as: 
𝑠 = (𝑚 − 𝑚∗) − 𝛼(𝑦 − 𝑦∗) + 𝛾(𝑖 − 𝑖∗) + 𝛿(∆𝑝𝑒 − ∆𝑝∗
𝑒
).                      6.21 
This equation shows that the RIDMM includes both the FPMM and SPMM. The 
clarifications made by the Frankel’s RIDMM is that if the set of real interest rate is at a 
disequilibrium, exchange rate will then deviate from its long run-run equilibrium value; and if 
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the real domestic interest rate falls below the real foreign interest rate, the exchange rate of 
the domestic currency will then be undervalued in relation to its long run equilibrium value in 
order to cause compensation in the form of an expected appreciation of the real exchange rate 
of the domestic currency. 
Nevertheless, the unrealistic assumption that financial assets (domestic and foreign) are 
perfect substitutes is a major shortcoming of the monetary models of exchange rate 
determination. As well, the theoretical literature give recognition to the influence of hedging, 
speculation and international trade and payments. Nevertheless, because of the peculiar 
nature and environment (economic, political and legal) of the developing countries, some 
distinct factors should be recognised in the modelling of exchange rate determination and 
behaviour in this class of countries. It is important to stress here again that the WAMZ 
economies under investigation operate sizeable proportion of informal economic activities 
which impact exchange rate behaviour. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the effects of 
the informal economy in the modelling of exchange determination and behaviour in these 
countries.  When the augmentations of informal economic activities and primary commodity 
price were introduced into the two monetary models of exchange rate determination for the 
WAMZ countries, the flexible price monetary model turned out as: 
𝑠𝑡 = 𝑚𝑑𝑡 − 𝑦𝑑𝑡 + 𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝑦𝑑𝑡 + 𝐶𝑃𝑡
𝑛                                              6.22 
while the real interest differential monetary model resulted in: 
𝑠𝑡 = 𝑚𝑑𝑡 − 𝑦𝑑𝑡 + 𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝜋𝑑𝑡
𝑒 + 𝑠𝑦𝑑𝑡 + 𝐶𝑃𝑡
𝑛                                  6.23 
Where 𝑚𝑑𝑡 , 𝑦𝑑𝑡 , 𝑖𝑑𝑡 , 𝑠𝑦𝑑𝑡 , 𝐶𝑃𝑡
𝑛 and 𝜋𝑑𝑡
𝑒  are of money stock differentials, real income 
differential, interest rate differentials, informal (shadow) economy’s real income differential, 
commodity price and long run inflation  differential respectively. What the flexible price 
monetary model of exchange rate determination in Equation 6.22 predicts here is that 
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exchange rates are affected by relative money supplies, relative levels of national income 
(formal and informal) and relative interest rate while these were controlled for by price of 
primary commodities. This is a novel step taken in exchange rate behaviour empirical 
literature. The augmentation of the theoretical structural models with the effects of informal 
economic activities and commodity prices as supplementary factors in explaining the 
dynamics of nominal exchange rates contributes to the resolution of extant empirical 
exchange rate disconnect puzzles in these developing nations.  
Failure of Monetary Models: Series of research methodologies involving econometric and 
statistical techniques have been applied to investigate currency parities in many researches on 
monetary models of exchange rate determination. Generally, in these past studies, these 
monetary models performed poorly as a very large number of empirical findings failed yield 
evidences in support of relationships between macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange 
rates under the floating exchange rate regimes. Most of these empirical works rejected the 
absolute PPP assumption which is the monetary models’ bedrock.100 Consequently, it can be 
suffice to state that the failure of these monetary models could be strongly ascribed to 
deviations of PPP as Smith and Wickens (1994) established that the rejection of the monetary 
models often emanated from the breakdown of the PPP assumptions. In spite of the devotion 
of attention of academic empirical researches to PPP deviations, Afat et al (2015) in a study 
of flexible exchange rate determination in OECD countries asserted that the failure of 
monetary models is due to the insufficiency of the Keynesian Money Demand Function 
which disregards intercountry money demand, particularly for currency parities comprising 
‘reserve currencies’ (US dollar, euro, pound sterling, Japanese yen) commonly traded with 
                                                          
100 Husted and MacDonald (1998), Groen (2000), Rapach and Wohar (2004), Sosvilla-Rivero and Garcia (2006), Uz and 
Kentenci (2008) Cerra and Saxena (2010). 
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internationally and which are only demanded for and kept in reserve by many monetary 
authorities, being reserve currencies for the purpose of maintaining financial stability and for 
intervention in the foreign exchange market as and when necessary. These global demand for 
these reserve currencies (particularly the euro and US dollar) for international trade and direct 
investment and for assets and currency swaps are huge but the implied assumption of the 
monetary model of exchange rate is that currency are not demanded as reserve currencies 
internationally. This narrow perception overlooks the various reasons for foreign currencies 
demand. This is a major drawback of these monetary models. Further highlights by Afat et al 
(2015) was that currency substitution (relating to demand for reserve currencies which are 
parallel (or as alternatives) to domestic currencies) is a crucial in negatively impacting the 
mechanism of these monetary models. An instance is a situation in which foreign currency is 
a reserve currency while the domestic currency is not and in this case, there should 
appropriately be appreciation of nominal exchange rate whenever there is increase in the 
home country’s real income, however in real sense, because it is impossible to separate the 
demand for domestic currency from the demand for foreign (reserve) currency, there may not 
be appreciation of domestic currency as expected. Another shortcoming of the monetary 
models identified is the restriction imposed on econometric model (which requires one-to-one 
relationship between money supply and price levels) by the decomposition of real money 
balances and the use of money supply and price level individually as entrenched in the 
underlying PPP theory. Also, while these monetary models assume stable income elasticity 
and interest rate semi-elasticity, it is very possible that these may not be achievable due to 
financial crises, developments in the financial systems and changes in banking sector 
regulations (like the use of bank cards taking prominence over the use of physical cash). 
These are some of the fundamental flaws of monetary models of exchange rate determination. 
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6.2.2 Data and Methods 
Data (annual and quarterly) generally spanning between 1980 and 2015 on US dollar/WAMZ 
countries' bilateral exchange rates and fundamental data of money supply, nominal interest 
rates, inflation, real GDP, estimated real GDP of the informal economy, and primary 
commodity price were employed for the six WAMZ countries for the purpose of exchange 
rate determination in the WAMZ. Appropriate cross-rate conversions were made to generate 
bilateral exchange rates among the WAMZ countries. 
The monetary model constructed here considered the extent of informal economy in member 
countries. As earlier indicated in Chapter 3, estimates of the sizes of informal economy 
incorporated into the monetary models here were generated with the application of the 
Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) modelling.101 These secondary data 
(percentages) of shadow economies as generated by Medina and Schneider (2018) were 
employed for the estimation of the real GDP of the informal economy as percentages of the 
formal real GDP. Informal real GDP estimated over the period between 2001 and 2015 were 
in line with the related percentages exhibited in Table 3.1. 
Apart from incorporating informal economic activities in the modelling of exchange rate 
determination here, the monetary models were further augmented with the effects of primary 
commodity price, given the fact that the WAMZ countries under assessment are primary 
commodity producing countries. Although, market powers of a country in the world 
commodity market is a source of endogeneity and there is the possibility that WAMZ 
commodity exporting countries hold market powers in the world commodity market. It may 
therefore be inappropriate to augment these monetary models with country-specific 
commodity price indices due to the potential problem of endogeneity that could bias the 
                                                          
101 MIMIC is a special type of structural equation model (SEM) which is frequently used in literature. 
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estimates. Nevertheless, country-specific weighted commodity price indices in relation to the 
generalised ‘world commodity price indices’ estimated for each WAMZ country were 
applied in these respects in order to avoid (or reduce) potential endogeneity. For individual 
WAMZ countries, this study applied the specific class of indices into which the top export 
commodities of each country fall. The percentage of these top primary export commodities in 
the total exports were applied as weights to these class-index to generate country indices 
applied in this work.  
For estimations based on annual data, the macroeconomic fundamentals in the models were 
expressed in the annual percentage change difference between those of the five WAMZ 
countries (The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) and that of Nigeria (a 
possible lead economy). This approach was applied in order to generate more stable results 
when seasonal effects in the data are removed and when noise are removed from the short 
term movements in the exchange rate and the explanatory fundamentals. The estimations of 
the two exchange rate determination models built here were performed in two-fold. In the 
first instance, the model estimations were carried out from the perspective of the US dollar 
bilateral exchange rates of the six countries. In the second instance, the Nigerian naira 
bilateral exchange rate of the five other WAMZ countries were estimated. The reason for the 
second instance estimation is the big size of the exchange market of Nigeria which may 
absorb other exchange markets in the event of the monetary union coming into fruition due to 
the fact that these five other economies sharing less than 20% of the total GDP of the entire 
proposed monetary zone will be in a monetary integration in which Nigeria is big enough to 
dominate with her strong economic forces that can cause the country to solely determine the 
proposed single official exchange rate for the proposed union. Apart from checking the 
similarities (or otherwise) in the expected signs of coefficients of the fundamentals, the 
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inclusion of commodity price index further reveals the similarities (or otherwise) in the role 
of commodity price in determining exchange rate movements in the WAMZ.   
In the annual data evaluation, the two monetary models of exchange rate determination were 
estimated with the application of the Canonical Cointegrating Regression (CCR), Dynamic 
Ordinary Least Square (DOLS) regression and Markov Switching Dynamic (MSD) 
regression approaches for country estimation and Random Effect (Generalised Least Square) 
estimation of panel data of the six WAMZ countries in order to answer the pertinent question 
relating to the homogeneity of exchange rate behaviour in the six WAMZ countries was 
further performed. The questions to answer by the application of this approach on exchange 
rates of these countries are about: (i) the linearity of exchange rate behaviour; (ii) the major 
dynamics characterising exchange rate behaviour; (iii) the key fundamentals that determine 
regime switches and the uniformity in the forces driving regime switches as a well as the 
roles played by the fundamentals in this regard. The CCR and DOLS methods were applied 
to establish if the signs of the fundamentals are comparatively, in line with the theoretical 
expected signs and to determine homogeneities across the proposed member countries of the 
WAMZ in this respect. The application of the MSDR was meant to assess the pattern of the 
time-varying influence of macroeconomic fundamentals on exchange rate movements in 
these countries. The motivation for the application of a more sophisticated estimation of the 
models of exchange rate fundamental determination through the MSDR was prompted by the 
poor explanatory powers of the structural monetary models of exchange rate determination in 
the ordinary sense.  
Exchange rates are one of the many economic and financial time series that undergo periods 
in which the series behaviour changes quite dramatically when compared to what was 
exhibited during the previous period. The time series behaviour could be of change over time 
in terms of volatility, its value or rather the extent to which its current value is related to its 
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past value. The time series may have 'structural break' when its behaviour may change once 
and for all. In some regards, the series may change for a time period before reverting back to 
its original behaviour or rather experience 'regime switch' in which case the series switch to 
another style of behaviour due to wars, financial panics, government policy changes etc. A 
possible approach towards solving this apparent problem of time series shifts is to split data 
around the time of change and estimate separate model for each segment. Such model should 
be flexible enough to allow different types of behaviour at different point in time. Markov 
switching regression method belongs to the category of regime switching methods that allow 
this. Markov switching dynamic (MSD) regression is a useful tool to apply in describing 
exchange rate behaviour due to regime changes in the real world of economies and finances. 
It defines two or more states/regimes. Therefore, the approach vividly reveals the dynamic 
process and behaviour of variables of interest and give researcher a clear idea of how the 
variable evolved in the past as well as the possible future dynamics. The econometric 
equations of the FPMM and RIDMM models in Equations 6.22 and 6.23 above are expressed 
below for estimation with CRR, DOLS and MSD regressions: 
∆𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚∆𝑚𝑑𝑡 − 𝛽𝑦∆𝑦𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖∆𝑖𝑑𝑡 − 𝛽𝑠𝑦∆𝑠𝑦𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑝∆𝐶𝑃𝑡
𝑛+ 𝜀𝑡                     6.24 
and 
∆𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚∆𝑚𝑑𝑡 − 𝛽𝑦∆𝑦𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖∆𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝𝑡𝑒∆𝜋𝑑𝑡
𝑒 − 𝛽
𝑠𝑦
∆𝑠𝑦𝑑
𝑡
+ 𝛽
𝑐𝑝
∆𝐶𝑃
𝑡
𝑛 + 𝜀𝑡                 6.25                                                                                                                   
where ∆ indicates one-year percentage change in the respective independent variables and 
exchange rate. In the MSD regression, the coefficients 𝛼 and 𝛽 depends of state variables 
which may be (1) or (2). Exchange rates and fundamentals in these models are expressed in 
one-year percentage changes because PPP which is a crucial element of the monetary models 
holds for differences, rather than holding at levels. For the MSD regressions, this approach 
yields the possibility of reducing noise in the observations as well as taking care of seasonal 
effects of the data involved. All coefficients are allowed to switch in between states. These 
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coefficients are dependent on the regime variables. The transition probabilities are of greater 
interest. The method allows the probabilities transition matrix to vary/change so as to 
conform to the Markov switching monetary models of exchange rate and the time varying 
transition probabilities models. Further to the application of annual data to the assessments of 
the FPMM and the RIDMM, higher frequency quarterly data were equally applied. These 
data span over the period between 1995Q1 and 2015Q4. These evaluation were necessary to 
provide further insights into the investigations of the performance of these monetary models, 
drawing from the fact that long run relationships are better captured in analyses with high 
frequency data. 
For the econometric estimation of FPMM, relative money supply is expected to be positive 
and unity, domestic output is hypothesised to be negative while nominal interest rate is 
expected to be positive. Increase in domestic money stock relative to foreign money supply 
leads to a rise in exchange rate, implying a fall in domestic currency’s value. On the other 
hand, when domestic output increases, there is domestic currency appreciation. Domestic 
currency depreciates when there is a rise in interest rate because such increase causes 
reduction in domestic money demand. When relative domestic real income rises, this prompts 
excess demand for domestic money, all other things being equal. When economic agents 
attempt to increase their real money balance, this would cause domestic residents to reduce 
expenditure, and consequently, price would fall until money market equilibrium is achieved. 
The fall in domestic prices (when foreign prices are constant) amounts to domestic currency 
appreciation, according to the PPP theory. On the RIDMM, the argument of Frankel (1979) 
was that the change in nominal interest rate is a reflection of changes in monetary policy 
tightness and that the reason for increase in domestic interest rate (relative to foreign interest 
rate) is the contractions in domestic money supply relative to domestic money demand 
without a fall in price to match this. Domestic interest rates higher than foreign interest rates 
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attract capital inflows, leading to instant appreciation of domestic currency. Consequently, in 
RIDMM, there is negative relationship between exchange rates and nominal interest rate 
differentials. Drawing from an assumptions of FPMM, nominal interest rates are reflections 
of expected inflation changes. There is a rise in domestic nominal interest rate because of the 
expectation that domestic price would, through inflation and depreciation, lose its value. 
Demand for domestic currency (relative to the demand for foreign currency would fall 
causing the domestic currency to depreciate (increase the exchange rate). 
6.2.3 Findings and Results 
The implications of the outcomes the ADF and PP unit roots tests for the variables employed 
in the estimation of the monetary models of exchange rate determination for the WAMZ 
countries are expressed in Table 6.1 below.  
Table 6.1: Results Unit Roots Tests for the Variables of Exchange Rate Determination 
Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Nominal Exchange Rate (US 
Dollar) 
Nominal Exchange Rate(NGR 
Naira) 
Relative Money Supply (US) 
Relative Money Supply (NGR) 
Relative Real Interest Rate (US) 
Relative Real Interest (NGR) 
Relative Nominal Interest (US) 
Relative Nominal Interest (NGR) 
Relative Real Income (US) 
Relative Real Income  (NGR) 
Relative Expected Inflation (US) 
Relative Expected Inflation (NGR) 
Oil Commodity Price: I(1) 
Non-fuel Commodity Price: I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
I(0) 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(2) 
I(0) 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(2) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(2) 
I(1) 
I(2) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(2) 
I(0) 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(2) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
I(1) 
na 
I(2) 
na 
I(0) 
na) 
I(1) 
na 
I(1) 
na 
I(0) 
na 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(2) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
Source: Author's estimations. Note: ADF and PP unit root tests were carried out at 5% level of significance 
'US' indicates variables for the US dollar based models while 'NGR' variables are for the Nigerian naira-based 
models. 
The variables of exchange rate determination for both the US dollar rate and the Nigerian 
naira rates reported a mix of stationarity, first-order integration and second order integration. 
All non-stationary variables were made stationary according to the respective orders of 
integration. 
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The first task was to examine if the fundamentals yield the expected theoretically 
hypothesised signs in the two monetary modelling (FPMM and RIDMM), in the two 
instances of modelling and estimation (US dollar rate and the Nigerian naira rates).  
Homogeneity in these expected signs among the WAMZ countries were also evaluated, given 
the necessity for the underlying properties and fundamentals of exchange rate determination 
in these countries to behave in similar manner if the adoption of the future single exchange 
would be appropriate for all. Table 6.2 below exhibits these expected signs and explanatory 
powers of the fundamental's coefficients of the exchange rates applied. 
Table 6.2: Expected Signs of Coefficients of Fundamentals in Monetary Models of Exchange Rate 
Determination 
Fundamentals/Models Flexible Price Model Real Interest Diff. Model 
Relative Money Stock 
Relative Real Income 
Relative Nominal Interest Rate 
Commodity Price Shock 
Relative Real Interest Rate 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
not applicable 
+ (>0) 
-(˂0) 
-(˂0) 
+ 
+(>0) 
 Source: Theoretical Literature 
The results of the CCR and DOLS estimations performed are shown in Table 6.3 below for 
the US dollar and the Nigerian naira rates. We can remarkably observe that relative money 
stock coefficients generate the expected positive signs for all the six countries in the CCR and 
DOLS regressions of the FPMM and the DOLS estimations of the RIDMM. It is interesting 
to note that all the fundamentals for The Gambia (reported as the most economically stable of 
all) and Nigeria (the largest economy) generated the expected coefficient in the FPM model 
in both CCR and DOLS estimations. For the RIDMM, all the fundamentals of The Gambia 
and Nigeria produced the expected coefficient signs. It is apparent that at least two-third of 
the WAMZ countries had two of their fundamentals money supply and nominal interest rates 
(which are two strong monetary policy instruments) yielding the same coefficient signs in the 
two monetary models of exchange rate determination when the two estimation methods were 
employed. 
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Table 6.3: Cointegrating Equation Estimation Coefficients and Signs of the Fundamentals in the US 
Dollar/WAMZ Exchange Rates Determination Modelling 
Flexible Price Monetary Model: Canonical Cointegrating Regression (CCR) 
Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Relative Money Stock 
Relative Real Income 
Relative Nominal Interest Rate 
Commodity Price Shock 
+0.570* 
-1.29** 
+0.056* 
+0.001 
+0.961* 
-1.265** 
+0.010 
-0.006 
+1.780* 
-1.795*** 
+0.005 
-0.015 
+2.374* 
+0.680 
-0.103* 
-0.087 
+0.803* 
-2.029 
+0.051* 
+0.003 
+1.116* 
-0.816 
+0.014* 
-0.012 
Flexible Price Monetary Model: Dynamic Ordinary Least Square (DOLS) 
Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Relative Money Stock 
Relative Real Income 
Relative Nominal Interest Rate 
Commodity Price Shock 
+0.444* 
-0.609 
+0.074* 
+0.001 
+0.895* 
+1.161 
+0.005 
-0.026 
+1.486* 
-16.373 
-0.045 
+0.000 
+2.131* 
+0.265 
-0.051 
-0.087 
+0.803* 
-3.636* 
+0.055* 
+0.003 
+1.116* 
-0.0871 
+0.006 
-0.012 
Real Interest Rate Differential Monetary Model: Canonical Cointegrating Regression (CCR) 
Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Relative Money Stock 
Relative Real Income 
Relative Nominal Interest Rate 
Relative Real Interest Rate 
Commodity Price Shock 
+0.621* 
-1.391** 
+0.052* 
-0.004 
+0.001 
+0.948* 
-1.435* 
+0.011*** 
+0.003 
-0.004 
+0.980* 
-0.206 
-0.001 
-0.007** 
-0.013* 
+2.434* 
+0.759* 
-0.098* 
-0.007 
-0.092* 
+0.979* 
-1.845*** 
+0.056* 
-0.002 
+0.001 
+1.118* 
-1.018* 
+0.011* 
-0.007* 
-0.009* 
Real Interest Differential Monetary Model: Dynamic Ordinary Least Square (DOLS) 
Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Relative Money Stock 
Relative Real Income 
Relative Nominal Interest Rate 
Relative Real Interest Rate 
Commodity Price Shock 
+0.520* 
-0.703 
+0.068 
-0.004 
+0.000 
+0.911* 
+0.438 
+0.002 
+0.005 
-0.018** 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
+4.298 
+4.103 
-0.087 
-0.063 
-0.219 
+0.898* 
-3.529* 
+0.039* 
-0.011 
+0.015*** 
+1.300* 
-0.459 
+0.002 
-0.018** 
-0.018 
    Source: Author's Estimation and EViews7 Output 
The coefficient of commodity price consistently produced its expected positive signs in The 
Gambia and Nigeria, all through. The percentage achievements of the expected coefficient 
signs (country by country) within the application of the monetary models and the two 
estimation methods are as shown in Table 6.4 below.  
Table 6.4: Percentage Achievements of the Generation of Expected Fundamentals Coefficient Signs of the 
US Dollar/WAMZ Exchange Rates Modelling 
 FPM Model RIDM Model Overall 
 CCR (%) DOLS (%) CCR (%) DOLS (%)  
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
100 
75 
75 
25 
100 
75 
100 
50 
75 
25 
100 
75 
100 
60 
60 
40 
100 
80 
100 
40 
na 
40 
100 
80 
100% 
56% 
70% 
33% 
100% 
78% 
     Source: Author's Estimation and EViews Output  
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Liberia scored the least in both models at 25% and 40% respectively for FPM and RIDM 
models. Ghana also had the least of 40% in the DOLS estimation of the RIDM model. The 
Gambia and Nigeria both had the overall 100% achievements, followed by Sierra Leone 
(78%) and Guinea (70%). On the overall, Liberia score the least of 33% achievements; and 
this indicates that Liberia's exchange rate determination fundamentals were least fit to 
consider in the determination of an eventual single exchange rate for the future monetary 
union, whereas, the models for The Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone were able to show 
'good fit' in the estimations. 
Table 6.5: Panel Data Estimation Coefficients and Signs of Fundamentals of the 
 Nigerian Naira/WAMZ Exchange Rates 
Flexible Price Monetary Model 
 
Fundamentals 
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect (GLS) 
Relative Money Stock 
Relative Real Income 
Relative Interest Rate 
Commodity Price Shock 
Corr(𝜇𝑖,𝑥𝑏): 
F/χ2: 
Rho: 
-0.814* 
+0.353* 
-0.009 
+0.005* 
-0.723 
0.00 
0.98 
+0.580* 
-1.173* 
+0.0100 
+0.000 
 
0.00 
0.33 
Real Interest Rate Differential Model 
 
Fundamentals 
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect (GLS) 
Relative Money Stock 
Relative Real Income 
Relative Nominal Interest Rate 
Relative Real Interest Rate 
Commodity Price Shock 
Corr(𝜇𝑖,𝑥𝑏): 
F/χ2: 
Rho: 
+0.832* 
+0.449* 
-0.007 
+0.004** 
+0.003 
-0.783 
0.00 
0.58 
+0.566* 
-1.175* 
+0.006 
-0.010*** 
+0.004 
 
0.00 
0.35 
  Source: Author's Estimation and Stata 14 Output 
The results of the unbalanced panel data Fixed Effects (FE) and Random Effects -Generalised 
Least Square (RE-GLS) estimations of the two augmented models of exchange rate 
determination for the WAMZ in the context of the Nigerian naira exchange rates of the other 
five member countries are presented in Table 6.6 above. The results of the RE-GLS 
estimations of the two monetary models were considered due to the negative correlation of 
explanatory variable and the unobserved heterogeneity across clusters at  𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜇𝑖 𝑥𝑏) =
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−0.783, which caused the rejection of the FE estimations results. The panel data 
fundamentals employed for the two monetary models generated the theoretically 
hypothesised signs in the RE (GLS) estimations at joint statistical significance. What these 
imply for the future currency union is that the fundamental determinants of exchange rates 
within the zone work well in consonance with theoretical postulations (and as desired) 
towards exchange rate integration when the largest economy within the zone (Nigeria) was 
factored into the exchange rate determination.  
A common reflection of the explanatory powers of the coefficients of the estimated exchange 
rate fundamentals as reported in Table 6.5 above was the low explanatory powers of the 
relative nominal interest rate, relative real interest rates and the commodity price shocks 
(which are much more insignificant) in explaining exchange rates movements in the six 
countries. These have huge implications for these fundamentals in powerfully influencing the 
proposed single exchange rate. The generated coefficients of relative money supply in all the 
WAMZ countries which yielded the theoretical postulated signs, are all statistically 
significant at 1% level of significance, though for The Gambia and Nigeria, they were less 
than one when they should theoretical be more than one. Surprisingly, relative real income 
coefficients (expected to be less than one), were greater than one intermittently for the six 
countries in FPMM and RIDMM estimations as well as the random effect panel data 
estimations. Although, monetary models of exchange rate determination were attractive, they 
worked within some assumptions, some of which are the free adjustment towards the 
equilibrium exchange rate and supply and demand in the foreign exchange market, perfect 
substitutability of domestic foreign assets etc. Given these and due to the difficulties in the 
application of the monetary models uniformly to all countries as evident by deviations of the 
coefficient signs generated from the theory-backed expectations, owing to different economic 
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situations and dissimilarities in behaviours, Markov switching regime process of changes in 
exchange rates serves as alternatives.  
Markov Switching Dynamic (MSD) Regression methods were applied to the two monetary 
models of exchange rate determination to estimate the regime switching behaviours of the US 
dollar and the Nigerian naira exchange rates of the WAMZ countries, in which all the 
fundamentals were allowed to switch. The comparative results of the MSD regressions of the 
FPMM and RIDMM of the US dollar exchange rates are exhibited in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 
below respectively. For the PFMM, the levels of persistence range from 0.64 to 0.97. The 
Gambia and Nigeria each record the highest probability of 0.97 of remaining in the first state, 
translating into expected duration of 38.5 years and 31.59 years respectively, while Liberia 
and Guinea has the lowest of 0.88 years and 0.81 years respectively. In regime two, Nigeria 
has the lowest probability of 0.64 and the lowest expected duration of 2.8 years.  
The Gambia's highest transition probability under this regime translates into 16.57 years of 
expected duration. Relatively, The Gambia had the most stable expected duration time of all 
the six WAMZ countries, followed by Nigeria and Ghana. Guinea reported to be the least 
volatile in the entire process.  In spite of these implications, the best fitted FPM model was 
that of Liberia with the lowest AIC, HQIC and SBIC values, while the log likelihood results 
infer Guinea (with the highest log likelihood value) as having the maximum likelihood 
maximisation procedure that gives the best result at -20.161. For the MSD regression of the 
RIDMM of the US dollar exchange rates, The Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone had the highest 
probability of remaining in the first regime and high expected duration of 39.42, 29.04 and 
39.70 years respectively. In the second regime. The Gambia and Sierra Leone keep the 
highest levels of persistence, both of 0.94 transition probabilities and highest expectation 
durations of 18.14 and 17.35 years respectively. 
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Table 6.6: Comparative Statistics and Fundamental Coefficients of Markov Switching Dynamic 
Regressions (US Dollar/WAMZ Currencies) 
Annual Flexible Price Monetary Model 
Fundamentals Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
∆Relative Money Supply: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
∆Relative Real Income: 
State1  
State 2 
∆Relative Nominal Interest: 
State1:  
State 2: 
∆Commodity Price Shock: 
State1:  
State 2: 
Transition Probability: 
P11: 
P22: 
Expected Duration: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
Standard Deviation (Sigma): 
AIC: 
HQIC: 
SBIC: 
Log Likelihood 
No. of Observations: 
 
-1.855 
6.178* 
 
-3.786 
-29.057* 
 
0.018*** 
0.193 
 
-0.144* 
0.582*** 
 
0.97 
0.94 
 
38.50 
16.57 
2.176 
5.454 
5.653 
6.038 
-79.721 
34 
 
0.552* 
2.77* 
 
21.921 
262.596* 
 
-0.068 
0.555* 
 
-1.173* 
0.851 
 
0.96 
0.75 
 
27.05 
3.96 
15.46 
9.485 
9.682 
10.080 
-138.755 
32 
 
0.637* 
0.067*** 
 
10.728* 
-12.489 
 
-0.046* 
-0.016* 
 
-0.100* 
-0.004 
 
0.81 
0.86 
 
5.40 
7.11 
0.43 
3.159 
3.299 
3.805 
-20.161 
21 
 
0.019 
0.690* 
 
-0.035 
2.124* 
 
-0.05* 
0.016* 
 
-0.009 
0.030* 
 
0.88 
0.78 
 
0.31 
8.34 
4.54 
2.044 
2.243 
2.628 
-21.744 
34 
 
0.033 
2.266** 
 
7.080 
186.57* 
 
0.026 
0.793* 
 
0.136 
9.861* 
 
0.97 
0.64 
 
31.59 
2.80 
1.97 
8.942 
9.141 
9.526 
-139.013 
34 
 
0.535 
17.662* 
 
-3.049 
115.033* 
 
0.329 
-0.210* 
 
-0.117 
4.604* 
 
0.93 
0.71 
 
15.28 
3.41 
8.94 
8.554 
8.753 
9.140 
-132.424 
34 
Source: Author's Estimation and Stata 14 Output  
In the current regime, the lowest probability of 0.87 was recorded by Liberia as Guinea had 
the lowest of 0.0 in the second regime. Nigeria and Liberia recorded second regime's lowest 
expected duration of 1.89 and 1 years respectively. Liberia has the least process volatility of 
0.35 in the RIDMM estimations, the best fitted model with the lowest AIC, HQIC and SBIC 
values and the model yielding the best result in the maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure. The Nigeria naira/WAMZ currencies exchange rates were equally applied to the 
two monetary models of exchange rate determination (FPMM and RIDMM) in the MSD 
regressions. 
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Table 6.7: Comparative Statistics and Fundamental Coefficients of Markov Switching Dynamic 
Regressions (US Dollar/WAMZ Currencies) 
Annual Data Real Interest Rate Differential Monetary Model 
Fundamentals Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
∆Relative Money Supply: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
∆Relative Real Income: 
State1  
State 2 
∆Relative Nominal Interest: 
State1:  
State 2: 
∆Relative Real Interest Rate 
State1:  
State 2: 
∆Commodity Price Shock: 
State1:  
State 2 
Transition Probability: 
P11: 
P22: 
Expected Duration: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
Standard Deviation (Sigma): 
AIC: 
HQIC: 
SBIC: 
Log Likelihood: 
No. of Observations: 
 
-1.914* 
6.276* 
 
-4.049 
-80.450* 
 
0.0181** 
0.317* 
 
0.003 
0.046* 
 
-0.150* 
-0.066 
 
0.97 
0.94 
 
39.42 
18.14 
2.19 
5.541 
5.771 
6.214 
-79.196 
34 
 
0.545* 
2.760* 
 
20.264 
269.889 
 
-0.06 
0.520** 
 
0.016 
0.029 
 
-1.115* 
0.746 
 
0.97 
0.75 
 
29.04 
3.96 
15.00 
9.478 
9.708 
10.151 
-146.128 
34 
 
-0.009 
-0.158* 
 
1.928* 
109.98* 
 
-0.013** 
0.024 
 
-0.003 
-0.006 
 
-0.024* 
-1.357* 
 
0.91 
0.00 
 
11.71 
1.00 
1.17 
4.460 
4.690 
5.134 
-60.827 
34 
 
-0.103* 
0.242** 
 
0.108*** 
1.930* 
 
0.003 
0.040* 
 
0.002* 
0.004** 
 
0.005 
0.025 
 
0.87 
0.51 
 
7.47 
2.04 
0.35 
2.368 
2.598 
3.041 
-25.255 
34 
 
0.016 
1.404* 
 
16.720*** 
556.89* 
 
0.001 
-0.288 
 
-0.002 
0.158* 
 
-0.01 
5.907* 
 
0.93 
0.47 
 
13.99 
1.89 
9.15 
8.734 
8.964 
9.408 
-133.48 
34 
 
0.005 
14.612 
 
-2.426 
180.952* 
 
0.036** 
0.367 
 
0.001 
-0.155* 
 
0.065 
4.497 
 
0.97 
0.94 
 
39.70 
17.35 
5.98 
7.591 
7.821 
8.265 
-114.057 
34 
Source: Author's Estimation and Stata 14 Output  
. The results of the regressions are displayed in Table 6.8 and 6.9 below. For the FPMM 
model estimations, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone generated the transition probabilities, 
each of 0.93 and respective expected durations of 13.80, 14.18 and 14.23 years. Liberia, 
which exhibited the lowest probability of 0.01 in the first regime, displayed the highest of the 
second regime probability at 0.90 translating into the longest 10.38 years. Ghana has the 
lowest process volatility of 1.21, the best fitted FPMMs that gave the best estimation results. 
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Table 6.8: Comparative Statistics and Fundamental Coefficients of Markov Switching Dynamic 
Regressions (Nigerian Naira/WAMZ Currencies) 
Annual Data Flexible Price Monetary Model 
Fundamentals Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia S/Leone 
∆Relative Money Supply: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
∆Relative Real Income: 
State1  
State 2 
∆Relative Nominal Interest: 
State1:  
State 2: 
∆Commodity Price Shock: 
State1:  
State 2: 
Transition Probability: 
P11: 
P22: 
Expected Duration: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
Standard Deviation (Sigma): 
AIC: 
HQIC: 
SBIC: 
Log Likelihood 
No. of Observations: 
 
0.572 
34.787* 
 
8.064** 
620.555* 
 
-0.022 
6.310* 
 
0.029 
11.067* 
 
0.93 
0.73 
 
13.80 
3.71 
38.64(6.08) 
8.830 
9.045 
9.459 
-136.117 
34 
 
-0.160 
3.430 
 
1.832 
-0.120* 
 
-0.770* 
0.398* 
 
-0.337 
0.397 
 
0.57 
0.62 
 
2.31 
3.22 
1.21(4.55) 
6.809 
7.021 
7.450 
-94.938 
32 
 
-0.004 
-0.051* 
 
-1.831 
-97.181* 
 
-0.007 
-1.537* 
 
-0.193 
2.630* 
 
0.93 
0.30 
 
14.18 
1.43 
4.12 
6.961 
7.160 
7.554 
-105.332 
34 
 
75.522* 
3.942** 
 
-33.032 
-6.126 
 
9.434* 
-0.084 
 
-15.230* 
0.880 
 
0.01 
0.90 
 
1.00 
10.38 
32.46 
10.957 
11.156 
11.541 
-173.277 
34 
 
0.006 
-0.785 
 
1.149 
-79.95* 
 
0.036 
-0.325** 
 
0.102 
4.255* 
 
0.93 
0.74 
 
14.23 
3.84 
6.57 
7.921 
8.121 
8.505 
-121.666 
34 
Source: Author's Estimation and Stata 14 Output  
In the regressions of the RIDMM, Sierra Leone recorded the highest probability of remaining 
in the current regime at 0.93, with the longest expected duration of 14.26 years; and followed 
by Guinea and The Gambia, both at 0.93 probabilities with 13.02 and 12.41 years expected 
durations respectively. At regime 2, Sierra Leone also recorded the highest probability of 
0.93 of remaining in the current regime, with the longest duration of 13.58 years. As we had 
in the FPMM for the Nigerian naira based exchange rates, Ghana generated the least process 
standard deviation of 2.62 for the RIDMM estimations as well as the best fitted model in the 
ML procedures and the best results given the lowest AIC, HQIC and SBIC statistics. 
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Table 6.9: Comparative Statistics and Fundamental Coefficients of Markov Switching Dynamic 
Regressions (Nigerian Naira/WAMZ Currencies) 
Annual Data Real Interest Rates Differential Monetary Model 
Fundamentals Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia S/Leone 
∆Relative Money Supply: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
∆Relative Real Income: 
State1  
State 2 
∆Relative Nominal Interest: 
State1:  
State 2: 
∆Relative Real Interest Rate: 
State1:  
State 2: 
∆Commodity Price Shock: 
State1:  
State 2 
Transition Probability: 
P11: 
P22: 
Expected Duration: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
Standard Deviation (Sigma): 
AIC: 
HQIC: 
SBIC: 
Log Likelihood 
No. of Observations: 
 
-1.672 
74.157* 
 
14.892 
333.62** 
 
0.116 
4.035* 
 
0.103 
0.212* 
 
0.430 
-20.170 
 
0.92 
0.30 
 
12.41 
1.43 
32.24 
11.190 
11.420 
11.864 
-175.23 
34 
 
-0.004 
0.124** 
 
-4.873 
25.954* 
 
0.014 
-0.306* 
 
-0.05* 
-0.02* 
 
0.045 
0.393** 
 
0.69 
0.51 
 
2.31 
3.22 
2.62 
6.809 
7.021 
7.450 
-89.407 
32 
 
0.000 
-0.867* 
 
2.254 
-96.410* 
 
0.007 
-1.491* 
 
-0.002 
0.017* 
 
0.250** 
2.437 
 
0.92 
0.29 
 
13.02 
1.41 
3.80 
6.918 
7.150 
7.593 
-105.332 
34 
 
73.788* 
3.634** 
 
-34.590 
-6.922** 
 
8.668* 
0.108 
 
-0.393* 
-0.005 
 
-8.789* 
0.820** 
 
0.53 
0.93 
 
2.13 
13.58 
20.38 
10.278 
10.508 
10.951 
-159.726 
34 
 
0.002 
0.782 
 
1.222 
-79.481* 
 
0.035 
0.320** 
 
0.000*** 
0.002 
 
0.102 
4.244* 
 
0.93 
0.74 
 
14.26 
3.88 
6.57 
8.038 
8.268 
8.712 
-123.537 
34 
Source: Author's Estimation and Stata 14 Output  
The implications of high probability of remaining within the same regime for a country's 
currency is infrequent switches from one regime to another. From the results of the MSD 
regressions of the PFMM and RIDMM of the US dollar exchange rates, we can infer that The 
Gambia dalasi, the Nigerian naira and Sierra Leonean leone have transition probabilities 
higher than others implying  long expected durations. However, these failed to hold for The 
Gambian dalasi in the Nigerian naira exchange rates estimations in which Sierra Leonean 
leone took the lead. The disturbing observation was that many of the coefficients of the 
fundaments in the two models estimations do not yield the expected and there are more 
statistically significant fundamental coefficients in the second regime than the first regime 
outcomes. 
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For the quarterly data evaluation of the FPMM and RIDMM in the WAMZ, the results of the 
unit root tests of all the variables employed are exhibited in Table 6.10 below. These results 
reflects mixed orders of integration. Majority of these variables are non-stationary. Except for 
two exchange rate variables (The Gambia/Sierra Leone and Liberia/Sierra Leone), nominal 
exchange rate variables and commodity price index variables are all stationary.  
Table 6.10: Results of ADF Unit Roots Tests of Exchange Rates Determination Variables of the WAMZ 
Home 
& Foreign 
Country 
 
Exchange 
Rate 
 
Money 
Supply 
 
Formal 
Real 
Income 
 
Interest 
Rate 
 
Inflation 
Differential 
 
Informal 
Real 
Income 
 
Commodity 
Price 
Index 
GAMBIA 
Ghana: 
Guinea: 
Liberia: 
Nigeria: 
S/Leone: 
 
-1.490 
-1.269 
-2.103 
-2.191 
-3.164** 
 
-0.087 
-0.947 
-1.866 
-1.574 
-0.379 
 
-0.235 
3.904* 
4.460* 
-2.717** 
-0.907 
 
2.185 
-1.604 
-0.759 
-1.758 
-1.022 
 
-3.644* 
-2.979** 
-1.8613 
-3.719* 
-2.721* 
 
-0.732 
-2.020 
-3.563* 
-0.981 
-2.732** 
 
-1.098 
-1.063 
-0.887 
-1.815 
-3.098* 
GHANA 
Gambia: 
Guinea: 
Liberia: 
Nigeria: 
S/Leone: 
 
-1.490 
-1.461 
-2.281 
-1.592 
-1.520 
 
-0.087 
-1.408 
-2.250 
-0.377 
-0.434 
 
-2.275 
-0.235 
-4.160* 
-1.824 
-2.692 
 
-2.185 
-0.883 
-1.584 
-3.906* 
-1.798 
 
-3.644* 
-3.343* 
-2.594*** 
-4.815* 
-4.670* 
 
-0.733 
-1.608 
-4.427* 
-1.832 
-0.796 
 
-1.098 
-1.312 
-1.312 
-2.297 
-1.095 
GUINEA 
Gambia: 
Ghana: 
Liberia: 
Nigeria: 
S/Leone: 
 
-1.269 
-1.461 
-1.134 
-1.609 
-1.936 
 
-1.408 
-0.947 
-2.270 
-3.117** 
2.723*** 
 
-3.904* 
-0.518 
-4.638* 
-1.001 
-2.238 
 
-1.604 
-0.883 
-1.869 
-1.230 
-1.592 
 
-2.999** 
-3.343* 
3.914* 
4.384* 
1.715 
 
-2.019 
-1.608 
-4.625 
-1.449 
-1.741 
 
-1.063 
-1.312 
-1.312 
-1.312 
2.282 
LIBERIA 
Gambia: 
Ghana: 
Guinea: 
Nigeria: 
S/Leone: 
 
-2.103 
-2.281 
-1.134 
-2.208 
-3.183** 
 
-1.866 
-2.250 
-2.270 
-2.601*** 
-2.714*** 
 
-4.460* 
2.717** 
-4.638* 
-3.096** 
-3.290* 
 
-0.758 
-1.584 
-1.869 
-3.083** 
-1.555 
 
1.861 
2.594*** 
3.914* 
2.713*** 
2.071 
 
-3.563* 
-4.427* 
-4.625* 
-3.299* 
-3.277* 
-0.887 
-1.312 
-1.312 
-1.312 
-1.954 
-0.683 
NIGERIA 
Gambia: 
Ghana: 
Guinea: 
Liberia: 
S/Leone: 
 
-2.191 
-1.434 
-1.608 
-2.208 
-2.288 
 
-1.574 
-0.377 
-3.117** 
-2.601*** 
2.683*** 
 
-0.907 
-1.824 
-1.001 
-3.096* 
-2.213 
 
-1.758 
-3.905* 
-1.230 
-3.014** 
-1.497 
 
3.719* 
4.815* 
4.384* 
2.713** 
3.858* 
 
-0.981 
-1.832 
-1.449 
-3.299* 
0.103 
 
-1.815 
-2.297 
-2.282 
-1.954 
-1.843 
S/LEONE 
Gambia: 
Ghana: 
Guinea: 
Liberia: 
Nigeria: 
 
-3.164** 
-1.520 
-1.936 
-3.183** 
-2.288 
 
-0.380 
-0.434 
2.723*** 
2.714*** 
2.683*** 
 
-2.275 
-2.692** 
2.238 
-3.290* 
-2.213 
 
-1.022 
-1.798 
-1.591 
-1.355 
1.497 
 
2.721*** 
4.670* 
1.715 
2.071 
3.858* 
 
-2.732** 
-0.796 
-1.741 
-3.277* 
0.103 
 
-3.098** 
-1.095 
-1.040 
-0.683 
-1.843 
Source: Author’s Estimations and EView 10 Output 
These results have implication for long-run relationship assessment because cointegration 
tests require all variables to be stationary. If these time series variables are of different orders 
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of integration, there cannot be long run relationships and by implications, there cannot be 
cointegration. In order to verify this assumption, applying quarterly data, this study carried 
out three residual-based cointegration tests of the relationships in the FPMM and RIDMM 
(Phillips-Oualiaris, Engle-Granger and Park’s Added Variable tests) on the residuals of the 
estimates of FMOLS cointegrating regressions. 
Table 6.11: Results of Cointegration Tests for FPMM Exchange Rates and Fundamentals in the WAMZ 
 Phillips-Oualiaris 
Tests 
Engle-Granger  
Tests 
Park’s Added 
Variable Tests 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
 
tau-statistics 
 
z-statistics 
 
tau-statistics 
 
z-statistics 
 
Chi-Square 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-4.2644 
-4.2866 
-3.8466 
-3.5058 
-3.4620 
-34.8145*** 
-27.6101 
-24.7272 
-21.9782 
-22.6037 
-4.7296*** 
-4.2444 
-3.5542 
-3.2145 
-3.6094 
-46.2723* 
-27.5379 
-59.6930* 
-18.2674 
-26.4736 
4.4676** 
7.1792* 
0.0057 
2.0873 
0.5426 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-4.2644 
-3.6801 
-4.1760 
-3.8472 
-3.8461 
-34.8144** 
-23.4686 
-30.5085 
-3.5925 
-28.8650 
4.7297*** 
-3.4920 
-4.3934 
-23.1743 
-4.2194 
-46.2724* 
-21.1204 
88.7412* 
-26.6976 
-39.1089** 
4.4676** 
0.0288 
37.5387* 
0.0148 
0.3606 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-4.2886 
-3.6801 
-3.4475 
-3.5080 
-3.3443 
27.6101 
-23.4686 
-18.1775 
-21.1241 
-20.4331 
-4.2444 
-3.4920 
-3.4276 
-4.1117 
-3.0625 
-27.5379 
-21.1204 
-18.3140 
35.2443** 
-14.1025 
7.1792* 
0.0288 
1.8616 
1.8871 
0.2384 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-3.8466 
-4.1760 
-3.4475 
-3.0905 
-3.4430 
-24.7272 
-30.5085 
-18.1775 
-19.1442 
-23.4745 
-3.5542 
-1.3934 
-3.4275 
-3.2087 
-3.3912 
59.6930* 
-88.7412* 
-18.314 
-21.9772 
-74.0705* 
0.0058 
37.5387* 
1.8616 
2.8405*** 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
-3.5058 
-3.8472 
-3.5080 
-3.0905 
-3.5678 
-21.9782 
-26.6976 
-21.1240 
-19.1442 
-22.8613 
-3.2148 
-3.5925 
-4.1117 
-3.2087 
-3.2180 
-18.2674 
-23.1743 
-35.2443** 
-21.9772 
-18.2893 
2.0873 
0.0148 
1.8871 
2.8404*** 
14.0251* 
S/LEONE Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-3.4620 
-3.8461 
-3.3443 
-3.4430 
-3.5678 
-22.6067 
-28.8650 
-20.4331 
-23.4750 
-22.8613 
-3.6094 
-4.2194 
-3.0624 
-3.3912 
-3.2179 
-26.4735 
-39.1089** 
-17.1025 
-74.0705* 
-18.2893 
0.5426 
0.3606 
0.2384 
9.7987* 
14.0251* 
Source: Author’s Estimations and EView 10 Output 
 
The results of the FPMM and RIDMM cointegration tests are displayed Tables 6.11 above 
and 6.12 below respectively, where Phillip-Oualiars and Engle-Granger tests clearly revealed 
at 5% significance level, the null hypothesis that the series are not cointegrated cannot be 
rejected. What this implies is that there are no long run relationships from all directions of the 
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bilateral relationships investigated. This thus confirmed what the general results of the unit 
roots tests denote. The connotation of ‘no cointegration’ between exchange rates and the 
fundamentals as revealed in these FPMM and RIDMM models of exchange rate 
determination in the cases of the foreign exchange bilateral relationships across the WAMZ is 
that the monetary fundamentals of money supply, formal nominal output, informal nominal 
output, inflation, interest rates as a well as commodity price in both monetary models do not 
affect exchange rates in the long run, though they may do in the short-run.  
Table 6.12: Results of Cointegration Tests RIDMM Exchange Rate and Fundamentals in the WAMZ 
 Phillips-Oualiaris 
Tests 
Engle-Granger  
Tests 
Park’s Added 
Variable Tests 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
 
tau-statistics 
 
z-statistics 
 
tau-statistics 
 
z-statistics 
 
Chi-Square 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.7074 
-4.2867 
-4.9019*** 
-3.5541 
-3.5709 
-12.9736 
-27.6646 
-42.4387** 
-22.7469 
-23.9763 
-4.6988 
-4.2396 
-3.6245 
-3.2603 
-3.7879 
-45.6813** 
-27.4966 
-54.6091 
-18.9580 
-28.9101 
3.0203*** 
5.8363*** 
2.2429 
0.0227 
0.0497 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.7074 
-3.6669 
-4.0102 
-3.8003 
-3.0307 
-12.9736 
-22.9318 
-27.0140 
-26.0786 
-15.9841 
-4.6988 
-3.4528 
-4.2720 
-3.5475 
-4.7316 
-45.6813** 
-20.1925 
-69.2145* 
-22.6233 
-47.7123** 
-3.0203*** 
2.5968*** 
86.2247* 
0.0957 
0.5009 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-4.2867 
-3.6669 
-3.8341 
-3.7672 
-3.7717 
-27.6646 
-22.9318 
-24.4380 
-24.9817 
24.0565 
-4.2396 
-3.4528 
-3.8630 
-4.1116 
-3.5901 
-27.4967 
-20.1925 
-25.4275 
-35.2429*** 
-21.7325 
-5.8363** 
-2.5968*** 
-31.5968* 
2.1581 
0.1084 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-4.9019*** 
-4.2010 
-3.8341 
-3.0538 
-3.5825 
-42.4387*** 
-30.2506 
-24.4380 
-18.7378 
-25.0867 
-3.6245 
-4.2720 
-3.8630 
-3.1873 
-3.3428 
-54.6091* 
-69.2145* 
-25.4275 
-21.6174 
-70.2468* 
2.2429 
86.2247* 
31.9363* 
3.9340** 
22.9438* 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
-3.5541 
-3.8003 
-3.7672 
-3.0538 
-3.7452 
-22.7469 
-26.0786 
-24.9817 
-18.7378 
-25.4206 
-3.2603 
-3.5475 
-4.1116 
-3.1873 
-3.2393 
-18.9580 
-22.6233 
-35.2429*** 
-21.6174 
-18.5031 
0.0227 
0.0957 
2.1581 
3.9340** 
13.1894* 
S/LEONE Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-3.5709 
-3.0307 
-3.7717 
-3.5825 
-3.7452 
-23.9763 
-15.9841 
-24.0565 
-25.0867 
-25.4206 
-3.7879 
-4.7316 
-3.5901 
-3.3429 
-3.2393 
-28.9101 
-47.7123* 
-21.7325 
-70.2468 
-18.5030 
0.0497 
0.5009 
0.1684 
-22.9438* 
-13.1894* 
Source: Author’s Estimations and EView 10 Output 
The fully modified ordinary least square (FMOLS) estimation results of the quarterly data 
FPMM for both directions of bilateral exchange rate relationships across the WAMZ are 
exhibited in Table 6.13 below showing the explanatory powers and signs yielded by the 
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fundamentals. The outputs show that differentials of money supply and interest rates are 
hugely significant at 10% level of significance except for the cases of Nigeria/Sierra Leone 
money supply as well as the interest rate differential cases of Ghana/Liberia Guinea/Nigeria 
and Liberia/Nigeria, and these were also the three cases in which interest rate differentials 
failed to yield the hypothesised positive signs. 
Table 6.13: Results of FMOLS Estimations of Explanatory Powers and Theoretical Signs of the 
Fundamentals in FPMM Exchange Rates in the WAMZ 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
 
Money Supply 
Differential 
 
Formal Output 
Differential 
 
Interest Rate 
Differential 
Informal 
Output 
Differential 
Commodity 
Price 
Differential 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
1.2400* 
0.3367*** 
0.3051* 
0.3662*** 
0.8141* 
-1.8708* 
0.3490 
-0.0308 
-4.6418* 
-0.6400* 
0.1610* 
0.4478* 
0.3140* 
0.1632*** 
0.1242* 
-0.0839 
-0.1476 
-0.2832 
2.010* 
-0.3799*** 
-0.3104** 
0.1723 
-0.3874 
1.4046* 
0.6558 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
1.2401* 
0.6273* 
0.5944* 
0.8345* 
1.2709* 
-1.8708* 
1.3419** 
3.7715** 
-3.1073** 
0.3172 
0.1610* 
0.2453* 
-0.0843 
0.3132* 
0.1339* 
-0.0840 
-0.3972*** 
-4.5048** 
2.9818 
-0.3659 
-0.3104** 
-0.3972*** 
0.7887* 
0.4516*** 
-0.3800*** 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.3367*** 
0.6273* 
0.3561*** 
0.2320** 
0.8957* 
0.3490 
1.3419** 
0.5227 
-2.8950* 
0.2465 
0.4478* 
0.2453* 
0.2038* 
-0.0362 
0.1731* 
-0.1476 
-0.3972*** 
-0.2071 
1.4000* 
-0.6615** 
0.1724 
-5.0024* 
1.3027* 
-0.9491* 
0.2438 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.3051* 
0.5944* 
0.3561** 
0.3384** 
0.4100* 
-0.0308 
3.7715** 
0.5227 
1.2745 
0.6825** 
0.3140* 
-0.0843 
0.2038* 
-0.0573 
0.2633* 
-0.2832 
-4.5048** 
-0.2071 
-2.2115 
-1.2596* 
-0.3894 
0.7887* 
1.3027 
0.6314** 
-0.3116 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
0.3661*** 
0.8345* 
0.2320** 
0.3384** 
-0.1442 
-4.6418* 
-3.1043** 
-2.8950* 
1.2747 
1.7723** 
0.1632*** 
0.3132* 
-0.0362 
-0.0573 
0.2195* 
2.0097* 
2.9818 
1.4000* 
-2.2115 
-2.7639* 
1.4046* 
0.4516*** 
-0.9491* 
0.6314** 
0.9718* 
S/LEONE Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
0.8141* 
1.2709* 
0.8957* 
0.4100* 
-0.1442 
-0.6400* 
0.3172 
0.2465 
0.6825** 
1.7723** 
0.1241* 
0.1339* 
0.1731* 
0.2633* 
0.2195* 
-0.3799*** 
-0.3659 
-0.6615** 
-1.2596* 
-2.7639* 
0.6558 
-0.3800*** 
0.2438 
0.1315 
0.9718* 
Source: Author’s Estimation and EViews 10 Output 
The only relationship where the expected signs failed to reflect in the relative money supply 
is the Nigeria/Sierra Leone case. Apart from the cases of The Gambia/Ghana and Sierra 
Leone/ Ghana, the explanatory powers of money supply were lower than unity as 
hypothesised. Both formal and informal output differentials yielded some few expected 
negative signs, but with better results by informal output differential. The explanatory powers 
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of these two fundamentals were huge in relationships involving Ghana and Nigeria which are 
the strong economies of the WAMZ. These quarterly data FPMM estimations results were 
closely similar to what were obtained for the annual data estimations of the model.  
Table 6.14: Results of FMOLS Estimations of Explanatory Powers and Theoretical Signs of the 
Fundamentals in RIDMM Exchange Rates in the WAMZ 
Home 
& Foreign 
Country 
 
Money Supply 
Differential 
 
Formal 
Output 
Differential 
 
Interest Rate 
Differential 
 
Inflation 
Differential 
 
Informal 
Output 
Differential 
 
Commodity 
Price 
Differential 
GAMBIA 
Ghana: 
Guinea: 
Liberia: 
Nigeria: 
S/Leone: 
 
1.2743* 
0.2786 
0.3210* 
0.3959** 
0.8202* 
 
-1.8848* 
0.4070 
0.4233 
-3.8340* 
-0.7036* 
 
0.1553* 
0.4107* 
0.3759* 
0.1238 
0.0981* 
 
0.0005 
0.0024 
0.0133** 
-0.0062** 
0.0026 
 
-0.1601 
0.0757 
0.0972 
1.4448* 
-0.1341 
 
-0.3425*** 
0.2356 
-0.8184 
1.1271* 
0.6933 
GHANA 
Gambia: 
Guinea: 
Liberia: 
Nigeria: 
S/Leone: 
 
1.2743* 
0.5950* 
0.6548* 
0.8484* 
1.2555* 
 
-1.8848* 
1.2566** 
3.3288*** 
-2.7666 
0.2332 
 
0.1553* 
0.1740* 
-0.1314 
0.2795* 
0.0887** 
 
0.0004 
0.0048*** 
0.0034 
0.0034 
0.0029 
 
-0.1601 
-0.0933 
-4.1695** 
2.3848 
0.0801 
 
-0.3425** 
-5.2977* 
0.9278* 
0.5078*** 
-0.4879** 
GUINEA 
Gambia: 
Ghana: 
Liberia: 
Nigeria: 
S/Leone: 
 
0.2786 
0.5950* 
0.1306 
0.2476*** 
0.7637* 
 
0.4070 
1.2566** 
0.2845 
-2.8898* 
0.0068 
 
0.4107* 
0.1740* 
0.1117** 
-0.0353 
0.1077* 
 
0.0024 
0.0047*** 
0.0131* 
-0.0005 
0.0060* 
 
0.0757 
-0.0933 
-0.0521 
1.3913* 
-0.2273 
 
0.2357 
-5.2977* 
1.7475* 
-0.9744* 
0.2400 
LIBERIA 
Gambia: 
Ghana: 
Guinea: 
Nigeria: 
S/Leone: 
 
0.3210* 
0.6548* 
0.1306 
0.3046*** 
0.4190* 
 
-0.4233 
3.3288*** 
0.2845 
0.4184 
0.7437* 
 
0.3759* 
-0.1314 
0.1117** 
-0.0005 
0.2737* 
 
0.0133** 
0.0034 
0.0131* 
-0.0060 
0.0008 
 
0.0972 
-4.1695** 
-0.0521 
-1.1891 
1.3250* 
 
-0.8184*** 
0.9278* 
1.7475* 
0.5252 
0.3339 
NIGERIA 
Gambia: 
Ghana: 
Guinea: 
Liberia: 
S/Leone: 
 
0.3959** 
0.8484* 
0.2476** 
0.3046*** 
-0.0062 
 
-3.8340* 
-2.7666 
-2.8898* 
0.4184 
1.4734** 
 
0.1238 
0.2795* 
-0.0353 
-0.0005 
0.2134* 
 
-0.0062** 
0.0033 
-0.0005 
-0.0060 
-0.0036 
 
1.4448* 
2.3848 
1.3973* 
-1.1891 
-2.9376* 
 
1.1271* 
0.5078*** 
0.9744* 
0.5252 
1.0631* 
S/LEONE 
Gambia: 
Ghana: 
Guinea: 
Liberia: 
Nigeria: 
 
0.8201* 
1.2555* 
0.7638* 
0.4190* 
-0.0062 
 
-0.7036* 
0.2322 
0.0068 
0.7437* 
1.4734** 
 
0.0981* 
0.0887** 
0.1077* 
0.2737* 
0.2134* 
 
0.0026 
0.0030 
0.0060* 
0.0008 
-0.0036* 
 
-0.1341 
0.0801 
-0.2273 
-1.3250* 
-2.9376* 
 
0.6933 
-0.4879** 
-0.2400 
0.3339 
1.0631* 
Source: Author’s Estimations and EView 10 Outputs 
 
On the overall here, it could be inferred that there were a good number of similarities in 
explanations offered by these fundamentals about exchange rate determination in the WAMZ, 
however, these explanations were not convincing enough to justify a conclusion that the 
FPMM was strongly valid across the WAMZ. The results of the RIDMM estimations in 
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Table 6.14 above reveals that as obtained in the FPMM estimation results in Table 6.13 
above, the differentials of money supply and interest rate reflected the hypothesised signs, 
with one exception in money supply differentials and three exceptions in interest rate 
differentials On inflation differentials, apart from some negative signs yielded for the Nigeria 
based relationships, the hypothesised positive signs were generated for other relationships. 
Output differentials (formal and informal) recorded few instances of expected signs. The 
number of coefficients with statistical significance (at 5%) were sparse. Generally, going by 
the results of the estimations of the RIDMM, apart from money supply and interest rate 
differentials, it is apparent that the FPMM performed better than the RIDMM in the WAMZ. 
The explanatory powers of inflation differentials were the lowest across the WAMZ. This 
signified the low extent of the influence of real inflation on exchange rates determination; 
although, most of these coefficients lack economic meanings due to their statistical 
insignificance.  Further to these, the evidence of the failure of cointegration of gathered in 
this section caused the conclusion that there are no long-run cointegrating relationships 
between exchange rates and the fundamentals across the WAMZ. 
The FPMM and the RIDMM estimations results under these quarterly data assessments 
highlighted that there were some few similarities in signs and magnitude of the explanations 
offered by exchange rate determination fundamentals across the WAMZ. These similarities 
were not strong enough to confidently infer that a single foreign exchange market can suffice 
for the WAMZ countries. Given the possibility that the proposed monetary union’s foreign 
exchange markets is likely to be built around Nigeria, a detailed look at the output of the 
Nigeria based exchange rate and the associated explanatory variables in both monetary 
models estimated shows that they were not encouraging due to the signs and explanatory 
powers and statistical significance of coefficients of these explanatory variables. Therefore, if 
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the WAMZ should adopt a single exchange rate in a common foreign exchange market, this 
step should be taken with cautiously. 
 
6.3  Exchange Market Pressure  
In attempts to stabilise international reserve positions towards avoiding unpleasant 
movements in their rate of foreign exchange, monetary authorities have been experiencing 
foreign exchange market pressure since the beginning of the managed floating regime in the 
early 70s, When central banks face market pressure of this nature, the monetary model holds 
for exchange rates in flexible regime alone and are not likely to hold for exchange rates in a 
market pressurised regime. Therefore, the monetary model of exchange rate determination 
requires modification that would take exchange market pressure into cognisance. 
Furthermore, it is crucial for the monetary authority under a managed floating regime to 
determine the degree at which its monetary independence is being affected by exchange rate 
target. The currency crises around the world and the impact on the real economy as well as 
the contagious effects prompted the need for economic stability in which exchange rate 
stability is playing a crucial role. In monetary union formation process, exchange rates 
stability is a strong convergence criterion to fulfil by prospective members. One analytical 
tool appropriate for the measurement of the foreign exchange market condition and the 
stability of the market is exchange market pressure (EMP). Generally, exchange market 
pressure (EMP) relates to money market disequilibrium. This makes it important in driving 
the understanding of the mechanism and instrument that would assist in achieving the market 
equilibrium. Many different yardsticks have been developed and adopted to identify periods 
of crisis, out of which exchange market pressure (EMP) index has been of relative 
importance. Given the significance of this subject, there had been renewed theoretical and 
empirical attention towards ensuring that the question on whether financial crisis could be 
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forecast and/or prevented effectively by monetary policy.102 These make research analysis on 
exchange market pressure in WAMZ member countries to be significant. 
This section of the thesis chapter on exchange market pressure identified currency risks 
period (or otherwise) in the WAMZ and further tests the response of exchange market 
pressure to monetary policy related factors in these countries as well as movements in 
primary commodity prices, given the feature of these countries as primary commodity 
exporting countries. These revealed the statistically and econometrically determined 
exchange rate stability over the years as well as the susceptibility of these countries to 
currency crisis. This study is novel in that there is no know or existing literature that has 
applied exchange market pressure in the assessment of monetary integration; and specifically 
in the evaluation of the WAMZ as a monetary union. 
The first phase of the EMP analysis in this section employed the model-independent 
statistical method of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) to derive EMP indices in 
determining currency crisis susceptibility of the countries under study. The second part 
assessed the response of EMP to monetary policy across the WAMZ as well as evaluate the 
similarities in the patterns and strengths of the response of EMP towards checking for 
compatibility across the WAMZ countries. In this respect, the Girton and Roper (1977) 
model of exchange market pressure was applied in the model-dependent estimations for the 
six countries under study. The specific aim was the investigation of the nature of the response 
of EMP to monetary variables to changes in domestic credit as scaled by base money; and to 
                                                          
102 Many authors identified EMP analysis as one of the key tools in this respects. Some of these papers are 
Girton and Ropers (1977), Goldfajn and Gupta (1999), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), Eichengreen, Rose 
and Wyploz (1996), Kaminsky, Reinhart and Lizondo (1997), Bensiad and Jeanne (1997), Furman and Stiglitz 
(1998), Delke, Hsiao and Wang (1999), Bussiere and Mulder (1999), Tornell (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999), Drazen (1999), Gould and Kamin (2000), Ahluwalia (2000), Lahiri and Vegh (2000), Flood and Jeanne 
(2000), Tanner (2001). 
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check if the responses of the EMP to monetary policy stances across the WAMZ are 
homogeneous in pattern.103 These were expected to reveal similarities or otherwise in 
monetary management and to show if monetary policy instrument of domestic credit/base 
money managed exchange rate pressures in the WAMZ in similar manner. It was also 
expected to show if the reaction to EMP by monetary policy instruments are according to 
theoretical presumptions in testing the validity of the monetary model of exchange market 
pressure. 
6.3.1 Theory and Models 
Exchange market pressure (EMP) depicts money market disequilibrium. Traditionally, the 
two major monetary approaches used in literature to assess money market disequilibrium are: 
(i) monetary approach to exchange rate; and (ii) monetary approach to balance of payments. 
While foreign reserves variation assists in restoring the equilibrium under the balance of 
payments’ monetary approach, the change in exchange rate would cause the equilibrium 
restoration under the monetary approach to exchange rate (Frankel, 1976 and Mussa, 1976). 
Foreign reserves changes or exchange rate changes (one in isolation of the other) would not 
provide enough guide in revealing the features and accurate picture of the external account of 
any economy. For instance, monetary authority can delay or avoid depreciation in exchange 
rate (partially) if foreign reserves are depleted so as to inject foreign currency into the foreign 
market. On the other hand, foreign currency could be purchased from the market to fortify 
foreign reserves; and this restrains the appreciation in the rate of exchange as prompted by 
the underlying fundamentals. These show that there would be misleading view of external 
position of an economy if either of the two intervention tools (foreign reserves variations and 
                                                          
103 Domestic credit is a more appropriate proxy for monetary policy in that it is directly controlled by monetary authorities. 
While domestic credit/base money is quantitative monetary management policy tool, interest rate is a market-based 
monetary management policy instrument. These two policy techniques have different implications. 
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exchange rate movements) to the exclusion of the other is emphasised. This makes a good 
case for a composite definition and description of EMP in the model-dependent assessment. 
This composite description of EMP incorporates foreign reserve variations and exchange rate 
changes in characterising the pressure in the exchange market. This is the starting point of the 
first seminal work on EMP by Girton and Roper (GR) 1977 in which an EMP model was 
developed to reflect exchange market pressure as a composite variable. The EMP values 
represents the magnitude of the foreign exchange market disequilibrium which should 
consequently be removed by respective change in exchange rate and/or change in foreign 
reserve position, depending on the ruling exchange rate regime. 
Exchange market pressure are measured in two ways as: (i) model-independent and (ii) 
model-dependent. The model independent exchange market pressure index (EMPI) measures 
the extent of contagion-caused market pressure on a currency vulnerability of a country to 
currency crisis. For a proposed currency union, it reveals if the macroeconomic fundamentals 
of intending members are strong for single currency and single exchange rate in exchange 
rate integration and further, if the underlying macroeconomic variables can  withstand market 
tensions and exchange rate regime vulnerabilities that may arise in the future monetary union. 
The weighted exchange market pressure index (EMPI) appropriate for the measurement of 
the extent of currency pressure is expressed as: 
𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = (
1
𝛼
%∆𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + (
1
𝛽
∆(𝑖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
∗ ) − [
1
𝛾
(%∆𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − %∆ 𝑟𝑡
∗)]                       6.26 
where 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the price of a relative foreign currency in terms of country 𝑖′𝑠 currency at time 𝑡. 
𝑖𝑖,𝑡 is the nominal interest of country 𝑖 at time 𝑡;  𝑖𝑡
∗  is the foreign country's nominal interest 
rate, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the nominal interest of country 𝑖 at time 𝑡;   𝑟𝑡
∗  is the ratio of international reserves 
to narrow money supply (M1) in the foreign country while 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾 are the respective 
standard deviations appropriately applied as weights. This measure of market pressure takes 
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its roots from the idea that when there are excess demand and supply in a foreign exchange 
market, there can be changes in foreign exchanges price as well as changes in reserve level.  
The model-dependent study focusses on developing a model that provides links between 
EMP and monetary policy in order to check if EMP responds to monetary policy in the right 
manner (according to theoretical underpinnings). Basically, the Girton-Roper model of EMP 
is a variant of the monetary approach to exchange rate determination. The model is based on 
monetary approach to balance of payment which revolves around the notion of demand for 
money and supply of money. The idea within the monetary approach to balance of payment is 
that excess money supply causes international reserve losses under the fixed exchange rate 
regime and by implication, this leads to balance of payments deficits. Under flexible 
exchange rate regime, currency depreciation absorbs the pressure on balance of payments. 
Therefore, the need for equilibrium between domestic money supply and money demand 
necessitate the evolution of the exchange market theory. Naturally, excess money supply 
causes increases in demand for goods and services (the implication of demand-pull inflation) 
which translates into increase in economic agents’ demands for foreign goods and services 
and this in turn, causes reserve depletion in the domestic market. The modelling of exchange 
market pressure therefore assesses whether or not monetary authority absorbs pressure in the 
foreign exchange market by drawing down (depleting) reserves or by currency depreciation. 
The principal theoretical proposition of the modelling of EMP by Girton and Roper (1977) is 
that whenever the domestic money market equilibrium is disturbed, the resulting 
disequilibrium is restored through some combinations of international reserve outflows (or 
inflow) and depreciation  (or appreciation) of currency. Therefore, to restore the money 
market disequilibrium, the excess domestic money demand will prompt a combination of 
reserve depletion (outflow) and depreciation of currency. In the instance of excess domestic 
money supply, the consequence will be some combinations of inflow of reserves and 
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appreciation of currency. This is a strong reason for the appropriateness of the G-R model of 
EMP in the fixed, managed floating and floating exchange rate regimes. Under the fixed 
exchange rate regime, the change in exchange rate is zero and under a floating/flexible 
exchange rate regime, the change in reserve is zero. Either of reserve losses and currency 
appreciation (or a combination of both) absorbs exchange market pressure under the managed 
floating system. 
The basic ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ conditions for the G-R model are: (i) the money market 
equilibrium condition; and (ii) the imposition of the purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Therefore in deriving the G-R model, it is necessary to begin with the formulation of the 
money market and the PPP. In the first instance, for equilibrium in the money market to hold, 
it is necessary to have: 
𝑀𝑑 = 𝑀𝑠                                                                     6.27 
where 𝑀𝑑 is the demand for money and 𝑀𝑠 is money supply. Money demand and money 
supply can further be specified as: 
𝑀𝑑 = 𝑘𝑃𝑌                                                                    6.28 
and  
𝑀𝑠 = 𝑚(𝐵)                                                                   6.29 
where is 𝑘 a constant, 𝑃 is domestic price level, 𝑌 is real output, 𝑚 is money multiplier and is 
𝐵 monetary base. This makes money supply to be the product of money multiplier (𝑚) and 
monetary base (𝐵) in a functional relationship in which: 
𝐵 = 𝑅 + 𝐷                                                                    6.30 
Where R is net foreign assets (which is the foreign component of monetary base) and 𝐷 is 
domestic credit (which is the domestic component of monetary base). In working towards the 
derivation of the G-R model, the PPP theory is incorporated at this point: 
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𝐸 =
𝑃∗
𝑃
                                                                          6.31 
or  
      𝑃 = 𝐸(𝑃∗) 
where 𝐸 is the nominal exchange rate, 𝑃 is the domestic price level and 𝑃∗ is the foreign 
price level. It is important to note here that the nominal exchange rate in this modelling is the 
number of units of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency. If Equation 6.28 and 6.29 
above are substituted into Equation 6.27 above, we will have: 
𝑘𝑃𝑌 = 𝑚(𝑅 + 𝐷)                                                                   6.32 
If the equivalent of P in Equation 6.35 above is made to substitute for P, in Equation 6.36, 
this yields: 
𝑘 (
𝑃∗
𝐸
) 𝑌 = 𝑚(𝑅 + 𝐷)                                                               6.33 
Assuming that people hold a fraction of nominal income in the form of cash, as constant 𝑘, 
we can express Equation 6.33 in percentages form thus: 
𝑃∗ − 𝑒 + 𝑦 = 𝑚 + 𝑟 + 𝑑                                                          6.34 
where 𝑃∗ is percentage change in foreign price level, 𝑒 is percentage change in nominal real 
exchange rate, 𝑦 is percentage change in real output, 𝑎 is percentage change in money 
multiplier, 𝑟 is percentage change in reserve and 𝑑 is percentage change in domestic credit. 
The rearrangement of the terms in Equation 6.34 leads to the G-R exchange market pressure 
model expressed as: 
𝑟 + 𝑒 = 𝑃∗ + 𝑦 − 𝑚 − 𝑑                                                          6.35 
where (𝑟 + 𝑒) represents exchange market pressure.  
The intuition of the G-R model is that increase in domestic credit (and/or money multiplier): 
(i) stimulates proportionate loss of foreign reserve (with no change in exchange rate); or (ii) 
stimulates a proportionate depreciation of domestic currency (with no change in reserve) or 
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(iii) a combination of the two, all at a given rates of growth of domestic income and foreign 
prices. On the other hand, when there is increase in domestic income and/or foreign price, the 
effect is proportional inflow of international reserves and proportional appreciation of 
domestic currency. It is established in literature that Equation 6.39 could be augmented with a 
variable 𝑏, which is (
𝑒
𝑟
) in order to check the response of monetary authority in the 
absorption of exchange market pressure through the draw-down of reserve or by exchange 
rate depreciation. The augmented equation becomes: 
𝑟 + 𝑒 = 𝑃∗ + 𝑦 − 𝑎 − 𝑑 + 𝑏                                           6.36 
When the coefficient of 𝑏 is positive and significant, this means that currency depreciation is 
applied by the monetary authority to absorb exchange market pressure. A negative and 
significant coefficient of 𝑏 shows that reserve depletion is the tool employed by monetary 
authority in the absorption of exchange market pressure. When the coefficient of 𝑏 is 
insignificant, this is an indication of the lack of sensitivity of monetary authority to these 
components of exchange market pressure. 
6.3.2 Data and Methods 
The evaluation of exchange market pressure in the WAMZ employed the use of both annual 
and monthly data of the WAMZ countries under assessment as well as the CPI inflation data 
of the US. These data spanning between 2001 and 2015 and sourced from the databases of 
the EIU, the IMF and the World Bank, are for nominal interest rates, international reserves, 
nominal exchange rate (US dollar), domestic credit, narrow money supply, net foreign assets 
and real GDP. For the construction of the exchange market pressure index (EMPI), related 
annual data (2001 to 2014) were applied while monthly data (2001M1 to 2015M12) which 
were converted from the sourced annual data were used in the case of model dependent 
analysis of exchange markets pressures across the WAMZ. EMPI were constructed for each 
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of the WAMZ member countries within the contexts of the US dollar and the Nigeria naira 
foreign exchange markets in the WAMZ. The span of the period for the exchange market 
pressure estimations were made shorter so as to avoid the possible distorting influences and 
effects of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone on their exchange markets as well as 
other exchange markets within the zone. Variables involved in the construction of the EMPI 
were relatively measured against those obtained in the US (for the US dollar/WAMZ 
exchange rates) and in Nigeria, the strongest WAMZ economy (for the Nigerian 
naira/WAMZ countries exchange rates).104 For each WAMZ country, currency crisis 
thresholds were estimated as the sum of the standard deviation and mean of the weighted 
exchange market pressure index derived from the estimation of Equation 6.30 over the 
sample period thus: 
𝑇 = 𝜎𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐼 + 𝜇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐼                                              6.41 
where 𝑇 indicated threshold while 𝜎 and 𝜇 denote the EMPI sample standard deviation and 
mean respectively. This links crisis with the extent of volatility and the average pressure in 
the foreign exchange market. A country is therefore susceptible to currency crisis if the 
weighted EMPI is greater than the applied threshold. There are no arbitrary weighting of 
market volatilities and averages as many researchers did. This was perceived inappropriate 
for the exchange market realities in developing economies, the category in which the WAMZ 
countries belong. In determining if the WAMZ countries are currency crisis vulnerable, this 
research work applied the following five different currency crisis thresholds situation for the 
WAMZ countries: (i) WAMZ country-specific threshold (US dollars exchange markets); (ii) 
WAMZ country-specific threshold (Nigerian naira exchange markets); (iii) WAMZ average 
                                                          
104Nigeria is the strongest economy with over 80% of the zone's total GDP and by implication forming around 
same proportion of the total size of the entire proposed monetary zone's foreign exchange markets. 
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threshold (US dollars exchange markets); (iv) WAMZ average threshold (Nigerian naira 
exchange markets); and (v) Nigeria currency crisis threshold.  
For the model dependent EMP, robust regression method was applied in the estimation of 
Equations 6.39 and 6.40 above. A robust regression is that which: (a) is reasonably efficient 
and unbiased; (b) small deviation from the assumptions of the model will not substantially 
impair the performances of the estimated model; and (iii) large deviation does not invalidate 
the model completely. OLS regression is not robust with outliers because it can yield results 
that are misleading if such outliers are undetected. If outliers, influential observations and 
heavy-tailed distribution can hinder the efficiency of OLS regression, then an alternative in 
robust regression is appropriate. Robust statistics aim at describing the structure best fitting 
the bulk of the data, identify deviating data points (outliers) for further treatments, identify 
(or warn about) highly influential data points (leverage points), deal with unsuspected serial 
correlation. Consequently, robust regression devises estimators that are not so strongly 
affected by outliers in order to produce resistant results in the presence of outliers as it 
dampens the influences of outlying observations so as to provide better fit for the majority of 
the data and thereby achieve the necessary stability. Theoretically, what apply in explaining 
the performance of robust regression are the properties of efficiency, breakdown points and 
high leverage points.  
The process of the evaluation of the model-dependent EMP across the WAMZ in this 
assessment started with the OLS estimation of the augmented EMP model as expressed in 
Equation 6.40, in order to check for outliers in the variables involved in the modelling of 
EMP for the six WAMZ countries. The output of the OLS estimations were not be reported 
since the purpose was to check for the possible presence of outliers in justifying the use of the 
robust least square (RLS) regression method for same purpose. The RLS estimation 
performed here used the M-estimation option (which has a function that provides less weight 
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to outliers) and applied the Welsch objective specification with Huber Type I covariance 
estimates (on which the z-statistics estimations are based) and zero-centered Median 
Absolute Deviation (MAD) estimator. MAD is regarded as a robust measure of central 
tendency and unlike mean and standard deviation, it is not sensitive to the presence of 
outliers. MAD is the median absolute value of the residuals (which are deviations from the 
median of the data), measuring statistical dispersions. Since standard deviation can easily be 
influenced by outliers because the distance from mean are squared in standard deviation, 
large deviations are consequently weighted heavily. However, with MAD applied here, 
deviations of outliers are not relevant. For the iteration control, this study allows for 500 
maximum iteration and 0.0001 convergence. In robust least square (RLS) regression, R-
squared and Rw-squared statistics are the two measures of goodness-of-fit. This study applied 
Rw-squared which was deemed a better measure of fit than the R-square reported in the RLS 
regression. One other special statistic reported by RLS is Rn-square statistic which is the 
robust version of the Wald test of the true value of the coefficients, based on sample estimate. 
This (calculated by applying the standard Wald test quadratic form) tests the hypothesis that 
all the coefficients are equal to zero. Therefore, a p-value of 0.00 of the Rn-squared statistics 
depicts strong rejection of the null hypothesis that all non-constant coefficients are equal to 
zero. 
6.3.3  Results and Findings 
To benchmark for currency crisis susceptibility, the estimated thresholds for individual 
WAMZ countries as well as the related averages under the two exchange markets situations 
are highlighted in Table 6.15 below. 
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Table 6.15: Exchange Market Pressure Index Thresholds 
US Dollar Nominal Exchange Rates 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone Average 
Threshold 3.2907 2.6959 2.2261 1.7115 4.1698 2.7095 2.8006 
Nigeria Naira Nominal Exchange Rates 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone Average 
Threshold 1.0597 1.5006 1.3268 -0.0216 na 0.3526 0.8436 
Source: Author's Estimation 
Table 6.16: Currency Crises Definitions with Country Specific Threshold (US Dollar Exchange Markets) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 
(3.29) 
0.33 
(N) 
2.48 
(N) 
3.09 
(N) 
6.27 
(Y) 
0.21 
(N) 
-3.94 
(N) 
2.68 
(N) 
-1.1 
(N) 
1.24 
(N) 
2.1 
(N) 
0.57 
(N) 
-0.34 
(N) 
0.36 
(N) 
1.64 
(N) 
2.46 
(N) 
Ghana 
(2.70) 
6.09 
(Y) 
0.84 
(N) 
-3.98 
(N) 
-3.83 
(N) 
-2 
(N) 
-1.84 
(N) 
-1.51 
(N) 
0.79 
(N) 
2.3 
(N) 
1.93 
(N) 
-2.64 
(N) 
0.29 
(N) 
1.45 
(N) 
0.74 
(N) 
2.01 
(N) 
Guinea 
(2.22) 
na 
1.13 
(N) 
1.11 
(N) 
0.78 
(N) 
1.08 
(N) 
3.6 
(Y) 
1.78 
(N) 
-0.54 
(N) 
0.43 
(N) 
0.17 
(N) 
1.89 
(N) 
2.4 
(Y) 
-0.82 
(N) 
-1.42 
(N) 
2.18 
(N) 
Liberia 
(1.71) 
-0.75 
(N) 
3.1 
(Y) 
0.59 
(N) 
-1.45 
(N) 
-2.99 
(N) 
-1.32 
(N) 
-2.02 
(N) 
0.49 
(N) 
2.03 
(Y) 
1.74 
(N) 
0.06 
(N) 
-0.11 
(N) 
0.5 
(N) 
0.88 
(N) 
na 
Nigeria 
(4.17) 
1.43 
(N) 
3.55 
(N) 
3.8 
(N) 
1.84 
(N) 
1.58 
(N) 
-2.37 
(N) 
0.24 
(N) 
-0.68 
(N) 
0.88 
(N) 
0.41 
(N) 
2.26 
(N) 
4.52 
(Y) 
3.55 
(N) 
1.33 
(N) 
1.74 
(N) 
S/Leone 
(2.71) 
0.17 
(N) 
-2.24 
(N) 
0.26 
(N) 
2.89 
(Y) 
0.77 
(N) 
-1.9 
(N) 
-0.87 
(N) 
-0.09 
(N) 
0.31 
(N) 
1.33 
(N) 
3.5 
(Y) 
2.58 
(N) 
-0.56 
(N) 
-2.65 
(N) 
-0.98 
(N) 
Source: Author's estimations 
Note: ‘Y’ denotes susceptibility to currency crisis, while ‘N’ means non-susceptibility to currency crisis. 
 
For the US dollar market country-specific threshold, Table 6.16 above shows that over the 
period covered by this study, The Gambia (in 2003), Ghana (in 2000), and Nigeria (in 2011) 
were susceptible to currency crisis once while the vulnerability of Guinea (in 2005 and 2011), 
Liberia (in 2001 and 2008) and Sierra Leone (in 2003 and 2004) to currency crisis were twice 
during the period covered by this study. Figure 6.1 below shows the diagrammatic 
representations of the information in Table 6.16. In these charts (and subsequent related 
charts in this section), point zero line is the currency crisis cut-off point and the sizes of the 
bars indicate the magnitudes of currency crisis ‘susceptibility’ and ‘non-susceptibility’. When 
bars are located above point zero, they depict periods of susceptibility to currency crisis while 
bar below the zero point are periods of non-susceptibility to currency crisis. 
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Figure 6.1: Country Specific Threshold Currency Crises Definitions (US Dollar Exchange Markets) 
 
Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9.5 Output 
In comparison with the scenario of the Nigerian naira bilateral exchange markets, country-specific 
crisis threshold, The Gambia (in 2003), Ghana (in 2000) , Guinea (in 2005) and Sierra Leone (in 2010 
were susceptible once and Liberia was not vulnerable according to the information in Table 6.17 
below and as reflected in Figure 6.2 below. 
Table 6.17: Country Specific Threshold Currency Crises Definitions  
 (Nigerian Naira Exchange Markets) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 
(1.06) 
-0.4 
(N) 
-0.31 
(N) 
-0.1 
(N) 
4.31 
(Y) 
-0.87 
(N) 
-0.9 
(N) 
-2.2 
(N) 
-0.8 
(N) 
-0.6 
(N) 
-2.9 
(N) 
-1.62 
(N) 
-4.13 
(N) 
-2.57 
(N) 
0.23 
(N) 
0.68 
(N) 
Ghana 
(1.50) 
4.66 
(Y) 
-0.27 
(N) 
-4.0 
(N) 
-1.8 
(N) 
-2.23 
(N) 
0.25 
(N) 
-1.14 
(N) 
0.66 
(N) 
1.05 
(N) 
-1.1 
(N) 
-2.93 
(N) 
-2.76 
(N) 
-0.7 
(N) 
-0.2 
(N) 
1.26 
(N) 
Guinea 
(1.33) 
na 
-1.17 
(N) 
-1.5 
(N) 
-0.6 
(N) 
-0.28 
(N) 
4.92 
(Y) 
1.26 
(N) 
-0.2 
(N) 
-0.5 
(N) 
-3.85 
(N) 
-0.15 
(N) 
-1.31 
(N) 
-3.63 
(N) 
-2.8 
(N) 
-3.6 
(N) 
Liberia 
(-0.02) 
-1.6 
(N) 
-12.2 
(N) 
-63.2 
(N) 
-19.3 
(N) 
-22.6 
(N) 
-3.8 
(N) 
-19.8 
(N) 
-5.5 
(N) 
-4.1 
(N) 
-21.1 
(N) 
-11.2 
(N) 
-13.3 
(N) 
-10.2 
(N) 
-7.5 
(N) 
na 
S/Leone 
(0.35) 
-1.4 
(N) 
-4.95 
(N) 
-3.1 
(N) 
0.23 
(N) 
-0.12 
(N) 
0.22 
(N) 
-0.95 
(N) 
0.38 
(N) 
-0.2 
(N) 
-4.92 
(N) 
1.12 
(Y) 
-1.38 
(N) 
-3.48 
(N) 
-3.9 
(N) 
-2.4 
(N) 
Source: Author's estimations. 
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Note: ‘Y’ denotes non-susceptibility to currency crisis, while ‘N’ means non-susceptibility to currency crisis. 
 
Figure 6.2: Country Specific Threshold Currency Crises Definitions (Nigerian Naira Exchange Markets) 
 
Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9.5 Output 
 
 
 
Table 6.18: WAMZ Average Threshold (2.80) Currency Crises Definitions  
(US Dollar Exchange Markets) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 
 
0.33 
(N) 
2.48 
(N) 
3.09 
(Y) 
6.27 
(Y) 
0.21 
(N) 
-3.94 
(N) 
2.68 
(N) 
-1.1 
(N) 
1.24 
(N) 
2.1 
(N) 
0.57 
(N) 
-0.34 
(N) 
0.36 
(N) 
1.64 
(N) 
2.46 
(N) 
Ghana 
 
6.09 
(Y) 
0.84 
(N) 
-3.98 
(N) 
-3.83 
(N) 
-2 
(N) 
-1.84 
(N) 
-1.51 
(N) 
0.79 
(N) 
2.3 
(N) 
1.93 
(N) 
-2.64 
(N) 
0.29 
(N) 
1.45 
(N) 
0.74 
(N) 
2.01 
(N) 
Guinea 
 
na 
1.13 
(N) 
1.11 
(N) 
0.78 
(N) 
1.08 
(N) 
3.6 
(Y) 
1.78 
(N) 
-0.54 
(N) 
0.43 
(N) 
0.17 
(N) 
1.89 
(N) 
2.4 
(N) 
-0.82 
(N) 
-1.42 
(N) 
2.18 
(N) 
Liberia 
 
-0.75 
(N) 
3.1 
(Y) 
0.59 
(N) 
-1.45 
(N) 
-2.99 
(N) 
-1.32 
(N) 
-2.02 
(N) 
0.49 
(N) 
2.03 
(N) 
1.74 
(N) 
0.06 
(N) 
-0.11 
(N) 
0.5 
(N) 
0.88 
(N) 
na 
Nigeria 
 
1.43 
(N) 
3.55 
(Y) 
3.8 
(Y) 
1.84 
(N) 
1.58 
(N) 
-2.37 
(N) 
0.24 
(N) 
-0.68 
(N) 
0.88 
(N) 
0.41 
(N) 
2.26 
(N) 
4.52 
(Y) 
3.55 
(Y) 
1.33 
(N) 
1.74 
(N) 
S/Leone 
 
0.17 
(N) 
-2.24 
(N) 
0.26 
(N) 
2.89 
(Y) 
0.77 
(N) 
-1.9 
(N) 
-0.87 
(N) 
-0.09 
(N) 
0.31 
(N) 
1.33 
(N) 
3.5 
(Y) 
2.58 
(N) 
-0.56 
(N) 
-2.65 
(N) 
-0.98 
(N) 
Source: Author's estimations 
Note: ‘Y’ denotes non-susceptibility to currency crisis, while ‘N’ means non-susceptibility to currency crisis. 
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Figure 6.3: WAMZ Average Threshold (2.80) Currency Crises Definitions (US Dollar Exchange Markets) 
 
Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9.5 Output 
 
When the WAMZ average threshold of 2.80 was set in the US dollar exchange markets, 
Table 6.18 and Figure 6.3 above exhibit currency crisis susceptibility in all the six countries 
with Nigeria (in 2001, 2003, 2011 and 2012) having the highest of four years of vulnerability. 
The Gambia (in 2002 and 2003) and Sierra Leone (in 2003 and 2010) had two while Ghana 
(in 2000) and Guinea (in 2005) and Liberia (in 2001) were prone to crisis once. Nigeria, the 
lead foreign exchange market recorded the highest number of currency crisis vulnerability 
according to the WAMZ average threshold. This is a result that comes with negative 
implications for the exchange market integration of the WAMZ. 
Table 6.19 and Figure 6.4 below give crisis information when the WAMZ average for the 
Nigerian naira exchange markets in which an average crisis threshold of 0.84 was set. Under 
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this scenario, Liberia shows no sign suggesting crisis. The Gambia (in 2003) and Sierra 
Leone (in 2010) had once, Ghana (in 2000, 2008 and 2014) and Guinea (in 2005 and 2006) 
had twice. 
Table 6.19: WAMZ Average Threshold (0.84) Currency Crises Definitions  
(Nigerian Naira Exchange Markets) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 
 
-0.4 
(N) 
-0.31 
(N) 
-0.11 
(N) 
4.31 
(Y) 
-0.87 
(N) 
-0.91 
(N) 
-2.2 
(N) 
-0.78 
(N) 
-0.65 
(N) 
-2.87 
(N) 
-1.62 
(N) 
-4.13 
(N) 
-2.57 
(N) 
0.23 
(N) 
0.68 
(N) 
Ghana 
 
4.66 
(Y) 
-0.27 
(N) 
-4.07 
(N) 
-1.76 
(N) 
-2.23 
(N) 
0.25 
(N) 
-1.14 
(N) 
0.66 
(N) 
1.05 
(Y) 
-1.1 
(N) 
-2.93 
(N) 
-2.76 
(N) 
-0.7 
(N) 
-0.25 
(N) 
1.26 
(Y) 
Guinea 
 
na 
-1.17 
(N) 
-1.53 
(N) 
-0.57 
(N) 
-0.28 
(N) 
4.92 
(Y) 
1.26 
(Y) 
-0.19 
(N) 
-0.51 
(N) 
-3.85 
(N) 
-0.15 
(N) 
-1.31 
(N) 
-3.63 
(N) 
-2.77 
(N) 
-3.64 
(N) 
Liberia 
 
-1.6 
(N) 
-12.2 
(N) 
-63.2 
(N) 
-19.3 
(N) 
-22.6 
(N) 
-3.78 
(N) 
-19.8 
(N) 
-5.54 
(N) 
-4.11 
(N) 
-21.1 
(N) 
-11.2 
(N) 
-13.3 
(N) 
-10.3 
(N) 
-7.48 
(N) 
na 
S/Leone 
 
-1.45 
(N) 
-4.95 
(N) 
-3.12 
(N) 
0.23 
(N) 
-0.12 
(N) 
0.22 
(N) 
-0.95 
(N) 
0.38 
(N) 
-0.16 
(N) 
-4.92 
(N) 
1.12 
(Y) 
-1.38 
(N) 
-3.48 
(N) 
-3.94 
(N) 
-2.44 
(N) 
Source: Author's estimations 
Note: ‘Y’ denotes non-susceptibility to currency crisis, while ‘N’ means non-susceptibility to currency crisis. 
 
Figure 6.4: WAMZ Average Threshold (0.84) Currency Crises Definitions (Nigerian Naira Exchange 
Markets) 
 
Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9.5 Output 
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These currency crisis information generated with the application of the WAMZ average 
thresholds calculations are essential for the future single exchange rate market within the 
WAMZ.  The size of the Nigerian economy within the WAMZ, having direct effect and 
influence on the size of the expected common foreign exchange market in the proposed 
monetary union, prompted the setting of the Nigerian currency crisis threshold of 4.17 against 
the EMP indices of the other five WAMZ countries; and the results of crisis vulnerability 
estimations for the five countries, in this context for the US dollar exchange market are 
shown in Table 6.20 below. In this result, only The Gambia (in 2003) and Ghana (in 2000) 
exhibit crisis vulnerability over the period of study. 
Table 6.20: Nigerian Threshold (4.17) Currency Crises Definitions  
(US Dollar Exchange Markets) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 
 
0.33 
(N) 
2.48 
(N) 
3.09 
(N) 
6.27 
(Y) 
0.21 
(N) 
-3.94 
(N) 
2.68 
(N) 
-1.1 
(N) 
1.24 
(N) 
2.1 
(N) 
0.57 
(N) 
-0.34 
(N) 
0.36 
(N) 
1.64 
(N) 
2.46 
(N) 
Ghana 
 
6.09 
(Y) 
0.84 
(N) 
-3.98 
(N) 
-3.83 
(N) 
-2 
(N) 
-1.84 
(N) 
-1.51 
(N) 
0.79 
(N) 
2.3 
(N) 
1.93 
(N) 
-2.64 
(N) 
0.29 
(N) 
1.45 
(N) 
0.74 
(N) 
2.01 
(N) 
Guinea 
 
na 
1.13 
(N) 
1.11 
(N) 
0.78 
(N) 
1.08 
(N) 
3.6 
(N) 
1.78 
(N) 
-0.54 
(N) 
0.43 
(N) 
0.17 
(N) 
1.89 
(N) 
2.4 
(N) 
-0.82 
(N) 
-1.42 
(N) 
2.18 
(N) 
Liberia 
 
-0.75 
(N) 
3.1 
(N) 
0.59 
(N) 
-1.45 
(N) 
-2.99 
(N) 
-1.32 
(N) 
-2.02 
(N) 
0.49 
(N) 
2.03 
(N) 
1.74 
(N) 
0.06 
(N) 
-0.11 
(N) 
0.5 
(N) 
0.88 
(N) 
na 
S/Leone 
 
0.17 
(N) 
-2.24 
(N) 
0.26 
(N) 
2.89 
(N) 
0.77 
(N) 
-1.9 
(N) 
-0.87 
(N) 
-0.09 
(N) 
0.31 
(N) 
1.33 
(N) 
3.5 
(N) 
2.58 
(N) 
-0.56 
(N) 
-2.65 
(N) 
-0.98 
(N) 
Source: Author's estimations 
Note: ‘Y’ denotes non-susceptibility to currency crisis, while ‘N’ means non-susceptibility to currency crisis. 
The implications of the results in Table 6.19 above is that if the currency market pressure in 
Nigeria is the core currency crisis determinant, three WAMZ countries (Guinea, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone) are not likely vulnerable to currency crisis, given the past trends of currency 
susceptibility.  
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Figure 6.5: Nigerian Threshold (4.17) Currency Crises Definitions (US Dollar Exchange Markets) 
 
Source: Author’s Estimation and Eviews 9.5 Output 
Positive enough, Nigeria showed signs of currency crisis susceptibility just once (in 2011) in 
the results of the US dollar market threshold estimation in Table 6.16 above when its own 
threshold of 4.17 (applied for investigation yielding results in Table 6.20) is set against its 
EMP index. The susceptibility of the WAMZ countries in this scenario is shown graphically 
in Figure 6.5 above. 
What the information generated under this section suggest is that the WAMZ is not currency 
crisis susceptible, given the low degrees of currency crisis susceptibility (of between 7% 
lowest and 27% highest) exhibited by the WAMZ countries over the 15-year period covered 
by this study. These high currency-crisis-free results portend stability in the WAMZ’s future 
single exchange rate and single foreign exchange market.  
For the estimations of the model-dependent exchange market pressure, as the first step, ADF 
unit root roots tests for stationarity was performed on all the data applied in this exchange 
market pressure evaluation at 5% level of significance as displayed in Table 6.21 below.  
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Table 6.21: Results the ADF Unit Roots Tests for the Variables of Exchange Market Pressure 
Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Exchange Market Pressure  
∆Domestic Credit/Money Base  
Domestic Real GDP Growth 
∆Money Multiplier 
Monetary Response Variable  
Foreign (US) Inflation (-1.8961) 
∆Commodity Index (-8.7045*) 
-3.1214** 
-4.0200* 
-5.6633* 
-17.6505* 
-12.8013* 
 
-3.4065* 
-3.5298* 
-3.0180** 
-15.3650* 
-13.3738* 
 
-3.9046* 
-1.8202 
-4.9966* 
-14.2086* 
-13.2085* 
 
-7.6934* 
-11.0540* 
-3.0330** 
-17.6906* 
-13.1097* 
 
-3.2906* 
-2.9593* 
-4.1619* 
-11.7025* 
-4.4156* 
 
-4.8507* 
-2.3718 
-0.4969 
-13.3079* 
-13.3808* 
Critical values of ADF Unit Roots Test 
1% 5% 10% 
-3.9591 -3.0810 -2.6813 
 
Source: Author's estimations and EViews 7 Output 
The data for foreign inflation, domestic credit/base money change for Guinea and Sierra 
Leone as a well as domestic real GDP growth for Sierra Leone were not stationary at levels, 
and were made stationary at first difference so that they can be used for regression. Every 
other variables employed were stationary at levels in the ‘with constant’ ADF unit root tests. 
Influence statistics and the leverage plots resulting from the OLS estimates are displayed in 
Figure 6.6 below. 
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Figure 6.6: Plots of Influence Statistics and Leverage of OLS Estimations of EMP 
The Gambia: 
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Ghana: 
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Guinea: 
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Liberia: 
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Nigeria: 
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Sierra Leone: 
 
 
Sources: Author’s Estimations and Eview 9.5 Output 
-8
-4
0
4
8
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
RStudent
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Hat Matrix
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
DFFITS
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2.4
2.8
3.2
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
COVRATIO
Influence Statistics
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
DDC_SL
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
DRYG_SL
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
-.3 -.2 -.1 .0 .1 .2 .3
DINF_US
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
-20 -10 0 10 20
MTP_SL
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20
CMD
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
-2,000 -1,000 0 1,000 2,000 3,000
MRUS_SL
USEMP_SL vs Variables (Partialled on Regressors)
374 
 
The spikes in the graphs for the four measures of influence revealed a good number of 
outliers in the data employed in the modelling of EMP for the WAMZ countries. These were 
further confirmed by the various leverage plots. These provided the basis for the justification 
of the appropriateness of the use of the robust least square regression in this EMP evaluation. 
The results of the robust least square regression of the model-dependent exchange market 
pressure in the six WAMZ countries are exhibited below in Table 6.17, showing results from 
the model without the sensitivity factor of monetary responses and Table 6.18 exhibiting 
these sensitivity factor of monetary responses.  
Table 6.22: Results of the Robust Least Square Regression Estimation of Exchange Market Pressure 
Model 
Independent Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Constant 
∆Domestic Credit/Money Base  
Domestic Real GDP Growth 
Foreign (US) Inflation 
∆Money Multiplier 
∆Commodity Price Index 
 
 
 
R2 
Rw2 
Deviance 
Prob. (Rn-Square Statistics) 
JB-Statistics (Prob.) 
No. of Observations 
-0.0908* 
-0.1986* 
0.7012* 
-34.535* 
0.0008 
-0.134* 
 
 
 
-0.01 
0.84 
60.65 
0.00 
0.00 
159 
-0.7621* 
-2.570* 
-0.0353 
10.2066* 
0.0347* 
-0.0205* 
 
 
 
0.45 
0.75 
227.25 
0.00 
0.00 
177 
-1.4502* 
-69.418* 
3.4222* 
-5.0205* 
-0.0473* 
0.1336* 
 
 
 
0.03 
0.33 
2132.41 
0.00 
0.00 
177 
2.8136* 
-0.0306* 
-1.1530* 
12.7280* 
0.0326* 
-0.0060 
 
 
 
0.08 
0.17 
3726.38 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
-2.4704* 
-0.1730* 
2.6761* 
-6.1774* 
0.0107* 
-0.0266* 
 
 
 
0.43 
0.81 
324.34 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
-0.1373* 
0.1825 
0.1010* 
3.0914* 
0.0015 
-0.0199* 
 
 
 
0.03 
0.06 
559.30 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
    Source: Author's Estimation and EViews9.5 Output 
In the results in Table 6.22 above and Table 6.23 below, the estimations of the RLS 
regression show that almost all the coefficients are significant at 1% level of significance 
except for The Gambia’s money multiplier, Ghana’s and Sierra Leone’s real GDP growth and 
commodity price index change for Liberia. In the estimation of EMP without the inclusion of 
the sensitivity factor, Table 6.23 reveals that for all the WAMZ countries, correct theoretical 
signs were reported for domestic credit growth (except for Sierra Leone), for domestic real 
GDP growth (except for Ghana and Liberia). For the countries with the correct signs in 
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domestic credit growth, these are indications that currency depreciation and depletion of 
reserves in these countries were caused by this factor. What the results of the domestic real 
GDP growth portend is that through reserve accumulation and domestic currency 
appreciation, this variable only influences EMP in The Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone. Foreign (US) inflation only yielded the correct theoretical sign in the cases of Ghana, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone indicating these as countries in which foreign inflation affects EMP. 
By the implication of this, foreign inflation does not affect exchange market pressures in 
Nigeria, the lead economy. Money multiplier produced the correct sign only for Guinea with 
the implication that virtually in all countries of the WAMZ (except Guinea), increase in 
money neither led to international reserve depletion nor domestic currency depreciation. 
Primary commodity index change yielded the correct sign only for Guinea, meaning that 
apart from Guinea, commodity price change does not increase reserves and does not cause 
domestic currency appreciation. This could be attributed to the global financial downturn and 
the downward trend in the prices of primary commodity over the period covered by this 
study. Explanatory powers of these coefficients are strong, particularly strongest across board 
in foreign inflation. For the measure of goodness-of-fit, Rw-squared (which is more 
appropriate for RLS regression) is high at 84% and 81% explanations of variations in the 
model in the cases of The Gambia and Nigeria respectively, but very poor at 6% for Sierra 
Leone. The p-values of 0.00 of the Rn-squared statistics reported for all the WAMZ countries 
indicate the strong rejection of the null hypothesis (the RLS version of Wald test) that all the 
non-constant estimated parameters are equal to zero, implying that all the variables employed 
could be included in the model. However, the p-values of the Jarque-Bera (J-B) statistics at 
0.00 across all estimations points to the rejection, at 1% level of significance, of the null 
hypothesis of normal distribution of the residuals. Generally across the WAMZ, the results of 
the evaluation of the EMP (without the monetary response factor) reveal a quite good number 
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of similarities in the parametric responses from the estimated augmented G-R model of EMP. 
It is significant that the results for the lead economy in the WAMZ are all according to 
theoretical postulations and with high goodness-of-fit. When the sensitivity factor of 
monetary authority’s response was introduced into the EMP model, the results in Table 6.19 
below show significant coefficients (at 1% level of significance) of the variable of sensitivity 
factor for the WAMZ countries (except for Guinea); and positive for all the countries (except 
for Liberia).  
 
Table 6.23: Results of the Robust Least Square Regression Estimation of Exchange Market Pressure 
Model (With Monetary Response) 
Independent Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Constant 
∆Domestic Credit/Money Base  
Domestic Real GDP Growth 
Foreign (US) Inflation 
∆Money Multiplier 
∆Commodity Price Index 
Monetary Response 
 
 
 
R2 
Rw2 
Deviance 
Prob. (Rn-Square Statistics) 
JB-Statistics (Prob.) 
No. of Observations 
-0.1036* 
-0.2014* 
0.7311* 
34.714* 
0.0010 
-0.0149* 
0.0055* 
 
 
 
-0.00 
0.85 
56.59 
0.00 
0.00 
159 
-0.7547* 
-2.2472* 
-0.0517 
10.2191* 
0.0362* 
-0.0203* 
0.0185* 
 
 
 
0.45 
0.75 
232.91 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
-1.4507* 
-69.4250* 
3.4200* 
-5.0092* 
-0.0472* 
-0.1334* 
0.009 
 
 
 
0.03 
0.33 
2131.38 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
2.8422* 
-0.03636* 
-1.1595* 
13.2776* 
0.03775* 
-0.0042 
-0.1601* 
 
 
 
0.09 
0.18 
3336.60 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
-2.4097* 
-0.1720* 
2.6536* 
-5.3313* 
0.0094* 
-0.0240* 
0.2819* 
 
 
 
0.44 
0.82 
300.05 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
-0.1369* 
0.1825* 
0.1010* 
3.0906* 
0.0014 
-0.0197* 
0.00*** 
 
 
 
0.03 
0.06 
559.69 
0.00 
0.00 
179 
    Source: Author's Estimation and EViews9.5 Output 
What the significance of the variable of monetary response denote is that monetary 
authorities in The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone (given the positive and 
significant coefficients) absorb more pressure through the depreciation of domestic currency, 
relative reserve depletion, while in Liberia, more market pressure were absorbed by reserve 
depletion, relative to currency depreciation. Monetary authority in Guinea was sensitive to 
none of the EMP components. One general implication here is that if Nigeria, with the 
strongest positive significant coefficient of the monetary authority sensitivity factor at 0.2819 
going to control over 90% of the economy of the WAMZ, it is therefore of high expectation 
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that exchange market pressure will be absorbed more by depreciating the common currency. 
This is more appropriate in an exchange market integration. 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
In determining the workability and viability of a common exchange rate and a common 
foreign exchange market for the six WAMZ countries, this chapter evaluated the feasibility of 
the monetary integration of the WAMZ from two exchange rate perspectives of: (i) exchange 
rate determination: and (ii) exchange market pressure. The estimations of two monetary 
models of exchange rates (the FPMM and RIDMM) for the US dollar based exchange rates 
and the Nigerian-naira based exchange rates gave evidences that led to the conclusions that 
The Gambian dalasi, the Nigerian naira and the Sierra Leonean leone are the three WAMZ 
currencies that are well-suited for a single exchange rate regime in the proposed monetary 
integration. Nevertheless, when the estimations of the Nigerian naira-based exchange rates 
were performed it was evident that Sierra Leonean leone, the Guinea franc and the Ghanaian 
cedi will as well be suitable for the single foreign exchange market. What is significant here 
is that Nigeria (the lead economy) is evidently suited for the single exchange rate regime.  
While the suitability of Sierra Leone was revealed in both estimations, Liberia was not 
reported to be suitable in any of the estimations. The investigations of exchange markets 
pressures to determine the vulnerability of the WAMZ countries to possible currency crisis 
(given past trends) produced the evidence to suggest that the six WAMZ countries may not 
likely to be vulnerable to currency crisis which may mar the eventual exchange market 
integration. The RLS estimations of the G-R model of exchange market pressure revealed 
uniform parametric responses to exchange pressures across the WAMZ. It is also significant 
that foreign (US) inflation has no influence on exchange market pressure in the WAMZ’s 
leading economy. However, evidences gathered revealed mixed forms of the absorption of 
market pressure in the WAMZ, with the majority of the member countries of the WAMZ 
378 
 
(including the lead economy) absorbing exchange market pressure through domestic currency 
depreciation relative to reserves depletion. These prompts the conclusion that in the eventual 
monetary union, foreign exchange market pressures are likely to be absorbed more by 
depreciation of the common currency rather than the depletion of reserves.  
Further assessments with higher frequency quarterly data revealed the failure of the models 
of exchange rate to hold while the cointegration of exchange rates and the fundamentals 
could not be established. Although, there were some few similarities in signs and magnitude 
of the explanations offered by exchange rate determination fundamentals, these similarities 
were not strong enough. Consequently, from the results of the assessments with both annual 
and quarterly data it cannot be confidently inferred that a common exchange rate and a single 
foreign exchange market is feasible for the WAMZ countries in the proposed single currency 
area. The adoption of a single exchange rate in a common foreign exchange market should 
therefore be considered with caution. The foreign exchange market is likely to be free from 
future currency crisis. Because of the possible and expected massive influence of Nigeria in 
the foreign exchange market, foreign inflation may not hugely impact the proposed exchange 
rate and the external value of the proposed single currency.  
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
The West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) which comprises of the five English speaking 
countries of the West African sub-continent (The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone) and Guinea was formed by the ECOWAS in 2000 as the second monetary zone with 
the objective of establishing a monetary union characterised by a common central bank and a 
single currency which was expected to replace the existing six national currencies. The first 
monetary zone consists of countries within the WAEMU (UEMAO) group of the French 
speaking countries sharing the single currency called the CFA franc. The main purpose of 
establishing the WAMZ was to accelerate the economic integration process and strengthen 
political cooperation and achieve long term objective of establishing an economic and 
monetary union between all member countries of the ECOWAS. The thinking was that the 
successful launching of the WAMZ would aid the merger with the CFA zone to usher in the 
ECOWAS single currency to be called the eco. The WAMZ implementation programme 
consists of four quantitative primary convergence criteria and six secondary convergence 
criteria that member countries are expected to achieve. It was expected that the successful 
attainment of these convergence criteria would pave the way for the take-off of the monetray 
union and the launching the common currency of the zone. The attainment of these 
convergence criteria have been hard nuts to crack for the prospective members of the WAMZ 
as the take off date has been shifted for four times now (in 2003, 2005, 2010 and 2015). 
Because of inadequate preparations and lack of economic convergence among the WAMZ 
members, the last agreed take off scheduled for 1 January 2015 could not be attained. The 
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WAMZ consequently gave up the introduction of the single currency for the proposed 
WAMZ and took the decision to relinquish the initial plan of the WAMZ-WAEMU merger 
and replace this with a new plan to reschedule the creation of a single currency for the 15-
member ECOWAS countries by 2020. In spite of this new arrangement, it is still consider 
justifiable to evaluate the monetary integration of the WAMZ, which will eventually be an 
integral part of the larger monetary cooperation within the ECOWAS alongside the CFA 
group, which is already monetarily integrated. It is against this background that this thesis 
specifically aimed at making assessments of the feasibility and prospects of monetary 
integration of the WAMZ and gather useful evidences and relevant information in drawing 
inference. Meeting the research aim and objectives involved the evaluation past trends in 
three financial and macroeconomic issues relating to the six WAMZ economies. The 
perspectives assesed by this research works, from which various findings were made and 
many conclusions drawn are: the propoerties of the OCA theory, money and monetary policy 
and exchange rates and exchage markets. Further efforts were made in evaluating the design 
of the EMU and draw out lessons for the African monetary integration initiatives in the light 
of the financial crisis-exposed architectural flaws of the Eurozone. 
Annual, quarterly and monthly secondary data used in the study were drawn majorly from the 
databases of the Economist Intelligent Unit (EIU), the World Bank, the IMF, African 
Development Bank (AfDB), West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) and member 
countries’ central banks and national offices of statistics. The thesis employed various 
appropriate statistical and econometric models, tools and estimation methods to make useful 
deductions. Autoregressive distributed lag regressions, Markov switching regression, 
ordinary least square regressions, robust least square regressions , quantile regression and the 
cointegrating regression methods of DOLS, CCR and FMOLS, as well as various unit root 
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methods were applied. Generally, most analyses undertaken in this research work spanned 
over the period of time between 1980 and 2015.  
7.2 Summary of Main Findings of the Thesis 
The main findings from this thesis are broadly classifed into four categories, each of the three 
major perspectives of the feasibility studies carried out in the research and of the lessons 
derived from the design flaws of the EMU. These findings, evidences and related conclusions 
are summarised in the following paragraphs: 
Macroeconomic Stylised Facts and Theoretical Propositions: At the initial stage of this 
thesis, in order to expose some relevant and salient features of the economies of the WAMZ 
countries under this monetary integration assessments, considerations were given to the 
evaluation of the validity of some popular macroeconomic empirical stylised facts, financial 
regularities and theories propositions. Specifically, international parity relationships in PPP, 
IFE and UIP, Phillips curves and Lucas output/inflation trade-off relationships, the 
relationships between domestic cyclical output and some macroeconomic variables for the 
WAMZ countries and selected developed economies (Germany, The UK and the US), as well 
as some exchange rates and exchange markets regularities were assessed. There were mixed 
results towards giving supports or otherwise to the stylised facts and theories evaluated. 
Nevertheless, there were evidences to draw conclusions that co-movements of cyclical 
components of macroeconomic series with real output as well as the fluctuations and 
variability of these macroeconomic variables follow similar patterns in the developing 
economies (of the WAMZ) and the developed economies sampled in this study. There were 
evidences that the theoretical propositions and assumptions of PPP (absolute and relative), 
IFE and UIP all failed to hold in the WAMZ, with negative implications for the monetary 
models of exchange rate determination for the WAMZ economies. Virtually all the stylised 
facts of exchange rates and exchange market behaviours got supports from the WAMZ 
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countries. Over the period covered by the evaluation, characteristics and performances of the 
banking sectors of the WAMZ (as proxy for the zone’s financial systems) revealed stability 
of the banking sectors of the WAMZ countries. Although, there were few similarities in signs 
and explanatory powers of economic fundamental, the two monetary model failed to hold in 
the WAMZ assessments performed with higher frequency quarterly data over the 15-year 
period. This failure may however, be attributed to some of the reasons given in this thesis. 
OCA Theory Perspectives: The evaluation of the feasibility of the monetary integration of the 
WAMZ was performed from the perspectives of seven properties of the OCA theory. 
Estimation methods applied in these assessments were ANOVA, Theil coefficient of 
inequality, coefficient of variation, correlation, unit root, inflation differentials, Euclidean 
distance, production structure differentials, bilateral trade intensity ratios, interest rates 
spread, and labour rigidity ratios. Evidence gather suggested that: (i) that virtually all these 
macroeconomic and financial indicators failed to exhibit similar features across the WAMZ; 
(ii) in terms of economic dynamics of the whole WAMZ, Nigeria stands the only country that 
enormously share similarities with the WAMZ aggregate economy, while Ghana has same 
feature in a WAMZ aggregate economy, in a WAMZ without Nigeria; (iii) business cycles 
across the WAMZ is unsynchronised; (iv) The Gambia is the most country feasible for the 
exchange rate integration and fixation with the euro and the US dollars while Nigeria, the 
lead economy yielded unfavourable results in the inflation evaluation; (v) permanent and 
long-lasting effects of inflation rate and that the cost implications of disinflationary measures 
in a common monetary policy may be high since the future inflation may be unpredictable 
within the zone; (vi) there were huge similarities in production structures, particularly in the 
last six years of the period covered by this study, implying that the future common monetary 
policy will in this respect be appropriate in attending to economic disturbances in the 
proposed monetary zone; (vii) Liberia is the most open economy, while other countries 
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demonstrated close similarities in this respect. The concerns here is about the lead economy 
exhibiting the lowest degree of openness; (viii) The five smaller bank-based financial markets 
in the WAMZ (the WAMZ apart from Nigeria) have strong positive association with the 
Nigeria’s bank-based financial system. As a factor that will determine financial development 
within the proposed currency area, there is lack of financial systems convergence and lack 
uniformity in WAMZ’s central banking attitudes; (ix) Nigeria is the most labour flexible of 
the WAMZ countries (at a high degree of)  implying (from theoretical proposition) a 
benefitting feature for the proposed monetary zone. Other WAMZ countries are reasonably 
flexible apart from Sierra Leone that exhibited a high degree of labour rigidity. 
On the overall, the inference that could be drawn from the OCA perspectives is the WAMZ 
may not be an optimum currency area, although production structures and financial system 
integration assessments are positive. This is evident by the mixed results generated from the 
various assessments of the seven properties of the OCA and some poor results yielded by the 
lead economy (apart from the evidence from labour mobility and economic dynamics 
analyses). 
Monetary Perspectives:  Under the monetary perspectives assessments, money neutrality and 
money superneutrality, monetary reactions, monetary dominance, degree of loss of monetary 
independence, the suitability of common monetary policy were evaluated across the WAMZ 
with the application of various estimation techniques (ARDL, OLS, and dynamic Markov 
switching regressions). Inferences drawn from evidences gathered from these estimations led 
to the following suggested conclusions that: (a) due to non-neutrality and non-superneutrality 
of money in virtually all the WAMZ countries, a single monetary policy (with money supply 
as policy instrument) will suffice for the WAMZ’s monetary integration in achieving future 
policy objectives and economic stability with the proposed monetary zone; (b) it may take 
long term adjustment for a single monetary policy to be suitable for all the six countries at a 
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time; (c) still, given the diverse forms of the nature of reactions of the monetary policy 
instrument to inflation and output, a single monetary policy may not be suitable for the future 
monetary zone; (d) there are good incidences of monetary dominance across the WAMZ. 
These are essentially good for monetary integration of the WAMZ; (e) The Gambia and 
Liberia will bear high costs of expected loss of monetary independence while the extent of 
this loss would be low in the cases of Ghana and Sierra Leone; (e) there will be huge 
influence of Nigeria over five other members of the WAMZ regarding the suitability of the 
proposed common currency. This thus makes Nigeria to be solely guarenteed to find the 
monetary integration conducive and beneficial as well as find the single monetary policy 
adequate for her national stability.  
On the overall, conclusions from the monetary perspectives assessments are mixed. From the 
viewpoint of the huge size and the expected enormous influence of Nigeria (which serve as 
negative factor) and monetary reactions dissimilarities, the WAMZ may not likely be in a 
successful future monetary integration. This had been major concern in empirical literature of 
the assessment of the WAMZ as an optimal monetary union. However, the Ricardian 
equivalent stance of monetary dominance and monetary neutrality investigations both give 
supports in favour of the feasibility of the monetary integration of the WAMZ.  
Exchange Rates Behaviours Perspectives: Assessments carried out under exchange rate 
perspectives here determine the feasibility exchange rate integration and a common foreign 
exchange market for the six WAMZ countries from standpoints of exchange rate 
determination, exchange market pressure and exchange rate volatility. The evidence gathered 
from the CCR and the DOLS regression estimations of two monetary models of exchange 
rates (the FPMM and RIDMM) for the US dollar based exchange rates and the Nigerian-
naira based exchange rates is that The Gambian dalasi, the Nigerian naira and the Sierra 
Leonean leone are the three WAMZ currencies that are well-suited for a single exchange rate 
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regime in the proposed monetary integration while the evidence generated from the Nigerian 
naira-based exchange rates evaluations led to the conclusion that Sierra Leonean leone, the 
Guinea franc and the Ghanaian cedi will, as well be suitable for the single foreign exchange 
market. What is significant here is that Nigeria (the lead economy) is evidently suited for the 
single exchange rate regime. The outcomes of the random effect panel data estimations 
suggested that the fundamental determinants of exchange rates within the zone work well in 
consonance with theoretical postulations in establishing a single exchange rate for the 
proposed union when the largest economy within the zone is factored into the exchange rate 
determination. Evidences got here appear good for the operation of a single exchange rate in 
the WAMZ.  Taking cognisance of the influence of exchange rate determination 
macroeconomic fundamentals, the Markov switching dynamic regressions applied to the 
PFMM and RIDMM models of the US dollar exchange rates display high probability of 
remaining within the same regime, implying infrequent switches from one regime to another. 
These suggest that The Gambia dalasi, the Nigerian naira and Sierra Leonean leone have 
transition probabilities higher than others, implying long expected durations. These however 
fail to hold for The Gambian dalasi in the Nigerian naira exchange rates estimations in which 
Sierra Leonean leone takes the lead. The conclusion here is that behaviour of exchange rates 
of The Gambia, the Nigeria and Sierra Leone depict that these countries are well suited for 
exchange rate integration of the proposed currency area under the US dollar-based exchange 
rates determination model. The Nigerian naira-based exchange rates regime model however 
revealed Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ghana as suited for the single exchange rate system. 
Liberia was not reported to be suitable in either of the two classes of estimations. The 
exchange markets pressures assessments yielded evidence to suggest that the six WAMZ 
countries are not likely to be vulnerable to currency crisis which may mar the eventual 
monetary integration. The RLS estimations of the G-R model of exchange market pressure 
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revealed similar parametric responses to exchange pressures across the WAMZ and that 
foreign (US) inflation does not impact exchange market pressure in the WAMZ’s leading 
economy. There were varied evidences about the absorption of market pressure in the 
WAMZ, with the majority of the member countries (including the lead economy) absorbing 
exchange market pressure through domestic currency depreciation relative to reserves 
depletion. The consequential conclusion here is that in the eventual monetary union, foreign 
exchange market pressures are likely to be absorbed more by depreciation of the common 
currency rather than the depletion of reserves. This is a good form of uniformity.  
On the overall, in consideration of both strands of evaluation exchange rate determination in 
the WAMZ, the adoption of a common exchange rate and a single foreign exchange market 
may not be viable for the WAMZ countries. Although, the single foreign exchange market is 
strongly likely to be free from future currency crisis. Exchange rate and the external value of 
the proposed single currency viz-a-viz the US dollar may not be hugely impacted by foreign 
inflation due to the possible massive influence of Nigeria in the foreign exchange market.   
7.2.1 Eurozone Crisis Lessons for Monetary Integration of Africa 
The OCA theory developed by Mundell, McKinnon and Kenen (as of then), specified all that 
were required for the smooth operation of a monetary union within regions that were already 
existing as federations (the US and Canada). The theory is silent about the necessary pre-
requisites and other factors now exposed by the Eurozone crisis, some of which are: (i) the 
essential political requisite for proposed monetary unions; (ii) the need for a banking union to 
be incorporated in a monetary union; (iii) the need to see banks or banking propagating 
asymmetries of shocks; (iii) the need for central bank serving as 'lender of last resort' in a 
monetary union; (iv) the requirement of further political integration for fiscal integration. 
What were not anticipated by the OCA theory founding fathers, but now exposed by the EZ 
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crisis, offer some crucial and essential lessons for the smooth operations of proposed 
monetary unions within the continent of Africa. Therefore, for the monetary integration of the 
WAMZ, the ECOWAS, the EAC and the African monetary integration initiative at large, 
lessons derived from the Eurozone design flaws are as summarised in the following 
paragraphs: 
1) Gradual process of monetary integration transition for Africa: The financial crisis in 
the Eurozone reflects clear over-ambition in the monetary and exchange rate 
integration of Europe in spite of the EMU’s macroeconomic divergences. This is a 
lesson for the African monetary integration as the continent (and its sub-regions) may 
suffer the after-effect and possible economic/financial crisis if sub-regional exchange 
rates (and monetary integration) are not gradually implemented. These require 
member countries' commitments and political agreements as well as monetary and 
fiscal coordination of member countries of the proposed monetary unions. For the 
purpose of the economic adjustments and flexibility, such gradual steps in monetary 
integration at the African sub-regions are essentially necessary with huge 
commitments, trusts and the willingness of proposed member countries to cooperate, 
defend and uphold the proposed single currency and agreed exchange rate regime. 
Nike Theory (the 'just-do-it' theory) and the Coronation Theory (the 'Bundesbank 
view') are the two schools of thoughts at the pre-Europe monetary unification and 
which the proponents of the African monetary cooperation should evaluate. All the 
same, the benefits of hindsight have flawed the former while the latter appeared to 
have been vindicated.105  
                                                          
105 The 'just-do-it' theory (the Nike Theory) points to endogenous economic convergence soon after the 
completion of monetary integration while the 'Bundesbank view' (the Coronation Theory) is with the argument 
that the long convergence and political process receive the crowning achievement of a monetary union. 
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2) Asymmetric shocks are natural, inherent and in-built: The OCA theory sees the 
aggregate disturbance pattern (symmetry and asymmetry) as a guiding criterion which 
is exogenous in deciding the participation in a monetary union.  Within the Eurozone, 
there are the 'core' and the 'periphery' and the economic development gap between 
these two categories is wide. The 'periphery countries' record higher inflation rate 
with the consequence of lower interest rates operating across these countries if the 
uniform nominal interest rates operate across the Eurozone; and this would lead to 
destabilising asymmetric shock consequences stemming from unsustainable 
consumption and boom in investments in the periphery countries as witnessed during 
the Eurozone crisis. There were booms in the periphery countries' construction 
spending (in Ireland and Spain), consumption spending (in Portugal) and government 
spending (in Greece) due to reduced costs of borrowing. These spending booms were 
largely financed by large cross-border capital flows from the Eurozone's 'core' to the 
'periphery' causing equally huge current account imbalances (deficits and surpluses 
for the 'periphery and the 'core' respectively). There was 'sudden stop' of these capital 
inflows in 2009/2010 due to sustainability problems and this imparted damaging and 
weakening asymmetric shocks within the Eurozone. These are identified problems 
within the Eurozone with some implications for the African 'core' and 'periphery' 
countries.   
3) Need for banking union: The Eurozone crisis has obviously revealed that banking 
union is required in a monetary union. Such banking union should be expected to 
encompass single financial rules and regulations, a single banking supervision, a well-
funded single resolution mechanism for 'bad' banks and harmonised deposit insurance. 
These are essential whenever banks are involved in cross-border capital flows, given 
the destabilising effects of the inadequate supervision and regulation of a cross-border 
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lending policies. In the event of insolvency of banks and the absence of orderly 
resolution mechanism, bail-out was seen as the only alternative. This promoted moral 
hazards, caused bank under-capitalisation problem, negatively affected the solvency 
of national governments that were responsible for bank capitalisation, and increased 
the spirits of robotic banks and companies. If not well addressed, this problems could 
lead to decline confidence in banking systems, spilling beyond the specific countries. 
This is an issue not addressed by the OCA theory. Therefore, without banking union, 
African monetary union project may fail. 
4) Instituting banking systemic fragility/instability prevention mechanism: At the 
eventual launch of a monetary union (at the continent and sub-continent levels), 
appropriate mechanism ought to be put in place to strengthen national financial 
systems and thus prevent national banks from falling into crisis. One of the measure 
that are necessary here is the enforcement of capital requirements higher than the 
capital adequacy requirements prescribed the Bank for International Settlements. 
Apart from this, the levels of bank capitalisation should be regularly monitored and 
reviewed for long run stability of the banking systems as guide against banking 
system fragility. These are very essential for the African monetary integration project. 
5) Forestalling fiscal extravagance and associated painful effects: Unchecked public 
sector spending and fiscal recklessness/complacency (as in the case of the Eurozone's 
Greece) should be obviated by prospective members of the proposed African 
monetary unions in order to avoid possible cost of market-imposed fiscal adjustment 
which may be painful and unbearable. In the Eurozone, pains from the fiscal 
adjustments took the form of fiscal austerity measures which precluded affected 
member countries from offsetting the adverse impact of budget contradictions on 
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economic activities and employment, by applying independent monetary policy and 
exchange rate policy as implied by membership of the monetary union. 
6) Detailed assessment of public finance sustainability at the pre-take-off stage of the 
African monetary cooperation project: The dynamics of public debt in the Eurozone 
countries, more or less, witnessed stability around ten pre-crisis years. The standard 
equations of public debt dynamics indicates that if a country's interest rate on debt is 
more than the nominal GDP growth, it is necessary for such country to stabilise the 
debt/GDP ratio by running a sufficiently large primary budget surplus. This is a 
condition lacking in the case of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain in the wake of the 
financial crisis when public debts in these countries increased. This necessitates 
continuous and detailed assessment of fiscal sustainability of member countries of a 
monetary union. This is a factor worthy of note for the monetary integration of Africa. 
7) A debt restructuring mechanism is essential for the African monetary union 
project: Automatic fiscal stabilisers can stabilise the heavily indebted countries within 
a monetary union if there are mechanisms for removing debt overhangs. The case of 
Greece in the Eurozone erupted the generalisation that heavy indebtedness is a 
significant obstacle to the use of automatic fiscal stabilisers around the subsequent 
application of market-based sovereign debt exchanges within the monetary union as 
basis for higher degree of stability. Because of the great scope for contagion, member 
countries of the Eurozone have fewer alternative means or mechanism for handling 
the debt crises within the union, apart from the bail-out brought about by the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM).106  This should be considered for the African 
monetary initiatives.  
                                                          
106 It is a mechanism that should immunise sovereign from legal actions by holdouts in situations of approved 
debt restructuring.  Debt restructuring should be set as a pre-condition when assessing lending under the 
mechanism in case sovereign debts go beyond the pre-agreed limit. 
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8) Envisaging possible sovereign government-banking system loop at the pre-take-off 
stage of the African monetary cooperation project: There is a strong link between the 
sovereign and banks in the Eurozone. This was not taken into cognisance in the pre-
crisis period. This is a feature of weakness that should not be ignored by member 
countries of the African monetary unions at all levels. Within the Eurozone, with the 
lack of a unified and integrated banking resolution institution and framework at the 
union's level, it is the responsibility of each member government to rescue its 
domestic banking system from collapse. A major consequence in countries with large 
banking system was of the risks inherent in such banking system rescue, particularly 
increased and apparent huge public finance deterioration for the rescuing governments 
in the form of banking recapitalisation and rescue packaging costs. 
9) Avoidance of the design of problematic financial systems: African financial markets 
are broadly bank-based. Even in the face of weak and badly structured financial 
systems (generally lacking the existence of capital markets), African monetary unions 
should avoid instituting awkward and problematic financial structures at the sub-
regions and the regional level of monetary cooperation. This is to avoid replica of 
hurting effects of the faulty designs of the Eurozone's financial system that are 
apparent in the contradictions in the homogeneous interbank market which happened 
to be characterised by dissimilar heterogeneous banking markets. 
10) Enhanced surveillance and monitoring of regional financial markets: Financial 
crises spread like wild fire among integrated economies through financial or trade 
channels or a combination of the two. This justifies the institution of high-powered 
management of capital flows risks. Since no country within an integrated region can 
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detach itself from financial troubles and risks apparent in the regional environment, 
prevention and management of financial crisis is necessary at the monetary regional 
levels. This takes care of volatilities in international capital flows and serves as 
complement to other related global initiatives. A major lesson here is for the members 
of the proposed African monetary unions at the sub-regional levels to work towards 
enhancing the monetary region's architecture, further to the enhancement of 
regulatory capacities at national levels as well as financial cooperation at the 
international level. It is therefore essential for the regulatory authorities to focus on 
going beyond micro-prudential regulations and supervision of individual financial 
institutions and work in favour of the identification and management of inter-linkage 
and market-interdependent system risks. For the proposed African monetary union, 
this would prevent crisis-activating events (like large financial institution failure) 
from impairing national financial markets and the intending members’ economies at 
large.  
11) A normal central bank is desirable for the African monetary union project: The 
common bank for a monetary union should go beyond just following monetary rules 
but should be conscious of performing the role of a lender of last resort, stabilising the 
union’s payment system and banking systems supervision. The ECB has narrow scope 
and focus by operating less than a normal central bank. In line with the degree of 
independence, the extent of accountability of proposed African common central banks 
should be made strong. However, it is very essential that a strong political institution 
should be established to exert control over such common central bank. 
12) The necessity for crisis prevention and crisis resolution mechanisms: The inferences 
from the Eurozone crisis as well as the Asian financial crisis pointed to the view that 
it is difficult to establish and coordinate crisis resolution mechanism in the middle of 
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stormy economic and financial crisis. It is evident that the two monetary integrated 
region were totally unprepared to face the crisis and the after-effects thereof, thus 
pushing this huge tasks to the multilateral monetary and financial organisations at 
global and continental levels.107 Because of the contagious adverse nature of financial 
and banking crisis and the vulnerabilities to external shocks, it is important that 
effective and well-functioning crisis resolution mechanism are established at the 
formation stages of the African monetary union in the direction of ensuring sufficient 
preparations for preventing financial crisis, providing prompt/swift response to crisis 
as well as the avoidance of unnecessary frictions during the crisis.  
13) Proper evaluation of the costs/benefits of international financial integration within 
the African monetary integration plans: The neo-classical theoretical prediction of 
automatic capital allocation efficiency as a propeller of international financial 
integration was proved wrong by the Eurozone crisis. Efficient allocation of capital as 
expected by the Europe's SGP was neither assured nor guaranteed, rather, 
unsustainable financial imbalances and bubbles were developed out of the Eurozone's 
unrestricted financial integration. There was under-pricing of sovereign risks in the 
Europe, followed by very poor debt repayment abilities of sovereign debts while 
much needed funds were nowhere thus leading to forced, painful overdue 
adjustments.108 These were equally experienced by some developing and emerging 
economies in which the 'halt', 'sudden stop' and capital flows reversals were the 
repercussive 'capital flow bonanzas' that emanated from the period of strong 
unsustainable output growth. This Eurozone experience should therefore prompt the 
African monetary integration initiatives to properly evaluate the costs and benefits of 
                                                          
107 The attempt to set up a functioning Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) failed.   
108 Volz (2013) 
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international financial integration within the context of proposed monetary integration 
of the continent in the consideration of the capital account management and 
international flow regulations in the determination of long term benefits and costs. 
Cross border activities of banks and financial institutions escalate systematic risks 
within a monetary union and challenges in the area of regulations. Therefore, in 
working towards monetary and financial integration and single markets in the African 
sub-regional levels, high degree of care is necessary in taking too fast financial market 
liberalisation at the sub-continent levels. The low level of developments in the 
African financial markets (particularly, the capital markets) is a point of concern at 
this point. Nevertheless, sound evaluation of the African monetary integration should 
answer the question pertaining to the extent of the integration of the financial market 
sectors which are beneficial in monetary integration process, having in mind the risk 
contagion effects of increases in international finance (as evident by the case of 
Greece within the Eurozone). As part of the lessons from the Eurozone crisis, 
proposed developments of monetary integration of the African sub-regions necessitate 
excellent financial architecture that would put regional cross-border financial 
regulatory and supervisory bodies (within a structure of supranational regulation) in 
place in order to guide cross-border financial flows, financial services restrictions and 
the liberalisation of financial regulations at the domestic national levels. 
14) The consciousness of Africa's political and socio-cultural differences: Unlike the 
successful monetary integration in the US, the Eurozone is made up of member 
countries having separate and different systems of government, separate law making 
machinery (parliament), independent and sovereign governments, different cultures 
and social beliefs. To work in favour of sustainability and independence, it is 
therefore necessary for the proposed African monetary unions to strongly address and 
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reduce fiscal dominance at national levels (where politicians frown at economic 
policy reforms) and bank dominance (in which banks might not be bothered about 
banking operation calamities, but rather, to enhance return on equity). 
15) Need for strong direct link (and relationship) between inflation target and fiscal 
targets: The future African monetary union should evolve a design that would not 
make price stability targets to be an obsession with fiscal targets. The architecture of 
African monetary unions should hugely focus on price stability and inflation target 
through the design that would prompt the avoidance of inflation differentials among 
prospective members in the monetary integration and enforce adherence to long term 
inflation targets and fiscal targets. The size of budget balance (deficits) and public 
debt should be made to affect inflationary performances of the prospective members.  
 
7.3 Statement of General Conclusions 
This thesis gathered some positive evidences from the perspectives of production structures, 
factor market mobility, money neutrality and superneutrality, monetary dominance and 
exchange market pressures. Nevertheless, other differences in underlying macroeconomic 
variables across the WAMZ discovered from the other perspectives of OCA properties, 
monetary policy and exchange rate behaviour perspectives are very key and crucial in 
determining the feasibility of monetary integration of the zone. The huge financial, economic 
and monetary domination of Nigeria is a massive negative factor that should never be 
discarded with because of its political implications across the West African region. Given 
these factors (and the non-achievement of the set convergence criteria over the years), the 
main conclusions of the thesis is that a long-lasting and stable monetary integration of the 
WAMZ is not feasible. 
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7.4 Contributions of the Thesis to Knowledge 
This study made frantic efforts in contributing to existing body of literature on monetary 
integration, particularly in the African context with specific emphasis on the West African 
sub region. Deviating sharply from what obtained in extant empirical literature on monetary 
cooperation, this thesis employed the novel strategy of embarking on monetary integration 
feasibility assessments from a wider range of perspectives of the OCA theory, money and 
monetary policy, exchange rate and exchange market behaviour as well as lessons taught by 
the Eurozone crisis. Apart from these, there were initial tests of the validity of some 
macroeconomic and financial stylised facts and relationships propositions and exchange rate 
and exchange market behaviours. Consequent upon these academic exercises embarked upon 
by this research work, the thesis has updated empirical literature on monetary integration. 
Many earlier literatures on monetary integration feasibility operated within the very limited 
scope of the properties of the OCA theory which incidentally were inadequate for the 
commencement of a monetary union as specifically evident by the Euro crisis that exposed 
the flaws in the design of the Eurozone. This thesis therefore took the novel initiative to 
broaden (as much as possible), areas and issues that were hitherto not covered in literature but 
which are necessarily essential for the evaluation of the viability and feasibility of a proposed 
monetary integration of a geographic and economic bloc.  It is remarkable that this thesis, all 
together, brought into the investigation of monetary cooperation feasibility in Africa, the 
novel innovation of the application of good number of statistical and econometric analytical 
tools.  
An innovation brought by this study is the splitting of the period of analyses under the OCA 
theory perspectives into two major comparative periods: (i) pre-convergence period and (ii) 
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the convergence period. This was considered necessary by this thesis so as to allow for the 
comparison of the trends of related macroeconomic variables between the period of 
‘normalcy’ and the ‘artificial’ period running-up to meeting the convergence criteria. One 
other novel contribution to literature is the breaking down of business cycle investigation into 
two components of classical cycle and transitory cycle over these two periods. Equally, the 
analyses of inflation trends and inflation deviation in relation to the Eurozone and the US 
monetary blocs (and the various estimated averages in this respect) within these two period 
are innovative contributions to monetary integration literature. It is a novel effort that this 
study restricted the evaluation of financial system homogeneity based solely on banking 
system factors, due to the reality that WAMZ developing economies are grossly bank-based. 
The introduction of money neutrality and monetary dominance issues into an African 
monetary integration feasibility evaluation are pivotal contributions given the role expected 
of the single currency within the entire future African single currency bloc. The inference 
from this study is that the single currency, very likely, will play a crucial role in influencing 
real macroeconomic variables across the WAMZ. This work deviated from the use of the 
Taylor rule to examine monetary reactions, monetary independence and monetary policy 
suitability by appropriately employing the use of a variant of the hybrid McCallum Taylor 
rule model and McCallum monetary rule in which money supply growth serve as the 
responding variable of monetary policy instrument in related econometric/statistical analyses 
as well as the statistical estimations of monetary policy suitability index. The deviation from 
the application of policy interest rate (as monetary policy instrument) in this respect was 
motivated by the comparative reality of macroeconomic impact of money supply growth over 
interest rate in developing economies. Contributions made in this regard (of McCallum 
money growth rule) therefore portend developing economy realities and implications in the 
direction of establishing the homogeneity of monetary reactions, expected degree of loss of 
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monetary independence and the suitability of common currency in the WAMZ as a future 
monetary union. This research work added values to the existing body of knowledge in pre-
monetary integration analyses by incorporating exchange rate and exchange market 
behaviours into such study. A novel contribution here is the information provided by the 
behaviour of the underlying macroeconomic factors of exchange rate determination in the 
WAMZ, under the two monetary models of exchange rates determination, augmented with 
the influence of country-specific primary commodity price, under two exchange rate 
quotation systems. The application of dynamic cointegrating methods of CCR and DOLS and 
Markov switching regression provide the needed knowledge in this aspect of the research 
study which introduced dynamic modelling into exchange rate determination study of the 
WAMZ, due to the sluggish nature of responses of macroeconomic and financial variables in 
developing economies.  This thesis constructed or estimated monetary policy suitability index 
for the six countries (employing money supply growth as policy instrument). The knowledge 
provided here are statistical proof and evidence of the dominance of the future common 
monetary policy of the WAMZ by Nigeria as the research work here revealed ‘statistically’ 
that the future single monetary policy would be most suitable for Nigeria for her national 
stability, given the revealed ranking of the six WAMZ countries as pointed out by the 
monetary policy suitability indicators (MPSI) generated by the analysis and the crucial 
comparative distance gap between the MPSI for Nigeria and those of other five WAMZ 
countries. 
The evaluation of exchange rate behaviours in the WAMZ, based on bilateral exchange rate 
relationships between the WAMZ countries is an innovation in monetary integration 
assessment literature. Further comprehensive information on exchange market behaviour was 
provided and new knowledge added on currency crisis susceptibility of foreign exchange 
markets in the WAMZ to currency crisis, within the context of two exchange rate quotation 
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markets (the US dollar and the Nigerian naira exchange market). The analysis of exchange 
market pressure and exchange market currency crisis susceptibility involving the rate of a 
possible anchor country of a proposed monetary union viz-a-viz other members of the 
proposed union is novel in monetary integration evaluation literature on Africa. This thesis 
specifically provided comprehensive knowledge on the degree and possibility of currency 
crisis (a component of financial crisis) crippling the monetary integration of the WAMZ from 
the view-point of: (a) WAMZ country-specific threshold (US dollars exchange markets); (b) 
WAMZ country-specific threshold (Nigerian naira exchange markets); (c) WAMZ average 
threshold (US dollars exchange markets); (d) WAMZ average threshold (Nigerian naira 
exchange markets); and (e) Nigeria currency crisis threshold. Further knowledge on exchange 
rate and exchange market behaviour were yielded on the largest foreign exchange market in 
the WAMZ (the Nigerian market) which may likely determine the trend and bulk of 
operations within the WAMZ’s future consolidated exchange rate market. Knowledge were 
added about the volatility of exchange rate return and the speed of reaction to shocks within 
the market in the determination of the influence of external shocks of exchange rate 
volatilities. This study is of the view that the nature of the Nigerian foreign exchange market 
would greatly reflect the overall expected feature of the WAMZ’s integrated foreign 
exchange market.  
Crucial lessons (which are hugely essential for the formation and stability of the African 
monetary union) were equally spelt out by this thesis. These are lessons derived from the 
Eurozone crisis. The compendium of issues and information provided in this particular area 
of study is in the form of a bulk of the necessary and valuable knowledge that would put the 
future African monetary unions on solid foundation and sound footing. 
For the academia, further knowledge added is that studies on monetary integration feasibility 
could be expansive (beyond the OCA theoretical underpinnings) and be more all-
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encompassing to cover wider areas and issues which prevailing economic and financial issues 
could prompt. The application of many other tools of analysis that works with realities would 
work all together in achieving this goal. 
Consequent upon the findings and contributions that this thesis has made to the existing body 
of knowledge, I here recommend that issues and findings generated by this thesis to the 
academics as well as the appropriate national and regional authorities within the West 
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), the wider ECOWAS monetary integration and beyond, for 
necessary decision making and actions. 
7.5 Implications of the Study for Policy 
Findings of this thesis and discussions thereof have significant policy implications both at 
national and regional levels in the WAMZ, the wider ECOWAS, Africa and beyond. The 
academic exercises performed in this research work have offered up-to-date relevant 
information to international financial and economic policy makers at these levels. Expositions 
on money and monetary and fiscal policies related issues, business cycles shocks and 
inflation trends, financial systems convergence, labour mobility, economic dynamics, 
exchange rate determination and exchange market behavioural reflections of currency crisis 
susceptibility and convergence criteria achievement ratings and others, pass on valuable 
information which are all together necessary for policy decision making and actions as well 
as overall improvement.  
Specifically, for the ECOWAS monetary integration project, policymakers at the West 
African Monetary Institute (WAMI), the common central bank for the WAEMU as well as 
the WAMZ’s bodies of central bank Governors and Ministers of Finance and other 
institutions responsible for decision making and action on the take-off of the ECOWAS 
monetary integration, results and findings generated by this thesis would inform decisions 
about continuing membership of the WAMZ, and subsequent of the expanded ECOWAS 
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monetary union  expected to take off by 2020 as well as the African monetary union and 
single currency scheduled for take-off in 2023.  
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APPENDIX 1.1 
 
Nominal Output Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 1.7: Real Output Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
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Figure: 1.8: Inflation (GDP Deflator) Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
 
 
 
Figure: 1.9: Inflation (Consumer Price Index) Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
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Figure: 1.10: Real Output Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 1.11: Real Output Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
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Figure: 1.12: International Reserves Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
 
 
 
Figure: 1.13: Money Supply (Base Money) Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
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Figure: 1.14: Money Supply (Quasi Money) Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
 
 
Figure: 1.15: Government Expenditure/GDP Ratio Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
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Figure: 1.16: Government Revenue/GDP Ratio Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 1.17: Public Debt/GDP Ratio Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
 
 
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
GAMBIA_GOV_REV_GDP
0
5
10
15
20
25
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
GHANA_GOV_REV_GDP
8
12
16
20
24
28
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
GUINEA_GOV_REV_GDP
0
200
400
600
800
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
LIBERIA_GOV_REV_GDP
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
NIGERIA_GOV_REV_GDP
4
8
12
16
20
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
S_LEONE_GOV_REV_GDP
20
40
60
80
100
120
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
GHANA_PUBDEBT_GDP
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
GAMBIA_PUBDEBT_GDP
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
GUINEA_PUBDEBT_GDP
0
5
10
15
20
25
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
LIBERIA_PUBDEBT_GDP
0
20
40
60
80
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
NIGERIA_PUBDEBT_GDP
0
40
80
120
160
200
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
S_LEONE_PUBDEBT_GDP
428 
 
Figure: 1.18: Government Expenditure Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 1.19: Government Revenue Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
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Figure: 1.20: Public Debt Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 1.21: Money Market Interest Rate Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
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Figure: 1.22: Deposit Interest Rate Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
 
  
Figure: 1.23: Policy Interest Rate Data Available for the WAMZ Countries 
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APPENDIX 3.1 
 
Results of ADF and PP Unit Roots Tests of Cross Exchange Rates 
  ADF PP 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-4.253 
-1.280 
-1.813 
-2.031 
-3.536* 
-4.192* 
-3.034 
-2.275 
-2.012 
-3.429*** 
-4.871* 
-1.359 
-1.698 
-2.051 
-3.004** 
-3.867** 
-2.115 
-2.308 
-2.079 
-2.728 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.274 
-1.185 
-1.478 
-0.006 
-0.073 
-1.499 
-1.018 
-0.401 
-1.128 
-1.666 
-0.796 
-1.185 
1.309 
-0.206 
-0.399 
-0.857 
-1.018 
-0.635 
-1.447 
-1.540 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.093 
-1.765 
-1.204 
-1.655 
-1.986 
-1.535 
-1.517 
-1.484 
-2.044 
-1.987 
-1.209 
-1.483 
-1.271 
-1.396 
-1.851 
-1.768 
-1.421 
-1.484 
-1.481 
-1.609 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.698 
-7.720* 
-1.850 
-1.800 
-2.681*** 
-2.009 
-6.356 
-2.783 
-1.659 
-2.584 
-1.572 
-6.441* 
-1.187 
-1.775 
-3.456* 
-1.826 
-3.621** 
-1.864 
-1.573 
-2.428 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
-2.085 
-2.459 
-1.683 
-1.932 
-2.150 
-1.988 
-3.840*** 
-1.075 
-1.913 
-2.126 
-2.248 
-2.460 
-1.182 
-1.899 
-2.211 
-2.173 
-3.084 
-1.198 
-1.925 
-2.189 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-2.730*** 
-1.802 
-2.213 
-1.846 
-2.577 
-2.698 
-3.087 
-1.330 
-3.952** 
-2.711 
-2.436 
-1.539 
-2.180 
-1.794 
-2.771*** 
-2.372 
-2.499 
-1.608 
-2.664 
-2.920 
Source: Author’s Estimations and EViews 10 
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APPENDIX 3.2 
 
Results of ADF and PP Unit Roots Tests of Absolute PPP Term (P-P*) 
  ADF PP 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.704* 
-7.200* 
-0.498 
-3.518* 
-1.824 
-4.723* 
-5.171* 
-3.913*** 
-7.093* 
-0.041 
-11.524* 
-5.688 
-1.402 
-8.940 
-3.792 
-9.780* 
-2.556 
-2.453 
-20.828* 
-1.777 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
0.995 
-4.579 
-0.395 
-0.968 
0.373 
-2.782 
-3.143 
-3.311*** 
-1.400 
-3.228*** 
1.268 
-3.257** 
0.715 
-0.505 
1.194 
-2.053 
-1.694 
-3.549** 
-2.040 
-0.835 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-2.108 
-3.049 
-1.870 
-2.898*** 
-0.590 
-1.496 
-1.912 
-3.444*** 
-1.350 
2.165 
-1.793 
-2.426 
-1.943 
-2.629*** 
1.758 
-0.869 
-1.125 
-1.551 
-1.492 
-2.161 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-0.190 
-1.845 
-3.312** 
-1.605 
-1.658 
-3.255 
-4.092** 
-1.827 
-2.814 
-3.329* 
-0.715 
-0.653 
-3.427 
-1.406 
-1.577 
-2.511 
-2.957 
-1.815 
-2.837 
-3.545** 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
-1.735 
-2.595** 
-4.697* 
-1.564 
-3.471 
-3.079 
1.773 
-3.051 
-2.852 
-0.489 
-1.678 
-1.043 
-4.489* 
-1.369 
0.281 
-3.133 
-1.524 
-2.307 
-2.880 
-2.541 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-1.712 
-0.930 
-1.156 
-2.135 
-4.247 
-0.149 
-5.532 
-0.904 
-3.594 
-0.796 
-3.389** 
-0.338 
-3.525** 
-1.866 
0.241 
 
-1.815* 
-4.184 
-3.269*** 
-2.126 
Source: Author’s Estimations and EViews 10 
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APPENDIX 3.3  
 
Results of ADF and PP Unit Roots Tests of Real Exchange Rates 
  ADF  PP 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
With Constant With Constant 
& Trend 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-8.059* 
-6.448* 
-1.847 
-7.032* 
-2.554 
-4.493* 
-4.457* 
-3.468*** 
-5.886* 
-2.459 
-15.018* 
-7.897* 
-1.881 
-6.948* 
-2.306 
11.576* 
-5.285* 
-2.190 
-5.816* 
-2.010 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
3.441 
-3.918* 
2.876 
0.743 
0.473 
2.108 
-4.564* 
0.395 
 
1.935 
4.033 
-2.519 
3.017 
1.485 
0.872 
2.173 
-2.308 
0.305 
-0.511 
-1.059 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.847 
-2.414 
-2.086 
-2.523 
-1.785 
-1.499 
-2.525 
-1.527 
-2.342 
-2.492 
-1.824 
-1.908 
2.060 
-2.337 
-2.028 
-1.648 
-1.837 
-1.527 
-1.555 
-2.103 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
-1.863 
-1.658 
-4.940* 
-2.805** 
-3.313** 
-2.069 
-5.991* 
-3.420** 
-3.221** 
3.416** 
-1.951 
-0.243 
-5.035* 
-2.850* 
-2.181 
-2.158 
-3.704** 
-3.457** 
-3.282*** 
-2.193 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
-1.585 
-2.390 
-6.589* 
-3.044** 
-2.871*** 
-2.175 
-3.900** 
-8.228* 
-3.380** 
4.800** 
-1.619 
-2.357 
-7.269* 
-3.032*** 
1.950 
-2.295 
-3.076 
-4.932* 
-3.435*** 
-2.401 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
-2.361 
-1.334 
-2.221 
-3.458** 
-2.743** 
-2.312 
-2.973 
-3.614** 
3.540** 
3.894** 
-2.050 
-0.580 
2.815*** 
-2.156 
-1.966 
-1.950 
-1.908 
-3.498*** 
-2.101 
-2.401 
Source: Author’s Estimations and EViews 10 
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APPENDIX 3.4 
 
Results of ADF Unit Roots Tests (Exchange Rates Changes/CPI Differentials and IFE Terms) 
 Exchange Rate CPI Differentials IFE Terms 
Home 
Country 
Foreign 
Country 
With 
Constant 
With 
Constant 
& Trend 
With 
Constant 
With 
Constant 
& Trend 
With 
Constant 
With 
Constant 
& Trend 
GAMBIA Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
US 
-5.700* 
-6.366* 
-4.880* 
-8.426* 
-6.266* 
-6.000* 
-5.704* 
-6.305* 
-5.022* 
-8.392* 
-2.666* 
-5.972* 
-2.396 
-4.524* 
-3.119** 
-6.038* 
-3.708* 
-2.584 
-6.149* 
-3.157*** 
-6.303* 
-3.637** 
-2.358 
-2.022 
-0.683 
-2.324 
1.801 
-2.660 
-1.665 
-2.308 
-2.756 
1.435 
GHANA Gambia 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
US 
-5.712* 
-6.042* 
7.262* 
-6.896* 
-5.375* 
4.054* 
-5.712* 
-6.153* 
-7.345* 
-6.860* 
-5.337* 
-4.110* 
-2.396 
-4.912* 
-4.054* 
-8.717* 
-2.243 
-2.584 
-5.845* 
-3.050* 
-8.822* 
-2.204 
-2.223 
-1.837 
-2.887** 
-3.662* 
0.511 
-3.062 
-0.185 
-3.222*** 
-3.636 
0.100 
GUINEA Gambia 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
US 
-5.819* 
-5.249* 
-7.429* 
-5.602* 
-5.617* 
-5.991* 
-5.768* 
-5.409* 
-7.468* 
-5.708* 
-5.767* 
-6.141* 
-4.524* 
-4.912* 
-6.925* 
-4.651* 
-2.022 
-6.149* 
-5.845* 
-7.756* 
-5.613* 
-2.157 
-0.705 
-1.992 
-1.535 
-2.900** 
-2.631*** 
-0.496 
-1.866 
-0.441 
-2.945 
-3.693** 
LIBERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
S/Leone 
US 
-5.344* 
-5.154* 
-7.238* 
-8.599* 
-2.406 
-5.687* 
-5.401* 
-5.318* 
-7.192* 
-8.590* 
-2.314* 
-5.717* 
-3.119** 
-4.054* 
-6.925* 
-7.467 
-3.048** 
-3.157*** 
-3.051 
-7.756* 
-7.399* 
-3.224*** 
 
-0.753 
-2.087 
-2.527 
-4.146* 
-0.401 
-1.806 
-2.192 
-1.346 
-4.352* 
-0.378 
NIGERIA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
S/Leone 
US 
-9.060* 
-8.829* 
-6.223* 
-8.983* 
-9.031* 
-9.056* 
-9.074* 
-8.820* 
-6.283* 
-9.038* 
-9.015* 
-9.086* 
-6.038* 
-8.717* 
-4.651* 
-7.467* 
-3.693* 
-6.030* 
-8.822* 
-5.613* 
-7.399* 
-3.057 
-1.779 
-4.036* 
-1.450 
-2.617*** 
-0.928 
-2.120 
-4.076* 
-1.075 
-2.964 
1.378 
SIERRA Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
US 
-5.935* 
-5.704* 
-6.156* 
-2.159 
-7.495* 
-6.419* 
-5.963* 
-5.673* 
-6.235* 
-6.182* 
-7.480* 
-6.714* 
-3.708* 
-2.243 
-2.022 
-3.048** 
-3.693* 
 
-3.637** 
-2.204 
-2.158 
-3.224*** 
-3.057 
-2.781*** 
-3.051** 
-1.755 
-1.802 
-2.410 
-3.060 
-2.955 
-2.358 
-1.493 
-2.320 
Source: Author’s Estimations and EViews 10 Output 
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APPENDIX 3.5 
Trends of Exchange Rate Regimes in the WAMZ 
Historical developments of foreign exchange markets and regimes within which the six 
WAMZ countries operated over the years are discussed in the following paragraphs.  
The Gambia: The currency of The Gambia is dalasi, subdivided into 100 units of bututs. The 
currency was adopted in 1971 to replace The Gambian pound. For thirty years up till 1985, 
fixed exchange rate regime prevailed in The Gambia when the currency was pegged to the 
British pound. In 1986, interbank floating exchange rate system was however introduced 
when the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was adopted with a consequential effect 
of depreciation of dalasi in 1987. By April 1990, foreign exchange bureau were introduced 
towards strengthening the foreign exchange market. Thereafter, the emergence of interbank 
foreign exchange market led to reduced premium of prevailing exchange rates of these two 
established foreign exchange market; while in September 2003, competition in the market 
became stiffer when more non-bank foreign exchange dealers were licensed and the 
operations of the parallel markets were halted. There was relative stability of dalasi in the 
1990s. However, the currency witnessed series of depreciation against the US dollar between 
2000 and 2003, but showed appreciation up till 2007. Nevertheless, the depreciation of dalasi 
had been sluggish since 2008, till the present days. 
Ghana: The first Ghanaian currency, cedi, came into effect in 1965 when it replaced the 
Ghanaian pound. Up till 1982, Ghana foreign exchange market operated under the fixed 
exchange rate regime. Between 1983 and 1986, there were series of devaluations (of cedi) 
under the Ghanaian government’s Economic Reform Programme (ERP) in which a fixed 
exchange rate was maintained in spite of the periodic devaluation that saw cedi devalued by 
up to 96.9%. These quarterly devaluation were in stages within this period. In December 
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1984, the Bank of Ghana switched to a system of periodic adjustment mechanism because at 
then, cedi was highly overvalued.  However, up till the early 1980s, cedi was relatively 
stable. The Ghanaian government established a foreign exchange auction market in which 
there were dual exchange rates of two windows even while leaving the determination of the 
exchange rate partially to market forces of demand and supply in the second phase of the 
ERP between 1987 and 1989. The government placed control over the exchange rate for 'vital 
transactions' in what was called 'Window One Transactions' which operated within a fixed 
exchange rate system, purposely for transactions in cocoa exports, crude oil transactions, 
government debt servicing and pharmaceuticals. Simultaneously, the foreign exchange 
auction system controlled by the Bank of Ghana was introduced for 'Window Two 
Transactions' in weekly auction for all other transactions involving 'priority areas of the 
economy'.  
Under the ERPII (1987-1989), there were two-tier exchange rate markets operating in Ghana. 
Foreign Exchange Bureaux were established in 1988 so as to incorporate parallel foreign 
exchange market into the system. These were established in all major cities of Ghana to 
channel foreign exchange transaction of the black market through the banking system. The 
implication of this was that the Ghanaian foreign exchange market had two rates. The two 
windows exchange rate markets were unified in early 1987 yielding the Dual Retail Auction 
(DRA) and the Dutch Auction (DA). The DRA operated the marginal pricing mechanism in 
which successful bidder were to pay the marginal price while in the DA successful bidders 
paid the bid price. There were modifications to the Auction system in the first quarter of 
1990. The wholesale auction was introduced as replacement for the retail auction. The 
exchange rates (against major currencies) were determined in an interbank foreign exchange 
market adopting the weekly whole sale auction system. In April 1992, the wholesale auction 
system was replaced by the interbank foreign exchange market in which banks as authorised 
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dealers; and foreign exchange bureau have since operated in this competitive environment in 
which the selling and the buying of foreign exchange were determined by commercial banks 
average daily retail exchange rate. The pace of depreciation of cedi became slow between 
2001 and 2007. On 3 July, 2007 the Ghanaian cedi was redenominated as 1 new cedi 
(Ghanaian cedi) to 10,000 old cedi. Following this, between 2008 and 2009, the external 
values of cedi fell sharply. This decline in value was attributed to the redenomination 
exercise. 
Guinea: The Guinean currency adopted on independence in 1958 was Guinean syli, pegged 
to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) on 11 June 1975, under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Due to increased overvaluation of this currency which created a gap with the parallel market 
rate, a second foreign exchange market was created in October 1985 with the main purpose of 
attracting foreign exchange to the official channels. A new currency, the Guinean franc 
replaced the Guinean syli in 1986. As at this time, exchange rates were set during the central 
bank's weekly foreign exchange auctions. A flexible exchange rate regime was introduced in 
October 1994 as well as an interbank foreign exchange market. This caused series of 
depreciation in the Guinea franc between 1997 and 2000. The weekly auction system was 
replaced by monthly auction system between 2000 and 2002 due to foreign exchange 
shortages in the official circles.  The Guinean currency was pegged to the US dollars between 
late 2002 and July 2004 and this led to the appreciation of the Guinean franc. The auction 
was in 2005 abandoned in a foreign exchange market liberalisation initiative of the 
government. Since then, the official exchange rate has been determined by weekly estimation 
of an arithmetic averages of deposit banks and non-bank authorised bureau de change (as the 
reference rate). Although, the currency experienced depreciation in 2010, there were series of 
appreciation in 2007 and 2009 and related stability up till the present days. 
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Liberia: Since independence in 1847, the Liberian economy has been wholly dollarised. 
There had been intensive use of foreign currencies within the economy. The tie between the 
country and the US and British West African Colonies greatly dictated the country's choice of 
currency. The 'Doe dollars', the 'JJ Roberts dollars' and the 'Liberty dollars' were different 
Liberian dollars minted between the 1980s, through the civil war until the end of the last 
century. JJ Roberts notes and the Liberty notes were in circulation during the civil war period 
between 1989 and 1997, when the JJ Roberts dollar notes was made at par with the US 
dollar. Since this devaluation, Liberian currency have been witnessing an average 5% annual 
devaluation so as to be in tune with inflation differential between the country and the US. 
Between 1981 and 1997, Liberia operated fixed exchange rate regime in which the Liberian 
dollar was pegged to the US dollar at fixed parity. The country abandoned the exchange rate 
peg in January 1998 and operated free floating exchange rate regime (since 1998) when the 
country's US dollar exchange rate was devalued from L$1=US$1 to L$43=US$1. This 
caused the exchange rate to witness depreciation significantly in 1998, but appreciated 
thereafter when a managed floating exchange rate regime was adopted in 2000. There had 
been relative stability in the value of the Liberian dollar between in the last ten years. 
Nigeria: The currency of Nigeria is naira which was introduced on 1 January 1973 when it 
replaced the Nigerian pound which served as the country’s currency between 1907 and 1973. 
Nigeria used the British West African pound until 1958. The Nigerian pound was at parity 
with the British pound, having easy convertibility. As at the introduction of naira in 1973, the 
exchange rate was two pounds to one naira. Nigeria operated fixed exchange rate regime 
(pegging of her currency to major international currencies) from her independence in 1960 up 
to 1986. The fixed exchange rate policy was implemented by applying different systems 
according to the state of the country’s economy. Under this regime, parity (determined by the 
gold content of the Nigerian pound) was maintained with pound sterling until when the 
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Nigerian pound ceased to exist at the close of 1972. There was a change of the Nigerian 
pound gold content to US dollar between 1971 and 1974 in response to the international 
monetary system crisis in which the convertibility of US dollar into gold was suspended. The 
import-weighted basket approach was adopted in 1978. The Nigerian foreign exchange 
market had since, witnessed tremendous changes. In 1986, following the introduction of the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), the Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) 
was introduced and naira was floated under the adopted dual exchange rate system for the 
allocation of foreign exchange. Under this system, transitional items (like debt services 
payments and official transfers) were settled at the first-tier exchange rate. In 1989 there was 
official recognition granted the parallel market for foreign exchange (which has been in 
existence since the exchange control era which started in 1962) when the Bureaux de Change 
(BDCs) were licensed to accord access to small users of foreign exchange and enlarge the 
officially recognised foreign exchange market. Exchange rates in the BDCs are market 
determined. In 1994, due to volatility in exchange rates, further reforms were introduced in 
the market. Some of these reforms are: formal pegging of the naira exchange rate, the 
centralisation of foreign exchange in the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the restriction of 
Bureaux de Change to buy foreign exchange as agents of the CBN, the reaffirmation of the 
illegality of the parallel market and the discontinuation of open accounts and bills for 
collection as means of payments. In 1995, the Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market 
(AFEM) was introduced to liberalise the market and redress market distortions. The AFEM 
was for the purpose of selling foreign exchange to end-users by the CBN through selected 
authorised dealers at market determined exchange rate. Bureaux de Change were also 
accorded the status of authorised buyers and sellers of foreign exchange. The AFEM (which 
operated alongside the fixed official market window) catered for the foreign currency needs 
of private economic agents. Exchange rate was relatively stable under this system. To further 
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liberalise the market, there was transition from AFEM to Interbank Foreign Exchange Market 
(IFEM) on October 25, 1999.  Under this regime, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) served 
was the major source of foreign exchange which authorised dealers could purchase on behalf 
of their customers at a rate determined by the CBN. IFEM was meant to broaden and deepen 
the foreign exchange market daily and also to discourage speculative activities. Nevertheless, 
this system led to exchange rate instability with the worst record of depreciation of 77.7%. In 
2002, the Dutch Auction System (DAS) was introduced to deepen the market and this caused 
the naira to appreciate between 2004 and 2007. There were Retail Dutch Auction System 
(RDAS) and Wholesale Dutch Auction System (WDAS) options under this regime.  RDAS 
was adopted till February 2006. The CBN participated to sell foreign exchange under the 
WDAS option from February 2006 till October 2013 when RDAS was reintroduced. The 
strategy under the WDAS was to ensure increased restriction of access to official market in 
order to reduce the demand pressure being exerted on the parallel market. The end goal here 
was to facilitate a convergence between official and parallel markets so as to achieve a single 
exchange rate for the naira. The IFEM was however reintroduced in February 2015. 
Sierra Leone: The currency of Sierra Leone, the leone came into existence on 4 August, 
1964 when it replaced the British West African Pound. Following the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods System in the 1970s, Sierra Leone (like many other countries), adopted a fixed 
exchange rate regime. The country changed to the floating exchange rate regime in 1986 
when SAP was introduced and leone was revalued. The introduction of the floating regime 
was towards reducing exchange volatility to the minimum possible level and increase the 
competitiveness of exports. In order to prevent excessive depreciation of the leone, managed 
floating regime was adopted in April 1991 when the Central Bank of The Gambia (through 
its periodic regulation of the market) carried out weekly foreign exchange auction. These 
caused significant depreciation of leone between 1986 and 1990. However, between 1991 and 
1994, the rate of depreciation of the currency was hugely sluggish and stable, but reflecting 
declining depreciation till recent times. 
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APPENDIX 3.6  
Banking Systems of the WAMZ Countries 
Banking Sector of The Gambia: Banking started in The Gambia over a century ago. The financial 
system of The Gambia is dominated by commercial banking and majority of the commercial banks 
are foreign-owned. Commercial banks in The Gambia offer a wide range of financial services. The 
banking system is sound and prudent given the moderate volume of non-performing loans, though it is 
not a fully developed banking system. One of the fourteen banks currently operating in The Gambia 
banking sector is an Islamic banking institution while the other thirteen banks run conventional 
banking. The Gambian banks are liquid and adequately capitalised as the risk weighted capital 
adequacy ratio was 27.1% as at the end of 2011. The rapid growth witnessed by The Gambian 
banking system during the last decade was mainly driven by the inflows of FDI, rigourous 
competition within the banking system, enhanced financial intermediation and the provision of 
finance through credits made available to the private sector which grew over the years and stood (as a 
ratio of GDP) at 15.4 as at the end of 2012. Commercial banks in The Gambia met the minimum 
reserve requirement. The Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) is the apex banking institution in The 
Gambia, having the responsibility to regulate and supervise banks and other related financial 
institutions in the country. In recent past, the CBG carried out some reforms in the banking sector of 
The Gambia so as to ensure solvency and large scale financial stability within the banking sector and 
the economy. As reform initiative, capital requirements of banks were tripled within three years 
(2010-2012), new payment systems were introduced, Credit Reference Bureau (CRB) was established 
and on-site banking supervision process was emphasised. 
Banking Sector of Ghana: The banking system of Ghana which has 26 universal banks and 135 rural 
and community bank is well developed. Apart from these banks, there are 49 non-banking financial 
institutions and about 402 and credit unions and cooperatives operating the Ghanaian financial 
system. The funding strategy of the Ghanaian banking sector has been deposit-based; and due to this, 
over the past decade, commercial banks’ deposits/assets ratio revolved around 63% and 72%. In 2012, 
a seven-year compound annual growth of banks’ total assets and aggregate loans stood at 33.1% and 
32.8% respectively. Between 2010 and 2012, there was established improvement in the ratio of non-
performing loans demonstrating a drop from 17.6% (in 2010) to 13.2% (in 2012), propelled by 
prudent risk management that was put in place as well as ‘enhanced recovery’.  
In the WAMZ, the Ghanaian banking sector is the second largest (after Nigeria) with a total asset of 
US$14.3billion as at the last quarter of 2013, though this was accompanied by low degree of banking 
penetration manifested in the banking sector asset/GDP ratio of 49% as at 2013. At 2012 Ghana 
recorded the highest loan/deposit ratio in the WAMZ at 66.5% from 58.5% in the previous year, 2011. 
Over the past decade, the Ghanaian banking sector is well capitalised and liquid. The Capital 
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Adequacy Ratio (CAR) had been above the minimum benchmark of 10%, standing at 18.5% in 2013 
(higher than Nigeria’s CAR of 18.3 in same year, though below Liberia and Sierra Leone’s CAR for 
the same year. The capital bases of banks in Ghana received the much needed boosts courtesy of the 
banks’ recapitalization exercise that took place between 2009 and 2012. The set minimum capital 
requirement was met by all the banks. However, it is suffice to state that the entire WAMZ’s banking 
sector is well capitalised as evident by the CAR which are above the set minimum requirement in all 
the WAMZ countries. Thanks to the consolidation and capital requirement increase initiatives in 
Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone over the recent years. Between 2005 and 2012, the liquidity of the 
banking sector in Ghana was swinging between 39% and 55%, but down-trended to 51% in 2012. The 
sector had in recent time witnessed improved profitability with a 8-year average growth rate of 36.4% 
as at 2013, while banks’ revenue growth had been robust with the contribution of gross revenue 
standing around 70% in 2012 (and non-interest income contribution at 30%). In 2013, the total assets 
and deposit of this banking sector grew by 33% and 27% respectively. There had been year-on-year 
improvement in asset quality of the Ghanaian banking sector which was 12% in 2013.  
The apex banking institution in Ghana is Bank of Ghana (BOG) which supervises and regulates the 
banking sector. BOG which introduced universal banking in 1003 directed all Ghanaian banks to 
recapitalise between 2009 and 2013. 
Banking Sector of Guinea: The banking sector in Guinea dominates the country’s financial system. 
The concentration of banking services in hugely in the capital city Conakry. Currently, there are 13 
banks and 6 microfinance institutions which increasingly grant business and agricultural credits to 
small enterprises due to difficulties of the businesses in accessing commercial bank financing. 
Domestic banks and subsidiaries of foreign banks have been playing active roles in financial 
intermediation in Guinea. The Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea (BanqueCentrale de 
Republique du Guinee –BCRG) which regulates and supervises Guinean banks is the apex bank of 
Guinea. This bank is known to be an active promoter of financial inclusion.109 This bank recently 
introduced some reforms tailored towards banking efficiency and ensuring conformity of the financial 
system to international standards. The bank’s reform agenda are in the area of strategies for liquidity 
management, credit operation and inter-bank foreign exchange dealing as well as the introduction of 
corporate and new management practices in banking, implementation of accounting ration and 
rejuvenating of payment systems to conform with/to modern practices. These are probably fruits of 
lessons learnt from Eurozone crisis in warming up for the take-off WAMZ as a currency union.  
                                                          
109Financial inclusion entails delivering financial services to the disadvantages and low-segment of the populace 
at low and affordable costs. 
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It is necessary to note that between 2006 and 2010, the central bank was in the practice of financing 
public budget deficits through the issuance of currency. This practice led to budget explosion, high 
inflation, poverty, poor management of public finance, high external debt stock, incessant foreign 
exchange market intervention of the central bank and monetary policy easing, among others. The 
central bank has been enjoying independence (from government control) since the beginning of 2011.  
Banking Sector of Liberia: The financial system of Liberia is dominated by the banking sector which 
is very small and presently has nine (9) commercial banks which are well capitalised and liquid, but 
however exhibiting some risk elements owing to the general low level of profitability and high non-
performing loans. The degree of financial intermediation is generally low in Liberia, while access to 
banking finance is limited on the overall. Poor infrastructure is a huge impeding factor in the growth 
of baking services in Liberia. Apart from these, the entirefinancial system had been susceptible or 
exposed to various instabilities (economic and political). The Liberian banking sector is dominated by 
Ecobank and the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment (LBDI). The LBDI has the strongest 
capacity to face challenges and needs (loans, deposits mobilisation, foreign exchange transactions and 
remittances, real estate etc) within the Liberian financial system. Over a five-year period till 2012, 
commercial banks’ credits to private sector/GDP ratio in Liberia recorded steady increasing trend 
from 12% in 2008 to 16% in 2012. 
The Central Bank of Liberia is the apex bank in Liberia. The bank is also involved in the promotion of 
financial inclusion. The apex bank, in recent time, came up with various steps to strengthen the 
banking sector and improve access to financial sector services and the expansion of intermediation 
through substantial developments (legal and financial) regulatory framework and corporate 
governance within the Liberia banking sector. Improvement in banking supervision is evident by the 
incorporation of semi-annual on-site examination requirement for all commercial banks operating in 
Liberia. These are right steps in the right direction, against banking sector instability in Liberia. 
Banking Sector of Nigeria: The banking sector dominates the Nigerian financial system. Currently, 
Nigeria has 21 commercial banks (deposit money banks) and many microfinance banks. Many of 
these big banks have opened branches and subsidiary offices in the regions of Africa (UBA, Access 
Bank, Guaranty Trust Bank, Zenith Bank and Skye Bank). Banking is the core of the Nigerian 
financial system in which banks play major role in money and capital markets, accounting for one-
third of total equity market capitalisation as at 2011. Four largest banks in Nigeria hold about 60% of 
total assets as at 2012.110The Nigerian banking system is the largest in the WAMZ, reflecting the 
enormous share of Nigeria’s share (over 80%) of the total GDP of the entire WAMZ. There have been 
many significant reforms in the history of banking in Nigeria. The banking sector had greatly 
                                                          
110Thirteen (13) Nigerian banks were included in the ‘Top 1000 Banks Index’ of The Banker in2014. 
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successful bank consolidation and recapitalisation exercise in 2005/2006 when the minimum capital 
requirement of banks was fixed for N25billion (US$160 million) for national banks in Nigeria and 
this pruned the number of banks in Nigeria down to 25 from 89. The minimum capital requirement for 
international banks operating in Nigeria and overseas was N100billion (US$640 million).The 
recapitalisation exercise ushered in increasing credit expansion brought about by widening of banks’ 
activities.  
In spite of the success of the consolidation and recapitalisation exercise, the banking sector crisis of 
2009 crept into the Nigerian banking system. The banking crisis was caused large scale insider abuse 
and bad lending decisions, leading to problem loans. The regulatory authorities however responded 
swiftly to the crisis by applying series of measures which curtailed the crisis. Some of the measures 
taken by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) were the intervention of ten banks (with eight of these 
banks had their management replaced), provision of liquidity and capital supports of about US$4.1 
billion, introducing new supervisory framework (combination of risk-based supervision and 
consolidate supervision), among others. The implementation of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) and those of some of the provisions of the Basel Accord (Basel III) are future 
measures to take. It is evident that the banking crisis provoked improved banking regulation and 
supervision (on site and off site) as well and corporate governance practices of high standard. 
However, on the other hand, the 2005/2006 capitalisation exercise gave some Nigerian banks the 
motivation and incentive to expand beyond the shores of Nigeria by going international with the 
establishment of subsidiaries in other regions of Africa. Nigerian commercial banks are now 
‘common features’ in many African banking sectors. The Nigerian banking system has the largest 
subsidiary of pan-African bank that has its headquarters outside Nigeria. These make the stability of 
the Nigeria banking sector extremely crucial to the financial stability of the proposed WAMZ and the 
SSA in general.  Nevertheless, according to the IMF (2013), the Nigerian financial system is still 
vulnerable to global and domestic shocks, even as it has recovered from its domestic banking crisis 
and that ‘most Nigerian banks could withstand extreme shocks’ liquidity pressure as a well as 
‘absorbing moderate potential losses’. 
The apex bank in Nigeria banking system is the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) which has over the 
last couple of years taken some steps, decisions and reforms that are decisive in strengthening its 
oversight functions and ensuring stability of the Nigerian banking sector. The bank has been making 
efforts to enhance and intensify its cross-border banking supervision with the establishment of a 
department and framework for this purpose as well as the initiation and execution of bilateral 
memorandum of understanding on cross-border supervision and cooperation in 2012. Though this is 
challenging, given some of the possible obstacles, however, it has good implications for the WAMZ 
as a proposed currency union. 
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It is necessary to note that Nigeria is the only WAMZ country that has an established body for bank 
deposit insurance. This body (known as the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation) serves as safety 
net for the Nigeria banking sector by protecting the banking system from instability that emanates 
from bank runs and loss of depositors’ confidence in the banking system. The major purpose of this 
body which exercises supervisory role over insured banks is to make the Nigerian banking system 
secured. 
Banking Sector of Sierra Leone: Commercial banks dominate the financial system of Sierra Leone. 
Currently, there are 12 commercial banks (with huge presence of subsidiaries of Nigerian banks) and 
other rural and community banks in Sierra Leone. As at the end of 2012, the domestic credit to private 
sector/GDP ratio stood at a low of 6.2% while the liquid reserve/bank asset ratio was 10.3%. The non-
performing loan/total loan ratio declined from 15.6% in 2010 to 14.7% in 2012. Banks in Sierra 
Leone are adequately capitalised and are profitable (given the growing interest rate spread around 
12% and 10% in the last six years.  
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APPENDIX 5.1 
  
Charts of the CUSUM and CUSUM Square Charts of Parameter Stability 
in ARDL Estimations of Money Neutrality 
Gambia 
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Liberia 
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Nigeria 
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Sierra Leone 
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